Some Aspects of Rasa Theory

Author(s): V M Kulkarni
Publisher: B L Institute of Indology
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/006967/1

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Some Aspects Of The Rasa Theory Edited by V, M. Kulkarni M.A., Ph.D. .yAmmasAra 228|| BH BHOGILAL OF INDOL EHERCHAN VSTITUTE BHOGILAL LEHERCHAND INSTITUTE OF INDOLOGY (a Project of Shree Vallabh Smarak) DELHI (Extension Centre, Patan)

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About the Volume Of the Sanskrit theories of art the rasa theory is the most important. This theory has been much discussed and written about. Some of its aspects, however needed to be re-examined. These aspects include: the nature of rasa : laulika, alaukika, the rasa theory and the darsanas (systems of philosophy), the rasa theory in relation to other fine arts, the rasa theory and its relevance to modern literature, catharsis and rasa, and the like. The present volume discusses some of these aspects critically and exhaustively and should provide rich food for thought and stimulate further study and research in depth in the field of ancient critical thought in India and its relation with modern literary thought in the West. About the Editor Dr. V. M. Kulkarni, formerly Director, B. L. Institute of Indology, Patan, Professor of Sanskrit and Prakrit (Maharashtra Educational Service, Class I) and Director of Languages, Maharashtra State, Bombay has taught Sanskrit and Prakrit Literature, Sanskrit Poetics and Aesthetics for several years. Besides contributing critical articles and notes to Encyclopaedias in English and Marathi he has published over ninety papers and critical reviews in various research Journals of repute. His works include: Studies In Sanskrit Sahitya-Sastra : A collection of selected papers relating to Sanskrit Poetics and Aesthetics, published by the B.L. Institute of Indology, Patan (North Gujarat), 1983. Prakrit Verses In Sanskrit Works On Poetics - A Critical Edition : Volume I (dealing with over 2800 Prakrit verses and their Sanskrit Cchaya and Alphabetical Indexes), being published by the B.L. Institute of Indology, Delhi, (in the press), and several editions such as:

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B. L. Series No. 4 General Editor : V. M. Kulkarni Some Aspects of the Rasa Theory (A Collection of Papers read at the "Rasa" Seminar) Edited by V. M. Kulkarni, M.A., Ph.D. (Formerly Director, Bhogilal Leherchand Institute of Indology, Patan, (North Gujarat), and Professor and Head of the Department of Sanskrit (and Prakrit), Elphinstone College, Bombay, and Director of Languages, Maharashtra State) ARRE re WOGILAL LEHE INDOLOG B. L. INSTITUTE OF INDOLOGY DELHI (Extension Centre, Patan) HERCHANO NSTITUTE OF

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First Edition: 1986 Price Rs. 120.00 Published by Pratap Bhogilal, Chairman, Governing Council B. L. Institute of Indology, (a Project of Shree Vallabh Smarak) C/o Shree Atma Vallabh Jain Smarak Shikshana Nidhi 22nd Km., G.T. Karnal Road, P.O. Alipur, Delhi 110 036. Printed by P. P. Bhagwat Mouj Printing Bureau Khatau Wadi, Girgaum, Bombay 400 004

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iii PUBLISHER'S NOTE We have great pleasure in presenting to the world of scholars Some Aspects of the Rasa Theory as the fourth volume of the Bhogilal Leherchand Series. There has been considerable delay in publishing this book for reasons over which we could not possibly have any control and therefore we crave the indulgence of the scholars who have contributed the papers to this publication. We sincerely thank Professor V. M. Kulkarni and his Research Assistant, Miss Nirmalaben Chheda, M.A., for successfully organising the Seminar on the Rasa Theory at Patan in 1982 and preparing the Presscopy of this volume. Our thanks are due to the authorities of the Mouj Printing Bureau, 'Khatau Wadi, Bombay who have spared no pains to make the volume attractive. This volume, it is earnestly hoped, will be warmly welcomed by scholars interested in the theories of art, more especially in the Indian theories of art and comparative aesthetics. Bombay 8 September 1986 Pratap Bhogilal Chairman, Governing Council B. L. Institute of Indology, Delhi

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jJAna-kriyAbhyAM mokssH| tajjJAnameva na bhavati yasminnudite vibhAti rAga-gaNaH / tamasaH kuto'sti zakti dinakara-kiraNAgrataH sthAtum // rucInAM vaicitryAdRjukuTilanAnApathajuSAM nRNAmeko gamyastvamasi payasAmarNava iva //

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SETH BHOGILAL LEHERCHAND Born: 9th April, 1883 Died: 7th December, 1979 MOTTO IN LIFE Simple living -- High thinking'

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PREFACE The Institute has decided to bring out a series of books and monographs on different aspects of Indology. Our primary aim is to cover fields which have not attracted the attention of scholars so far and to publish books on subjects in which a re-examination has become necessary. Of the Sanskrit theories of art, the most important is the well-known rasa theory. It has been much discussed and quite a lot has been written about it. It was, however, felt necessary to re-examine some of the aspects of the rasa theory, for example, the nature of rasa : laukika, alaukika, rasa theory and the darsanas (systems of philosophy), the rasa theory and its application to all other fine arts, the relevance of rasa theory to modern, literature, catharsis and rasa, etc. Eminent scholars of Sanskrit, English, Marathi and Gujarati literatures were, therefore, invited to read papers on the above topics at the Rasa Seminar, organised by the Institute in February 1982 at Patan (North Gujarat). These papers have been included in the present volume. We have added by way of Appendices two more related papers, "The Relevance of Sanskrit poetics to Contemporary Practical Criticism' by Sri Umashankar Joshi and, 'Does the Rasa theory have any modern relevance ?' by Dr. R. B. Patankar, first published in Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bombay and in Philosophy East and West 30, no. 3, July 1980 : The University Press of Hawaii respectively. We are grateful to the authorities of Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bombay and Philosophy East and West who readily gave permission to include them in the present volume. We tender our heartiest thanks to Dr. E. A. Solomon, Professor and Head, Department of Sanskrit, School of Languages. Gujarat University, Ahmedabad for inaugurating the Seminar and Dr. K. P. Joag, Professor of Sanskrit, Deccan College, Pune, and Professor Nagindas Parekh, Ahmedabad for actively participating in the Seminar, and all the scholars who contributed their papers on the topics assigned to them, and made the Seminar a success. We hope scholars interested in the Sanskrit Aesthetics and Comparative Aesthetics will find the papers thought-provoking and that these papers will stimulate further study and research in depth in the field of ancient critical thought in India and modern literary thought in the West. 31st December 1982 Patan (North Gujarat) V. M. Kulkarni Director B. L. Institute of Indology, Patan

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vi Resepctfully Dedicated To Pujya Mahattara Sadhvieri Mrgavatiji Who with her learning and devotion tried to realize the ennobling ideals of her Guru Acaryasri Vijayavallabhasuri, the Yugadrasta Pratap Bhogilal Chairman, Governing Council Bhogilal Leherchand Institute of Indology, Delhi

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vii Contributors 1. Professor H. C. Bhayani, M.A., Ph.D. Honorary Professor of Sanskrit, L.D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad-380 009, Formerly Professor of Linguistics, Gujarat University, Ahmedabad-380 009 2. Professor M. V. Patwardhan, M.A. Formerly Professor of Sanskrit and Head of the Department of Sanskrit at Fergusson College, Pune 3. Professor R. B. Patankar, M.A., Ph.D. Professor of English and Head, Department of English, University of Bombay, Vidyanagari, Santacruz (East), Bombay 400 098 4. Professor V. M.. Kulkarni, M.A., Ph.D. Formerly Director, B.L. Institute of Indology, Patan, Professor and Head of the Department of Sanskrit (and Prakrit). Elphinstone College, Bombay, and Director of Languages, Maharashtra State 5. Professor T. S. Nandi, M.A., Ph.D. Professor of Sanskrit, School of Languages, Gujarat University, Ahmedabad 380 009 6. Professor Krishna S. Arjunwadkar Department of Marathi, University Santacruz (East), Bombay 400 098 of Bombay, Vidyanagari, 7. Professor P. R. Vora, M.A. Head, Department of Sanskrit, L.D. Arts and Science College, Ahmedabad 380 009 8. Dr. Bhagavatiprasad Pandya, M.A., Ph.D. Reader in Sanskrit, Department of Sanskrit, School of Languages, Gujarat University, Ahmedabad 380 009 * 9. Professor P. N. Virkar, M.A. Formerly Professor of Sanskrit and Head of the Department of Sanskrit at Fergusson College, Pune 10. Professor K. Krishnamocrthy, M.A., Ph.D. Formerly Professor of Sanskrit and Head of the Department of Sanskrit Studies, Karnatak University, Dharwad 11. Professor C. N. Patel, M.A. Formerly Professor of English, Department of English, Gujarat College, Ahmedabad 380 006

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viii CONTENTS v Page: Publisher's Note : Pratap Bhogilal III Preface : V. M. Kulkarni Contributors VII Contents VIII 1. The Basic Modes of Poetic : H. C. Bhayani 1 Expression 2. Germs of the Later Rasa Doctrine : M. V. Patwardhan in Bharata's Natyasastra 3. Sankuka : A Defence : R. B. Patankar 4. Abhinavagupta on the Alaukika : V. M. Kulkarni 28 Nature of Rasa 5. Worldly Nature of Rasa : T. S. Nandi 6. Rasa Theory and the Darsanas Krishna S. Arjunwadkar 54 7. Rasa Theory and the Darsanas-2 : P. R. Vora 8. Rasa Theory and the Darsanas-3 : Bhagavatiprasad Pandya 70 9. Rasa Theory in relation to all the : P. N. Virkar Fine Arts 10. The Relevance of Rasa Theory to : K. Krishnamoorthy Modern Literature 11. Catharsis and Rasa : C. N. Patel Appendix - I : The Relevance of Umashankar Joshi Sanskrit Poetics to Contemporary Practical Criticism Appendix - II: Does the Rasa : R. B. Patankar theory have any modern relevance ? 110

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The Basic Modes of Poetic Expression H. C. BHAYANI According to the early tradition of Indian poetics Alankara, embellishment, was the principal source of poetic beauty, and it distinguished poetic expression from non-poetic expression. In this tradition Svabhavokti, natural description, seems to have caused considerable difficulty. It involved an unresolved paradox. If Alankara was the sine qua non of poetry, Svabhavokti cannot claim to be poetry, because the relationship of embellishment and that which is embellished was inherent in the former, but the latter was by definition unembellished expression (Kuntaka).2 On the other hand, it could not be denied that poems having just Svabhavokti and no other figure were felt to be beautiful (Mahima-bhatta).3 Even prior to Bhamaha the opinion in this matter was sharply divided: Some rejecting and others somehow accepting Svabhavokti. It was not merely a technical issue or theoretical matter of marginal value. Works of best poets had numerous passages graphically describing objects and situations without using figurative expressions, and there were hundreds of short lyrics, Muktakas, wherein the main source of poetic charm was Svabhavokti. It was therefore inevitable to recognize two distinct basic sources of poetic beauty. Accordingly, the whole domain of literature was classified into Svabhavokti, using the natural mode of expression, and Vakrokti, using the figurative mode (Dandin). In the Dhvani tradition, however, the basis of poetic beauty was thought to be quite different. The special manner in which the poetic meaning was conveyed, Vyanjana, suggestion, was accepted as the principal ground of poetic beauty. The suggested sense may be an emotion, Rasa, a figure, Alankara or an idea, Vastu. Of these the suggestion of emotion, Rasadhvani, was considered poetically the most excellent (Anandavardhana, Abhinavagupta). Even though Alankara was said to be another ground of poetic beauty, this was said just for the sake of form, for it was categorically stated that the poetry bereft of Rasa and having only Alankara was imitation poetry, hardly 1. The present paper partly aims at making explicit and drawing pointed attention to what has been implicit in V. Raghavan's detailed treatment of the various points touched here briefly. See 'Some Concepts of the Alankara sastra,' 1942, pp. 92-130; Bhoja's sragara Prakasa, 1963, pp. 105-137, 401. That treatment requires however, to be supplemented by an account of Kuntaka's views, which is a serious omission. 2. Vakroktijivita, I 11-15. 3. Vyaktiviveka, pp. 108-109. 4. fa fat tahalilishafa areti (Kavyadarsa, 11-363)

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SOME ASPECTS OF THE RASA THEORY worthy of the name.5 Quite obviously, Svabhavokti can have quite an insignificant place in this scheme of things. A serious consequence of accepting such a position is that a large mass of Sanskrit and Prakrit poems would be consigned to a very inferior status. Svabhavoktis would be put down either as specimens of weak poetic exercises, or alternatively, they would be accepted as secondary poems, by associating with them a shade of emotion on the basis of some supposed context (Jagannatha). Possibly there were historical reasons for this downright devaluation of the poetic beauty deriving exclusively from Alankara and Svabhava-varnana. Bhoja has recognized three types of poetic beauty, based on three distinct modes of expression : Svabhavokti, Vakrokti and Rasokti, i. e. natural description, figurative description and delineation of emotion respectively.7 When the poetic beauty primarily derives from Guna we have Svabhavokti; when it derives from Alankara, we have Vakrokti; when it derives from the delineation of Rasa, we have Rasokti. The credit, however, goes to Kuntaka for working out basic principles of categorizing the poetic expression. His treatment of the problem is marked by perception, lucidity and logical rigour. The introduction to his treatment of Alankaras in the Vakroktijivita (III-1-16) establishes that the poetic beauty deriving primarily from non-figurative description of objects (as in Svabhavokti) and delineation of emotions (as in Rasavat) inheres in the poetic subject-matter or content, Vastu, while that deriving primarily from the embellishment, Alankara, of the poetic content inheres in the verbal expression. In Kuntaka's words, in the former case the Saundarya is Svabhavika, while in the latter case it is Racana-vaicitrya-yukta. Dhvanivada and Rasavada cannot account for the whole range of the experience of beauty in poetry. Some types of experiences have quite a different basis. The aesthetic experience produced by natural description of objects remains unaccounted for by the Dhvani theory, and that produced by rhetorical description remains unaccounted for by the Rasa theory. Ruyyaka and Jayaratha have pointed out the psychological basis of Svabhavokti and Rasavat Alankara (which closely corresponds to Rasokti). In poetry the Sahsdaya cxperiences Hsdaya-samvada, the correspondence or 5. Dhvanyaloka, Vstti on III 41-42; Locona on the same. 6. yattu rasavadeva kAvyamiti sAhityadarpaNe nirNItam , tnn| vastvalaMkArapradhAnAnAM kaavyaanaamkaavytvaaptteH| na ceSTApattirmahAkavisaMpradAyasyAkulIbhAvaprasaMgAt |...n ca tatrApi yathAkathaMcit paraMparayA rasasparzo'styeveti vAcyam / (Rasagangadhara. Nirnaya-Sagar, edn, 1939, pp 8-9) See also K. Krishnamoorthy, 'Essays in Sanskrit Criticisin. 1964' pp. 234-240. fina Tatranea ahaliftica 9192941 (Sarasvatikanthabharana, V.8.) flag: gerai: 1 alfa:,' alimi:,'Tini Rai anhelarga qaft:, warfego to water:, faHarghiaoufaIRETTU Thlaspil afera I (srngaraprakasa, p. 438)

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THE BASIC MODES OF POETIC EXPRESSION identification of the reader's consciousness with that of the poet as expressed in the poetic work. In the case of Sybhavokti, it is Vastu-samvada, objective matching or correspondence (i. e. the feeling that the expressed idea is exactly as we thought it to be), while in the case of Rasokti it is Citta-vrtti-samvada, emotional matching or correspondence (i. e. identification of the reader's emotion with that expressed in the poem).8 The following remarks by Raghavan in this context, even though made with respect to Bhoja, apply much more aptly to Kuntaka. :. 'In the realm of ideas or Artha, there are only two classes, namely, the mere nature of things--Vastu-svabhava and Emotions. In the description of these two, we have Vastu-samvada and Citta-samvada respectively, and the corresponding cases of expressions are called Svabhavokti and Rasa-delineation, or Rasa-Ukti, according to Bhoja. These two are bare descriptions, Vastu-svabhava or Rasa-svabhava being the object of description. When both of these are figuratively described, we have the third kind of Ukti, Vakrokti'.9 In other words, the different types of beauty experienced from poetry depend upon the depiction of ideas or emotions, and the manner of depiction in both cases can be either natural and vivid or heightened and embellished. Such a categorization of literary beauty can be matched with the types of aesthetic experience from life. Things and expression of emotions are felt beautiful, just by themselves or when tinged with psychological associations. Though content and form are interfused or integrated in a literary work, resorting to the Apoddhara method (as Kuntaka says), we can consider each of the two by itself. We find that in some works, the poetic content functions as the main source of beauty, while in some others, such a function is fulfilled by the poetic form of expression. We can say that Svabhavokti and Rasokti are content-oriented and Vakrokti (in Bhoja's terminology) is form-oriented.10 While concluding, I would like to hint at the wider significance of the above-noted views of Kuntaka and Bhoja. In a recent important work of literary criticism dealing with some fundamental problems like the nature and typology of literature, David Lodge examinesll the relationship between form and content in the literary text. Adopting a vital linguistic distinction from Roman Jacobson, Lodge establishes a fundemental polarity between the metaphoric (analogous, symbolic) and metonymic (contiguous, realistic) techni 8. na ca hRdayasaMvAdamAtreNa svabhAvoktirasavadalaMkArayorabhedaH / vastusaMvAdarUpatvAt svabhAvokteH, cittavRttisamAdhirUpatvAcca Thacoareli (Alankarasarvasva, p. 227.) 9. Bhoja's s? ngaraprakasa, p. 136. 10. It is assumed here that for certain purposes and in certain contexts we can take these controversial terms as contrastive. The Modes of Modern Writing published by Arnold Heinemann, London, 1977 (reprinted in 1979), issued as Indian Edition in 1980. Lodge adopted for his purpose Jacobson's theory that dichotomy of metaphor and metonymy characterizes all verbal behaviour and human behaviour in general. Sce' The Modes of Modern Writing', pp. 73-103.

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SOME ASPECTS OF THE RASA THEORY ques of expression. Quite obviously Lodge is dealing with the vast and highly complex perspective of modern literature, while Kuntaka's perspective is comparatively quite limited. Even then the matter both of them are talking about is, it seems to me, essentially analogous. But of course this requires to be discussed in depth as a separate issue. Some parallels to the basic categories of the aesthetic experience of literature can be drawn from another domain of art, viz, painting. In the area of objective painting, (1) naturalistic works like landscapes and still life, (2) works with symbolic meanings and (3) scenes from life have in some styles, obviously different aesthetic bases.

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Germs of the later Rasa doctrine in Bharata's Natyasastra. M. V. PATWARDHAN The Natyasastra of Bharata deals among several matters pertaining to dramaturgy, with the four-fold abhinaya:- (1) angika, (2) vacika, (3) sattvika and (4) aharya. Drama differs from poetry because of its four-fold abhinaya. In poetry there is no scope for any abhinaya, if it is recited silently by a reader to himself. If, however, it is recited publicly before an audience there is a good deal of scope for vacika and angika abhinaya. Vacika abhinaya in a dramatic representation on the stage is concerned with the proper recitation and intonation of the speeches assigned to different characters, these speeches being marked by literary qualities, such as excellences (guna), tropes (alankara) and other miscellaneous traits (laksana). According to Bharata all the four kinds of abhinaya are intended to convey to the audience the thoughts and feelings of the characters. Bharata explains this basic concept of abhinaya in Natyasastra 8. 7-10 and in the prose passage preceding these stanzas. (Baroda edn., Vol. II, pp. 1-2) Out of these four kinds of abhinaya, angika, vacika and sattvika are located exclusively in the actors (nata) representing the different characters, while aharya abhinaya, in its aspect of make-up, costume and personal adornment, is located in the actors, and in its aspect of scenic arrangements on the stage and the employment of various items of stage-apparatus it is located outside the actors and constitutes the scenic background. Bharata's treatment of abhinaya is intimately connected with conveyance of the thoughts and emotions of the characters in a drama to the audience, and the treatment of the rasa doctrine in the Natyasastra is intended to explain the purpose served by abhinaya in a dramatic representation. Bharata deals with the rasa doctrine in the context of drama in chapter 6(rasadhyaya) and chapter 7(bhavadhyaya) of the Natyasastra. It is proposed to show in this paper how Bharata's treatment of the rasa-doctrine contains a good many hints of the rasa theory propounded by later writers on Sanskrit poetics beginning with Anandavardhana (author of Dhvanyaloka). In the prose passage immediately following st. 31 of chapter 6 (p. 272), Bharata stresses the paramount importance of rasa (emotion) in a dramatic work. He says that there cannot be any theme worthy of being handled in 1. abhipUrvastu nnii-dhaaturaabhimukhyaarthnirnnye| yasmAt prayoga nayati tasmAdabhinayaH smRtH|| vibhAvayati yasmAcca nAnArthAn hi pryogtH| zAsvAGgopAGgasaMyuktastasmAdabhinayaH smRtH|| caturvidhazcaiSa bhavennAvyasyAbhinayo dvijaaH| anekabhedabahulaM nATayamasmin prtisstthitm|| AGgiko vAcikazcaiva AhAryaH saattvikstthaa| jJeyastvabhinayo viprAH caturdhA parikIrtitaH // abhinaya iti kasmAt / ucyate / abhItyupasargaH, NIJ ityayaM dhAtuH praapnnaarthH| asya abhinI ityevaM vyavasthitasya 'e: ac' (pANini 3,3,56) iti acpratyayAntasya abhinaya iti rUpaM siddhm| etacca dhAtvarthavacanena avadhAryam / Compare also Natyasastra, 7, 2-3, which enumerates the four kinds of abhinaya, *2. a Me Tara Faget: gaaa.

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SOME ASPECTS OF THE RASA THEORY a drama apart from human emotion. This means that according to Bharata, portrayal of the emotions of various characters is the main business of a play. A drama necessarily deals with the emotional ups and downs and emotional conflict in the minds of various characters. For many of the thoughts and most of the actions of human beings are prompted directly and indirectly by some emotion or the other in their minds. This holds good as much in the case of poetry as in that of drama. In fact the rasa-doctrine and the supreme importance of the portrayal of rasa in drama as propounded by Bharata has been accepted in toto by all writers on poetics and the portrayal of human emotions has been regarded by them as the essence of poetry and drama.3 In Natyasastre 14.2 (Vol. II, p. 220), while dealing with vagabhinaya (i.e. vacika abhinaya), Bharata says that the utmost care must be taken by an actor in the matter of the recitation of speeches assigned to the character represented by him (and by implication, also by a playwright in regard to the composition of those speeches), because these speeches are the corpus (tan) of a drama.4 since a drama is predominantly a vocal performance. This statement of Bharata, coupled with his earlier statement about the paramount importance of rasa in a drama, clearly shows that he foreshadows the idea set forth by later writers on poetics, that rasa.is the soul of poetry (including drama) and that words (and their literal senses) are the body of poetry.5 Later writers on poetics, such as Anandavardhana, while stressing the importance of rasa as the soul of poetry, say that rasa' (emotion) is always to be suggested in poetry through the description of its causes (vibhavas) and its effects (anubhavas) and is never to be mentioned by its name. In this connection they have propounded the doctrine of vyanjana or dhvani 3. agnipurANa, 336,33 : vAgvaidagdhyapradhAne'pi rasa evAtra (kAvye) jiivitm| dhvanyAloka, 1, 5 (pR. 86): kAvyasyAtmA sa evArthaH (=rasarUpaH eva arthaH); 3, pR. 336 : kavinA rasaparatantreNa bhvitvym|...n hi kaveritivRttamAtreNa kiMcit prayojanam , itihAsAdeva ttsiddheH|| 4, 5, pR. 529 : vyaGgyavyaJjakabhAve'smin vividhe (= trividhe) sNbhvtypi| rasAdimaya ekasmin kaviH syAdavadhAnavAn // ; anonymous stanza quoted by pratIhArendurAja in his commentary on udbhaTa' kAvyAlaMkArasArasaMgraha, 6, 7 (pR. 83, BORI edn) : rasAyadhiSThitaM kAvyaM jIvadrUpatayA ytH| kathyate, tadrasAdInAM kAvyAtmatvaM vyvsthitm||; rAjazekhara, kAvyamImAMsA, 3 (pR. 26, Chowkhamba Series edn, 1934) : rasaH aatmaa|; abhinavagupta, locana, pR.175 : rasena eva jIvati kaavym|; mammaTa, kAvyaprakAza, 7,49 (pR. 263, BORI edn.) : mukhyArthahatirdoSaH, rasazca mukhyaH (=mukhyaH arthH)| vizvanAtha, sAhityadarpaNa, 1, 3 : vAkyaM rasAtmakaM kaavym| It will be seen from these quotations that Bharata's statement cited in note 2 has inspired subsequent writers on Sanskrit poetics to emphasise rosa as the soul or quintessence of poetry. vAci yatnastu kartavyaH nATayasyaiSA tanUH smRtA| On this Abhinavagupta says (Vol. II, p. 220) : vAci yatnastu kartavyaH kavinA nirmANakAle, naTena pryogkaale| kuta ityAha-eSA hi tanurnATayasya sakalaprayoga-bhittibhUtatvena AtodyagItAbhinayAnugrAhakatvAt , svayam abhinyruuptvaacc| 5. daNDin , kAvyAdarza, 1, 10 : taiH zarIraM ca kAvyAnAm alaMkArAzca drshitaaH| zarIraM tAvadiSTArthavyavacchinnA padAvalI; rAjazekhara kAvyamImAMsA, 3, pR. 25 : zabdArthoM te (= kAvyapuruSasya) shriirm| vizvanAtha sAhityadarpaNa, 1, 2 pR. 3 (Kane's edn.) : kAvyasya zabdArtho shriirm|

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GERMS OF THE LATER RASA DOCTRINE IN BHARATA'S NATYASASTRA (suggestion). The very first karika of Dhvanyaloka says that suggestion is the soul of poetry. The Dhvanyaloka is the first work on Sanskrit poetics dealing with the theory and practice of poetic suggestion in all its aspects. A superficial reader of the Natyasastra may carry the impression that, though Bharata recognised and propounded the supreme importance of rasa in drama, he did not say that rasa is to be suggested and not to be identified by its name. But it is a fact that Bharata was acquainted with the concept of suggestion in the context of rasa.? ___ In Natyasistra 7, Vol. I, pp. 348-349 (Baroda edn,1956), Bharata uses the phrase samanyagunayogena in connection with the experience of rasa arising from the portrayal of the 49 bhavas through their appropriate vibhavas and anubhavas. This phrase used by Bharata in the context of the experience of rasa anticipates the doctrine of sadharanikarana which together with abhidha (denotation) and bhogikarana (or bhogakrttva or bhojakatva) (gustation) forms the basic triology of Bhatta Nayaka's hypothesis about rasa-experience.9 The idea of sadharanilcarana (generalisation or universalisation) of the vibhavas, anubhavas, vyabhicaribhavas, and sthayibhavas, which is already found in Bharata's work was adopted by Bhatta Nayaka, Abhinavagupta and later writers on poetics. Abhinavagupta, however, enlarged the scope of 6. dhvanyAloka 1, 1 : kAvyasyAtmA dhvaniH / 7. nATyazAstra, 6, pR. 288-289 (Vol. I, Baroda edn., 1956) : nAnAbhAvAbhinayavyajitAn vAgaGgasattvopetAn sthAyibhAvAn AsvAdayanti sumanasaH preksskaaH| 7, pR. 348, prose passage after stanza 6 : evam ete kAvyarasAbhivyaktihetavaH ekonapaJcAzad bhAvAH prtyvgntvyaaH| ebhyazca sAmAnyaguNayogena rasAH nisspdynte|| pR. 349 : atrAha-yadi kAvyAthasaMzritaiH, vibhAvAnubhAvavyaJjitaiH ekonapaJcAzadbhAvaiH sAmAnyaguNayogena abhiniSpadyante rasAH...1; 14,2: aGganaipathyasattvAni vAkyArtha (= rasabhAvAdirUpaM kAvyAthai) vyaJjayanti hi| In all these four passages the words vyajita, abhivyakti and vyaJjayanti are used in the context of rasa-experience, and they have undoubtedly a reference to the linguistic and non-linguistic function of suggestion, which forms the most essential part of the doctrine of dhvani as propounded in the Dhvanyaloka. 8. See Note 7 above. 9. For a summary of Bhatta Nayaka's hypothesis, see Locana II, pp. 182-183 (Kashi Sanskrit Series edition with Bilapriya commentary, 1940). kiMtu anyazabdavailakSaNyaM kAvyAtmanaH zabdasya jyshtaaprsaadaat| tatra abhidhAyakatvaM vAcyaviSaya, bhAvakatvaM rasAdiviSayaM, bhojakatvaM sahRdayaviSayam, iti trayo aMzabhUtAH vyApArAH / tatra etad bhAvakatvaM nAma rasAn prati, yat kAvyasya tadvibhAvAdInAM sAdhAraNatvApAdanaM naam| bhAvite ca rase tasya bhogaH prbrhmaasvaadsvidhH| sa eva ca pradhAnabhUtaH aMzaH siddhruupH| Compare the following stanza quoted by Uttungodaya in his commentary on the Locana, p. 79 (Kuppusvami Shastri's edition, Madras, 1944): vyApArastrividho budhairabhimataH kAvye'bhidhAbhAvanAbhogotpAdakatAtmanaH (? tmakaH), tadadhiko nAsti dhvani ma naH / siddhAdyA vyavahArabhUmiSu, vibhAvAdyarthasAdhAraNIkArAtmA tvaparA, nirrglrsaasvaadaatmikaivaantimaa|| Compare also the following two stanzas (of Bhatta Nayaka ?) cited by Hemacandra in his Kavyanusasana (Bombay edition, 1964), pp. 96-97 : abhidhA bhAvanA cAnyA tadbhogIkRtameva c| abhidhAdhAmatAM yAte zabdArthAlaMkRtI, ttH|| bhAvanAbhAvya eSo'pi zRGgArAdigaNo hi yat / tadbhogIkRtarUpeNa vyApyate siddhimAn nrH||

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SOME ASPECTS OF THE RASA THEORY sadharanikarana in two directons: (1) mental identification (tanmayibhavana or hrdayasamvada of the sensitive, cultured readers and spectators (sahrdaya) with the characters and their emotions as depicted in poetry and drama, through the employment of appropriate style marked by suitable literary excellences (guna) and figures of speech (alankira); 10 (2) Sharing of an aesthetic experience by a reader or spectator along with several other fellow readers or spectators. The consciousness that several other people are having the same aesthetic experience heightens the intensity of that experience.11 In chapter 6, pp. 288-289, Bharata says that rasa is called rasa because it is capable of being relished (asvadya), and then he gives an illustration to show how rasa is relished. He says that rasa is relished by cultured and sensitive spectators in the same way as dainty dishes are relished by connoisseurs of food and that this relishment of rasa gives them joy and satisfaction.12 Here Bharata uses the word bhunjanah in the case of connoisseurs alone, but it is clear that he intends it to be understood in the case of sensitive and cultured spectators also.13 The implicit use of the word bhunjanah by Bharata in the context of rasa-experience must have inspired Bhatta Nayaka to regard bhojakatva (or bhogikarana) as a function of poetic expression, along with abhidha and sadharanikarana (bhavana). On pp. 188-189 of the Locana (edition of Dhvanyaloka with Locana published in the Kashi Sanskrit Series, Varanasi, 1940), Abhinavagupta also accepts the idea underlying bhogikarana, not as a function of poetic expression, but as the result of the revelation (or suggestion) of aesthetic experience due to the suggestive power of poetic expression. 14 His contention is that bhoga (relishment of rasa) is not the direct outcome of poetic expression and that consequently it cannot be regarded as a function belonging to poetic expression. 15 According to him bnoga is a synonym of asvada (delectation), and consists in the revelation of the essentially 10. Locana, p. 188: HT49afa fragor of EICH E a faca ayat PEF Sagan The employment of appropriate style enables the sensitive reader or spectator to identify himself with the characters and situations depicted in a poem or drama and enables him to share their emotions, The words and acai are frequently used by Abhinavagupta in the Locana and Abhinavabharsti in the context of rosa-experience. Abhinavabharati on Natyasastra VI, Vol. I, p. 279: sta ga HTHAF 9 ga pratipatteH sutarAM rasaparipoSAya, anAdivAsanAcitrIkRtacetasAM vaasnaasNvaadaat| atrAha-rasa iti kaH pdaarthH| ucyate, aasvaadytvaat| kathamAsvAdyate rsH| yathA hi nAnAvyaJjanasaMyuktam annaM bhujAnA rasAnAsvAdayanti sumanasaH puruSAH harSAdIMzcAdhigacchanti, tathA nAnAbhAvAbhinayavyajitAn vAgaGgasattvopetAn FATTATTI TIFFa 5498: FI:, ita fereaf-a1 The two stanzas 32 and 33 on p. 290 merely repeat in metrical form the idea expressed in the prose passage cited just now 13. Thus he means to say : FAT917 YETAT: yhaa: 987 : 017 311Facy fra 14. Locana, p. 188: H RUTI9R29 Tappi Tafaa chai 15. Locana, p. 189 : Sf 7 164 Tota, fa 7 THEzalago 311Figarria alaukike drutivistaravikAsAtmani bhoge kartavye lokottare, dhvananavyApAra eva muurdhaabhissiktH| taccedaM bhogakRttvaM rasasya dhvananIyatve devsiddhm|

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GERMS OF THE LATER RASA DOCTRINE IN BHARATA'S NATYASASTRA 9 delightful nature of the soul immediately after the removal of the shroud of the dense infatuation (enveloping the soul), by the artistic portrayal of an emotional situation by a poet. In the passage from the Natyasastra cited in note 12 and explaining how rasa is relished, Bharata says that cultured, sensitive readers obtain delight, : etc. (harsadin). According to Abhinavagupta, who holds the view that all rasas, without exception, are delightful, the word adi in harsadin does not stand for soka (sorrow), bhaya (fear), jugupsa (disgust) etc., but for moral and intellectual enlightenment, cleverness in worldly matters, etc. 16 In addition to this view of Abhinavagupta regarding the uniformly and invariably delightful nature of all rasas (kevalanandavada), there is another view (called vibhajyavada, propounded by Ramcandra and Gunacandra in the Natyadarpana, according to which some rasas (srngara, hasya, vira, adbhuta, and santa) are of a delightful nature, while other rasas (karuna, bhayanaka, raudra and bibhatsa) are of a painfui nature.17 It is quite possible that Bharata believed in vibhajyavada. This is shown by what he says in Natyasastra 27.55, about the different mental reactions of a cultured spectator to the various emotions depicted in a drama. 18 Thus the seeds of both kevalanandavada and vibhajyavada can be found in Bharata's phrase harsadin, depending on how the word adi is interpreted. In Natyasastra VI, pp. 288-289 Bharata uses the word sumanasah to qualify connoisseurs (purusah) and spectators (preksakah) while comparing the gustatory enjoyment of culinary preparations with aesthetic enjoyment of emotional situations. The phrase sumanasah preksakah is used here in the sense of cultured, responsive and sensitive spectators, and it is clearly a forerunner of the sahtdaya frequently used in the Dhvanyaloka by Anandavardhana and in the Locana by Abhinavagupta. The word sahedaya is found used in Vamana's Kavyalankarasutravrtti19, I. 2.21, stanza 2, in the sense in which it is used by Anandavardhana, Abhinavagupta and later writers. Abhinavagupta explains the word in Locana, I, p. 38, as follows: "sensitive readers are people who have the capacity of identifying with matter under description in poetry because the mirror of their heart has become clean (or polished) due to their repeated reading and contemplation of poetry".20 In the introductory stanza at the commencement of the Locana, Abhinavagupta says 16. Abhinavabharati Vol I. p. 289 : FIAT Alfogcqrmacizle1917 341F9EETH!"**Bp I 'Adizabdena zokAdInAmA sNgrhH| sa ca na yuktH| sAmAjikAnAM hi hakaphalaM nATyaM na zokAdiphalam / / p. 282 : sta 3119666 991 ga Hatari ; p. 292 : 34 CFH 3119799977 377fiaal aa kA duHkhaashngkaa| 17. Nalyadarpana III (pp. 141-142, : Baroda edition, 1959). 18. yastuSTau tuSTimAyAti zoke zokamupaiti c| dainye dInatvamabhyeti sa nATaye prekSakaH smRtH|| 19. udayati sa hi tAdRk kvApi vaidarbharItau sahRdayahRdayAnAM raJjakaH ko'pi pAkaH / 20. yeSAM kAvyAnuzIlanavazAd vizadIbhUte manomukure varNanIyatanmayIbhavanayogyatA te svahRdayasaMvAdabhAjaH shRdyaaH| . Cf. Dhvanyaloka, p. 359, line 6: AFHE Tegar ga nagu

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10 SOME ASPECTS OE THE RASA THEORY that the essence of poetry is the presence of creative imagination in the poet and of sensitive responsiveness in the cultured reader.21 Sensitive readers and critics are indispensable for the proper evaluation of poetry. Even good poetry is wasted on incompetent readers and critics, and even ordinary poetry becomes exalted when it is evaluated by competent and sensitive critics.22 While speaking of vacika abhinaya which is concerned with the recitation. of speeches assigned to various characters in a drama with appropriate intonation and modulation of the voice, in chapter 16, Bharata deals with three important topics in poetics having a vital bearing on rasa. These topics are: (1) the ten literary qualities or excellences (gunas), (2) the ten blemishes (dosas) and (3) the four stylistic figures (alankaras) namely upama (simile), dipaka (zeugma), ripaka (metaphor) and yamaka (rhyme). The gunas, dosas and alankaras belong in the first instance to the words used in a drama and to the senses conveyed by them. But in the last instance they have the effect of augmenting or spoiling the beauty of the portrayal of emotions in a drama. Though the number and nature of the gunas, dosas and alankaras have undergone considerable modifications in their treatment by later writers on poetics, still their vital bearing on the portrayal of emotional situations in poetry and drama is unanimously recognised by all. The connection between poetry and drama on the one hand and the presence of gunas and absence of dosas on the other is invariable and vital.The connection between poetry and alankaras is, however, not vital and invariable.23 But, as 21. sarasvatyAstattvaM kavisahRdayAkhyaM vijyte| 22. Locana, II. p. 260 : sajanaiH (=sahRdayaiH) vinA kAvyam ityeSa zabdo'pi dhvNste| teSu tu satsu zabdasaMdarbhamAtramapi kAvyazabdavyapadezabhAk subhagam aaste| Vamana, KavyalaikarasUtra, III 1. 1-3 : kAvyazobhAyAH kartAro dharmAH guNAH / tdtishyhetvstvlNkaaraaH| pUrve (=guNAH) nityAH / Vamana implies by sutra No. 3, that alankaras are anitya, i.e., dispensable and variable attributes of poetry. Compare Dhvanyaloke II, 6 : tamarthamavalambante ye'GginaM te guNAH smRtaaH| aGgAzritAstvalaMkArAH mantavyAH kaTakAdivat // ; Sahityadarpana, X. 1 : zabdArthayorasthirAH ye dharmAH zobhAtizAyinaH / rasAdInupakurvanto'laMkArAste'GgadAdivat // Kavyaprckasa, VIII. 66 : ye rasasyAjhino dhamIH zauryAdaya ivaatmnH| utkarSahetavaste syuracalasthitayo guNAH // ; Sahityadarpana, VIII.1:rasasyAGgitvamAptasya dharmAH zauryAdayo ythaa| guNAH mAdhuryamojo'tha prasAda iti te tridhA | Kavyaprakasa VIII. 67 : upakurvanti taM santaM ye'dvAreNa jaatucit| hArAdivadalaMkArAste'nuprAsophmAdayaH // The employment of alankaras, though not indispensable, is quite common in poetry. Coripare Dhvanyaloka, III. p. 507 : vAcyAlaMkArasaMkIrNatvam alakSyakramavyaGgyApekSayA rasavati sAlaMkAre kAvye sarvatra suvyavasthitam; on which Abhinavagupta says : IdRzameva kAvyaM bhavati / Dhvar.yaloka I. p. 87 : vividhavAcyavAcakaracanAprapaJcacAruNaH kAvyasya sa eva arthaH sArabhUtaH, which is explained by Abhinavagupta (pp. 87-88) as : vividhaM tattadabhivyaJjanIyarasAnuguNyena vicitraM kRtvA vAcye vAcake racanAyAM ca prapaJcena yat cAru zabdArthAlaMkAraguNayuktam ityarthaH / / Dhvanyaloka, I. p. 45 : lalitocitasaMnivezacAruNaH kAvyasya, on which Abhinavagupta says : lalitazabdena guNAlaMkArAnugraham aah| Vamana, Kavyalaikarasutravrtti I.1-1 says : kAvyazabdo'yaM guNAlaMkArasaMskRtayoH zabdArthayoH vrtte| Bhoja, Sarasvatikaithabharana

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GERMS OF THE LATER RASA DOCTRINE IN BHARATA'S NATYASASTRA 11 Mammata says, poetry is by and large adorned with figures of style - and only occasionally marked by their absence. Even Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta--the chief exponents of the rasa-dhvani doctrinerecognise the importance of figures of style in poetry, as is clear from their express statements in this behalf and from the pains they take for laying down rules for the judicious employment of figures of style in a way congenial to the portrayal of emotional situations,21 It is clear that Bharata anticipated later writers in the matter of literary excellences, literary blemishes and literary tropes. He does not however anywhere precisely state the relation between rasa on the one hand and the gunas, dosas and alankaras on the other hand. Vamana was the first writer on poetics who tried to define the nature and role of the gunas and alankaras in poetry and said that riti (style) consisting in the presence of literary excellences is the soul of poetry, that the gunas are intrinsic, invariable and indispensable attributes (nitya-dharma) of poetry and that the alankaras are extrinsic, and dispensable properties (anitya dharma) of poetry.25 Dandin also said that the ten gunas are the life-breath (prana) of the vaidar bha marga (i. e. vaidarbhi riti).26 It was Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta who first ever defined the relation of the gunas and alan karas to the suggested emotional content (rasa) in poetry and formulated a philosophy of literary excellences, blemishes and adornments.27 Bharata's Natyasastra does not contain any hints of this subsequently developed philosophy. I. 2 says : nirdoSaM guNavat kAvyam alNkaarairlNkRtm| Mammata follows Bhoja in describing poetry ___ as : tadadoSau zabdArthI saguNAvanalaMkRtI punaH kvApi, Kavyaprakasa I-4 ab), and then says kApi ityanena etad Aha . yat sarvatra sAlaMkArI, kvacit tu sphuTAlaMkAravirahe'pi na kAvyatvahAniH / We find Jayadeva (Candraloka, I. 8) insisting on the invariable presence of alankaras in poetry, with a hit very probably against Mammata : aGgIkaroti yaH kAvyaM shbdaarthaavnlNkRtii| asau na manyate kasmAd anuSNam analaM kRtii|| Aecording to Jayadeva alailearas, are an intrinsic and indispensable attribute of poetry, as heat is of fire. 24. Dhvanyaloka, II. 18-20, pp. 223-234. 25. See the first quotation under Note 23. Kavyalailearsutra, I. 1.6-8: rItirAtmA kAvyasya / viziSTapadaracanA riitiH| vizeSo gunnaatmaa| 26. Kavyadarsa, I. 42 . iti vaidarbhamArgasya (=vedAH rIteH) prANA daza guNAH smRtaaH| 27. Dhvanyaloka, II. 6 : tamarthamavalambante ye'Ggina te guNAH smRtaaH| aGgAzritAstvalaMkArA mantavyAH kaTakAdivat // ; Locana, II. p. 204 : alaMkAryavyatiriktazca alaMkAro abhyupagantavyaH, loke tathA siddhatvAt , yathA guNivyatiriktaH guNaH / guNAlaMkAravyavahAraH ca guNini alaMkArye ca sati yuktH| sa ca asmatpakSe eva (= dhvanyAtmavAdipakSe eva) uppnnH| See also Locana II. pp. 197-198 : etaduktaM bhavati-upamayA yadyapi vAcyo artho alaMkriyate, tathApi tasya (= vAcyasya arthasya) tadeva alaMkaraNaM yad vyaGgayArthAbhivyaJjanasAmAdhAnam, iti vastutaH dhvanyAtmA eva alaMkAryaH (na tu vAcyaH arthH)| kaTakakeyUrAdibhirapi hi zarIrasamavAyibhiH cetanaH AtmA eva tattaccittavRttyaucityasUcanAtmatayA alNkriyte| tathAhi acetanaM zavazarIraM kuNDalAyupetamapi na bhAti, alaMkAryasya abhaavaat| yatizarIraM kaTakAdiyuktaM hAsyAvahaM bhavati, alaMkAryasya anaucityAt / na hi dehasya kiMcid anaucityam , iti vastutaH AtmA eva alaMkAryaH, aham alaMkRtaH iti abhimAnAt /

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12 SOME ASPECTS OF THE RASA THEORY One of the common topics discussed in later works on poetics is the benefits accruing to poets and readers from the composition of poetry and its contemplation respectively (kavyaprayojana). One of the benefits accruing to the readers is mental delight or satisfaction (priti) and another is intellectual and moral enlightenment (vyutpadana or upadesa). In Natyasastra I. 106-117, Bharata deals with the role of drama as a means of people's entertainment and education. There he uses the phrases hitopadesajanana, sarvopadesajanana, lokopadesajanana, visrantijanana and buddhivivardhana, to convey the recreative and educative functions of dramatic poetry. These phrases anticipate the ideas of later writers on poetics, (such as Bhamaha, Rudrata, Anandavardhana, Abhinavagupta, Mammata and Visvanatha) on this twofold role of poetry in general. According to Anandavardhana (Dhvanyaloka III, p. 398), drama is intended by Bharata to be a potent means of imparting moral instruction to people.28 The phrase Visrantijanana used by Bharata in the sense of relief from mental worries and tensions, must have undoubtedly.. inspired Bhatta Nayaka and Abhinavagupta in giving a new dimension to the recreative role of poetry and in putting forward the idea of svasamvidvisranti-repose in the essentially blissful nature of the soul.29 The phrase buddhivivardhana in Bharata is perhaps at the root of the idea of enlightenment in dharma, artha, kama, moksa and secular arts of which Bhamaha speaks in his Kavyalankara,30 and the idea of the training and sharpening of the critical faculty of readers of which Abhinavagupta, speaks in the Locana.31 It will be seen from the points discussed above that Bharata's Natyasastra anticipates in quite a few respects the concepts germane to the doctrine of rasa experience as elaborately developed and cogently presented in later works on poetics. Bharata was undoubtedly acquainted with various important matters connected with the doctrone of rasa experience, but he made only a casual or passing reference to them and did not undertake a detailed discussion on them, as he thought that such a discussion would involve him in digression from the main purpose of his work, namely the theory and practice of dramaturgy (natya). 28. sadAcAropadezarUpA hi nATakAdigoSThI vineyajanahitArtham eva munibhirvtaaritaa| 29. See Locana, II. p. 183: pad 7 th :'**Taha ghaghra hartHITAIFA vizrAntilakSaNa: parabrahmAsvAdasavidhaH / This forms part of Bhatta Nayaka's view regarding the nature of rasasvada, which does not differ from that of Abhinavagupta. See Locana, p. 190, lines 2-3. 30. Kavyalan kara, I.2 : 4414Fergj Feste 31. Locana, II. p. 190 : 1 TEST BE fa 39#rant Infahifagai selera 3rd Alfa (F1044)

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Sankuka-A Defence R. B. PATANKAR As all know, a statement of Sri Sankuka's theory has not come down to us in his own words. We have to depend entirely on the brief versions which appear in Abhinava or Mammata or Hemacandra. One point should be clear from this; these three critics must have taken Sankuka's theory seriously; otherwise they would not have given it the space they have in their writings; nor would have Bhatta Tauta thought it worth his while to attempt its detailed refutation. Our first task is to re-construct Sankuka's theory with the help of the points we get in these different versions. We must also keep in mind that these critics must have had before them not only the views of Sankuka alone, but also those of his followers; it is not unlikely that in the course of their discussion with their critics the Sankukaites changed sankuka's original position, some of them even misrepresenting it in places. We must further remember that following the Sanskritist convention Bhatta Tauta must have considered all the possible interpretations of Sankuka's position including those which to us look improbable. Threading our way through all this is indeed a difficult task. We shall be guided in our inquiry by the following assumption : Sankuka was a sophisticated theoretician capable of building up a self-consistent theory which can stand critical scrutiny if considered sympathetically. The last clause is necessary because Sankuka's theory is likely to prove to be a viable alternative to the theories of Bhatta Nayaka and Abhinavagupta; the latter are so powerful that it requires special efforts on the part of a researcher to break their spell and consider the earlier theories afresh. The use of some modern speculative instruments will help us do this. Sankuka's theory will have to be scrutinised first as expressed in a statement which follows his attempted refutation of Lollata, and later in the context of Tauta's attack on Sankuka. Let us consider it in that order. (A) The sthayi which originally belongs to chief characters like Rama, when imitated, is known by the transformed name as rasa, its character of being an imitation warranting the transformation of the name. The sthayi is perceived as belonging to the actor through the process of inference by artificial tokens, which do not look artificial.1 1. tasmAddhatubhirvibhAvAkhyaiH "prayatnArjitatayA kRtrimairapi tathAnabhimanyamAnairanukartRsthena liGgabalataH pratIyamAnaH sthAyI Hat TERTHIETSTATUT Sateur 469159 TAHIRITO reet TH:(All quotations, unless otherwise mentioned, are from Professor R. P. Kangle's Edition of the VI and VII chapters of Natyasastra, with Abhinavabharati; the Edition was published by Maharashtra Sahithya Sanskriti Mandal, Bombay 32, in 1973. The present quotation is on pp. 129-30.)

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SOME ASPECTS OF THE RASA THEORY One observation may be made here. The two processes of 'imitation' and 'inference' are to be taken as synchronous and inter-related processes. If only one of the two were present rasa would not be produced. For example, if the James-Lange theory of emotion is correct, having a particular emotionbehaviour-pattern will induce in a person the relevant emotion. Sankuka will not call this induced emotion rasa, because the emotion-behaviour-pattern is real and not artificial. Originally an emotion and the accompanying behaviour -pattern are two parts of one whole. But later on they can be separated, in thought and also in fact. For example, one may be very angry and yet may show no external signs of it. Again, one may produce all the external signs of anger and have no emotion of anger at all. As one grows in years one develops a control over the two aspects so well that either of the two aspects can be activated or suppressed at will. This opens the road to deception, hypocrisy, etc. on the one hand, and to play-acting on the other. There is obviously a difference between an imposter and an actor. The difference does not consist only in the presence and absence of the motive to deceive. It consists, mainly in the difference between the responses expected of the spectators. People are, at least sometimes, deceived by an imposter; but they are not deceived by what the actor says or does. Just as the actor is not an imposter, he is also not a man who by producing emotion-behaviour produces in himself a real emotion. The emotion-behaviour that Sankuka appears to have in mind is the one that is acquired through learning; according to him it is artificial, not real, although its artificiality is not noticed by the spectator. The details mentioned about the artificial vibhavas etc. indicate that Sankuka is writing for an audience that is well acquainted with the concept of 'play-acting'. The next relevant question is how to give a logical account of 'playacting', particularly of the experience of seeing a play, in terms of the nature of this kind of seeing and also in terms of the object of this seeing. The first tentative position that Sankuka takes is that seeing a play is seeing of the non-real, in other words, a false perception. The real sthayi belonging to the original character is replaced by an imitated, de-realized sthayi, located in the actor; but this false perception does not destroy its causal efficacy (artha-kriyapi mithya-jnanad drsta). But he shifts his position soon afterwards, most probably because he has undertaken a closer scrutiny of the ontological and epistemological aspects of the concept of 'play-acting', which involves a special relationship between the actor and the character. If it were seeing the actor as the actor, or Rama as Rama the situation would have presented no problems, for there would not have been anything more than veridical perception. But the situation is very complicated. We do not perceive that the actor here is happy (Rama] (na catra nartaka eva sukhiti pratipattih); we do not perceive that the actor himself is Rama (nipyayameva Rama iti), nor again that the actor is not happy [Rama] (na

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SANKUKA-A DEFENCE 15 capyayam na sukhiti), nor is there a doubt whether the actor is Rama (napi Rama syad va na vayamiti), nor is the actor seen to resemble Rama (na capi tatsadesa iti); we perceive that this actor is the happy Rama (kintu yah sukhi Ramah asavayamiti pratitirasti). The perception relevant in drama is different from the four known varieties of perception enumerated by the Sanskritists: veridical perception, false perception, perception of resemblance, doubtful perception. It is here that the concept of citraturaga-pratiti is introduced by Sankukaites.2 The most important question here is how to interpret citra-turaga-pratiti. What sort of seeing' is it? We shall make use of some modern conceptual tools and compare this 'seeing' with some other sorts of 'seeing'. (a) Somebody points to a tree and says 'That tree is green' or "That is a mango tree.' In this context various questions become relevant, e. g. "Where is it? How old is it? What price do the mangoes fetch nowadays? Where do you propose to sell the fruit this season ? Could you let me have one mango ?' (b) I say 'I saw a mango tree in my dream yesterday. It was near the compound wall. It looked very old. The man who was with me told me that I would get a good price for the fruit'. These statements regarding the location of the tree do not puzzle 'us because we have learnt to take them to refer to the dream-space and dream-time. If we have acquired the concept of dreaming we also know that the following questions have no application : 'If we go to the compound wall after breakfast, will you please show me the tree? I didn't see any tree last evening; did it suddenly come into existence during the night? What price will these mangoes fetch today? Can I have one mango ?' They have no application because there is no continuity between the dream world and the commonly shared real world. (c) I look into a mirror and see my face in it against the background of some pieces of furniture. Where are my face and the furniture that I see there, located ? If we have formed the concepts relevant to the situation of looking into a mirror, we shall answer 'In the mirror-space, of course'. In the course of forming these concepts we shall also have learnt not to confuse mirror-space with the surface of the mirror. The former is not continuous with our space, but the latter is. (d) Now suppose we are looking at a painting. We could say that we see a framed piece of canvas with pigments spread over it; but instead we say, 'we see a horse standing some distance away from a mango tree, a long way from the village; it is latish afternoon, the shadows of things are lengthening'. That all 2. As Mammata puts it : TRIERTERRAE caz fase og fara rastafa sfatat 21 Vamanacarya Jhalakikar in his commentary explains this with the help of a quotation from Kavyaprakasadarpana : yathA bAlAnAM citraturage vastuparicchedazUnyA turago'yamiti alghara au THISUfara afacer SA TE T erforaaf 1 Jhalakikar himself calls this bhrama :- yadyapyayaM bhrama eva tathApi bAdhaciraskasyaivAtra bhramatvena vivakSaNAna dossH| atra ca bAdhAnavatAraH spaSTa eva / 3Tale as cara a PTI (Kavyaprakasa of Mammata repr. from the Fifth Edition, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, 1955, pp. 88-89.)

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16 SOME ASPECTS OF THE RASA THEORY these things are spatially and temporally inter-related in certain ways is clear; but they are so inter-related in the picture-space and picture-time which are not continuous with our' space and time. Answers to the questions What are you looking at?', 'What do you see there?' will vary from one conceptual context to another. 'I see a painted piece of canvas', 'I see a horse', 'I see a pictorial representation of a horse', 'I see an Impressionist painting',-all these are correct answers in their appropriate conceptual contexts. The point to remember is that one must not mix up contexts and end up with a feeling of philosophical puzzlement. Our relation with the objects in the picture-world appears to be peculiar. It appears that there is a limited, one-way causal relation between these objects and us. Suppose we are looking at the picture of a holy man. Whatever we may do, it is logically impossible for us to affect the holy man. We can at best bring about changes in the canvas and the pigments. But, on the other hand, it seems, the holy man in the picture can affect us, although in a limited way; e. g. he can create in us the attitude of respect. But, of course, he cannot come out of the picture-world and hit us on the head. One more point to remember is that within a certain conceptual framework there is nothing odd about looking at a painting, say, that of a man, and attributing human qualities, values, emotions to what we see. We refer to the sad face of the man...' A face in a picture may be called sad if it saddens the spectator. But sometimes we locate the sadness in the painting itself. Suppose; it is the picture of a sad refugee who has lost everything in the world. We then refer to the 'sad face of the refugee'. The sadness of the refugee is now seen 'expressed in the picture, is taken as an attribute of the face in the picture, which, under another description, i. e. in another conceptual framework, is only a configuration of pigments and nothing more. (e) Now finally, let us analyse 'seeing a play'. Here the situation becomes complicated because the actor and the character appear to be on the same ontological plane, which they share in common with the spectators as well. Actor Caitra plays the role of the character Rama, and the spectator sees this take place. All the three are human beings, and one is likely to take them as interacting substances. The confusion which would not arise if Caitra, a human being, were replaced by a configuration of pigments, now is likely to arise, if we lose grip over the concept of play-acting and the corresponding concept of seeing a play. While looking at a painting we can legitimately say (i) 'we see a piece of canvas with pigments spread over it'; (ii) 'we see a horse'. We know that the horse in the painting does not have the same ontological status as the painted canvas, an actual physical object, has. To see the horse in the painting as animated by life impulses, etc. is a special variety of seeing'. But we do not equally readily realise that an identical situation exists when we see a play being enacted on the stage. Actor Caitra has an ontological status, which is similar to that of the spectator; they belong to one Space-Time context; they can be related as two actually existing interacting substances. But a fictional character like Carudatta of Mrochakatika

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SANKUKA-A DEFENCE cannot interact in a similar way with Caitra or the spectator; Carudatta does not belong to the Space-Time context to which Caitra and the spectator belong. However, when we see a play, we do not say that we see Caitra; we say that we see Carudatta. But we cannot see Carudatta in the same sense in which we can see Caitra, because of the ontological difficulty mentioned above. We can circumvent this difficulty only by changing the conceptual context. In this new context, we can see Caitra as Carudatta, Caitra representing Carudatta, playing the role of Carudatta or imitating Carudatta. Caitra can play this role only on the condition that he temporarily suppresses his independent ontological status to lend it to Carudatta. Carudatta and Caitra cannot co-exist as beings with equal ontological status. If the spectator forgets this, he is likely to develop a logical squint and see double, see Carudatta and Caitra as co-existing, having real, individual emotions and other experiences. Actually the spectator sees Caitra speaking, gesticulating, laughing, shedding tears; but as Caitra has lent his ontological status temporarily to Carudatta, the spectator 'sees' Carudatta, (not in the straightforward sense of seeing a physical object, but in the special sense in which we 'see' the horse in the painting.) Gesticulation, shedding of the tears is actully done by Caitra; this can be verified. But in accordance with the rules of projection in force in the context of 'play-acting', Carudatta is taken to do all this and through it express emotions, etc. Conceptual confusion arises if we forget that Caitra has temporarily lent his ontological status to Carudatta, and take the actions, etc. to be those of Carudatta expressing Carudatta's emotions. In that case there will be two sets of actions and emotions, those of Caitra and those of Carudatta. This confusion arises because Carudatta and Caitra are conceived as human beings capable of having their own separate emotional experiences. This possibility does not exist in citraturagapratiti, because a configuration of colours is not capable of having emotional experiences. Here the ontological self-sacrifice on the part of the colour-configuration is so complete, that the question of there being two emotions does not arise. The citraturagapratiti is expected to help us interpret correctly 'seeing a play being enacted'. Let us look at the diagrams below.

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18 SOME ASPECTS OF THE RASA THEORY Diagram 1 Configuration of pigments A terrified Horse Possesses ontological status as Possesses ontologicol status as a configuration of pigments only Horse As such is incapable of experiencing As such is capable of experiencing emotions like fear. emotions like fear. A terrified Horse in a Painting Configuration of pigments which has temporarily suppressed its ontological status and lent it to a horse which here does not possess ontological status of its own. The spectator now. can ignore the pigments' incapacity to experience emotions and see the emotions as belonging to the 'horse' in the painting Diagram 2 Actor Caitra Character Rama or Carudatta. Actual human being Actual/Fictional human being Possesses ontological status as a If actual, possesses ontological status human being as a human being If fictional, does not possess ontolo gical status as a human being. Capable of experiencing emotions If actual, capable of experiencing real such as fear; capable of perceiving, emotions such as fear. etc. If fictional, incapable of feeling real emotions such as fear. At the time of play-acting Caitra's A special feature of the play-acting ontological status as Caitra is situation is that a character like suppressed and temporarily lent to Rama, with his own ontological Rama or Carudatta. Caitra's capacity status, his own position in Space and to experience emotions, to perceive, Time is not and cannot actually etc. is temporarily transferred to remain present on the stage.. Rama or Carudatta. Although Caitra

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SANKUKA-A DEFENCE retains these capacities in some ways they are, according to the rules of the concept seeing a play', to be ignored; e. g. Caitra as Caitra knows that the crown he wears is not made of gold; the Ravana he 'kills' is not really there and is not really killed. But Caitra is not supposed to act on what he knows as Caitra; he is expected to act on what he knows as Rama or Carudatta. If he feels any emotions as Caitra, they are to be ignored. His ontological status being temporarily suppressed, his actions, emotions, etc. are ascribed to Rama or Carudatta. This is inevitable because play-acting is logically based on the temporary suppression of the actor's existence/ actuality and its temporary projection on to the character. With the help of the above two diagrams we can pose the problems again. What does the spectator see? What variety of seeing is this? What does he make of the relation between Caitra and Rama ? If seeing an actual physical object' is called 'seeingi', the spectator cannot be said to be concerned with 'seeingi' Caitra, for he is not interested in Caitra as an actual individual, nor to be 'seeingi' Rama, for the latter does not have the necessary SpaceTime location in order that 'seeingi' may become possible for the spectator in the theatre. The possibility of seeingi' Carudatta just cannot arise because he is fictional. That the spectator sees someone cannot however be denied. The only alternative that remains to be considered is that of 'seeing Caitra as Rama'. This may be called 'seeingz' to distinguish it from 'seeingi' Caitra as Caitra, or Rama as Rama. The spectator does not say that he sees, Caitra as happy/happy Rama'; nor does he 'see, that Caitra himself is Rama', nor again does he 'see, that Caitra is not happy Rama'; he does not also say that'he sees, Caitra and Rama as resembling each other'; he is not in doubt whether he sees, Rama. Seeing, is not involved at all. The spectator just takes Caitra as the happy Rama. The perception relevant here is not of the variety of seeingi' but that of 'seeingz', the only variety of seeing that is in accordance with the rules of the concepts of "play-acting'/' seeing a play'. The sthiyi of the character is made the object of the experience of the

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20 SOME ASPECTS OF THE RASA THEORY spectator through acting, and not through words.3 Rasa thus is sthayi represented by means of acting (and not denoted by words).4 As the sthayi of the character is made the object of experience by logical tokens which, as presented not by the character himself, but by the actor by means of artificial tokens, it is the case of 'seeingz' the sthayi as located in the actor when he is in the process of acting. But, as we have seen earlier, the actor as a particular actual man, following the particular profession of acting, is not the object of perception. The actor, as playing the role of Rama, and only during the time he is playing that role, and in that capacity, functioning, as it were, like the carrier of Rama's emotion, is the object of our perception. (B) We shall now turn to the second stage in Sankuka's statement of his position, which appears while he is under attack from his critics, particularly from Abhinaya's teacher (upadhyayah), Bhatta Tauta. If rasa is said to be the imitation of sthayi, the objector asks, to whom does it appear in that form : (a) to the spectator, or (b) to the actor, or (c) to the wise interpreter who distinguishes between reality and appearance, or (d) to Bharata ? Let us follow the polemic step by step. Some of the answers are recorded in the text as actually given by the Sankukites; and the others may be taken as answers supplied by modern Sankukaites. Objection 1. Things perceivable by one sense can alone be regarded as imitating each other. The actually perceived drinking of one liquid can be taken to be an imitation of the perceived drinking of another liquid. But how can something accessible to one sense imitate something not available to that sense ? How can rati which belongs to the realm of the mind and is accessible to the mind alone, be imitated by bodily gestures, etc. which are. accessible to physical senses alone ? Reply : One fails to see how this objection applies to Sankuka's theory at all, because he has not maintained that the actor's gestures, etc. imitate any mental states. Objection 2. Only if one has experienced the original, can one recognise its imitation. But nobody has had a prior experience of Rama's rati. How can therefore anyone claim that something is the imitation of Rama's rati, or that the actor is imitating Rama ? Reply : If Ramayana is regarded as history, and not as an epic poem which deals only with a fictional world, one does not see how this objection can be raised. No living person today can claim that he has seen Sivaji or 3. Janata: garar fa: Fereit Prats rated a grandi stareharriren and 41148419|| R. P. Kan gle, op. cit. p. 130. 4. F20ATTESTATTETETICE T Framator suareg) Ta: Ibid.

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SANKUKA-A DEFENCE Akbar. But cannot people say that these two kings existed and had particular characteristics, basing their claim to this knowledge on the evidence obtained from contemporary documents ? If Rimayana is taken as history, we can get enough evidence in it regarding Rama's appearance, his actions, etc. And if we possess enough factual knowledge about Rama, why are we not competent to judge whether the actor is imitating Rama ? The objection can be regarded as valid only with regard to fictional characters. This can be met by pointing out that here the original to be imitated consists of what the poet has given us in his text. The poet gives us information about how the fictional character he has created looks, speaks, behaves. The actor can be said to imitate him if he follows the poet's description closely. (What is to be done if the Actors or Directors interpret in different ways the characters created by the poet is a further problem, but it does not fall within the scope of this paper.) If the objection is about the previous perception of Rama's rati, something mental, and therefore accessible only to Rama, this objection will rule out all mutual understanding among men-and that is an untenable position. riginal character'sced as imitated rati. Thes. It may be said they haveauses, etc som in which Objection 3. This can be validly raised only if objection 2 is sustained. Let us assume for discussion's sake that it is sustained. If it is granted that the rati aroused in the Actor cannot be regarded as the imitation of the original character's rati, someone may suggest that the rati aroused in the Actor be itself regarded as imitated rati. The objector will point out that much depends on the form in which it appears. It may be said by Sankukaites that rati appears in the Actor in the same form in which it appears in common people through the relevant causes, etc. If Sankukaites take this position it will indicate that they have replaced the theory of 'imitation of the emotion of a particular character like Rama' by 'imitation of the emotion of people in general'. This shift from the particular to the general is significant. It partly anticipates the later emphasis on generality (sadharanya) in Sanskrit poetics. Secondly, this shift is very natural because a move towards generality becomes unavoidable at some stage or the other in the argument. For even if we know plenty of details regarding even a historical character, we do not, and cannot, know all; whatever we know has to be supplemented by what we know about people in general. Recourse to the latter is necessary to a greater extent in the case of fictional characters. It will be objected that, in that case, (i. e. if the Sankukaites have really given the above answer), real rati and not its imitation will be produced. The Sankukaites might point out that a difference will still be there. For in the case of the men whose emotions are imitated the vibhavas, etc. are real, whereas they are artificial - unreal - in the case of the imitator. This explanation is necessary to complete and reinforce the earlier Sankukaite .5. nanu pramadAdibhiH kAraNaiH "liMgabharyA laukikI kAryarUpA kAraNarUpA sahacArirUpA ca cittavRttiH pratItiyogyA a hrana zarafa: ufahifa i Ibid, pp 136-37,

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SOME ASPECTS OF THE RASA THEORY argument. For at that stage it was not made clear why the rati in the actor, aroused as rati is commonly aroused, should be called 'imitated' rati. It will now be objected that if the spectator knows that the vibhavas, etc. in the case of the imitator, are unreal, how can, with the help of unreal logical tokens, real rati be experienced/inferred? Smoke and mist resemble each other; so do fire and red flowers. Although one can legitimately infer the existence of fire from the existence of smoke, it is not legitimate to infer the existence of red flowers (which resemble fire) from the existence of mist (which resembles smoke). In the same way, one cannot legitimately infer from artificial vibhavas, etc., which resemble real vibhavas, etc., the existence of imitated rati, which resembles real rati. Reply : The whole attack on Sankuka's position seems to be based on the non-recognition of the variety of seeing which we have called 'seeing,'. The view attributed to Sankuka appears to be as follows : Diagram 3 Relation of Imitation. Rati (Imitated) Rati In Rama In the Actor Relation of Inference Relation of Inference or Imitation L Rama's Vibhavas Anubhavas, etc. Actor's imitated Vibhavas, Anubhavas, etc. But if the concept of 'seeingz is accepted Sankuka's view can be represented as follows: Rama's Rati Diagram 4 Actor's Rati Relation of Inference Rama's Vibhavas, etc. Actor's Vibhavas,etc. Relation of Imitation

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SANKUKA-A DEFENCE What is presented is the Actor and his imitated vibhavas, anubhavas. Rama is not presented, because, as we saw earlier, he cannot be presented on the stage, for his reality, as a historical being, has a spatial and temporal location quite distinct from those of the different theatres and also of the different troupes of actors performing plays with Rama as a character in them. The actor has suppressed his ontological status and lent it for the time being to Rama, who has his own independent ontological status as a historical human being located elsewhere in Time and Space. Just as the changes in the mercury column in the thermometer are read as changes in the temperature of the patient's body, whatever the actor does or says is seen as done by Rama. Whatever inferences we draw from them regarding mental states are taken as inferences regarding the mental states of Rama and not those of the actor. To say that there are two ratis-one real rati belonging to Rama and the other rati belonging to the actor, the latter being the imitation of the former, is to put an extremely clumsy and artificial construction on what Sankuka could have meant. It goes against the very concept of play-acting. In the framework of that concept, arousal of any emotion in the actor as an actual person is totally irrelevant. What is being denied here is not the possibility of emotion-arousal in the actor, but only its relevance to the concept of play-acting. Play-acting can take place whether there is emotion-arousal in the actor or no. The actor, who has lent his being to the character, acts and speaks... and we draw inferences about the character's rati. It is, however, not unlikely that some Sankukaites inadvertently slipped into the false position of assuming the existence of two ratis. Objection 4. An attempt is now made to show that there are selfcontradictions in the position of Sankuka. Here again one has to admit that perhaps some sankukaites actually took some of the positions which are here criticised. Or perhaps these are the possible interpretations of the Sankuka position that his critics could think of. (a) The Sankukaites might say in defence of the imitation theory : Even when the actor is not angry, i. e. does not himself experience the emotion of anger, he looks as if he is angry. The objector might say that this obviously contradicts the view ascribed earlier to Sankuka that in the actor there is an arousal of an emotion, which is supposed to imitate the emotion of the character. (b) It might be further pointed out by the objector that the resemblance is confined only to externals like movements of the eye-brows. But, according to Sankuka's critics, this does not constitute imitation. (Most probably what is expected by the objector is imitation of emotion, and not imitation of the externals.) Reply :- It is not true that all Sankukaites have admitted the real existence or the relevance of rati in the actor.

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SOME ASPECTS OF THE RASA THEORY Objection 5. When the spectator perceives the actor and says 'he is Rama', it should be taken as veridical perception if it is not disproved at a later stage; if it is so confuted it should be regarded as false perception. And even in the absence of such a confutation what the spectator gets is false perception. Reply :- The objector appears to be using only the concepts of veridical and false perception. For reasons which he has not stated, he has, towards the end, placed the perception involved in seeing a play in the category of false perception (vastavena ca vrttena badhakanudayepi mithyajnanameva syat). The arguments really fail to sustain the objection. It is wrong to operate with only two concepts, those of veridical and false perception, if one wants to do justice to the concept of 'seeing a play'. Objection 6. Even when one actor is replaced by another actor, the experience is that 'he is Rama'. In that case it will have to be admitted that Rama' stands not for an individual but for a class. Reply :- This will happen only if we take the dramatic perception to be veridical (Rama evayam ayameva Rama iti). All this time the objector has been considering the problem from the spectator's angle. Now he will discuss it from the Actor's angle. The objections raised here are reminiscent of or complementary to those raised earlier. Objection 7. The actor's experience also is not that he is imitating Rama or Rama's mental state. Let us assume that 'to imitate' is taken to mean to do something which is like something else (viz. the original). If the original is not available to the actor he is incapable of performing the act of imitationfor what can he 'imitate ?' If 'to imitate is interpreted as following after, doing something after something else, this is a common enough phenomenon in the world. Not being an exclusive feature of drama, it cannot be regarded as the distinguishing characteristic of drama. If it is said that the actor imitates not the emotion of grief of an individual but that of the people of a type (uttama-prakrteh sokam), then it is necessary to ask by what means he does it. Not by his own parallel grief, because he is not himself experiencing any grief. Not also by shedding tears, because, as shown earlier, what is accessible to the mind alone cannot be imitated by that which is available only for sense-perception. The only objects that the actor can possibly imitate are the effects the sthayi produces in the people of a type. But in order that this should happen it is necessary to give particularity to the object of imitation. If the actor tries to achieve particularization by saying 'I imitate the weeping of anybody who weeps in this way', it will not do,

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SANKUKA-A DEFCMCE 25 because the term 'anybody' can also cover the actor himself. And if it is taken to cover the actor also the concept of imitation will have no application. Reply :- No separate refutation is called for, as all these objections have been met earlier. Objection 8. Bharata has nowhere said that the imitation of sthayi is rasa.. It is true that he has called Drama the imitation of things in the world (saptadvipanukaranamityadi). But this does not lend support to Sankuka; for it only means that Drama shows the kind of things one sees in the real world. According to Abhinavagupta, by 'anukarana' Bharata means aesthetic reperception and not imitation or a replica of the world. Reply :- Bharata's statements appear to lend greater support to Sankuka's theory of de-ontologized imitation than to the theory of de-ontologized and de-particularised representation. For a change in the ontological status is necessarily involved in the process of imitation, but that of departicularization is not. Objection 9. The argument that a configuration of colours reveals a real bull is not acceptable. It is the light of a lamp which can reveal it. (The objector has obviously 'taken the word 'reveal' in its literal sense.) The colours arranged as the limbs of a bull are arranged in reality, are seen to resemble a bull; the experience is that of resemblance (which Sankuka has denied). Further, arrangement of vibhavas does not resemble an emotion like rati. Reply :- That there is a partial resemblance between a bull and its picture is true. This is restricted only to colours and shapes unless the latter ate 'seen,' as limbs of a bull. This resemblance between the bull and its 6. The following is an abridgement of R. Gnoli's note on the concept of Imitation :- Bharata (N. S. I, v, 106 or 107) says that "Drama is the re-telling (anukirtanam) of all the forms of existence in the three worlds (trailokyasyasya sarvasya natyar bhar'anukirtanam)" Accorling to A. G., the words 're-telling' and 'imitation' (anukarana, anukara), used by Bharata, must be interpreted in the sense of a "re-perception sui generis" (anuvyavasaya, anuvyavasayavisesa) and not in the proper sense of anukarana, imitation. This anuvyavasaya is "like a direct perception" (pratyaksakalpa, saksatkarakalpa).... The term anuvyavasaya is one proper to logic; it defines the activity of the mind which works on the data furnished by the senses. It is, therefore, the mental re-percepton (anu= pascat, afterwards) of the sensible perception. ... In aesthetics, anuvycvcsaya has come to mean aesthetic re-perception (without, that is, any association with the concepts of reality and irreality....and therefore with the limited "I", but generalized) of things perceived in practical life. The expressions anukarana, anukartana, etc. used by Bharata. ..., observed A. G., should not be interpreted literally, in the sense, that is, of imitation, i, e., of a replica of reality, but in the sense of an u vyavasaya, of aesthetic re-perception of the facts of practical life. (R. Gnoli: The Aesthetic Experience according to Abhinavcgupta , Roma, 1956, p. 108).

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26 SOME ASPECTS OF THE RASA THEORY pictorial representation is of a different kind from the resemblance between two bulls, say, one big and another small. If sadrsya is restricted to a relation between two things which share both form and matter in common, the relation between a bull and its painting cannot be called sadrsya. But if we have already formed the concept of representation', we can relate different things between which there are different degrees of resemblance, including the zero degree, (as when we say 'Phonetic symbols represent sounds'.) The objection regarding the arrangement of vibhavas resembling or imitating sthayi can only be met by showing that Sankuka has not held that the physical resembles or imitates the mental. If the objection is about inferring the mental states of characters from the physical actions of the actors, it can be pointed out that it is part of the concept of 'seeing2', where we see one thing as another, the actor as the character. Emotion-behaviour does not imitate an emotion. In ordinary life such a token seen in a particular person is taken as evidence for inferring the existence of an emotion in the same person. But if the context is that of 'see,' a physical token in the actor is taken as evidence for the existence of the relevant emotion in the character. 'Seez' involves such ontological and epistemological conditions that no other conclusion can follow. 'Seeg' is a variety of experience which is governed by rules which are peculiar to it, and which it does not share with such other forms of experience as samyak, mithya, sadrsya, samsaya. In that sense, and only in that sense, it can be called a-laukika. Objection 10. Sankuka's view that the sthaya, made the object of experience by means of vibhavas, is itself called rasa is wrong. If Sankuka's view is right, it should be possible to have rasa experience in ordinary life also; for if rasa can come into being in unreal things, it will certainly come into existence in real things.? Reply :- This objection needs no separate refutation if one has firmly grasped the concepts of play-acting and 'seeing2 a play.' Objection 11. It is significant that there is no mention of sthayi in rasasutra. Such a reference would indeed have created difficulties.8 Reply :- It is true that Bharata has not mentioned sthayi in this sutra. But that, by itself, does not mean that he deleted the mention of sthayi for any theoretical reasons. Elsewhere he does not mind bringing the two terms sthayibhava' and 'rasa' close together. For example, he says, "sthayibhavasca rasatvamupanesyamah.'9 7. evaM hi laukike'pi kiM na rsH| asato'pi hi yatra rasanIyatA syAt tatra vastusataH kathaM na bhvissyti| tena Firaatfargfaat TT SIT 7 TAI R. P. Kangle, op. cit. p. 174. 8. aa ga F ARO 797 l Tereza la FAITI Ibid, p. 174. 9. Ibid, p. 226.

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S ANKUKA-A DEFENCE Objection 12. Rasa is not in the actor. The actor is merely a vehicle.10 Reply :- This objection is based on a distortion of Sankuka's position, for Sankuka refers to rasa being in the actor only in the context of play-acting, and not outside it. We have gone through the moves and counter-moves made by Sankukaites and their opponents. As we saw at the outset it is likely that Sankukaites did not maintain one position throughout; perhaps they were required to make changes under the pressure of the opponents' attacks. There are places where they appear to be almost on the point of accepting two sthayis, one that of the character and the other that of the actor. But these lapses are very few and they do not detract from the value of the original insight Sankukaites have obtained into the nature of drama. Again, some of the views attributed to them were perhaps never actually held by them. Sankukaites thus emerge as the first aestheticians to bring out the ontological and epistemological peculiarities of the concepts of 'play-acting' and 'seeing a play'. Their theory offers a viable alternative to the theories of Lollata on the one hand and those of Nayaka and Abhinava on the other. 10. Ibid. p. 198.

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Abhinavagupta on the Alaukika' Nature of Rasa V. M. Kulkarni Some of the Sanskrit Alamkarikas, notably Ramacandra and Gunacandra, the authors of Natyadarpana and Siddhicandra gaai, the author of Kavyaprakasa-Khandana, unequivocally take the position that the rasa-pratiti or rasanubhava, the aesthetic or imaginative experience, is entirely laukika, that is, worldly or continuous with and like other experiences in everyday life. Abhinavagupta, who is the greatest authority in Sanskrit Aesthetics and his very able followers like Mammata, the author of Kavyaprakasa, a standard work on Sanskrit poetics and aesthetics, Visvanatha, the author of the well-known Sahitya-Darpana and Pandit Jagannatha, the author of the celebrated Rasagangadhara, take the very opposite position that the aesthetic experience is something that is alaukika, non-worldly, extra-worldly, transcendental and beyond our framework of time and space and that it only takes place in the realm of literature and never in real life. The present paper confines itself to giving a clear exposition of this concept of alaukikatva according to Abhinavagupta in the light of his observations in his two well-known commentaries-Abhinavabharati on Bharata's Natyasastra and Locana on Anandavardhana's Dhvanyaloka, and examining if it corresponds with the Western or, to be more specific, the Kantian concept of the autonomy of the art (aesthetic) experience. Abhinavagupta never tires of stating over and over again that rasa is alaukika. Some of the relevant passages from the two commentaries are almost identical, word for word; some others closely correspond with each other and only a few make a new point. The major passages in which Abhinavagupta dwells on alaukikatva are presented here : (i) Locana, p. 79: When a man hears the words : "A son is born to you" joy is produced (through the power of denotation-abhidha). But the suggested sense (rasa and the like) is not produced the way joy is produced in the above case. Nor does it come about through the secondary usage (laksana, gunavrtti, bhakti). But it arises in a sensitive man (sahrdaya- a man who is sensitive to literature) through his knowledge of vibhavas and anubhavas, because of his hrdaya-samvada (sympathetic response) and his tanmayibhava (identification). It is vilaksana (different) from ordinary awareness of happiness etc. and it is not an objective thing (like a jar etc.).2 1. The total range of meanings conveyed by the word 'alaukika' cannot be expressed through any one English expression. Different expressions such as sui generis, autonomous, extra-worldly, non-worldly, other-worldly, supra-normal, transcendental, etc, have neen used by critics in different contexts for the term alaukika. 2. na cAyaM rasAdirarthaH 'putraste jAtaH' ityato yathA harSo jAyate tathA / nApi lkssnnyaa| api tu sahRdayasya hRdaya

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ABHINAVAGUPTA ON THE ALAUKIKA NATURE OF RASA 29 (ii) Locana, pp. 50-52 : The Pratiyamanartha (suggested sense) is of two kinds (i) laukika (ordinary) : Thoughts (or ideas-vastu) and images (or alamkaras) may be suggested, but they are at the same time vacya (expressible) also; and (ii) Kavya-vyaparaika-gocara (=vyanjana-gocara or alaukika) what can only be suggested; no emotion is, in its essence, directly describable. It is not communicable like a thought (or idea) and image (or alamkara). (The use of words like 'love' and 'sorrow' may convey to a person, an idea of the corresponding emotion but it will be only an idea and not a felt emotion). Rasa, according to Abhinavagupta, is never even in a dream sva-sabda-vacya--conveyed by the mere naming of the emotion (to be suggested).3 In these passages Abhinavagupta draws our attention to the fact that rasc does not arise either through abhidha or laksana (bhakti, gunavrtti). It comes about through vyanjana the power of suggestion, peculiar to poetry (i. e., creative literature). (iii) Locana, p. 160: "In literature, however, the vibhavas etc. conveyed (by convention and context) immediately tend towards the production of aesthetic relish (and are not ends in themselves) and so convention etc. do not play any role in the actual aesthetic relish itself. Nor is this (knowledge of the suggested sense) like the apprehension of religious (injunctions) such as : 'I have been enjoined to do such and such. I am now engaged in doing such and such. I have accomplished such and such.' Because in these cases some action is involved, and so these are of worldly nature." In literature (however) the asethetic relish (of the suggested sense) through the vibhavas etc. is like the appearance of a magic flower; it is essentially a thing of the present moment which does not depend on the past or the future time."4 saMvAdabalAd vibhAvAnubhAvapratItau tanmayIbhAvenAsvAdyamAna eva rasyamAnataikaprANaH siddhasvabhAvasukhAdivilakSaNaH prisphurti| The last compound we dissolve in a way quite different from the way both the Coinmentators (The authors of Balapriya and Kaumudi, p. 147) and Professors Masson and Patwardhan (Aesthetic Rapture, Vol. I, p. 27 and Vol. II, p. 37, f. n. 233) do it. We dissolve the compound as 'siddha-svabhava-vilaksanah', and 'sukhadivilaksanah'. This way the compound expression agrees with Abhinavagupta's description of rasa in A. Bh. I., P. 284 : 'na tu siddha-svabhavah tatkalika eva',' and, smrtyanumana-laukika-samvedanavilaksana eva'. tatra pratIyamAnasya tAvad dvau medau-laukikaH kaavyvyaapaaraikgocrshceti| laukiko yaH svazabdavAcyatA kadAcidadhizete s...vstushbdenocyte|...ystu svapne'pi na svazabdavAcyo na laukikavyavahArapatitaH kiM tu zabdasamarpyamANahRdayasaMvAdasundaravibhAvAnubhAvasamucitaprAgviniviSTaratyAdivAsanAnurAgasukumArasvasaMvidAnandacarvaNAnyApArarasanIyarUpo rasaH, sa kAvyavyApArakagocaro rsdhvniriti...| -Loccna, pp. 50-52 4. iha tu vibhAvAdyeva pratipAdyamAnaM carvaNAviSayatonmukhamiti smyaadyupyogaabhaavH| na ca niyukto'hamatra karavANi . kRtArtho'hamiti zAstrIyapratItisadRzamadaH / tatrottarakartavyonmukhyena laukikatvAt / iha tu vibhAvAdicarvaNAdbhatapuSpavat - tatkAlasAraivoditA na tu pUrvAparakAlAnubandhinIti laukikAsvAdAd yogiviSayAccAnya evAyaM rsaasvaadH|

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SOME ASPECTS OF THE RASA THEORY In this passage Abhinavagupta points out that this aesthetic rapture is unique. It is different from the ordinary worldly joy (and also from the bliss of brahmasvada experienced by a yogin, as explained in the passage (ix) below.) (iv) A. Bh. I., p. 36 : In this marvellous passage Abhinavagupta identifies some of the distinctive features of rasa and the rasika : As it is a very long passage we shall refer only to the most striking features mentioned in it: For the sensitive spectator practical interests or affairs are of no consequence when he goes to the theatre. He feels: he would listen to and see something marvellous which is beyond his everyday experience (lokottara), something worthy of his attention, something whose essence is from the beginning to the end, sheer delight. He would share this experience with the rest of the spectators. Engrossed in the aesthetic enjoyment of appropriate music, both vocal and instrumental, a man completely forgets himself (and also his worldly preoccupations, the narrow interests of his routine life and his worries) and he is aware then of nothing beyond the object or the situation portrayed by the poet. His heart becomes like a spotless mirror. It facilitates hrdaya-samvada (sympathetic response) and tanmayibhava (identification). What he sees is divorced from space and time. His apprehension (of rasa) does not fall within the ordinarily recognised categories of knowledge : right knowledge, false knowledge, doubt, probability or fancied identification, and the like. He is so engrossed in what he sees and is so carried away by an overpowering sense of wonder that he identifies himself with the principal character and sees the whole world as the latter saw it.5 (v) Locana, p. 442 :: In everyday life we hear such sentences as : "Take the cow to the field for grazing" or "Bring the cow home as it is evening." On hearing these sentences the concerned boy actually carries out what he has been told to do. In literature, however, there is no such activity demanded of the spectator. There is absolutely no suggestion of anything that he is expected to do. His attitude towards the actor playing the part of, say, a villain like Ravana or the actress playing the role of the heroine Sita) is one of appreciation alone and his sole aim is to find restful joy.. In these passages Abhinavagupta pointedly refers to some of the important steps in the aesthetic experience, the attitude of a true spectator, the generalized nature of what he sees on the stage, the extra-ordinary or non-worldly 5. nATaye tu pAramArthika kiJcidadya me kRtyaM bhaviSyatItyevaMbhUtAbhisaMghisaMskArAbhAvAt sarva-pariSatsAdhAraNapramodasArAparyanta samAdaraNIyalokottaradarzanazravaNayogI bhaviSyAmautyabhisaMdhisaMskArAducitagItAtodyacarvaNAvismRtasAMsArikabhAvatayA vimalamukurakalpIbhUtanijahRdayaH sUcyAdyabhinayAvalokanodbhinnapramodazokAditanmayIbhAvaH pAThyAkarNanapAtrAntarapravezavazAt samutpanne dezakAlavizeSAvezAnAliGgite samyaG-mithyA-saMzaya-saMbhAvanAdijJAnavijJeyatvaparAmarzAnAspade svAtmadvAreNa vizvaM au 947... 6. kAvyavAkyebhyo hi na nayanAnayanAdyupayoginI pratItirabhyarthyate, api tu pratItivizrAntikAriNI, sA cAbhiprAyaniSThaiva naabhipretvstupryvsaanaa| -Locana, p. 442

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ABHINAVAGUPTA ON THE ALAUKIKA NATURE OF RASA 31 nature of the cognition of rasa, absence of any (physical) activity on the part of the spectator, and presence in him of a contemplative attitude. (vi) Locana, p. 158 :: Rasa is nothing but aesthetic enjoyment and this enjoyment consists (almost) exclusively in a kind of knowledge or consciousness. If it were possible to convey rasa through words (and their conventional meanings) alone we would have been possibly forced to admit that rasa is, like the denoted sense, laukika. But we do find that rasa is capable of being suggested by alliteration, gentle or harsh, which is devoid of any denoted sense. But in everyday life we never come across a thing which could possibly be suggested by anuprasa. This is therefore, an additional proof for the doctrine of the alaukikatva of rasa.? (vii) A. Bh. I., p. 284 : In another passage Abhinavagupta says : Rasa is completely different from the permanent emotions like love, sorrow, etc; and it cannot be maintained, as Sankuka did, that rasa is the apprehension of the permanent emotion of somebody else and that it is so called because it is an object of relish. For if it were so why should the permanent emotion of real life be not called rasa ? For if a non-existing (unreal) permanent emotion (in the actor) be capable of being the object of aesthetic relish, a real permanent emotion has all the more reason for being so capable. Therefore the apprehension of the permanent emotion of another person should be called only inference and not rasa. For what aesthetic relish is involved in this kind of inferences ? Rasa is not an objective thing in the real world as it is coterminus with the process of aesthetic relish and ceases to exist the moment the process of its relish is over;9... unless one is actually experiencing it, rasa does not exist. Its essence consists exclusively in aesthetic enjoyment. It is the permanent emotion (artha) brought to the state of aesthetic relish which is a form of knowledge free from worldly obstacles-worries, narrow personal interests, etc., by the vibhavas, anubhavas and vyabhicaribhavas which attain a unity in the mind of the spectator (or reader).20 7. jJAnavizeSasyaiva carvaNAtmatvAt / ityalaM bahunA / atazca raso'yamalaukikaH / yena lalitaparuSAnuprAsasyArthAbhidhAnAnupayogino'pi rasaM prati vyaJjakatvam / -Locana, p. 158 vAcakazabdaikagamyatve hi rasasya vAcyArthavallaukikatvaM kathaJcicchakyazakyamanuprAsAdinApi vAcakatvazUnyena vyaGgayatva mastyeva / na cAnuprAsavyaGgya vastu loke dRSTacaramato'pi rasasyAlaukikatvaM siddhmityrthH| _Balaprina 8. sthAyivilakSaNa eva rsH| na tu yathA zaGakukAdirabhyadhIyata-sthAyyeva vibhAvAdipratyAyyo rasyamAnatvAd rasa ucyata iti / evaM hi laukiko'pi kiM na rsH| asato'pi hi yatra rasanIyatA syAt tatra vastusataH kathaM na bhaviSyati / tena sthAyipratItiranumitirUpA prApyA (? vAcyA) na rasaH |...tthaa hi laukikacittavRttyanumAne kA rstaa| -A. Bh.J, p. 284 9. na tu siddhasvabhAvaH tAtkAlika eva na tu crvnnaatiriktkaalaavlmbii...rsH| -A. Bh. I, p. 284 10. ata evAlaukikavibhAvAdinAmadheyavyapadezyaiH...sAmAjikadhiyi samyag yoga saMbandhamaikAgryaM vA''sAditavaddhiralaukikanirvighnasaMvedanAtmakacarvaNAgocaratAM niito'rthshcy'maanntksaarH...rsH| -A. Bh. I, p. 284

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SOME ASPECTS OF THE RASA THEORY (viii) A. Bh. I., pp. 284-285 : The vibhavas etc. are alaukika and are so called on account of their peculiar functions of vibhavana (awakening to life the latent permanent emotion) etc.11 They are not the causes of the production of rasa (nispatti-hetus = karaka-hetus) for if it were so, there would arise the contingency of its (rasa's) existence even in the absence of the knowledge of the vibhavas etc. Nor are they the causes of cognition (Jhapti-hetus) of rasa as rasa is not an objective thing (like a ghata, pata-a jar, cloth, etc.) in our everyday life. Then what are the vibhavas etc.? The vibhavas, etc. are alaukika;; they make it possible for the rasika to relish rasa. If the opponent asks; "Is there anything in the whole world like this?" Abhinavagupta replies: The fact that there is nothing in the whole world like this only serves to strengthen our position that rasa is alaukika.12 In these passages Abhinavagupta draws our pointed attention to two distinctive features of rasa: : One,rasa which consists exclusively in aesthetic relish or pleasure is alaukika as it is radically different in kind from the permanent emotions (four of which are primarily pleasurable and four, primarily painful).13 And, two,: The vibhavas etc. are alaukika. They correspond to the karanas etc. in everyday life but as they make the relish of rasa possible they exist only in the context of rasa. In everyday life we do not have, such terms as vibhava, etc. They belong only to art, not to the real life. The ancients whom Bharata also follows invented an entirely new terminology to impress on our minds the basic distinction between the real life and the realm of literature, the real world and the world of drama. (ix) A. Bh. I. pp. 284-285. : The aesthetic enjoyment of rasa consists in a completely extra-ordinary sense of wonder or mystic delight (camatkara) and is totally different (vilaksana eva) from memory or recollection (smrti), 11. tairevodyAnakaTAkSadhRtyAdibhilaukikIM kAraNatvAdibhuvamatikrAntairvibhAvanA...mAtraprANaiH ata evAlaukikavibhAvAdivyapadezabhAgbhiH ... -A. Bh. I p. 284 12. ata eva vibhAvAdayo na niSpattihetavo rssy| tadvodhApagame'pi rasasaMbhavaprasaGgAt / nApi jJaptihetavaH yena pramANamadhye pateyuH / siddhasya kasyacit prameyabhUtasya rasasyAbhAvAt / kiMtarkhetaddhiM vibhAvAdaya iti / alaukika evAyaM carvaNopayogI vibhaavaadivyvhaarH| kvAnyotthaM dRSTamiti cedu bhuussnnmetdsmaakmlaukiktvsiddhau| . -A. Bh. I. p. 285 Cf also : na hi loke vibhAvAnubhAvAdayaH kecana bhavanti / hetukAryAvasthAmAtratvAloke teSAm / atha ta eva rasanopayogitve vibhAvAdirUpatAM pratipadyante / -A. Bh. I. p. 292 loke hi na kazcid vibhAvAdivyavahAra iti bhAvaH / -A. Bh. .. p. 293 loke vibhAvAnubhAvAbhinayAdivyavahArAbhAvAt / -A. Bh. I. p. 327 13. tathA hi-ratihAsotsAhavismayAnAM sukhasvabhAvatvam |...krodh-bhy-shok-jugupsaanaaN tu duHkhruuptaa| -A. Bh. I. p. 43

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ABHINAVAGUPTA ON THE ALAUKIKA NATURE OF RASA inference and worldly feelings of happiness, etc.14 The empirical means of valid knowledge such as direct perception, etc. do not operate in the case of this non-worldly or extra-worldly (alaukika) rasa-carvana. This aesthetic enjoyment or relish of rasa is brought about solely by the combination of the vibhavas, etc., which are extra-worldly (alaukika)15. It is different from the perception of the permanent emotions of rati (love) etc., aroused by the empirical means of valid knowledge such as direct perception, inference, agama, upamana, etc.16 It is also different from the perception without active participation of the thoughts of others on the part of imperfect yogins;17 further, it is also different from the ecstatic experience of the perfect yogin in which he experiences the undifferentiated bliss of his Self and in which all desire for worldly objects is absent.18 For these three forms of perception are vitiated by one kind of defect or another. To explain, : (i) The perception of the worldly permanant emotions like love etc. gives rise to practical desires such as possessing the object of love etc; (ii) The perception of an imperfect yogin lacks vividness and (iii) The perception of a perfect yogin is simply overpowered by the Atman (self, or Brahman, the Ultimate Reality); and therefore all these three perceptions are devoid of beauty.19 In aesthetic experience, on the contrary, there is no possibility of there arising any obstacle or defect : because of the absence of sensations of pleasure etc. as inhering exclusively in one's person, one is not overpowered by Atman, or Brahman, (the object of samadhi); because of one's active participation and the absence of sensations of pleasure etc. as inhering exclusively in other persons, there is no lack of vividness; and because of one's being overpowered by one's own vasana, say, love etc., awakened by the corresponding vibhavas, etc. which are generalized, there is no possibility of any obstacle confronting you.20 14. tathA hi laukikacittavRttyanumAne kA rstaa| tenAlaukikacamatkArAtmA rasAsvAdaH smRtyanumAnalaukikA sva] saMvedanavilakSaNa ev| -A. Bh. I. p. 284 15 ...na cAtra laukikapratyakSAdipramANavyApAraH / kintvalaukikavibhAvAdisaMyogabalopanateveyaM carvaNA / -Ibid, p. 285 16. #19 TANISHRITHI THPT f-ww-fata-trareaalea..aferad i -Ibid, p. 285 17. det alfitare fatadeperateralitat...rafica -Ibid, I. p. 285 18. sakalavaiSayikoparAgazUnyazuddhaparayogigatasvAtmAnandaikaghanAnubhavAcca viziSyate / -Ibid, p. 285 19. eteSAM yathAyogamarjanAdivighnAntarodayAt tATasthyahetukAsphuTatvena viSayAvezavaivazyena ca saundaryavirahAt / -Ibid, p. 285 20. atra tu svAtmaikAtatvaniyamAsaMbhavAnna viSayAvezavaivazyam , svAtmAnupravezAt paragatatvaniyamAbhAvAnna tATasthyAsphuTatvam, tadvibhAvAdisAdhAraNyavazasaMprabuddhocitanijaratyAdivAsanAvezAcca na vighnAntarAnA saMbhavaH / -Hemacandra's Kavyanusasana, MJV edn, pp. 102-103

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34 SOME ASPECTS OF THE RASA THEORY In this passage Abhinavagupta asserts that empirical means of valid knowledge do not at all operate in the case of rasana (and consequently that of rasa) and contrasts the aesthetic pleasure or relish or experience with a number of other experiences. These other experiences are: (i) ordinary perception or cognition or apprehension of love, etc. produced by empirical means of valid knowledge; (ii) telepathy (the knowledge of other people's minds) of an imperfect yogin and (iii) the ecstatic experience of the perfect yogin in which he experiences the undifferentiated (compact) bliss of his Self. He is all the while driving at the alaukika nature of rasa. (x) A. Bh. I. p. 285 : Rasa consists exclusively in aesthetic relish and it is not of the nature of the object of cognition. The very life or existence of rasa entirely depends on this aesthetic relish. (Rasa ceases to exist after its enjoyment.) The aesthetic relish is not the result of any means of valid congnition nor of any means of production. But rasa itself is not unprovable for it is verified by one's own heart--from one's own experience of it. Aesthetic relish or experience consists exclusively in knowledge. However this knowledge is totally different from all other empirical or mundane kinds of knowledge.21 In this passage Abhinayagupta makes it clear that aesthetic experience, which consists exclusively in knowledge, is in a class by itself, not comparable to any other kind of knowledge, unique, sui generis. Further, he asserts that the proof of rasa is "sva-samvedana-siddhatvam"-because rasa is felt, therefore it exists." (xi) Locana : pp 86, 92-93, 155 : In the "Kraunca-episode", narrated at the beginning of Valmiki's Ramayana, the sage's poetic utterance is not to be viewed as the expression of his own sorrow. It is hardly natural for one that is tormented by grief to play the poet,.. (It is not the emotional situation as it actually was (laukika) that is represented in it. It is the situation as it is in the poet's vision or as it has been transfigured by his sensitive nature and imaginative power (alaukika)22 The word "pratibha" means "creative imagination" capable of creating ever newer and newer things. A form of this pratibha is capable of creating beautiful poetry. It is when the poet is filled with rasa-(is fully under 21. rasyataikaprANo hyasau na prmeyaadisvbhaavH|...saa ca rasanA na pramANavyApAro na kaarkvyaapaarH| svayaM tu nAprAmANikaH / svasaMvedanasiddhatvAt / rasanA ca bodharUpaiva / kintu bodhAntarebhyo laukikebhyo vilkssnnaiv| 22. Afara afast HTA: Radt: HAT: yat krauJcamithunAdekamavadhIH kAmamohitam // iti // naga: sila sfa HMOQL .... a garantia chia -Locana, p. 86 Cf: evaM hi lokagatacittavRttyanumAnamAtramiti kA rstaa| yastvalaukikacamatkArAtmA rasAsvAdaH kAvyagata-vibhAvAdiH carvaNAprANo nAsau smaraNAnumAnAdisAmyena khilIkArapAtrIkartavyaH / -Ibid, p. 155

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ABHINAVAGUPTA ON THE ALAUKIKA NATURE OF RASA 35 the spell of rasa) that he spontaneously expresses himself in the form of poetry-like a liquid, say water, which overflows a vase if it be already full.23 The purport of this passage is : A poet does not depict "the emotional situation as it actually exists and as he witnesses it. That would by no means constitute art. He idealises the situation. Absorption in such an idealised situation helps transcending worries, tensions of ordinary life and attaining a unique form of experience. That is why rasa is called alaukika." (xii) A. Bh. I. p. 282 : All these rasas consist essentially in delight, for the essence of undifferentiated or compact prakasa (light) consisting in the aesthetic rapture of one's own consciousness is (transcendental) delight. In everyday life also women when they are totally absorbed in the relish or rumination of their consciousness plunged in profound sorrow find rest or repose in their own heart: For happiness consists in complete rest or repose without any kind of obstacle. Pain, on the contrary, is nothing but lack or absence of complete rest or repose. It is precisely for this reason that the Samkhyas who explain sorrow as property of rajas declare that restlessness is the very essence of sorrow. All the rasas thus consist essentially in (mystic) delight.24 (xiii). A.Bh. I. pp 291-292 : In this passage, which is apparently aimed at criticising Sankuka, Abhinayagupta says : People (like Sankuka) argue that rasa consists in the imitation of (permanent emotions such as) love etc. They themselves raise the objection : "How can sorrow be the cause of pleasure ?" And they answer their own objection by saying that it is the very nature of the emotions that when portrayed in a drama they give rise to pleasure. In refuting this position Abhinavagupta writes : "But in the first place, the objection they raise is itself false. For it is not a rule that when one perceives sorrow in somebody else, one will necessar . 23. afdall'engage ATHITTAT FENT I datat chandragite loadinara.cat -Ibid, pp. 92-93 ... yAvat pUrNo na caitena tAvannaiva vamatyamum / -Ibid, p. 87 Note :- For this paragraph I am indebted to M. Hiriyanna : Art Experience, pp. 34-35. 24. tatra sarve'mI sukhapradhAnAH / svasaMvicarvaNarUpasyaikaghanasya prakAzasthAnandasAratvAt / tathA hi-ekaghanazokasaMviccarvaNe 'pi loke strIlokasya hRdayavizrAntirantarAyazUnyavizrAntizarIratvAt / avizrAntirUpataiva duHkham / tata eva kApilairduHkhasya cAJcalyameva prANatvenoktaM rajovRttitAM vadadbhirityAnandarUpatA sarvarasAnAm / Read in this connection the following passage from Aesthetic Rapture, Vol. I. pp. 31-32: ...." The compassion of a poem is different from the compassion found in the ordinary world. The explanation is that sensitive readers (rasika) become more and more deeply attracted towards this aesthetic experience of grief whereas they tend to shun the real experience. For if (karuna) were to consist exclusively in sorrow the way worldly karunc does, then nobody would feel like going (to plays in which Koruna-rasa was present) and thus large and important) works as the Ramayana etc. which consist exclusively in karunarcsa, would fall into oblivion.... Therefore, karuna, like the other rasas consists in joy." Also, cf : Dhanika's Avaloka on Dasarupaka (Adyar edn. 1963, p. 221) and Sahitya-Darpana TII. 4-8.

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36 SOME ASPECTS OF THE RASA THEORY ily feel sorrow in oneself. For instance, when one finds one's enemy in sorrow one is delighted. In other cases (i. e. those of persons who are neither one's friends nor foes) one remains indifferent. Now as regards the answer they gave to their own objection that it is the very nature of the emotions that when they are portrayed in a drama they give rise to pleasure) it is no answer at all. In our opinion, in aesthetic experience it is one's own consciousness which consists of uniform bliss that is enjoyed. How can there be any suspicion of sorrow? The various permanent emotions like love, sorrow, etc. only serve to lend variety to the enjoyment of this bliss. Acting (abhinaya) etc. serve to awaken to life these permanent emotions."25 In these passages Abhinavagupta dwells upon his favourite theme that all rasas are essentially pleasurable. Even the painful emotions of anger, fear, sorrow and disgust (krodha, bhaya, soka and jugupsa) of our real life, when poetised or represented on the stage, are contemplated in their idealised form, completely divorced from reference to personal interests, one's own or those of others, (and from all reference to time and space); and when they are thus contemplated they yield pure joy. ___ (xiv) Locana : p. 40, p. 399, p. 455 : Abhinavagupta states that oyutpatti (instruction in regard to the four well-known purusarthas-ends of human life, or as the term has been sometimes interpreted, moral instruction, intellectual refinement) and priti (pleasure, joy, delight) constitute the goal of literature. If vyutpatti is half of the goal of literature, priti is the other half. But he does not fail to state that moral instruction and delight are not really different from one another but are two aspects of the same thing; for they both have the same cause-both are aroused by poetry-both are the result of one and the same aesthetic experience. 26 25. ye tu ratyAdyanukaraNarUpaM rasamAhuH, atha codayanti zokaH kayaM sukhaheturiti / pariharanti ca asti ko'pi nATyagatAnAM vizeSa iti / tatra codyaM tAvadasat / zoko hi pratIyamAnaH kiM svAtmani pratyeturduHkhaM vitanotIti niyamaH / zatrudaHkhe praharSAt / anyatra ca madhyasthatvAt / uttaraM tu bhAvAnAM vastusvabhAvamAtreNa (mAtratA) iti na kiJcidatra tattvam / asmanmate sNvednmevaanndghnmaasvaadyte| tatra kA duHkhAzaGkA / kevalaM tasyaiva citratAkaraNe rtishokaadivaasnaavyaapaarH| tadubodhane caabhinyaadivyaapaarH| - -A. Bh. I. pp. 291-292 26. (i) tatra kavestAvatkIrtyApi prItireva sNpaadyaa| yadAha-kIrti svargaphalamAhuH' (kAvyAlaGkArasUtravRtti 1.1.5) ityAdi / zrotRNAM ca vyutpatti-prItI yadyapi staH, yathoktamdharmArthakAmamokSeSu vaicakSaNyaM kalAsu c| karoti kIrtiM prItiM ca sAdhukAvyaniSevaNam // iti // tathApi tatra prItireva pradhAnam / anyathA prabhusaMmitebhyo vedAdibhyo mitrasaMmitebhyazcetihAsAdibhyo vyutpattihetubhyaH ko'sya kAvyarUpasya vyutpattihetorjAyAsaMmitatvalakSaNo vizeSa iti prAdhAnyenAnanda evoktH| caturvargavyutpatterapi cAnanda eva pAryantikaM mukhya phalam / ... ---Locana, pp. 44-41 (ii) ...rasAsvAdavaivazyameva svarasabhAvinyAM vyutpattau prayojakamiti prItireva vyutpatteH prayojikA / prItyAtmA ca rasastadeva nATayaM nATayameva veda ityasmadupAdhyAyaH / na caite prItivyutpattI bhinnarUpe eva / dvayorapyekaviSayatvAt / -Locana, p. 336

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ABHINAVAGUPTA ON THE ALAUKIKA NATURE OF KASA 7 (xv) A. Bh. I., p. 3 : Drama is indeed different from every wordly thing (laukika-padartha-vyatiriktam); it is altogether different from (vilaksanam), imitation (anukara), reflection (pratibimba), picture (alekhya), similitude (sadrsya), superimposition (aropa), identity, poetical fancy, dream, tricks, magic, and the like. It is fit to be cognised by one's own perception which is of the nature of aesthetic relish; and this cognition is altogether different (bhinna-vrttanta) from the well-known kinds of knowledge; right perception, error, doubt, lack of determinate knowledge, and lack of identity. It is truly of the nature of rasa (aesthetic experience).27 (xvi) A. Bh. I., p. 35 : Abhinavagupta explains the above passage with examples while commenting on Bharata's Natya-Sastra,) 1.107, p. 35: To explain : Here, that is in drama, (literally, in the Natyaveda) those who are seen (on the stage-playing the roles of the gods and the demons) are not the real gods and the demons. With regard to them there arises neither the cognition of identity nor of similitude, as in the case of twins; nor of error (mistaken knowledge), as in the case of a mother-of-pearl for silver, nor of superimposition, as when one says : "This man from the country called Balhika (part of modern Punjab) is a bull"; nor of a poetical fancy, as when one says " Her face is like the moon"; nor of a copy, as in the case of a picture or a clay-model etc.; nor of an imitation, as in the case of a disciple who cleverly imitates his teacher when reproducing his explanation; nor of a sudden creation, as in magic (indrajala); nor of an appearance by employing maya (tricks), as in the case of a sleight of hand, etc. In all these cases, as there is no sadharani-karana and the spectator is quite indifferent he cannot have the aesthetic pleasure or experience.28 er: (iii) na hi teSAM (kAvya) vAkyAnAmamiSTomAdivAkyavat satyArthapratipAdanadvAreNa pravartakatvAya prAmANyamanviSyate, prItimAtraparyavasAyitvAt / prItereva cAlaukikacamatkArarUpAyA vyutpatyajatvAt / -Locana, p. 455 ' 'Note :- Abhinavagupta quotes the view of an earlier writer: sAmAjikAnAM hi hakaphalaM nATayaM na shokaadiphlm|| -A. Bh. I. p. 289 "The sole purpose of drama is joy and that it never creates sorrow." From the passages cited above it would seem that Abhinavagupta would agree with this view. 27. tatra nATayaM nAma laukikapadArthavyatirikaM tadanukAra-pratibimbAlekhyasAdRzyAropAdhyavasAyotprekSAsvapnamAyendrajAlAdi vilakSaNaM tad-grAhakasya samyagjJAna-zrAntisaMzayAnavadhAraNAnadhyavasAyavijJAnaminnavRttAntAsvAdanarUpasaMvedanasaMvecaM vastu rasa-svabhAvamiti vkssyaamH| -A. Bh.I. p.35 28. tathAhi-teSu na tatvena dhiiH| na sAdRzyena yamalakavat / na bhrAntatvena rUpyasmRtipUrvakazuktirUpyavat / nAropeNa samyagjJAnavAdhAnantaramithyAjJAnarUpam / na tadadhyavasAyena gaurvAhIkavat / notprekSyamANatvena candramukhavat / na tatpratikRtitvena citrapustavat / na tadanukAreNa guru-ziSya-vyAkhyAhevAkavat / na tAtkAlikanirmANendrajAlavat / na yuktiviracitatadAbhAsatayA hastalAghavAdimAyAvat / sarveSveteSu pakSeSvasAdhAraNatayA draSTuraudAsInye rasAsvAdAyogAt / -A. Bh. I p. 35

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38 SOME ASPECTS OF THE RASA THEORY In these passages Abhinavagupta demonstrates how drama (or, for the matter of that, creative literature) is unique, different from the various ordinary worldly things and how it lies beyond the ken of the various recognised modes or means of cognition, and is therefore alaukika, completely outside both time and space . He means to say Drama or "Literature occupies a time and a space that exist to the side of the world we know, it is a dimension apart, a different order of reality."29 "The aesthetic perception which is not dependent on the concepts of reality and unreality, cannot be spoken of as a real experience (that is, the direct experience, perception of something real). Abhinavagupta says it is like a real experience. In other terms, the aesthetic experience is like a direct perception sui generis, free of every relation with practical reality, etc. "30 Abhinavagupta's alaukikatva of rasa doctrine may briefly be stated as follows: Objects in the world of poetry or drama have no place in the everyday world of our space and time. Owing to this lack of ontological status the question of reality or unreality does not apply to them. This, however, does not mean that they are unreal. They are drawn from life but are idealised. They, however, do not become false or illusory through idealisation. A reader or spectator who mistakes them for real objects or views them as unreal or false is no true spectator-sahrdaya. The objects, depicted in poetry or drama, assume a unique character which the spectator can describe as neither real nor unreal. To take a logical view of the things portrayed in poetry or drama or to adopt a strictly philosophic approach to literature would only invite ridicule (as Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta say).31. The things of our real life the poet transforms by the magic touch of his divine pratibha-creative imagination. That the aesthetic sense is not universal is a well-known fact. The poet therefore, needs a sahrdaya (one endowed with a similar sensitivity-a sensitive spectator or fully responsive reader) to, appreciate the things of beauty and joy he has created by his pratibha. 29. Aesthetic Rapture, Vol. I. p.32 and Vol. II. f. n. 271 30. R. Gnoli : The Aesthetic Experience According to Abhinavagupta, pp, 57-58, f. n. 1 31. kAvyaviSaye ca vyaGgayapratItInAM satyAsatyanirUpaNasyAprayojakatvameveti taMtra pramANAntaravyApAraparIkSopahAsAyaiva sNpdyte| --Dhvanyaloko, p. 455 na hi teSAM vAkyAnAmagniSTomAdivAkyavat satyArthapratipAdanadvAreNa pravartakatvAya prAmANyamanviSyate, prItimAtraparyava. sAyitvAt / prItereva cAlaukikacamatkArarUpAyA vyutpatyajatvAt |...naayN sahRdayaH kevalaM zuSkatarkopakramakarkazahRdayaH pratIti parAmaSTuM nAlamityeSa uphaasH| -Locana, p. 455 and, shitene i loga a FrostS -Locana, p. 173 Incidentally, it may be noted that Abhinavagupta's respected guru, Bhatta Tauta, argues against the maxim of a painting of a horse (citra-turaga-nyaya) of Sankuka. His arguments apply conditions of truth and falsiiy. (Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta are very well aware that such notions of truth and falsity do not apply to the realm of literature (or art in general) as would be crystal clear from the above quotations.

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ABHINAVAGUPTA ON THE ALAUKIKA NATURE OF RASA 39 In our real life everything is consciously or unconsciously related to the - individual perceiver (pramatr) or to his friend, or to his enemy (para) or to some one in no way connected with him (tatastha). But the poet's creations are not so related; they are wholly impersonal. They have no reference to anybody in particular. Being altogether divorced from reference to personal interests, one's own or those of others, aesthetic experience is free from all the limitations of ordinary pleasure, arising out of narrow attachment, such as envy, desire or aversion; and the sahTdaya becomes almost unconscious of his private self. He rises above the duality of pain and pleasure, love and hatred and enjoys through disinterested contemplation absolutely pure joy or delight. With the outer vesture of all practical interests and infatuation removed he experiences pure delight, ananda, bliss of his Self with this qualification that it is coloured by a particular vasana say of love, sorrow, etc., awakened to life for the time being by the particular vibhavas, etc.,32 He experiences or enjoys a unique kind of delight that has no parallel in our everyday life. It is therefore called alaukika. The aesthetic perception is an inward-oriented apprehension. The sahrdaya is completely absorbed in the aesthetic object to the exclusion of everything else-in other words, his mind is completely free from all obstacles, worries, tensions, preoccupations, prejudices etc., and he tastes his own consciousness which is but pure bliss and bliss alone. It is only coloured by some vasana. or the other, aroused by the particular vibhavas and that is why it is said to be akin to the enjoyment of Brahman-the Ultimate Reality (Brahmasvadasavidha). These important passages from Abhinavagupta's two works on literary and aesthetic criticism throw sufficient light on alaukikatva, a key term for him. It would be evident to a careful student of these passages that Abhinavagupta uses the term alaukika with different shades of meaning. In one or two places he uses the term alaukika to distinguish the process whereby rasa is achieved from other worldly or mundane (laukika) processes. It is achieved by the power of suggestion which is peculiar to poetry (or creative literature) and not by the commonly known processes of abhidha (power of denotation) and laksana, gunavrtti, or bhakti (secondary usage). Occasionally he uses this term 'alaukika'to point out that the mundane or worldly or earthly things of our everyday life are completely transformed by the magic touch of the activity of a poet's pratibha (creative imagination, genius). He, however, frequently uses this term to mean "what is different or distinct from worldly things", "non-ordinary", "non-worldly", "what is not found in every 32. (i) FAN Praca Agrupareared 99 71 : ETTET I got famafcut graantzalearealdhyApAraH / tadudbodhane caabhinyaadivyaapaarH| -A. Bh. I. p. 292 (ii) tatra sarvarasAnA zAntaprAya evAsvAdo viSayebhyo viparivRttyAntarmukhatAlAbhAt / kevalaM vAsanAntaropahita ityasya - sarvaprakRtitvAbhidhAnAya pUrvamabhidhAnam / -A. Bh. I. p. 339 (as restored by me)

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SOME ASPECTS OF THE RASA THEORY day life", "what exists only in the realm of literature (or any other fine art)". He also uses the term to convey the sense of "what is unique", "in a class by itself", sui generis, transcendental or autonomous. He lays great emphasis on this aspect of rasa when he, over and over again, remarks that experience of rasa is something that is alaukika, not really of this world, and beyond our concepts of time and space or divorced from time and space and that it approximates the experience of the perfect yogin in which he experiences the undifferentiated bliss of his Self or that it is akin to the enjoyment or relish of Brahman-the Ultimate Reality. Before comparing Abhinavagupta's position that rasa is alaukika with Kant's position that art experience is autonomous, let me briefly state in the words of Prof. R. B. Patankar, the author of Saumdarya-Mimamsa, a unique work on Aesthetics in Marathi, the autonomist position of Kant : "Two postions have been taken regarding the relation between (i) art experience and (ii) other experiences in life. The first position is that (a) there is a continuity between the two types, (i) and (ii), of experiences (b) and that art experience is valuable because it promotes goals of these other experiences. (E. g., art experience is valuable because it gives us an insight into reality, it makes us morally better.) The second position is that art experience is radically different from other varieties of experiences, the difference is one of kind, not one of degree. Art experience is sui generis; autonomous, selfcontained; art experience is valuable because it is art experience, and for no other reason. If one wants to maintain the autonomist position, as Kant wants to, one has to show that art experience is different from (i) cognitive experience (ii) practical experience, including moral experience; (iii) experience of sensory pleasure, entertainment, etc. If the autonomy of art experience is to be proved, it will have to be shown (a) that the art object does not have the ontological status that objects in the real world have, and (b) that, art experience is not mediated by any concepts. Sanskrit aestheticians like Sankuka, Abhinavagupta have pointed out that the art object does not have the ontological status that things in the real world have. But no Sanskrit aesthetician has thought it necessary to say that art experience is not mediated by concepts... Sankuka has deontologised the art object. But no Sanskritist deconceptualised art experience." If we examine the concept of Abhinavagupta, that rasa is alaukika, by applying the above-mentioned criteria we will have to admit that Abhinavagupta is not autonomist. It is true that according to Abhinavagupta the empirical means of valid cognition such as direct perception, inference, etc. simply do not operate in regard to rasa. He explicitly states that no kind of intellectual thinking bears any parallel to the experience of rasa. Further, it is also true that according to him sheer delight is ultimately the sole aim or goal of poetry (or creative literature). Saknuka, and following his lead, Abhinavagupta have deontologised the art-object. But they have not taken

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ABHINAVAGUPTA ON THE ALAUKIKA NATURE OF RASA 41 the second step-they have not deconceptualised art or aesthetic experience. So they cannot be called autonomist in the Kantian sense. But leaving aside this restricted Kantian meaning of the term 'autonornist' and accepting the words 'autonomy' and 'autonomist' in their wider sense we can certainly say that Abhinavagupta and Anandavardhana, whom Abhinavagupta follows, are both full-fledged autonomists: In his Dhvanyaloka Anandavardhana observes : "In the province of poetry (creative literature) obviously standards of truth and falsity have no relevance. Any attempt to find out or discover whether a poem (or any literary composition) is true or false by employing means of valid cognition leads to ridicule alone." Abhinavagupta comments on it : "Such a person will be ridiculed as follows: He is not sensitive to literature. He is not able or competent to appreciate aesthetic experience for his mind has become (truly) hard by his indulging in dry logic." 33 In the same work at another place Anandavardhana dwells upon the autonomy of a poet : "In the boundless world of poetry, the poet is the sole creator. As it pleases him to create a new world of his own, this real world is transformed. If the poet is pervaded by rasa then the whole world in his poem will be infused with rasa. But if he be devoid of emotion then the world too will become dry as dust. A great or good poet, by virtue of his autonomy, at his sweet will causes even insentient objects to behave as if they were animate and animate objects to behave as if they were inanimate."34 Mammata, a staunch follower of Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta endorses this view of poet's autonomy, and consequently, that of the aesthetic experience in the opening verse of his Kavyaprakasa : "Supreme is the poet's speech which unfolds an altogether new creation, which is free from the laws of niyati (Destiny or nature), which consists of delight and delight alone, which is completely independent of anything else and which is charming on account of nine rasas." So keeping in view the ancient tradition about the alaukika nature of poetic creation and Abhinavagupta's constant emphasis on the alaukika nature of rasa throughout his writings we are perfectly justified in 33. Vide footnote (29) supra. 34.38917 2764EUR ATT Hata: alla: yathAsmai rocate vizvaM tathedaM parivartate // zuGgArI cet kaviH kAvye jAtaM rasamayaM jagat / sa eva vItarAgazcennIrasaM sarvameva tat // bhAvAnacetanAnapi cetanavacetanAnacetanavat / vyavahArayati yatheSTaM sukaviH kAvye svatantratayA // - Dhvanyaloka, p. 498

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42 SOME ASPECTS OF THE RASA THEORY describing Abhinavagupta as a champion of alaukikatavada, an autonomist in the popular and wider sense of that word. To call Abhinavagupta an autonomist in the restricted sense in which Kant uses the term, would be a highly misleading and inexcusable error. Finally, it would be better to coin a new appropriate term (other than autonomy) in English to express Abhinavagupta's concept of alaukikatva and a new suitable term (other than alaukikatva) in modern Indian languages like Marathi, Gujarati, Hindi etc. to express Kant's concept of autonomy. If this suggestion is followed a lot of confusion in the minds of scholars reading books on Abhinavagupta and his alaukikatva in English and modern Indian languages would be avoided. Although Bhatta Tauta criticises Sankuka's analogy of citra-turagapratiti' and although it is traditionally believed that the view of the guru is also the view of his sisya, Abhinavagupta's own statements indisputably prove that he is one with Sankuka in accepting alaukika or the unique mode of perception involved in aesthetic experience- citra-turaga-pratiti. .

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Worldly Nature of Rasa T. S. NANDI Aesthetes over centuries have discussed the nature of rasa and they seem to have agreed to differ. Abhinavagupta, with his master Anandavardhana, and his followers, the great alamkarikas such as Mammata, Hemacandra, Visvanatha and Jagannatha and a host of others belonging to the formidable Kashmiri tradition, have all unequivocally declared the 'a-laukikatva' of rasa : asmanmate tu samvedanameva anandaghanam asvadyate; tatra ka duhkhasanka. But there were others who held the opposite view. Abhinava could see the strength of their case and in order to reduce it he was almost forced to amend the text of Bharata and read-'harsamcadhigacchanti' in place of harsadinscadhigacchanti,' but even while doing so he had to recognise a weighty opinion on the nature of rasa that went dead against him. We will try to examine this problem in its historical perspective. To say that the nature of rasa is worldly is to say that the emotional response to a work of art does not basically differ from its counterpart in the work-a-day world. This means that feelings and emotions and events presented through the medium of art do not differ in nature from their counterparts in the real world and that they cause identical response by way of generating a feeling of happiness or unhappiness in the minds of discerning spectators in the case of a dramatic performance or readers in the case of poetry. The crux of the problem is whether life presented through the medium of poetry or art retains its original character, that is whether it continues to be a mixture of good and evil resulting into happiness and unhappiness. Abhinava and his school are of the opinion that life presented through artistic media undergoes a sea-change, and is transformed into an experience totally unworldly, a-laukika, consisting of only bliss unbounded. The joys and sorrows of life, the favourable and the unfavourable, the acceptable and the unacceptable are all transformed creating a unique aesthetic experience not to be found in normal life. He says: Rasa or aesthetic pleasure is never met with in ordinary life, but is peculiar to art. The bhavas or emotions and feelings, when suggestedabhivyakta-cease to have their original character. But this was not acceptable to a number of aesthetes, perhaps beginning with Bharata himself. Life for them, continues to be the same mixture of pleasure and pain even when presented through the art-media. For Abhinava and his followers, therefore, rasa is sthayivilaksana, i. e. different in nature from the laukika sthayi while for the others the laukika sthayi, is itself rasa: . 1. m 2 7 6 4 Gia si: Natya-sastra VOL. I, p 291 (GOS edn, Baroda, 1956)

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44 SOME ASPECTS OF THE RASA THEORY sthayi eva rasah. We will try to see how a majority of the aesthetes held this view but were perhaps outnumbered by Abhinava and his friends. We will begin with Bharata, whose Natyasastra (NS) (second edn. G. O. S. 56) is perhaps the oldest available document on Indian aesthetics. Bharata wants the dramatic performance to represent life in its varied colours, reflecting the activity of the whole mankind in its various moods. He says: Natya is supposed to be rooted in dharma, i. e. it imparts instruction concerning one's duty, is covetable, is accompained by the means for attaining the four goals of human life in a direct way, throws light on all the activities of people for future generations. It is rich with the essence of all the sastras, promotes all arts. I will define the nature and scope of the fifth Veda called natya. (NS. I, 14, 15).2 The first performance presented an imitation, in which the demons were shown to be defeated by the gods.3 This presentation was full of the din and bustle, of life4 causing jubilation for the gods and a sense of insult and injury in the camp of the asurass. It was thought advisable to appease the demons, who felt sore over the presentation and took it as an insult. The creator of natya-veda or dramatic art tried to pacify them in soft words explaining how his art-creation tried to reflect the auspicious and the inauspicious alike in the case of both the gods as well as the demons, and that it followed the pattern of activity and intention on their part: I have created Natyaveda which depicts the good or bad fortunes of (both) the gods as well as you (Asuras) and it follows the patterns of one's activity, intention or feeling and lineage. It does not exhibit exclusively either your or the gods' (behaviour). It represents the behaviour and states of all the three worlds. (NS. I, 106, 107):.. 2. dharmyamaye yazasyaM ca sopadezyaM sasaGgraham / bhaviSyatazca lokasya sarvakarmAnudarzakam / nA. zA. (1-14, pR. 13). sarvazAstrArthasampannaM sarvazilpapravartakam / nATayAkhyaM paJcamaM vedaM setihAsaM karomyaham // (1-15, pR. 13) 3. tadante'nukRtibaddhA yathA daityAH surairjitaaH|| ___ nA. zA. (1. 57 ba, pR. 26). 4. sampheTavidravakRtA cchedyamedyAhavAtmikA / ___ nA. zA. (1.58 a, pR. 26) 5. abhavankSubhitAH sarve daityA ye tatra snggtaaH|| nA. zA. (1. 64 ba, pR. 28) 6. pratyAdezo'yamasmAkaM murArtha bhavatA kRtH|| nA. zA. (1. 103 ba, pR. 33) 7. bhavatAM devatAnAM ca zubhAzubhavikalpakaH / karmabhAvAnvayApekSI nATayavedo mayA kRtaH // nA. zA. (1. 106, pR. 35) naikAntato'tra bhavatAM devAnAM cAnubhAvanam / trailokyasyAsya sarvasya nATayaM bhAvAnukIrtanam // nA. zA. (1. 107, pR. 35).

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WORLDLY NATURE OF RASA Bharata seems to advocate that normal likes and dislikes, hate and love are reflected as they are in their true colours, of course, bereft of any personal element. It should exactly reflect different shades of life causing a feeling of joy or sadness as the case may be : Natya which is created by me, reflects various feelings and situations, (and) represents the general pattern of life in the world. It deals with the activity of the high, the middle and the low classes of people, imparts instruction for their welfare, and leads to satisfaction, entertainment and happiness, etc. (NS. I, 112, 113). 8 The 'adi' in 'sukhadikrt' is important and Bharata thereby admits 'duhkha' also in the fold of art-experience. Though of course Abhinava does not accept this and explains 'adi' as-by adi' is meant the enlightenment of the pious people.9 That the dramatic art is embracing is suggested by Bharata when he says that it touches every art and every aspect of life-There is no knowledge, no art, no branch of learning or fine art, no application (of art and knowledge), no activity which is not reflected in natya.10 In fact, this art is meant to reflect life in its entirety-This natya will imitate the activity of the) seven dvipas (i. e. the entire world.) 11 The nature of our existence which is a curious mixture of happiness and unhappiness is sought to be exactly represented by art-media : The nature of worldly existence which is a mixture of pleasure and pain as expressed by physical and other types of representation is called natya.12 Even Abhinaya, while commenting on verses 118 and 119 on p. 43, admits of the fact that the various sthayibhavas and vyabhicarins are a blending of both happiness and unhappiness : Natya is (the complete representation) of the entire world with both its pain and pleasure that one relishes in its depersonalized form.13 He further elaborates how various 8.. nAnAbhAvopasampannaM nAnAvasthAntarAtmakam / lokavRttAnukaraNaM nATayametanmayA kRtam // FT, 311. (9-993, 9. ro) .. uttamAdhamamadhyAno narANAM karmasaMzrayam / hitopadezajananaM dhRtikrIDAsukhAdikRt // HT. 31. (9.993, 9. ro) 9. Eta aqfeqat afatete garanti (27. #1. g. 38) 10. na tajjJAnaM na tacchilpaM na sA vidyA na sA kalA / nAsau yogo na tatkarma nATaye'smin yanna dRzyate // 1. 371. (1.994, . 89) 11. Harg rui arghaslacat PT. II. (9.990 7. 9. 89) 12. yo'yaM svabhAvo lokasya sukhaduHkhasamanvitaH / so'GgAyabhinayopeto nATayamityabhidhIyate // DE IT. ITT. (9.993, 9. x2) 13. lokasya sarvasya sAdhAraNatayA svatvena bhAvyamAnazcaya'mANo'rtho nATyam / sa ca sukhaduHkharUpeNa vicitreNa smnugtH| S aat CAT 1 - (27. pr. q. v:)

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SOME ASPECTS OF THE RASA THEORY feelings cause pleasure or pain, and concludes (p. 44, A. bh.): Natya is that complex of feelings which resembles the entire gamut of pleasurable and painful worldly emotions and which contains the traces of the latter. 14 It is only a necessary logical step further, to say that the nature of artexperience, the rasa is identical everywhere, i. e. of the nature of both happiness and unhappiness, resulting into the laukikatva' of this experience. This perhaps is undeniable so far as Bharata is concerned. The samavakara type as illustrated by Amrta-manthana (iv. 2, 3, 4 p. 85), or the dima. called Tripuradaha (iv. 10, p. 86), also represents the same admixture, the same reflection of activity and feelings of a similar (karma-bhavanukirtana) nature (iv. 11, p. 87). In chapter VI. vv. 15, 16, 17 etc. Bharata enumerates the rasas and bhavas, and gives his famous rasa-sutra viz., Vibhavanubhava-vyabhicari-samyogadrasanispattih, at VI. 31, p. 272. Lollata, whose views are quoted in the A. bh. (p. 272) seems to hold that the rasa is located both in the 'anukarya' i. e. original character, historical or otherwise as the case may be, and the anukarta, i. e. the actor- (p. 272, A. bh.) : Rasa is present in both-primarily in Rama, the object of imitation, and secondarily also) in the actor, through the continuous awareness (present in both, the actor and the spectator of the fact of representation).15 This perhaps implies that for Lollata emotion in art-experience is on the same footing as that in normal life. To put it more clearly, rasa is sukhaduhkhatmaka i. e. of the nature of pleasure and pain as in the case of laukika Ramadi i. e. worldly Rama etc. and is therefore of a worldly nature. Perhaps Lollata is close to Bharata, who, we will go to see, further explains in ch. VII, the nature of various sthayibhavas and vyabhicari-bhavas in a similar vein. For Lollata then,sthayi eva rasah'i. e. rasa is sthayibhava itself seems to be the guiding principle. For Sankuka also, rasa is an imitation of feelings and moods realised through inference with the help of unfailing marks in the actor. The sthayi (which originally belongs to chief characters like Rama and) which is perceived, on the strength of the tokens, as being present in the actor is of the nature of imitation; and because it is of the nature of imitation it is called by a different name rasa.16 It should be specially noted that in the A. bh. there is no mention of 'vastu-saundaryabalat rasaniyatvena...etc. thereby giving not even the 14. laukikA ye sukhaduHkhAtmAno bhAvAH tatsadRzastatsaMskArAnuviddho nATayalakSaNo'rthaH samudAyarUpastasyaiva bhAgAnusamayaH / (81. 9. 9. xv) 15. sa cobhayorapi / [mukhyayA vRttyA rAmAdau] anukArye'nukartaryapi cAnusandhAnabalAt / (39. HI. 9. 248) 16. anukasthatvena liGgabalataH pratIyamAnaH sthAyI anukaraNarUpaH / anukaraNarUpatvAdeva ca nAmAntareNa vyapadiSTo rasaH / (ST. 91. 9. 202)

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WORLDLY NATURE OF RASA 47 slightest chance of believing that perhaps for Sankuka the nature of artexperience was totally divorced from the nature of worldly experience and that for him rasa was laukika-sthayi-vilaksana. It is only Mammata who seems to introduce this twist, though of course Sankuka does differentiate between 'avagamanasakti' which is itself abhinayana' and vacakatva : avagamanasaktirhi abhinayanam vacakatvadanya (p. 273). 'Anumiti' and 'vacakatva' stand poles apart, but this does not change the laukika nature of rasa in the opinion of Sankuka, which is the main target of attack for Abhinaya who later on says : Where is the relish in the mere inference of a worldly feeling ?17 It seems very clear that at least for Abhinava, Sankuka's imaginative guess of a particular basic mental state is equivalent to the normal process of reasoning of a worldly mental state. In that case, it will be safe to presume that perhaps for Sankuka also rasa is identical with the feelings and emotions met with in ordinary life and is therefore laukika.' In these circumstances it is difficult to presume that Sankuka ever imagined a sthayi in the poetic context to be dissimilar to the ordinary sthayin. Tauta, when he criticises Sankuka means exactly this and observes : If someone were to say that the actor's feeling of Rati which is apprehended (by the spectator) is the. same as the Erotic sentiment (srngara) it remains to be seen in what form (it is so apprehended.) (Let us suppose that exponent of the Imitation theory says that) we apprehend the actor's feelings of Rati in the same way as we apprehend in ordinary life the Rati in a person through the complex of causes like young women, effects like their sidelong glances, concomitants like feeling of satisfaction. If this is so then it can be objected that Rati in its original form, and not in its imitated form, is apprehended. Then the whole talk of imitation is meaningless.18 Tauta comes to the inevitable conclusion that whatever Sankuka has said is less than sense-atha ca tadanukarapratibhasa iti rikta vecoyuktih (p.275, A. bh). Abhinava also seems to toe the line of his guru and declares that if rasa is just a feeling arrived at by reasoning with the help of (artificial) determinants etc., then what harm is there in recognising rasc in ordinary life where the determinants etc., are real?-And it is not as Sankuka and others have said viz. that a permanent emotion, brought to consciousness by determinants, etc., being relishable, is itself rasa.19 17.mafaraghahari (27. HT. . 228) 18. atha naTagatA cittavRttireva pratipannA satI ratyanukAraH zRGgAra ityucyate, tatrApi kimAtmakatvena sA pratIyata iti cintyam / nanu pramadAdibhiH kAraNaiH kaTAkSAdibhiH kAryaH dhRtyAdibhizca sahacAribhirliGgabhUtairyA laukikI kAryarUpA kAraNarUpA sahacArirUpA ca cittavRttiH pratItiyogyA tadAtmakatvena sA naTacittavRttiH pravibhAti hanta tarhi ratyAkAreNaiva sA pratipanneti dUre ratyanukaraNatAvAcoyuktiH / (27. HT. g. 248) - 19. na tu yathA zaGkakAdibhirabhyadhIyata, "sthAyyeva vibhAvAdipratyAyyo rasyamAnatvAdrasa ucyate / " evaM hi laukiko'pi Pa 77 78:1 (34. HT. . 268)

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SOME ASPECTS OF THE RASA THEORY From this it should be clear that for Sankuka, the imitated styayi is of lauki!ca nature. And keeping in view this result Abhinava says : To explain : Where is the relish in the mere inference of worldly feeling? The relish of rasa is in its essence a state of unique & wonderful enjoyment (camatkara). It is radically different from memory, inference and worldly (sensation of) pleasure.20 This much for the rasa-sutra of Bharata. True, Bharata himself has not provided any direct clue to the nature of rasa in the rasa-sutra, but his stray expressions at different places in NS, could be taken as dependable indicators in this respect. We will continue to examine them further, after once again taking note of two expressions of Bharata viz., dhrti-krida-sukhadi-krt at I. 113, and, sukha-duhkha-samanvitah at I. 119. While explaining what rasa exactly means, Bharata has the following observation : (p. 288, NS)-. . Now one enquires, "What is the meaning of the word rasa ? It is said, in reply (that Rasa is so called) because it is capable of being tasted (asvadyatvat). How do people relish rasa ? Just as good-natured connoisseurs relish food enriched with various condiments, good-natured spectators relish permanent emotions, suggested by the representation of various transient emotional states; the representation consists of speech, bodily gestures, and involuntary physical reflexes. The connoisseurs thus experience pleasure and other feelings.21 This expression viz., 'harsadimsca' is a clear pointer as to Bharata's attitude towards the nature of rasa. It is a direct thrust causing damage to the theory of the alaukikatva of rasa. And the result is that even Abhinava seems to have been embarrassed and has to be purely on the defensive when he observes that, while others include 'soka' etc., because of the word 'adi' in 'harsadinsca'he & his followers do not. For, a dramatic performance could not result in an experience other than that of unmixed' joy : Some are of the view that the word 'adi' ('other feelings' in the quotation cited above) includes sorrow, etc. But this view is not correct. For the end of Drama is to produce (unalloyed) joy, and never sorrow.22 If the result were anything but unmixed joy, then people would avoid any such performance, and further there is no valid reason also in accepting this. Abhinava would therefore make bold to suggest a text amendation, viz; harsamscadhigacchanti. He says (p, 289, 20. tathAhi laukikacittavRttyanumAne kA rstaa| tenAlaukikacamatkArAtmA rasAsvAdaH smRtyanumAnalaukikasaMvedanavilakSaNa eva (ST. H. . 368) 21. atrAha-rasa iti kaH padArthaH / ucyate-AsvAdyatvAt / kathamAsvAdyate rasaH / yathA hi nAnAvyaJjanasaMskRtamannaM bhuJjAnA rasAnAsvAdayanti sumanasaH puruSA harSAdIMzcAdhigacchanti tathA nAnAbhAvAbhinayavyajitAn vAganasattvopetAn sthAyibhAvAnAsvAdayanti sumanasaH prekSakAH harSAdIzvAdhigacchanti / tasmAnnATayarasA itybhivyaakhyaataaH| (FT. 31. C. CC-C) 22. anye tvAdizabdena zokAdInAmatra saMgrahaH / sa ca na yuktaH / sAmAjikAnAM hi harekaphalaM nATayaM na zokAdiphalam / (31. YU.. 268)

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WORLDLY NATURE OF RASA 49 A. bh.) : There is no reason to believe that Drama leads to sorrow; otherwise there would have arisen the need to disprove this view. Therefore some people accept the variant reading pleasures (harsamsca).23 Yogi as Abhinava was, he had no good reason to explain away the text in the mannar he does. His, and of course Ananda's eloquent advocacy of santa as the only rasa and a maharasa could also be viewed from this angle. But irrespective of what Abhinava says, we can clearly see that Bharata supports the view that Rasa is laukika in character. ...Bharata then explains individual rasas and says-We shall take the Permanent Emotions to the level of Rasa.24 Here also stray hints dropped by Bharata go to prove our thesis that for Bharata rasa was of a laukika nature. His treatment of vipralambha (p. 306), and karuna (p. 309) points in the same direction. Karuna is sokasthayibhavaprabhava (p. 317). But Bharata is silent about its aesthetic enjoyment. Raudra (p. 319), bhayanaka (p. 326) and bibhatsa (p. 328) are also delineated in keeping with their laukika nature. But all the description of various rasas and sthayibhavas, even in keeping with the laukika design, could not be taken as a pointer to Bharata's actual concept of the nature of tasting. No doubt Bharata holds that the vibhavas and the anubhavas need not be described by him because they are fairly known to us; tatra vibhavanubhavau lokaprasiddhau (p. 348). Bharata perhaps cites somebody else's verse when he says : (p. 348, v. 6) --The stanza which is relevant in the context is as follows:* The wise may note that the determinants and the consequents in dramatic representatian correspond to their counterparts in everyday life in respect of their nature and their behaviour.25 He says that there are eight sthayins, or the basic mental states, thirtythree vyabhicarins or accesssories and eight sattvika-bhavas or involuntary physical reflexes. These forty-nine taken together make for 'Kavya-rasabhi. Oyakti.' Rasas are born of these, when they are presented in a universalized state. He says-It may be noted that these forty-nine emotions in their generalized form are the source of Rasa.26 It may be noted that Bharata here and also elsewhere mentions "kavyarasa,' and if 'samanya-guna-yoga' is the same as interpreted by us above, 23. tathAtve nimittAbhAvAttatparihAraprasaGgAceti manyamAnA harSAzcAdhigacchantIti paThanti / . (27. 1. g. 2cs) 24. teftaraina taray44419: (TTT. . q. 339) 25. a 217 #:lokasvabhAvasaMsiddhA lokayAtrAnugAminaH / anubhAvA vibhAvAzca jJeyAstvabhinaye budhaiH // ** (Tr. 27. 9. x6. 11.) 26. evamete kAvyarasAbhivyaktihetava ekonapaJcAzadbhAvAH pratyavagantavyAH / ebhyazca sAmAnyaguNayogena rasA niSpadyante / (FT. II. . 180)

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50 SOME ASPECTS OF THE RASA THEORY then we need not wait for Bhatta Nayaka for the concept of sadharanikarana. Similarly Ananda's abhivyakti' also could be said to be present in Bharata, though this point needs to be carefully examined, in deciding this. That the sthayins, vibhavas, anubhavas and vyabhicarins follow the pattern of their normal form, should not necessarily lead us to believe that their relish also follows the laukika pattern. Yet there are indications, as seen above in Bharata's use of language which perhaps speak out his mind. For example, at the end of the description of sattvikabhavas, he has this observation viz. Drama is the representation of mundane life and therefore it is desirable that sattva (concentration) should be present in it. What analogy is there (in support of this) ? Here the pleasure and pain produced on the stage according to the dramatic conventions should be accompanied by Sattva (concentration) so that they would correspond with their originals in everyday life.27 These bhavas are said to be "sukha-duhkha-krtah" i. e., resulting into an experience of both pain and pleasure. They have to be therefore 'yathavat' i. e., absolutely identical in nature and scope with the bhavas at laukika level Bharata says: (p. 377, v. 108)..I have described here the forty-nine emotions which belong to three categories.28 This much about Bharata. And perhaps it strengthens our observation that Bharata's concept of the nature of rasa was laukika. The earlier alankarikas such as Bhamaha, Dandin Vamana, Udbhata, and Rudrata are not very specific as to the nature of rasa. But when Abhinava quotes from Dandin while discussing the views of Lollata, it would be safe to guess that these acaryas had a 'laukika' view of rasa. If upaciti' of a bhava is held as rasa by Dandin, it very much proves the point that for him sthayins etc., as presented through the art-media are identical in both nature and scope with their counter-parts at the normal work-a-day level. This much should suffice for the present here. Bhoja, with his ahankara-abhimana-srugara theory recognises many rasas in the madhyama koti wherein all the forty-nine bhavas, and some others also, become rasa through 'prakarsa' or enhancement. To quote Dr. V. Raghavan (p. 433, songara Prakasa, edn. '63) - "To Bhoja, rasa, as ordinarily understood, means what it meant to Dandin and Lollata, the Prakarsa of the sthayi-bhava." Bhoja accepted many rasas in keeping with Lollata who also accepted rasas not to be just eight but perhaps as many as are the bhavas. What concerns us here is that at least in this madhyamavastha or on 'vyavahara' plane, perhaps Bhoja also, took rasas as generating 'sukha' and 'duhkha' and thereby taking the 'laukika' 27. FETHITIT F AR ATT HigHtfeat I CERT: RAZGASTAT: yag:amat safe sattvavizuddhAH kAryAH yathA sarUpA bhavanti / (Fl. st. q. 304) 28. ekonapaJcAzadime yathAvadbhAvAsyavasthA gaditA mayeha / (911. ET. -906 37, . 20)

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WORLDLY NATURE OF RASA 51 character as suggested in Lollata also. Some quotations from Sr-Pra. will support our observation. Bhoja says : (1) Rasas are pleasurable and painful. They are seen in sentient beings and not in literature which consists of word and meaning and thus lacks sentience. (2) There are three classes of Figures (1) Vakrokti (Striking, Deviating Expression) (2) Svabhavokti (Natural Description) and (3) Rasokti (Portrayal of Rasa). Vakrokti is present when Figures like simile predominate; Svabhavokti is present when Qualities like slesa predominate; and Rasokti is present when Rasa arises out of the combination of the determinants, consequents, and concomitants. The determinants are of two kinds: fundamental (alambana) and excitant (uddipana). Of these two the fundamental determinants are meant to be seen as favourable or unfavourable... 23 While explaining raudrarasa-nispatti from krodha, Bhoja observes : (Anger) when accompanied by the concomitants of Jealousy, Trembling, Labour etc; which are painful in nature, rises to the level of the Furious when intensified.30 Dr. Raghvan (p. 449) further observes: "It was the sthayin itself that got the name rasa. Says Bharata : Thus these permanent emotions should be known as rasas.' So it is, says Sankuka, that in the Rasa-nispatti-sutra the word 'sthayin' is not found. It is merely the sthayin of the world that is called rasa when imitated. Dandin and Lollata applied the name rasa to the sthayin itself when it (is) samyukta, pusta or prakrsta or udrikta by means of vibhavas etc. Says Bahurupa-Misra in his commentary on the Dasarupaka : 'Thus then (rasa) is a particular state of permanent emotion itself. 'Bhoja followed these writers. He has not got two different departments as laukika and alaukika."31 We cannot accept Dr. Raghavan's last statement in the above quotation for when Bhoja follows this group of writers, the laukikatva of rasa in the madhyamavastha follows as a logical corollary. 29. (1) rasA hi sukhaduHkhAvasthArUpAH / te ca zarIriNAM caitanyavatAM, na kAvyasya / tasya zabdArtharUpatayA acetanatvena / Dr. V. Raghavan: Bhoja's srgara Prakasa, Third Revised Enlarged Edition, Madras, 1978, P. 423 2. trividhaH khalvalaGkAravarga:-vakroktiH, svabhAvoktiH, rasoktiriti / tatropamAdyalaGkAraprAdhAnye vakroktiH, leSAdiguNaprAdhAnye svabhAvoktiH, vibhAvAnubhAvavyabhicArisaMyogAttu rasaniSpattau rasoktiriti / tatra dvividho vibhAvaH, AlambanavibhAva uddIpanavibhAvazca / tayorAlambanavibhAva issttaanissttsNdrshnaadiH| yamAlambya sukhaM duHkhaM ateqaa aa gagafaringHTOH FARVET: #FFIT TO .................. ga ceffaaraat jihAsitasya cAhAnAt duHkhAtmakairvyabhicAribhizcintItsukyaveganirvedAdibhiH saMsRjyamAno duHkhAtmakavipralambhazRGgArAdi rasarUpatAmadhyAste / / G. R. Josyer : Maharaja Bhojaraja's Sringara Prakasha, Second Volume, Mysore, 1963, PP. 438-39 30. raraquareg Tang T IRE 9 Gaua TA19# Forea...... (Ibid, P. 440) 31. ---Dr. Raghavan: Bhoja's srngara Prakasa, Third Revised Enlarged Edition, P. 449

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52 SOME ASPECTS OF THE RASA THEORY "Siddhicandra, (the author of Kavyaprakasa-Khandana edn. 53, by Prof. Parikh.) explains a view held by some 'Navinas' who seem to take a laukika view of rasa. Siddhicandra (p. 16) observes: "Tadapeksaya kamini-kucakalasa-sparsa-candananulepanadineva natya-darsana-kavya-sravanabhyam sukhaviseso jayate. Sa eva tu rasa iti navinah.". This view puts the aesthetic pleasure on a par with ordinary sensual pleasures. In the discussion of Rasananda or aesthetic pleasure - observes Prof Parikh in his introduction (p. 10) to Siddhicandra's Kavya-Prakasa-Khandana -"this is really a moot point-viz., whether the aesthetic pleasure is like any other pleasure of ordinary life or whether its character is different : If the experience of the artistic representation of pleasure and pain is the same as the experience of these in life, what is painful in life would not give pleasure in poetry and therefore such sentiments as those of sorrow, anger, aversion, etc, cannot become rasas in poetry. Consistently with this view the Navinas, therefore hold that, there are only four rasas, viz; srngara, Vira, Hasya and Adbhuta. Siddhicandra says: navinastu srngara-vira-hasya-dbhuta-samjnascatvara eva rasah. (p. 16). He further refutes the claim of Karuna, Raudra etc; to the title of rasas in the words atha karunadinam katham na rasatvam iti cet,..etc." It is not clear who these Navinas were. But they certainly held rasa to be of laukika character. In Ramacandra and Gunacandra, the joint authors of the Natya-darpana, Edn. G.O.S., 1959), we find an eloquent advocacy of the sukha-duhkhatmaktva of rasa, thus placing its nature, on laukika plane. They hold rasa to be 'a-laukika' only in the sense that the assemblage of determinants etc., as portrayed in a dramatic or poetic composition are not real-(rasa is perceived in a real man and a real woman, an actor and a spectator) but with this difference : in the case of a real man and a real woman the rasa is perceived vividly because its determinants are actually present; and it is because of this fact that the accessories and the consequents produced by rasa (sentiment) are clearly perceptible. In other cases like that of a spectator, however, the sentiment is perceived not vividly but indistinctly for the determinants, etc., presented through kavya (a poem or a drama) have no real existence. As a consequence, the accessories and consequents too which follow rasa are not distinctly perceptible. That is why the rasa, perceived in a spectator, is said to be alaukika-extra-ordinary.32 That the Natyadarpana (ND) takes intensified sthayi which is of the nature of sukha and duhkha to be rasa is clear from its definition of rasa, (p. 141, IV-7). It is held that stngara, hasya, vira, adbhuta and santa having ista i.e., favourable determinants etc., are sukhatmaka, and karuna raudra 32. kevalaM mukhyatrI-puMsayoHspaSTenaiva rUpeNa raso vibhAvAnAM paramArthasattvAdata eva vyabhicAriNo'nubhAvAzca rasajanyAH tatra spaSTarUpAH / anyatra tu prekSakAdau dhyAmalenaiva rUpeNa vibhAvAnAmaparamArthasatAmeva kAvyAdinA darzanAt / ata eva vyabhicAriNo'nubhAvAzca rasAnusAreNAspaSTA eva / ata eva prekSakAdigato raso lokottara ityucyate / . Natyadarpana, Revised Second Edition, GOS, Baroda, 1959, P. 143

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WORLDLY NATURE OF RASA 53 bibhatsa and bhayanaka their determinants etc., being anista' or un- favourable are duhkhatmaka. The ND holds that people see performances with karuna etc., as principal rasa, only out of their love for the expert presentation on the part of the poet and the actor. It is for this camatkara' or sense of wonder caused by the expert presentation on the part of both the poet and the actor that the spectators take rasa to be pleasurable. But poets develop their themes keeping in mind the pleasurable and painful nature of the original story of Rama and the like. Incidents such as the abduction of Sita, the discourtesy shown to Draupadi, the slavery of Hariscandra, the death of Rohitasva, Laksmana's being hit by an arrow, the attempt to kill Malati, can never cause joy in the hearts of the connoisseurs. If imitation of tragic situation evokes a joyous response in the heart of the spectators, the imitation would cease to be imitation proper -yadi canukarane sukhatmanah syur na samyag anukaranan syat (p 182). All this makes it sufficiently clear that for the ND, rasa is primarily laukika because of the laukika nature of the sthayin concerned, and is only alaukika in the sense that the whole complex of deteminants etc., is unreal. For Visvanatha who follows the lead of Ananda and Abhinavagupta, and also for Hemacandra, the author of Kavyanusasana and the guru of Ramacandra and Gunacandra, rasa is alaukika. But Visvanatha finds it quite difficult to defend the case of karuna. Dhananjaya also, though he takes sthayin to be rasa (DR IV. i,), falls in line with the Kashmir School in taking rasa to be of alaukika nature. Later eminent writers such as Jagannatha, also accept the view of Abhinavagupta and uphold the a-laukikatva of rasa. The above presentation of the views of alamkarikas beginning with Bharata onwards shows that their house is divided so far as the problem of laukikatva or alaukikatva of rasa is concerned. But it seems probable that the earlier, writers from Bharata down to Rudrata emphasized the worldly nature of rasa and it required great courage to hold the fort against the formidable onslaught of the rasalaukikatvavadins like Ananda and Abhinavagupta, Mammata and Jagannatha. The Natyadarpana's was perhaps a lone voice with its heart lying with the laukikatva-vadin and its head bringing around a compromise in holding rasa as a-laukika on the almost flimsy ground that the vibhavadis or the whole complex of determinants, consequents and accessories presented by the poet in either poetry or drama is unreal i. e., artificial.

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Rasa Theory and the Darsanas KRISHNA S. ARJUNWADKAR SOURCES OF BHARATA : Bharata's rasa theory is original in most of its constituent concepts, their classification and the metalanguage he uses to expound the theory. No work in Sanskrit literature, contemporary or written prior to the Natyasastra of Bharata, attempts the treatment of similar topics in a way comparable to that of Bharata. The credit does not, of course, go to Bharata alone but is shared by him with his predecessors whom he has frequently quoted. As a probable source, a reference may be made to works on Ayurveda which, while treating of their materia medica, speak of the rasa, virya, vipaka and prabhava of the matarial described. One would expect an analysis of the faculties of mind in the Yoga System which Bharata might have made use of; but little is found in that system which has even a remote resemblance with what Bharata has presented. The Samkhya system, akin to the Yoga, says little in this respect that is different from its sister-system. Even Kamasutra, which has rati as its special field, disappointed me in my attempt to find anything resembling Bharata's analysis of mental faculties. Surprisingly enough, -and it may be a pure coincidence,-there is a striking resemblance between Bharata's theory of rasa and Carvaka's theory of caitanyaconsciousness, a quality of the body not present individually in the four elements-earth, water, heat and air-that combine to make the body but which emerges from their combination. The same may be said of rasa and its correlatives. LOLLATA : Lollata, the earliest critic on record, preferred to seek aid from his common sense rather than from any established system. For him, rasa, which is substantially the sthayin created by the vibhavas, revealed by anubhavas and nourished by the vyabhicarins, abided primarily in the character in the play like Rama, and secondarily in the actor who enacted the character. SANKUKA: For Sankuka who finds fault with Lollata's view, the actor himself, who is a contemporary of the spectators and who is not far removed from them as are characters like Rama whom he imitates, is the receptacle of rasa, which 1. Cp.37 Traif Harfa faarejasiftat: catubhyaH khalu bhUtebhyazcaitanyamupajAyate / fravalfer: a z a Surva-darsana-sarigraha, Carvaka-darsana.

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RASA THEORY AND THE DARSANAS is an imitation of the sthayin in the original character like Rama. This sthayin in the actor is inferred from his acting. Both the sthayin and its correlatives are thus unreal and hence are named by Bharata by specially newly coined terms like vibhava. How can such an unreal apparatus lead to the real enjoyment of rasa ?-As does the picture of a horse lead to the cognition of a real horse', (citra-turaga-nyaya) says Sankuka; he deems it 'samvadi-bhrama' and quotes Dharmakirti, the Buddhist philosopher, for a support. Imagine a person who sees rays of a lamp at a distance, thinks that it is a jewel, rushes to secure it, reaches the spot and, to his disappointment, finds a lamp there. Imagine also another person who sees rays of a jewel (and not the jewel itself, it being too small and too far from him), thinks that it is a jewel, reaches the spot and actually finds a jewel. In fact, both are mistaken in as much as they take as a jewel something other than a jewel. But this false knowledge (bhrama) produces a real action in them, with the only difference that one of the two is rewarded with what he sought (a case of samvadi-bhrama:) while the other is not (a case of visamvadi-bhrama).2 This is how Sankuka argues, conceding that the inferred sthayin in the actor and its apparatus are unreal. Personally he thinks that the cognition of the sthayin in the actor defies definition, that it cannot be included in any of the known varieties of cognition, but, at the same time, its existence cannot be denied as it is a matter of direct experience for every rasika.3 It is customary to deem Sankuka a Naiyayika because of his view that rasa, that is the imitated sthayin, is inferred. I do not subscribe to this view; for nothing typical of the Nyaya system is involved in this view. A farmer does not need to study Nyaya to infer that it would rain before long when he sees dark and heavy clouds in the sky. If Sankuka's theory of inference is an adequate ground to deem him a Naiyayika, his reference to Dharmakirti can be regarded as sufficient ground to deem him a Buddhist : I would consider the second claim to be more plausible, as the verse quoted from Dharmakirti is closely related to the theory of knowledge of the Buddhists who deny the existence of the objective world. This sort of naive tagging of names based on a flimsy ground is of little consequence in a serious study. NAYAKA Nayaka would like to explain rasa as a joint outcome of two operationsbhavakatva' and 'bhojakatva.' By the first he means the process of sadharanikarana' or generalization, i. e. shearing rasa and its correlatives of 2. mnniprdiipprbhyomnnibuddhyaabhidhaavtoH| PARTranaatesha fazlasersei fa ll Pramana-varttika, 2.57 This is alluded to in sankuka's view by the words riffsunfa fezaie ta' Kangle's edn. p. 130 pratibhAti na saMdeho na tatvaM na vipryyH| dhIrasAvayamityasti nAsAvevAyamityapi // viruddhabuddhapasaMmedAdavivecitaviplavaH / EROT alaysia yangua: || Kangle's edn. p. 130 3.

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56 SOME ASPECTS OF THE RASA THEORY their particular space-time-person context and making them a common wealth'-a state produced by fourfold acting in a play and gunalankuras in poetry. Thus generalized, rasa is relished by the spectator by bhojakatva, a unique process of the mind distinct from the commonly recognised modes of cognition such as perception, memory, etc. Though made up of the three primeval qualities, the sattva, the rajas and the tamas, it is dominated by the sattva, as a result of which this experience rests in the consciousness (caita-. nya) full of light and happiness-much the same way as the experience in the realization of the Supreme Brahman (Para-Brahmasvada-savidha). Nayaka conceives bhavakatva and bhojakatva as processes exclusively operating in the field of poetry (and drama) and distinct from the abhidha process which is common to poetry and other literature-mandatory (Veda, etc) and advisory (Itihasa, Purana, etc). The chief purpose of poetry is, therefore, to give pure joy, and only secondarily, to give moral instruction.. . . Even a hurried survey of Nayaka's theory would reveal that in formulating it he has drawn substantially on Mimansa (as Abhinava presents him), Samkhya and, most of all, Vedanta; this shows what an imaginative, discriminating man of wide knowledge can contribute to the exposition of a theory. For his bhavakatva concept, he is indebted to Mimamsa; for his conception of the rasa experience, to Samkhya (a part of which is also absorbed in Vedanta); and for the idea of over-whelming, total absorption in the experience, he is indebted to Vedanta. Nayaka is the first critic to compare poetic experience to the experience of Brahman which the Indian tradition regards as the highest goal of life. All subsequent writers on poetics are indebted to him for this brilliant conception. Even Abhinava who has rejected his contention that rasa is not a cognition and that bhavakatva is a specific process peculiar to poetic experience, concedes that his description of the poetic experience is on a par with the spiritual experience, and that his bhojakatva process is identical with Ananda's Vyanjana. As monistic Saivagama, of which Abhinava is the chief exponent, is basically not different from the monistic Vedanta, indebtedness of his exposition to saivagama needs no special mention. ABHINAVA AND NAYAKA : The two salient points in Nayaka's interpretation which Abhinava has criticised are: (i) rasa is not a cognition, and (ii) bhavakatva is a special poetic process which brings about sadharanikarana. About the first, Abhinava remarks that it is self-contradictory to call rasa a bhoga--pleasure, and at the same time to deny that it is a cognition-pratiti. What is pleasure if not a form of awareness or cognition ? Abhinava has no objection to singling it out from the common forms of cognition or awareness; but calling it no cognition' is equivalent to making it unfit for any dealing with it.4 As for bhavakatva, 4. apratItaM hi pizAcavat avyavahArya syAt / kiM tu yathA pratItimAtratvena aviziSTatve'pi prAtyakSikI, AnumAnikI, AgamotthA, pratibhAnakRtA, yogipratyakSajA ca pratItiH upAyavailakSaNyAt anyaiva, tadvat iyamapi pratItiH carvaNAsvAdana TITTAT HT I Locana on Dhvanyaloka with Balapriya (Com:), Banaras (1940); p. 187

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RASA THEORY AND THE DARSANAS Abhinava takes it as another self-contradiction Nayaka has committed; for it militates against his (Nayaka's) view that rasa is not produced. Bhavakatva is the same as bhavana of the Mimamsakas; and bhavana is conceived as a mental process of a person that causes a thing to come into being. It operates through two media: the word and the meaning; and is accordingly named Sabdi and arthi, as illustrated by the statements : (i) 'someone desires me to do this', and (ii) 'I must do this.' Mimansakas believe that through this process a performer is inducted by the Veda to perform a ritual, then a will is created in his mind to do it and this, eventually, is translated into the actual performance of the ritual. In matters secular, it is some person in command who plays the role of the Veda in the above cited example. With due respect to Abhinava, I beg to differ from him in his interpretation of Nayaka on the point of bhavakatva. It is in the context of sadharanikarana that Nayaka ushers in the bhavakatva, which, when understood in the proper light, means elimination of the element of particularity from the apparatus of rasa by the spectator on the strength of his will-power, something on a par with 'willing suspension of disbelief.' It is a unique power of the human mind to infuse a lifeless matter with life, to associate with or dissociate from something, to equate something with an agreeable or disagreeable complex of qualities. A lifeless picture or image, a book, a souvenir, a word, a flower, a smell, a colour, a piece of furniture, an apparel, --in short, anything, howsoever insignificant it might be from others' point of view, can mean a lot for a person who infuses it with feelings by his will-power. It is a symbol for him of something which exists in the world of his mind. This power of symbolism, which man discovered first in the formation of language and extended subsequently to other countless areas, is perhaps the one phenomenon that pervades the entire human life. All arts, plays, games, other forms of entertainment; religious, social or political conventions; meta-language and notations in all studies are nothing but manifestations of the power of symbolism backed by individual or social will-power. Bereft of this power, man would be a poor creature. This is man's bhavana sakti, which, I think, Nayaka implies when he speaks of bhavakatva. Abhinava's criticism of him on this point is, therefore, unfair or is an outcome of a misunderstanding. Even if Abhinava is supposed to be right in taking bhavakatva as equivalent to bhavana, it deserves to be noted that what Nayaka relates to it is not rasa but only sadharanikarana, which, by common consent, can be granted as produced. On a close examination of the rasa theory as understood by Nayaka and by Abhinaya, one cannot help feeling that the latter has essentially incorporated the former's view and developed it to a form one would inevitably arrive at by crdinary logical processes-except on thc points of bhavakatva where Abhinava has misunderstood Nayaka, and bhojakatva which, for Abhinava, is a cognition not different from vyanjani. The last point is merely a matter of difference in terminology.

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SOME ASPECTS OF THE RASA THEORY the ac atus-vibhavanues and carvana continly as long as the is d carosa exis atives ot be rede the speonly as ABHINAVAGUPTA: As interpreted by Abhinava, rasa is different from sthayin inasmuch as the former can abide only temporarily and only in a connoisseur (sahrdaya), while the latter exists dormantly and permanently in every being from the moment he is born. In other words, rasa exists only in drama (or other arts), and sthayins exist only in actual life. Rasa exists only as long as the act of carvana-relishing-continues : and carvana continues only as long as the rasa apparatus-vibhava etc.-is present before the spectator. That is the reason why the correlatives of rasa cannot be regarded as having a causal relation with rasa; for an effect like a pot can exist independently of the potter who has made it, once it has come into being. This leads us to the inevitable conclusion that the experience of rasa has no parallel in actual life and must hence be regarded as alaukika, uncommon. The relation between rasa and its correlatives is explained on the analogy of a pot and a lamp, - ghatapradipa-nyaya, and is called vyanjana. The pot is revealed, not produced, by the nearby lamp; and that also only as long as the lamp emits light. Rasa, too, which already exists in the form of sthayin in the mind of the spectator, is likewise revealed to him by its correlatives when it assumes the form of a rasc. Before this stage is reached, the sthayin undergoes a metamorphosis-shorn of its space-time-person context, it is generalized : this is sadharanikarana. As a result, it is experienced by the spectator not as his own, nor as his opponent's, nor as that of a neutral person, leaving thus no scope for such reactions as embarrassment, anger or indifference. This experience does not have the character of memory (for it is not recalling of something experienced before), or perception (for it is not produced through the medium of sense organs), or inference (for it is directly relished), -though, of course, the faculty of inference in the spectator as he utilizes it in worldly affairs lays the foundation for the experience of rasa. Hence it is a unique, pure experience, uninterrupted by any other cognition and unpolluted by any worldly motive, very much like the experience of the Supreme Brahman, and, liekwise, constituted of pure happiness. The most logical conclusion of this view is that theoretically rasa is only one (for Brahmasvada does not have varieties),-a suggestion not taken notice of by his immediate successors, but taken up later on by Bhoja and elaborated to its fullest extent. VYANJANA : IN GRAMMAR AND IN POETICS : For the concept of vyanjana, also called dhvani, presented in an elaborate form for the first time in the work.Dhvanyaloka', Ananda has acknowledged his debt to grammarians who first enunciated this principle in the context of sphota, a characteristic semantic theory of the Paninian school. Vyanjana 5. quffarn: quff489: 4174: Aca: Teg: 12:Sarva-darsana-saingrcha, Panini darsana. nAdairAhitabIjAyAmantyena dhvaninA sh| AvRttiparipAkAyAM buddhau shbdo'vrdhaayte|| Vakyapadiya, 1.85

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RASA THEORY AND THE DARSANAS does not have a very significant role to play in the corpus of formal grammar. It was Ananda who realized that this concept could contribute substantially to the criticism of poetry and therefore elaborated it in a systematic manner. It changed the whole outlook of Sanskrit criticism in the years that followed. JAYANTA AND MAHIMAN : The concept which Nayaka calls bhojakatva (only in the context of rasa) and the Ananda-Abhinaya school calls vyanjana (in a context wider than that of rasa), is challenged by Jayanta Bhatta briefly and Mahima-Bhatta in detail. The latter claimed that vyanjana or dhvani could always be reduced to inference (anumana) and that it was not necessary to invent a new power of a word like vyanjanc. For them the apparatus of rasa (vibhava etc.) is as much a cognitive tool (jnapaka hetu) of the sthayin/rasa as is smoke, of fire. They see no reason why there should be a discrimination between the two. Of course, of the two critics of vyanjana, Jayanta is candid enough to concede that, after all is said and done, this is the field of the critics of poetry and too profound for the logicians to pass a judgment on. But Mahiman argues the case of inference against vyanjana in his Vyaktiviveka. We cannot accept Mahiman's stand that all vyanjana is but kavyanumana without dismissing, as the Vaisesikas do, the claim of sabda (alongwith its other vyaparas, i. e. abhidha and laksana) as a separate pramana. BHOJA : As stated earlier, a suggestion in Abhinaya's exposition of rasa that rasa is one, was later taken up and elaborated by Bhoja. Bhoja does not subscribe to the traditional view that there are eight or nine rasas in drama or poetry. It is a myth, handed down from generation to generation and followed blindly like a belief that a certain tree is inhabited by a ghost! What are popularly, called rasas are no more than bhavas generated from the rasa, and they need not be limited to the sacred number eight or nine; they are as many as fortynine ! Why should only a few of them be promoted to the status of rasa ? We find one logical end of the rasa spectrum in Rudrata's answer to this question : that there can be as many rasas as there are bhavas, i. e. 49. The other end is found in Bhoja's position that none of the . 49 bhavas, which play alternately the principal and the subordinate roles in relation to one another, deserves to be called rasa, which is above them all. Bhoja names this one rasa variously as abhimana, ahamkara and srngara (which must not be confused with its namesake in Bharata's exposition). Rasa is what is relished, is the object of isvada. And what is it that we really relish ? Our own ego', says he; and explains it as self-love. Whatever is liked, disliked, loved, hated, welcomed, avoided, is the object of anger, sorrow or 6. # THAT THARA: 1 srngaraprakasa, intro. rasferisert: Ja cfa za Sarasvati-kanthabharana, 5.1

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SOME ASPECTS OF THE RASA THEORY surprise,-all that has an invariable reference to one's own self. This principle of ego is so overwhelming that it can convert even pain into pleasure and vice versa. A young girl feels pleasure at the scratches made by her lover's nails on her breasts : why ? Her ego is the answer. It is plain that every man is happy or sorry for the profit he makes or the loss he incurs. Even when he appears to be happy or sorry for another man's profit or loss, it is really for himself, in an indirect way. The sacrifice a man makes for another is also for himself-for the satisfaction he obtains therefrom. If he weeps for another, it also is really for himself. It is the self-love that is the source of all a man does or does not do. Even Yajnavalkya and Manu do not think otherwise;8 and, above all, no one can deny one's own exerience. This ego is a quality of the soul; and, hence, whosoever has a soul has also an ego. Its refinement which goes to make a rasika is the achievement of its cultivation during a series of past lives. The ego, according to the Samkhya theory, is constituted of sattva, rajas and tamas. It develops into rasa when the element of sattva reigns. Bhoja conceives it in three stages : the first, pure ego; the second, where the 49 bhavas get a scope to be enriched by their respective vibhavas, etc.; the third, the fully developed stage where the bhavas, enriched in the second stage, merge into one single awareness-self-love. Bhoja has openly acknowledged his debt to the Samkhya system. But there are in his exposition of rasa concepts like karman, vasana, punarjanman which are commonly shared by almost all Indian philosophical systems and are drawn upon tacitly or explicitly as much by Bhoja as by other expounders of the rasa theory like Abhinava: JAGANNATHA : Jagannatha is the last doyen of the Sanskrit tradition of criticism. He has enlisted as many as eleven views on rasa including those discussed by Abhinaya. Only the first four of these views are given by him in detail, while the rest are covered in a few lines, the last five receiving hardly a line each. The obvious distinction of Jagannatha's treatment of rasa is that he presents his material mostly in a style cultivated by the Navya Nyaya and adopted by the post-Gangesa works on Vedanta. Following the ancients, he 7. dukkhaM deMto vi suhaM jaNei jo jassa vallaho hoi| Equgfast fat ass 0789TUT 491 l Bhoja's songara Prakasa p. 516; see also pp. 465-66, 484, 527 8. Tort 2419 fog Hafa, BIHAFT TART a far Hafa i Byhadaranyaka, 4.5.6 akAmasya kriyA kAcid dRzyate neha karhicit / qele god at at Flatey are at ll Manusmrti, 2. 4 9. 99 97 CHA: 8598-a: usalaattia: sadi 37991 AF BATHTI ... TATT RATA... AtmanaH ahaMkAravizeSaH sacetasA rasyamAnaH rasa ityucyte| yadastitve rasikaH, anyathAtve nIrasa iti / Bhoja's strgara Prakasa, pp. 464-465

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RASA THEORY AND THE DARSANAS first pronounces the character of rasa as the sthayin qualified by uncovered - consciousness; and later rectifies the statement by saying that in fact, rasa is uncovered consciousness engulfed by the sthayin.'10 The difference between these statements is like that between the coloured glass illuminated by the sunlight' and 'the sunlight filtered through the coloured glass. As a true philosopher, he makes it categorically clear that the experience of rasa, engulfed by objects such as vibhava, is quite distinct from the experience of the Brahman in meditation.11 As a true Vedantin, he has traced rasa to a sruti passage, the oldest possible authority respected by all devout traditionalists. In the third interpretation which he has ascribed to the moderns', he presents rasa as on a par with the appearance of silver on a shell shining in the sun,-both caused by imperfections in cognitive conditions, and equally anirvacaniya, indeterminate.12 Others would like to call them both illusions. These are practically extensions to rasa of various khyatis in philosophical systems which attempt to explain what happens when X is cognized as Y.. CONCLUSION: From what has been stated above it would seem that the distinctive doctrines of more than one system of philosophy are found mentioned in Sanskrit works on poetics. The Samkhya and the Vedanta systems however appear to have exercised a profound influence in moulding the rasa theory. The very concept that rasa is not produced but already exists, it is only revealed, it is one with the Sthayin, has a close resemblance with the Samkhya doctrine of Satkaryavada. The concepts of 'bhoga' and 'sattvodreka' are also primarily derived from the Samkhya system. The idea of sadharanikarana, first propounded by Nayaka, has its roots partly in the Samkhya concept that the purusa (really not related to the gunas which cause bhoga) is subjected to the worldly experiences of pleasure and pain because of his identificationand sadharanikarana is practically a form of identification-in error with the Prakrti (which is constituted of the three gunas) and partly in the Vedanta idea that all is Brahman. (Yet another probable source for sadharanikarana is the concept of samanya of the Nyaya-Vaisesika systems which is the common heritage of most of the philosophical systems.) It is particularly significant in the context of identification and bhoga to find that the Samkhyas compare the role of Prakrti to that of an actress who presents the dance of pleasure and pain on the stage of the world, that is, the samsara, in which 10. itthaM cAbhinavaguptamammaTabhaTAdigranthasvArasyena bhagnAvaraNacidviziSTo ratyAdiH sthAyI bhAvo rasa iti sthitam / vastutastu vakSyamANazrutisvArasyena ratyAdyavacchinnA bhagnAvaraNA cideva rsH| ...astyatrApi 'raso vai saH, rasaM hyevAya gozaltret Haid' sa fa: ... Rasaganyadhara I, p. 55 in R. B. Athayle's edition (Poona 1953). vol. 1 11. U a TTATIEASTI AARTSTUTT, fahiangramarsaraan-perancata i loc. cit. 12. navyAstu...sahRdayatollAsitasya bhAvanAvizeSarUpasya doSasya mahimnA...svAtmanyajJAnAvacchinne zuktikAzakala iva Tage: 9499Aradacia:...T#: Op. cit, pp. 56-57

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62 SOME ASPECTS OF THE RASA THEORY the purusa gets involved so long as he does not realise that he is in no way part of it13. The idea that all rasas are pleasurable has its roots in the Upanisadic concept of Brahman as constituted of sat, cit, and inanda. Among the various terms used in the Upanisads to denote Brahman, one is 'ananda.' It is so termed because of the restful bliss that results from realising the inner harmony of the universe in one's own experience. In artistic (or aesthetic) perception, too, there is a realisation of unity in diversity and it is followed immediately by pure delight. But this pleasurable experience is fugitive or short-lived as it lasts for the duration of the dramatic performance. The novel rasa theory expounded by Bhoja is unquestionably founded on the Samkhya-Vedanta grid, with a marked Samkhya bias both in conception and terminology14 13. Fifcal Fadia 291 TRITI puruSasya tathAtmAnaM prakAzya vinivartate prakRtiH / / tena nivRttaprasavAmarthavazAt saptarUpavinivRttAm / yeofa rafa gan: d acafera: Fre: 11 Samkhya-karika 59, 65. The point to be noted here is that the spectator is viewed here as not involved in the drama going on before him, while the theory of rasasvada presumes involvement of the spectator in the drama to a certain extent. For a more detailed exposition, vide the author's paper : The Rasa Theory and the Darsanas in the Annals (pp. 81-100) of the B. O. R. Institute, LXV (1994), POONA . 14.

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Rasa Theory and the Darsanas-2 P. R. VORA Scholars, both ancient and modern, associate the interpretation of the Rasa-Sutra given by the early writers on Dramaturgy with the one or the other of the darsanas (Systems of Philosophy). Thus Lollata is thought to be a Mimamsaka, Sankuka is considered to have based his interpretation on the Nyaya darsana, Bhatta Nayaka is understood to have followed the Samkhya darsana, while Abhinavagupta is mostly accepted to have interpreted the rasa-sutra according to the Kashmir Saiva Philosophy. We shall discuss how far these claims are justifiable and proper. Lollata's theory : It is unfortunate that we do not have sufficient information about Lollata's view regarding rasa and its enjoyment. Scholars have even seen discrepancies in the presentation of his theory as available in the Abhinava-Bharati and Locana on the one hand and the Kavyaprakasa (K.P.) on the other. Dr. K. C. Pandey, for example, thinks that the word 'pratiyamanan' in the K. P. is 'a slight emendation (by Mammata) of the text of Abhinava', it is, therefore, very difficult and even rash to judge Lollata's attitude towards rasa 'from the meagre evidence that can be gathered from these aforesaid sources. However the following points may be noted : (i) rasa is a product of the combination of the determinants (vibhavas), consequents (anubhavas) and the auxiliaries (vyabhicaribhavas) (ii) rasa abides primarily in the original character (anukarya) and only secondarily in the actor (anukarta/nartaka) (iii) rasa is perceived by the samajika, who derives pleasure therefrom. According to Lollota the spectator enjoys rasa in this way: As he witnesses a dramatic performance, he allows himself to forget for the time being that he is witnessing a dramatic performance-this happens because of the clever acting of the nata. He identifies (anusandhana) the actor with the original character (anukarya, e. g. Rama). This identification is due to the former's peculiar movements, etc. (anubhavas). He is not able to account for the various mimetic movements of the actor otherwise than by construing them as the indications of love (rati) etc. He does so by resorting to laksana -secondary function of word (abhidheyavinabhuta-pratitih). This avinabhava is not necessarily an invariable connection like that between smoke and fire. Is this identification of the actor with the original character an aropa (superimposition) or a bhrama (illusion)? Yes, of course it is an aropa, and not a bhrama. It is a voluntary (aharya) superimposition. The samajika suspends his consciousness of the difference between the nata (anukarta) and the (original character) (anukarya). It is due to this sort of superim

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64 SOME ASPECTS OF THE RASA THEORY position that natya is called a rupaka (rupakan tat-samaropat). This aharya aropa is like the aropa of the moon (candra) on the face (mukha) in the illustration of metaphor : mukha-candrah udeti. Though we know that the face is not the moon, we enjoy this rupaka. We cannot, however, enjoy it if we are, all the while, conscious of the rugged and crator-covered surface of the moon. According to Lollata the samajika enjoys rasa in the same manner. His theory is confuted by Sri Sankuka. From the foregoing discussion it is amply clear that Bhatta Lollata was not influenced by the Vedanta darsana as some scholars have tried to establish, by explaining anusandhana' as superimposition (aropa) because, as has been pointed before, this aropu is not an illusion like that of a serpent on a rope. Lollata probably drew on the Bhatta school of Purvamimamsa, for he resorts to the secondary power of word (iaksana) accepted by. Kumarila. Bhatta, to account for the mimetic movements of the actor. It is suggested that Lollata explained this not by laksana but by Arthapatti. Even then one has to admit that he was influenced by the Purvamimamsa darsana.. MM. Kane too has suggested and rightly so, that Lollata was influenced by Purvamimamsa. While we discuss the rasa theory as influenced by Purvamimamsa it would not be out of place to refer to the views of Dhananjaya and his commentator Dhanika set forth in the Dasa-rupaka and the Avaloka thereon respectively. : They contend that one is able to apprehend rasa, by virtue of vakyartha i. e. tatparyartha which though it is not a padartha is none-the-less a vakyartha. (a-padartho'pi vakyarthah). According to Dhanika vibhavas etc., are like padarthas (vibhavoh padartha-sthaninah) and ratyadi connected therewith is vakyartha. Vibhavas etc., in short, conduce to the apprehension of the sthayi, which is the total meaning or purport (tatparyartha) of the sentence in the form of dramatic performance. It is, for this reason, that while distinguishing nrtya from natya he points out that nrtya is padarthabhinaya while natya is vakyarthabhinaya. Sankuka's theory of rasa : Sankuka argues that the spectator apprehends the sthayi abiding in the actor by inference and derives pleasure therefrom, since due to the clever acting of the trained and well practised actor he identifies the anukarta as the anukarya shorn of his individuality (i. e. not as Ramah ayam but only Ramoh). The following points may be noted in this connection : (i) Vibhavas etc., the lingas for the anumana are artificial; yet the samajika is led into believing them to be real due to the ingenious actions of the nata. (ii) The sthayi is cognised as abiding in the anukarya by inference of an extraordinary nature since other subjects of inference (anumiyamana) are not relishable whereas the sthayi is. (iii) The anukarta is taken for the nnukarya on the analogy of the citra-turaga. (iv). Though this sthayi cognised by the samajikd does not

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RASA THEORY AND THE DARSANAS_2 65 abide in him he none-the-less enjoys it and derives pleasure therefrom; and the sthayi so enjoyed is rasa. From the above it is clear that Sankuka's explanation of the rasa theory is influenced by the Nyaya darsana. But he makes it amply clear that in this anumana the object inferred is not prosaic like the object in the inference of the fire from the smoke. Commentators like Vidyacakravartin have tried to explain the extraordinary nature of the anumiyamana in this inference, Sankuka claims that the anukarta (nata) is identified with the anukarya on the analogy of the citra-turaga (The horse in a picuture, which is takena for a real horse). He explains this cognition as peculiar since it is distinct from prama as well as aprama. When one looks at the picture of a horse the cognition is not (i) mithya (false) since it is the same-unchanged-at all times and is not contradicted, (ii) it is not doubtful (samsaya) because it is certain, (iii) it is not even similarity .(sadrsya) because there is no similarity of limbs etc. between the picture and the horse. Hence just as this cognition of the citra-turaga is quite distinct from all other cognitions, the cognition of Rama with respect to nata is quite peculiar. This citra-turaga is like the vikalpa' says Nagesa, which is defined by Patanjali thus : Sabda-jnananupativastu-sunyo vikalpah/ Predicate-relation (vikalpa) is without any corresponding perceptible object and follows as a result of perceptions or of words'. Here too there is no corresponding real horse and yet the abhasa of a horse is there. Sankuka claims that the unreal vibhavas are taken for real by the samajika and on the strength thereof he infers the sthayi of the actor. This has no parallel in the Nyaya-sastra. Abhinava remarks that there cannot be any valid inference from an unreal mark (linga). Hemacandra quotes a verse from Dharmakirti's Pramana-varttika to justify Sankuka's stand; for causal efficiency (artha-kriya-karita) is after all the true test of reality, (i. e. for the right form of cognition). 'Even a mistake, observes Dharmakirti, if it does not delude the perceiving subject, is a source of right knowledge.' So Sankuka is vindicated to that extent if we accept causal efficiency to be the basic criterion for truth. It should be noted in this connection that though they do not subscribe to the view of Sankuka, Dhananjaya and Dhanika resort to a similar analogy. It would not be out of place to see what our greatest poet has to say in this connection. In the sixth Act of the sakuntala, the hero looks at the picture of his beloved, drawn by himself on the canvas. He gets so much lost in the act that for the time being he forgot that he is looking at the picture * till he is awakened, by the Vidusaka with the words, "Bhoh citram khalv etat." The disappointed king's reply suggests Kalidasa's view in the matter.

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66 SOME ASPECTS OF THE RASA THEORY He probably thought that it was not impossible to act on citra-turaganyaya, for Dusyanta says, "Punarapi citri-krta kanta." Bhatta Nayaka's theory of rasa : His main contribution to the theory of rasa is the idea of universalisation (sadharanikarana), whereby the determinants (vibhavas etc. are stripped off all relations, temporal, spatial or personal, and presented in a universalised form by a distinct function of words recognised by him and called bhavakatva. The sthayi which too is universalised by bhavakatva is enjoyed by virtue of the third function of words viz. bhojakatva/bhoga/bhogiksti, which is of the nature of samadhi. Now Bhatta Nayaka has no sastric (philosophical) authority to support him so far as the recognition of the last two functions, leaving abhidha, is concerned. One may call it his invention, but that does not in any way lessen the importance of his contribution to the explanation of the rasa theory. From the word 'sattvodreka' used by Bhatta Nayaka, Govinda Thakkur and Nagesa Bhatta infer that he was influenced by the Samkhya darsana. According to them bhoga is like the consciousness of ananda. According to the Samkhya system,' says Nagesa, jnana is nothing but the reflection of the citta-vrtti in the Purusa and the form of the jnana is, therefore, the same as that of the reflected citta-vrtti. Now when the samajika witnesses a drama, the sattva quality becomes predominant while the other two qualities, rajas and tamas, are subdued. This 'sattva-maya-citta-vrtti' is reflected in the Purusa; and since sattva gives rise to ananda, the sattva so: reflected in the Purusa, creates the consciousness of ananda. Thus the samajika enjoys rasa. This is the explanation given in Pradipa and Uddyota. Vidyacakravartin explains this theory with the help of the Yoga-darsana. He points out that by acts of purification (pari-karma) like cultivation of friendliness (maitri) towards happiness (sukha), compassion (karuna) towards pain (duhkha), joy (mudita) towards merit (punya) and indifference (upeksa) towards demerit (a-punya), the sattva quality becomes free from the other two qualities, rajas and tamas, which struggle to overpower it and the mind-stuff assumes a state of complete calm like that in a samadhi which is of the nature of consciousness (prakasa) and bliss (ananda). According to Vidyacakravartin's interpretation of Bhatta Nayaka, the samajika's pleasure partakes of the ecstatic bliss which a yogin enjoys in the state of samadhi. It is suggested that the words 'prakasa' and 'ananda' employed by Mammata in the explanation of Bhatta Nayaka's theory of rasa are used in their Saiva significance; so prakasa stands for vimarsa (self-consciousness) and the word sattva too should be interpreted in that light. This conjecture does not seem to be very helpful since Bhatta Nayaka's concept of aesthetic experience appears to be more akin to the Vedantic concept of ananda, which consists in the predominance of pure sattva due to the inoperation of the other two qualities, rajas and tamas, which is the result of the absenee of the

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RASA THEORY AND THE DARSANAS--2 phenominal world in this experience. The samvid-visranti conceived by Bhatta Nayaka stands for 'vigalita-vedyantara ananda'. We have the authority of one of the greatest philosophers of all times, Acarya Abhinava, to say with confidence, that Nayaka's approach to rasa theory was grounded in Vedanta Philosophy, for twice in the Locana and once in the AbhinavaBharati, he says that the ananda of the aesthete, as conceived by Bhatta Nayaka, is equivalent to the para-brahmasvada. It is possible that though Bhatta Nayaka was a Mimamsaka he explained the rasa theory on the basis of his own invention of the powers of words and explained the aesthetic pleasure with the help of an analogy making it akin to the state of bliss enjoyed by the person who realises Brahman. He wanted to confute the novel notion of dhvani. But his own invention of the two novel functions of bhavakatva and bhojakatva brings him close to the concept of dhvani or vyanjana (suggestion); and Abhinavagupta actually accepts his interpretation by identifying his two powers or functions of bhavakatva and bhojakatva with the concepts of sadharanikarana and vyanjana respectively. It may be pointed out that Dhananjaya and Dhanika who explain rasa theory on the basis of the Bhatta School of Purvamimamsa also seem to accept one of these two functions invented by Bhatta Nayaka, viz bhavakatva. They too believe in the process of universalisation though they do not elucidate this point. They also accept like Bhatta Nayaka and Abhinava that ratyadi sthayi belongs to the samajika or, as they put it, to the rasika. They also follow Lollata, as has already been pointed out, in respect of the cognition of sthayi by laksana. Abhinavagupta's theory of rasa : This is the most convincing of all the interpretations of the rasa theory. The following are some of the important features of Abhinava's theory :(i) The vibhavas etc; presented in a universalised form, suggest (vyaktah) the permanent state (sthayi) (ii) This sthayi is already present as a vasana (latent impression) in the spectator (samajika). (iii) The sthayi which belongs to the spectator and is so suggested by the vibhavas etc., is apprehended by him in a universalised form because at the time of witnessing the natya he becomes a de-individualised cogniser. (iv) This sthayi is enjoyed by the samajikc like the panaka-rasa (v) When relished the sthayi becomes rasa. (vi) The word nispatti in the Bharata-sutra refers not to the rasa but to the relish (rasana) of the rasa, which former is bodha-rupa (of the nature of consciousness) yet alaukika. (vii) This rasa is not itself distinct from one's being; and hence it is very much similar to the Brahmasvada. From the above points the indescribable and unworldly nature of rasa becomes fairly clear. Certain phrases used by Abhinava and his follower Mammata in their expoistion of the rasa-sutra e.g. (i) Svakara ivabhinno' pi gocarikrtah (ii) Brahmasvadam ivanubhavayan (iii) Svasamvedanagocarah (iv) alaukikanandamayasya (v) Sva-samvedana-siddhatvat etc.,

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68 SOME ASPECTS OF THE RASA THEORY lend support to the view that paraid is alaukika. These epithets used in respect of rasa have induced, of course, not unjustifiably, several scholars, to consider that Abhinaya's interpretation of the rasa theory is based on the Vedanta darsana. Let us examine some of these epithets : (i) Svakara ivabhinno'pi gocarikrtah : Like the self (atman) rasa is janarupa, yet it can be seen by atman itself as Kalidasa describes 'Atmanam atmany avalokayantam'. In the same way rasa which is of the nature of knowledge (bodha-svarupa) can also become the object (gocara) of knowledge. (ii) Sva-samvedana-gocarah and (v) Sva-samvedana-siddha. Like the self (atman), rasa is known to exist from its experience. One can only realise the rasa by oneself and in one's own self, but it cannot be described since it defies all descriptions like the Atman. It cannot even be proved either by sarikalpa or nirvikalpa pratyaksa. (iii) Brahmasvadam iva anubhavayan and (iv) alaukikanandamaya : These two expressions (Brahmasvada) and alaukikananda are invariably associated with the Vedanta System. It is wellknown that Brahma is anandamaya : This ananda is not the worldly transient ananda but the Eternal Bliss. There is a great resemblance between Brahmananda and rasasvada or rasananda; but they differ in the following respects : (a) Brahmananda is eternal, rasananda lasts only while the vibhavas etc last. (b) Brahmananda is a state of nirvikalpata, but rasananda or rasa is beyond savikalpata and nirvikalpata. "In this lies the secret of its alaukikatva," says Abhinava. From these several common features of rasasvada and brahmasvada it may be proposed that Abhinava's interpretation of the rasa theory is influenced, perhaps very heavily so, by the Vedanta philosophy. But this does not seem to be correct. Dr. K. C, Pandey has very ably and in a highly convincing and scholarly way established Abhinava's association with the Kashmir Saivism. He has also pointed out in great details the unquestionable influence of the Kashmir saiva philosophy on Abhinava's aesthetic theory. Abhinava and, following in his footsteps, Mammata, have used several technical terms and phrases which are borrowed from the Kashmir. Saivism. e. g. (1) parimita pramata; (2) na parimitam sadharanyam api tu vitatam; (3) bhunjanasyadbhutabhoga-spandavistasya camanah (? camatan) karanam camatkarah ; (4) sphurann astu, santana-vrtteh etc. As I have already said these and many other traces of Kashmir Saiva philosophy have been pointed out by Dr. K. C. Pandey. It is worth noting that this Saiva influence on the great Acarya's interpretation was well known to Bhatta Gopala, the learned author of the Sahityagudamani, a commentary on the Kavya-Prakasa. At least five hundred years back Bhatta Gopala interpreted Abhinava's doctrine, as given in the KavyaPrakasa, in the light of Kashmir saivism. He even quotes three verses from

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RASA THEORY AND THE DARSANAS-2 69 the Spanda-Karikas to support his explanation of the terms parimita and aparimita pramata. Who is an aparimita-pramata? The individual is a mere manifestation of the Absolute and as such he is related to temporal and spatial limitations; he is therefore called a parimita pramata, as a cogniser with utilitarian out-look. But when he is witnessing a drama (natya) the practical, utilitarian approach is absent, therefore he is freed from the temporal and spatial limitations. He can, therefore, witness the drama and cognise the vibhavas etc. and the sthayi in a universalised way, as Abhinava remarks; na parimitam sadharanyam api tu vitatam/(i. e. aparimitam or universalised). This is what they call'sadharanikarana.' The absence of savikalpa and nirvikalpa pratyaksa pramana also can be more satisfactorily explained on the basis of Kashmir saivism. Vikalpa is determinancy which has reference to the object related to temporal and spatial limitations as distinct from the subject. But since the Absolute of Saivism, unlike the Brahman of Vedanta is unity in multiplicity we can account for this alaukika condition of rasa in so far as it is neither perceived by savikalpa nor by nirvikalpa pratyaksa pramana, for Sadasiva too is selfconscious yet nirvikalpa. The word sphuran suggests sphuratta or satta, a power of the Absolute also called kriya, which appears in the individual in a limited way as sattva. The word bhunjana is explained as suggesting a person who 'attains to the state of rest on self, when he sees a good drama presented on the stage'. Dr. Pandey points out that the impediment in the form of object is totally absent' in the case of the aesthetic experience, whereas in the case of the experience of flavour this impediment is present. We have seen how the various interpretations of the theory of rasa differ. But it should not be forgotten that the chief aim of all the great scholars and Acaryas was to find out the process of the apprehension of rasa. They should therefore not be thought to be contradictory theories. Each one of these writers had a constructive approach. These theories are the several rungs of the same ladder (vikasa-sopana-parampara) as Abhinava has pointed out. :

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Rasa Theory and the Darsanas - 3 Bhagavatiprasad Pandya This happens to be a very, very brief summary of my paper on the above subject. At the outset it has to be made absolutely clear that it is one thing to trace the influence of various darsanas on the theory of rasa as interpreted by some acaryas, and it is quite another to hold that such and such an acarya was an avowed follower of such and such a darsana and that his interpretation is completely influenced by it. Modern scholars of eminence have made serious efforts to decide the issue which to my mind remains as open as it ever was. The obvious reason for this is that these acaryas had a very catholic outlook, and when they got themselves busy with the solution of the problem of aesthetic relish, they never allowed themselves to be unduly influenced by their philosophical commitments. Actually their philosophical leanings never clashed with their views on aesthetics, or else how can we explain the great Hemacandra, an advocate of Jain Darsana following Abhinavagupta, the great Saiva. We have therefore to be very careful in arriving at judgements. We may begin with Bharata himself. Where shall we place him? What were his philosophical leanings? We normally discuss this problem only with reference to the acaryas who tried to interpret his rasa-sutra. But we lose sight of Bharata himself who is very much in the centre. He talks of 'nispatti'. So do we associate him with Parinamavada for that? Is it proper ? He also talks of abhivyakti' at various places. Shall we call him Vyanjanavadi for that? I am afraid we cannot. And if we cannot place Bharata correctly would it be useful to try to place any other acarya so far as aesthetics is concerned ? This does not aim at side-tracking the issue. Nor do we deny influence of philosophical thought on aesthetics. For example, we come across any number of philosophical terms in the explanations of various ocaryas. We may begin with the term anusandhana' appearing in Lollata's explanation of the rasa-sutra. The Sanskrit commentators explain it either as aropa' or 'abhimana', while on the other hand Dr. K. C. Pandey takes it to mean Yojana' in the technical sense of the Saiva darsana. Lollata has left no clue. What do we do? He explains 'nispatti' as 'upaciti'. He accepts the fact of emotions and feelings remaining eternally in the form of impressions or 'vasana'. But does this lead us anywhere ? No. Actually there were certain notions shared equally by various philosophical systems. The Samkhya concept of prakrti which is 'trigunatmika' or having the three qualities of sattva, rajas and tamas, is practically acceptable to all darsanas. We cannot therefore brand Lollata either as a Mimamsaka or a follower of Saiva darsana. We shall have to collect and scrutinise all the references to ng eternally in apaciti'. He this lead

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RASA THEORY AND THE DARSANAS-3 Lollata scattered in different places to decide the issue. The same needs to be done in the case of the other acaryas except Abhinavagupta whose philosophical works are fortunately available. Further, while engaged in this task we shall have to keep our minds open. Let us turn to Sankuka. The fact that he takes' nispatti' to be 'anumiti, should not lead us to draw hasty conclusions. It is a matter of common experience that we always infer other people's feelings. If our observation is subtle and if we can correlate the external expressions with the inner feelings in an accurate way we may correctly infer other people's feelings or inclinations. As in life, so also in literature perhaps the same process is at work. We can only infer Rama's feelings. We cannot feel them for ourselves. As the setting is artistic and unreal the process of reasoning also becomes relishable according to Sankuka and then Mahima. Well, there is nothing wrong about it. But we need not characterise them as naiyayikas. Actually so many nyayas or maxims found in the mimarsa and nyaya darsanas are also shared by other darsanas without any reservations. When I infer or imagine your mood to be good or bad on a particular morning, I do not thereby become a naiyayika. As with Lollata, so with Sankuka also we have to search in for enough material to characterise him positively as belonging to this or that discipline. This in itself does not rule out the influence of nyaya-darsana on the anumitivada as advanced by Sankuka. But the simple conclusion is that the data are not sufficient to relate him definitely with any particular darsana. It may not sound unreasonable to share the views of Dr. Pandey who has put in great labour in tracing the philosophical movements in Kashmir in the centuries when these acaryas lived. It is possible that by faith and by virtue of their philosophical leanings these acaryas were all Saivites. A Hemacandra or a Ramacandra does not cease to be a Jain when he accepts or rejects the views of Abhinavagupta. The bhuktivada of Bhatta Nayaka and the Samkhya view (sarkhyad?sa) cited prior to it, carry an unmistakable stamp of the Samkhya darsana. The terminology used is absolutely transparent. But for that matter do we make Bhatta Nayaka an upholder of Samkhya philosophy ? Was he not, by faith, a follower of Kashmir Saivism ? We have no conclusive proof. We are on absolutely firm grounds when we talk of Abhinavagupta and Jagannatha. The reason is simple. We know more of these two. We also have their other works providing us necessaty research tools to decide the issue with certainty. Prof. Athavale has done excellent work on Jagannatha and we are clear about what particular branch of Advaita-vedanta he adhered to. To sum up, we may say that the efforts made in this direction are not sufficient enough to lead us to definite conclusions. We have to seek inspiration from the efforts made by Dr. Pandey and Prof. Athavale and continue our research in this direction with an open mind. It is possible that we may never reach a conclusion and be in a position to make any categorical statement. All this has been taken care of in my long paper, which was originally written in Gujarati, and which for want of time, I am not in a position to present in English right now.

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The Rasa Theory in Relation to All The Fine Arts P. N. VIRKAR Before proceeding to consider the relation of the rasa-theory to the various fine arts, we have to see which portion of that theory is relevant to : our present purposes and which arts fall under the head 'Fine Arts'. 'The rasa-sutra of Bharata has been accepted by all to be the basis of the rasa-theory. It is not necessary here to explain the different terms used in the rasa-sutra. It will be enough to remember that rasa is something experienced by the rasika and that the experience is a highly delightful one. The rasika gets such an experience on reading an excellent poem or on witnessing a first-rate dramatic performance. That poem or that performance is to be .' regarded as excellent or first-rate which has the power to give such a delightful experience to the rasika. Now when is it that a poem comes to possess this power to give a rasaexperience? It is, in the first place, only when the poet or the dramatist strains every nerve to delineate in his own way some feeling (bhava) through his work. This bhava may be a sthayz bhava or any other bhava. It is only when one feeling or the other is delineated in a poem that it looks as if it were full of life. Then alone would it be capable of touching the heart of the spectator or reader. But will it be enough for a poet merely to delineate a feeling or merely to rouse it in the heart of the reader? Of course not. That way so many happenings in life are capable of giving rise to some feeling or the other in a person's mind. Getting some money would make him happy. Winning a prize, a mishap in the family, the sight of a serpent or that of filth by the side of a road may generate some sort of a feeling, whether mild or intense, pleasant or unpleasant. Similar may be the condition of the spectator if he were to see a street accident, a smile on the face of a child, etc. The rise of every feeling is not, of course, pleasant and even if it happens to be pleasant, the pleasure derived will be 'laukika' or worldly and never 'alaukika' or higher than merely worldly, and cannot, consequently, be called a rasa. But an extra-ordinary or super-worldly joy will of necessity arise on witnessing a play of a high order or reading a poem of a similar level, provided, of course, that the spectator or reader is a rasika. Now, why should it be so? What is there in an excellent poem or a first rate dramatic performance that we do not come across in any incident in actual life! It is, of course, the exquisite beauty which a poem or a play happens to possess. Such beauty in a poem or play serves to give an 'alaukika' delight, to a rasika. W .

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THE RASA THEORY IN RELATION TO ALL THE FINE ARTS. 73 It is in order to lend beauty to the feeling depicted in a poem or play that the poet has to make a highly clever use of vibhavas, anubhavas and vyabhicari-bhavas, which are but the means to be employed to give rasaexperience to the reader. The word 'samyoga' in the raso-sutra means samyag yaga' or an exquisite combination. The whole charm of a poem is a result of the poet's choice of the appropriate vibhavas etc. and their proper synthesis into one whole. That is why it has been rightly said that the poet uses the same words as are known to all people and that he uses them in the same senses in which others do, but a piece of poetry assumes a new form, only on account of the skill of the poet in properly weaving them into one whole.1 Rasa may, therefore, be described as the beautiful delineation of an emotion with the help of suitable vibhavas etc. as to give an extremely delightful experience of that emotion to the reader or spectator. But the rasa-theory had initially been propounded as an essential element of natya (i.e., the dramatic art) and it came to be applied later on to kavya or poetry. Can this theory be of a considerable use to all the other fine arts as well ? That is the main question we have mainly to consider in the following pages of this article. Fine arts other than natya and kavya are generally supposed to be alekhya (i. e., drawing and painting), sangita (music), murtisilpa (sculpture) and vistusilpa (architecture). Sangita is made up of notya (dancing), gita (i. e., singing or vocal music) and vadya (i. e., instrumental music). By 'fine arts we shall, for our present purposes, understand those arts the main aim of which is to give delight to the artist himself and the rasikas by bringing into being something endowed with uncommon beauty. We shall begin, then, with alekhya. This art is pretty old so far as 'our country is concerned. I need not here proceed to describe the semi-circular, circular, square and other shapes that used to be given to sacrificial altars and the figure of a heron that used to be arranged' in Vedic times, as is mentioned in the 'Sulva-sutra' written soon after the Vedic literature proper. In the Ramayana of Valmiki, an explicit mention has been made of a number of pictures, in the bedrooms of Ravana. The sastra of the art of drawing and painting has been dealt with, fairly elaborately, in nine adhyayas (adhyayas 35 to 43) of the third Khanda of the Visnudharmottara Purana, supposed to have been written about 600 A. D. These nine adhyayas are known by the name 'Citra-sutra'. But much before the elaboration in the Citra-sutra proper, i. e., in the early slokas of the second adhyaya of the same third Khanda of the Visnu 1. a 99 ThT:, a garsiauna: tathApi navyaM bhavati kAvyaM prathanakauzalAt // 2. Tri sta tari tayya

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74 SOME ASPECTS OF THE RASA 'THEORY dharmottara Purana, the sastras of gita (vocal music), atodya (instrumental music), nTtta (dancing), citra and murtisilpa (pratima-laksana) have actually been mentioned and are dwelt upon in that and the following adhyayas. Pratima-laksana is discussed in a number of adhyayas after the C'itra-sutra, under the heading, Devatarupa-nirmanam'. Let us first see whether the rasa-theory is considered by the Visnudharmottara Purana to be of use, in the discussion of the fine arts mentioned therein. We have, constantly, to bear in mind that so far as the application of the rasa-theory to fine arts other than kavya or natya is concerned, we are not at all concerned with the different views regarding the process of rasa-realisation put forth by the so many commentators of the rasa-sutra of Bharata. We have to take into account only the core of the rasa theory pointed out above and see what importance it has in relation to the fine arts other than poetry and drama. In Adhyaya II of the third Khanda, the Visnudharmottara says that Citra-sutra cannot be understood without the NTtta-sastras and out of the fifteen Adhyayas from XX to XXXIV which deal with NTtta sastra, Adhyaya 30th is called Rasadhyaya and the next one (i. e., 31st) is named Bhavadhyaya. Nine rasas (including santa) are mentioned and described in the Rasadhyaya, the last (i. e., the 29th) verset of which says that nstta without rasa is of no significance and hence a dancer should always have recourse only to that nstta which is based on rasa. It will be interesting to note that in the 4th, 5th and 6th verses of the same Adhyaya, 'Colours of the various rasas are mentioned. Are we to take the hint and use these very colours to depict the different rasas in Drawing and Painting? As many as forty-nine bhavas are listed in the Bhavadhyaya and in the last (i. e., the 58th) verse of that Adhyaya we are told which bhavas are to be made use of in depicting each of the nine rasas. . Thus because Citra-sastra cannot be understood without Nitta-sastra and because NTtta is of no importance without a rasa, it follows that no Citra is worth anything if it does not delineate a rasa. 3. P a neru fetei uchun 4. nATayasya mUlaM tu rasaH pradiSTo rasena hInaM na hi nRttamasti / tasmAt prayatnena rasAzrayasya nRttasya yatnaH puruSeNa kaaryH|| elme: Famiques Taslan teren zaGgArastu bhavecchayAmo rakto raudraH prakIrtitaH // sito hAsazca vijJeyaH kRSNazcaiva bhayAnakaH / gauro vIrastu vijJeyaH pItazcaivAdbhutaH smRtH|| kApotaH karuNazcaiva nIlo bIbhatsa eva ca / These very colours are mentioned in Bharata's Natyasastra also (VI, 42-43).

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THE RASA THEORY IN RELATION TO ALL THE FINE ARTS 75 In the Abhilasitarthacintamani of Somesvara citra is said to be of four kinds. One of these is called bhavacitra. It is one at the very sight of which the rasika gets rasa-experience. This kind of citra is said to be causing curiosity. The words Darsanadeva are bound to remind us of Mammata's words 'Samanantarameva rasasvadanasamudbhutam? (absolutely instantaneous delight, which springs from the relishing of rasa), and also of the asamlaksyakeramavyangya variety of dhvani. Anandavardhana says that the rasa variety of the suggested sense is understood very soon, almost along with the expressed sense. And if we look at the question independently without worrying ourselves about what the sastras say, the importance of the rasa-principle to the art of drawing and painting should be very obvious. A picture that skilfully, delineates some emotion, is far too superior to another that depicts merely inanimate objects. The quality of pictures presenting landscapes etc. will be much greater when they are drawn with the object of impressing some bhava on the mind of the rasika. A picture which depicts a heap of fruits, howsoever neatly arranged, cannot, I think, hold a candle to another which depicts, artistically, say, the love of a mother for her child.++ I must here cite a verse quoted by Yasodhara in his commentary named Jayamangala on the Kama Sutra of Vatsyayana. The author of the verse is not mentioned. :: rUpabhedAH, pramANAni, bhAva-lAvaNya-yojanam / sAdRzya, varNikAbhaGga iti citraM SaDaGgakam // . :: Of the six angas of a picture mentioned in this verse, I wish to draw the attention of the readers to two, viz. bhava-yojana and lavanya-yojana, which are extremely important. Whava-yojana of course means depicting an emotion and lavanya-yojana means depicting it beautifully. Such a picture is superior to one that very skilfully presents inanimate objects. It is so, obviously because the latter is incapable of giving rasa-experience to the spectator. The name of the eighty-second Adhyaya of the Samarangana-sutradhara is Rasa-drstilaksana. The very first verse of that Adhyaya says that bhavabhivyakti in a citra is dependent on rasadrsti.8 The whole of the second + Could the picture of the yaksa that his wife might have drawn with a view to console herself, be not suggestive of his ardent love in separation ? [Please vide Kalidasa's Meghaduta, line II of verse 25 (Uttaramegha). If it is so suggestive, such a picture can be said to give an experience of (Vipralambha srrgara) rasa to the rasika. 6. 316TTITAT 7 Etaga trai afasi agreari faalg #R44 II (I, (3), 942-43). 7. Kavyaprakasa, Ullasa 1, Vrtti on verse No. 2 8. rasAnAmatha vakSyAmo dRSTInAM veha lakSaNam / tadAyattA yatazcitre bhAvavyaktiH prajAyate //

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76 SOME ASPECTS OF THE RASA THEORY plies to murtisilpon ting living figureshows feelings stanza and the first part of the third stanza give a list of eleven rasas and the latter part of that stanza states that experts in the art of painting hold that rasas are eleven. The thirty-third and the thirty-fourth stanzas of the same Adhyaya tell us that citra is dependent on the import that is suggested by the hands and the eyes. These (i. e., the hands and the eyes) serve to make the picture appear as if it were living. The same theory applies to murtisilpa also. As that art is concerned mainly with murtis, that is, with representing living figures, it could be said without hesitation that the murti which exquisitely shows feelings should be considered to be superb and far superior to one which does not exhibit a feeling, but which is just a symbol of a particular deity. A word about sadharanikarana which is an essential part of the rasatheory, would be quite appropriate here. I am not going to examine the different interpretations of that term offered by critics. I am trying to take quite an independent, practical view and to find out what the main idea underlying this concept can be. Both Bhattanayaka and Abhinavagupta Thave held that sadharanikarana takes place only after the rasika has understood the expressed (vacya) sense. Now, what can be the nature of the expressed sense of a kavya ? It is obviously the knowledge of the vibhavas, anuubhavas etc., as described by the poet. In the case of a picture for a murti), we may say that the expressed sense therein is equivalent to the vibhavas, anubhavas, etc. as shown or displayed by the artist. Now the vibhavas and anubhavas could be shown by the artist only in a 'particular? form. He has to choose 'particular characters and show their gestures and movements and those, too, in a particular setting only. He has to choose Dusyanta or Rama or some particular hero and a particular heroine etc. and manifest the intended bhava through their gestures and movements, So the reader or the spectator first understands the anubhavas etc. of those particular individuals at particular times and in particular places. But everything is presented by the artist with great workmanship hence if the beholder is a rasika, he is so much influenced by that workmanship that he repeatedly contemplates on whatever is expressed or shown. This is what Abhinayagupta means by anusandhana'. We must not forget that the main aim of a great artist is to depict a bhava and that the vibhavas etc. are but the instruments employed by him to achieve that aim. As a result of his repeated contemplation the rasika gradually forgets or loses sight of the instruments or less important details and concentrates all his attention only on the main bhava and on the beauty with which it is delineated. This and nothing else is, to me, the main idea underlying the concept of sadharanikarana. To be aware, only of whatever 9. hastena sUcayannathai dRSTayA ca pratipAdayan / sajIva iti dRzyeta sarvAbhinayadarzanAt // antia da para... yaydi (Hacaica (?)-) FFATCAI H A 11

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THE RASA THEORY IN RELATION TO ALL THE FINE ARTS is pradhana (or main) and to disregard everything that is gauna (or subordinate) should be taken to be the sum and substance of sadharanikarana (particular details are lost sight of and the spectator is 'generally'-(i. e., without being related to particular individuals or things) - aware of whatever is mainly intended to be conveyed). The same interpretation should hold good in the case of all works of art-whether it is a poem or a play or a picture or a murti or a statue. Vastus'ilpa or Architecture may be considered after murtisilpa. We have to remember in this connection that architecture can be looked upon as a fine art only when the architect intends to erect something mainly with a view to producing a piece of beauty. Not residential buildings or offices etc., but constructions like temples etc. in erecting which workmanship is predominantly made use of, can be said to be works of vastusilpa. Of these, only those temples etc. which are embodiments of bhakti will impress the spectator most. Much of the charm of the Taj is likely to be lost if one ignores that it is an embodiment of the love of Shahajahan for his dear Mumtaj. To turn, finally, to sangita. We have already seen earlier that sangita is composed of nitta, gita and vadya (please see note 2). The relation that rasa bears to nrtta has already been considered. Let us now take account of gita and vadya. In his Sangita-ratnakara, Sarngadeva says thus in verse 1351 of the seventh adhyaya : Experts wish that in this Tauryatrikal, rasa should be the main aim'. In the three hundred and twenty verses that follow, we have been supplied with exhaustive pieces of information about all the details regarding rasas, bhavas etc. and about their so many angas. Now although these details have been picked up mostly from Bharata,11 the Sangita-ratnakara has expressly said that in sangita (as in natya), rasa is the chief thing. For sangita the term tauryatrika has been used. This trika obviously means netta, gita and vadya. So in addition to Visnudharmottara-purana, the Sangita-ratnakara also tells us that nitta is rasapradhana. Moreover, it says that gita, too (with vadya), is rasa-pradhana. Let us take an independent view of this art, as we did in the case of citra. Is nytta in no way different from a demonstration of physical exercises ? And if it is different, it is so not only because it is an art, but because it artistically manifests one bhava or another. But what should we say about gita and vadya? The answer will be found in the answer to the question whether gita is meant to give joy to the rasika or not. The * Please vide separastara RTRERETHEZ1917 Anera zata: and acrofarfecaffha SHICHTETRIFaarat-9% afHIA TAIAT Kavyaprakasa, Zalkikar edition, p. 92, 10. ATF fa alifafa lagi 11. feftacenada arayacagareni AFECT Ari sinara 11 (VII-1672)

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78 SOME ASPECTS OF THE RASA THEORY Sangita-ratnakara in I-26-30 expressly says that gita has the power to give the highest delight to all, from God Siva down to an angry snake, 12 A Marathi poem, 'Satarice Bola'12 by the poet Kesavasuta is so well-known to Marathi speaking people. The poet had once been buried so deep in misery and disappointment that he for a moment felt like going to the length of committing suicide. As he was walking along in the darkness of the night in this mood, totally unmindful of everything that happened around him, he just chanced to listen to the sweet notes of a lute being played in some house. He at first got annoyed, thinking that the player was so self-centred as to be completly indifferent to the miseries of others. Gradually, however, he went on being so deeply influenced by the notes that continued to be emitted, that his mind ultimately achieved the state of perfect peace and happiness. If music (gita or vadya) is able to give such a joy even in the worst of moods, it must be such as would move the feelings of a listener. En A Sanskrit subhasital3 tells us that one whose heart does not melt on listening to a song is either one who has renounced all worldly bonds or is a beast. And can a song that is not rasa-pradhana be capable of melting the listener's heart? The same is suggested by J. Dryden, an English poet, when he says: "What passion cannot Music raise and quell ?"14. And what else do Shakespeare's following lines15 hint at ? : The man that hath no music in himself, Nor is not moved with concord of sweet sounds, Is fit for treasons, strategems and spoils : The motions of his spirit are as dull as night, . . . . . . . . Let no such man be trusted.' gItena prIyate devaH sarvajJaH paarvtiiptiH| gopIpatirananto'pi vaMzadhvanivazaM gataH // sAmagItirato brahamA, vINAsakA sarasvatI / kimanye devagandharvayakSamAnavadAnavAH // ajJAtaviSayAsvAdo bAlaH paryaGkikAgataH / rudan gItAmRtaM zrutvA harSotkarSa prapadyate // vanecarastRNAhArazcitraM mRgazizuH pazuH / lubdho lubdhakasaGgIte gIte tyajati jIvitam // kruddho viSaM vaman sarpaH phaNAmAndolayan muhuH / gAnaM jAGgalikAcchrutvA harSotkarSe prapadyate // . 13. g ada mitaa gadiat a to yasya na dravate cittaM sa vai mukto'thavA pshuH|| 14. 'A Song for St. Cecilia's day, 1687.' 15. Merchant of Venice, Act V. (Lorenzo's speech in the moonlight)

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THE RASA THEORY IN RELATION TO ALL THE FINE ARTS 79 I remember an experience I had some forty years ago. A friend of mine gave me the pleasure of listening to a song that was recorded. It was sung in the Bhairavi Ragini by Abdul Karim Khan. I really felt as if my vitals were being touched. Hence I can safely venture to say that even music rouses feelings and when, thus, it is rasa-pradhana, it rises to the height of one of the finest of arts. The doctrine of aucitya' (first clearly put forth by Anandavardhana) is one very closely allied to rasa. It is one that holds good with any fine art. To consider it at the present moment in the context of music : Music is regarded these days as an essential part of motion pictures. It will not, however, do if the music therein happens to be introduced for the sake of music alone. The tunes. the rhythm, must be perfectly suitable to the main theme of the picture and to the various incidents in it. The druta (i. e. fast) rhythm will damage the beauty of a song that may be sung with a view to giving vent to the sad thoughts of the singer. The sounds in the words must be soft, the tunes suitable to the rasa and the rhythm as slow as the mood requires. Then alone, and not when the song is a demonstration of mere erudition, that the rasika will be inspired to say to the singer : 16 . 'I am drawn, forcibly, by the charming melody of your song.' ADDENDA Several questions may occur when one thinks of the rasa-theory in the context of drawing and painting and of music. An attempt is made to consider some of them, in the following lines. Patterns and designs are employed on a number of occasions in everyday life, for example, while decorating door curtains, windows (with lattice work), floors, walls, dining tables and so on. The question is whether such designs are capable of giving rasa-experience to the spectator. The answer is that when designs etc. are used only for decoration, they cannot be likened to a composition forming one whole. Even when an attempt is made to arrange some of them into a whole, they may be said to resemble what Mammata calls citra-kavya'. Sometimes the designs may happen to be symbolic, i. e., suggestive (for example, a svastika, a lotus, a conch-shell, etc.). When such symbolic figures are made use of in temples and similar other places, they may serve to add to the main effect produced on the mind of a devotee visiting the temple. They are somewhat similar to the varnas, padas, parts of padas etc. used by a poet and are deemed as gunibhutavyangya by Anandavardhana (vide page 485 of the Kasi edition of the Dhvanyaloka.) It is possible that a series of symbolic figures may, in special circumstances, give rise to a bhiva in the mind of a rasika, as a Marathi poet, 16. Abhijnana-sakuntalam, last verse of the prelude (i. e., prastavana).

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80 SOME ASPECTS OF THE RASA THEORY Kesavasuta tells us in his poem on seeing a young woman drawing auspicious figures (rangavali) in the court-yard. Under such special circumstances, the symbolic figures may inspire a rasika onlooker with some bhava (emotional mood) such as piety, auspiciousness, etc. Another question that may present itself is, which, in the case of painting and of music in particular, can be said to be the vibhavas, anubhavas etc., if that piece of art is capable of giving rasa (or bhava) experience to a rasika. It was already said in this article that a picture is capable of evoking rasa (or bhava) only when it delineates some emotion. Take, for example, a picture representing the love of a mother for her child. The alambana vibhava of her motherly love is, obviously, the child. If the child is shown to be smiling, the smile on the child's face will be an uddipana-vibhava. The expressions on the mother's face and her actions meant to fondle the child will be the anubhavas and so on. To quote (as an additional instance) the following verse from the Meghaduta of Kalidasa : tvAmAlikhya praNayakupitAM dhAturAyaiH zilAyAmAtmAnaM te caraNapatitaM yAvadicchAmi kartuma astAvanmuharupacitaidRSTirAlupyate me pharastasminnapi na sahate saMgama nau kRtAntaH // If, in this case, we were to think only of the picture drawn by the yaksa (and not of the effect of seeing the picture on him), the Vipralambha-rati (love in separation) of the Yaksa's wife will have to be considered to be the sthayi bhava (suggested by the picture). The offence given by the yaksa provoking her anger will be the vibhava, the anger depicted on her face will be an anubhava, and so on. To turn, now to 'pure music'. Instrumental music can be said to be an ideal instance of pure' music. A reference was made, towards the close of this article, to the poem 'Tunes of a Lute (Satarice Bola)' by the Marathi poet, Kesavasuta. He, in that poem, says that in course of time the lute began to emit 'hope-in-spring' (asapreraka) tunes. So even pure music is capable of evoking some emotional mood, and thus of giving a bhava experience (if not a rasa-experience) to a rasika. If. then, the tunes of a musical instrument manifest some feeling, whose can it be said to manifest? Of course that of the person playing on the instrument. His mood at that particular moment is manifested.* If so, the tunes must be looked upon as anubhavas of the artist's mood. It will be useful to recollect the words "Fiat ForTT21" (and on hearing sweet sounds) from sakuntala (Act V, verse 2nd). They are enough to show that pure music does touch the heart of a (rasika) listener. 00 Uttaramegha, 38. Or rather, we may say that a mood' recollected by the artist) in Contemplation' is manifested.

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The Relevance of RASA Theory to Modern Literature K. KRISHNAMOORTHY "Criticism can never be a science : it is, in the first place, much too personal, and in the second, it is concerned with values that science ignores. The touchstone is emotion, not reason. We judge a work of art by its effect on our sincere and vital emotion, and nothing else. All the critical twiddletwaddle about style and form, all this pseudo-scientific classifying and analysing of books in an imitation-botanical fashion, is mere impertinence and mostly dull jargon.... A critic must be able to feel the impact of a work of art in all its complexity and force. To do so, he must be a man of force and complexity himself, which few critics are. The more scholastically educated a man is, generally, the more he is an emotional bore". -D. H. Lawrence While reading this passage, one will be reminded of Anandavardhana's dictum: It (i. e. the suggested meaning intended by the poet) is not understood by those who are learned merely in grammar and lexicography. It is understood only by those who have an insight into the true nature of poetic meaning.1 ,and Abhinavagupta's definition of a sahTdaya : Responsive critics are those whose mirror-like minds have become perfectly clear by dint of a constant and close perusal of poetic works and as a result of which they acquire the ability to share imaginatively what is described and to attain a heartfelt response within themselves.2 If great poets are rare, rarer are perceptive critics. In the history of the world's literature on poetry these two figures,-Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta--stand out as two peaks of Indian thought as they combined in themselves the all too rare endowments of creative poetry and meticulous 1. sabdartha-sasana-jianamitrenaiva na vedyate/ vedyate sa tu kavyartha-tattvajnaireva kevalam// -Dhvanyaloka, I. 7. 2. Yesam kavyanusilanabhyasa-vasad-visadibhute manomukure varnaniyatanmayibhavana yogyata te sva-hrdaya-samvadabhajah sahsdayah. -Locana on Dhvanyaloka, I. 1.

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82 SOME ASPECTS OE THE RASA THEORY learning, sensitive taste and penetrating philosophy. Not all the library of critical works today on poetry and drama including the specialized advances made in the psychology of literature and aesthetics, structural stylistics and semantics, etc. can render their vital findings out-dated or anachronistic; for they touch the vital mainspring of all art-creation and art-appreciation. That mainspring or pivotal point is rasa. That it is one of the most misunderstood and misinterpreted concepts, both by medieval schoolman in India as well as modern Sanskritists, would be an understatement, judging by the number of works which have appeared on the subject up-to-date. Not a little of the bewildering confusion is due to some mis-translations in English of key-words in Sanskrit. A study of the theory in an exclusively historico-critical perspective, in isolation from the total thought-complex of the great theorists, cannot but lead to inconclusive and misleading results. It is proposed in this short paper to re-examine just one or two most crucial constituents of the rasa theory, and indicate its implications in a way which will substantiate its relevance to the study of all literature, modern literature not excepted.. . Il We often come across English words like instincts, drives, propensities, emotions, moods, feelings, sentiments etc. borrowed from modern psychology, to designate the Sanskrit technical terms, bhava and rasa in their multiplicity. We also find words like 'art-experience,' 'aesthetic experience,' aesthetic contemplation' etc. as descriptions of the trained reader's enjoyment of literature. The former are common to life-experiences also; while the latter are prominent in the appreciation of the fine arts. But none is sure how they differentiate life-emotion from art-emotion. Allied to this confusion is the lack of clarity in our understanding of vibhavas and anubhavas, sthayibhavas and vyabhicaribhavas as also of bhava vis-a-vis rasa. As a result, the very seminal explanation of the aesthetic, process as involving sadharanikarana becomes distorted and difficult to accept. I might refer in this connection to the brilliant and closely-argued paper by Prof. R.B. Patankar entitled : "Does the rasa theory have any modern relevance ?" published in the prestigious journal, Philosophy, East and West.3 Rasa is a superstructure resting on one or two foundational pillars. Remove the pillars, and the whole structure goes to pieces. Before I embark upon setting down the basic passages relevant to a proper understanding of the rasa-theory from the master Abhinavagupta himself-passages not only from his well-known Alankara texts (Locana and Abhinavabharati); but also the ignored and almost unknown philosophical texts-I shall quote one or two passages as representative of modern critical thought and practical criticism. These two approaches appear to me to come closest to the ancient thought of Abhinavagupta. 3. Vol. 30, No. 3; July 1980.

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THE RELEVANCE OF RASA THEORY TO MODERN LITERATURE 83 1. The first is from Jacques Maritain's Creative Intuition in art4 where he discusses T. S. Eliot's views regarding the nature of emotions in poetic creation and criticism. While he agrees with Eliot that "one who reads poets should not mistake for the poetry an emotional state aroused in himself by the poetry, a state which may be merely an indulgence of his own emotions"; and that "the end of the enjoyment of poetry is a pure contemplation from which all the accidents of personal emotion are removed "-Maritain calls these "brute emotions or merely subjective feelings"-he adds his proviso that "this pure contemplation itself is steeped in the creative emotion or poetic intuition conveyed by the poem. T. S. Eliot goes on to say: "It is not in his personal emotions, the emotions provoked by particular events in his life, that the poet is in any way remarkable or interesting... The business of the poet is not to find new emotions, but to use the ordinary ones, and in working them up into poetry, to express feelings which are not in actual fact emotions at all,..poetry is not a turning loose of emotion, but an escape from emotion." And Maritain observes : "The escape of which he speaks cannot come about except through poetic knowledge and creative emotion, and in the very act of creating." At last he is in full agreement with Eliot when he ends up with the following observation: "Very few know when there is expression of significant emotion, emotion which has its life in the poem and not in the history of the poet." Before I cite the next passage, let me set beside this the aphorism of Anandavardhana-'If the poet be suffused with emotion, the entire world of his creation will be pulsating with rasa; If he should be devoid of it, the entire world of his creation too will be dry and inspid'.5 Here is Abhinavagupta's exegesis of srngari : The poet should be taken to be suffused with the delectation of the various ingredients of a love-situation as found in literature; one should not wrongly understand that he must be a voluptuary running after women in life. Further, the word srngara here is really indicative of rasa in general. 6 Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta thus are well aware of the distinction between what Maritain would call 'creative emotion and T. S. Eliot would call 'significant emotion' on the one hand and brute emotion or raw emotion of everyday life. The former is a singular feature underlying all creative writing; while the latter belongs to the private lives of people as particular individuals with their worldly love-hate complexities. I quote this passage to underscore the point that this has not been particularly noticed by Sanskritists, when Abhinavagupta regards kavi and sahrdayc as two poles of the same creative power : 4. New York, 1955, p. 310. 5 srngari cet kavih kavye jatam rasamayam jagat/ sa eva vitaragascet nirasam sarvameva tat// -Dhvanyaloka, Ed. K. Krishnamoorthy, Dharwad, 1974, p. 250. 6. Locana, N. S. P. Edn., Bombay, 1935, p. 278.

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84 SOME ASPECTS OF THE RASA THEORY Glorious indeed is the truth singular (or attitude identical) of Poetry, designated by two alternate names viz., the poet and the responsive critic. He is identifying them on account of this vital affinity between them in the partaking of rasa. The world of nature which is hard as stone is made instinct with life by means of this creative rasa within each of them; creative fully in the poet and re-creative in the critic : 8 What else but this creative-recreative emotion is involved in Valmiki's soka becoming.instantly a sloka? Lest we should confuse the sorrow as a life-emotion of the pained sage. Abhinavagupta comments that it is quite different from it and also of the nature of repose, within his creative spirit or soul, which melts his heart as it were and floods it with an afflatus of selfdelight : 9 The adjuncts nija and sva governing rasa in both these excerpts from Abhinavagupta deserve further notice. But we shall take it up later. The creative afflatus called rasa, karuna, here, overflows spontaneously and takes the art-form of a sloka. The creative rasa then is existentially co-terminus with the created art-form itself. As a citation in Pratiharenduraja states : The poet's creative soul which delights in rasa shines bright when it finds a ready reflection in the clear mirror of word and meaning, a mirror embellished elegantly by literary qualities like perspicuity and power. The poet's rasa is a lamp and his creation a mirror which adequately reflects the lamp-light. It has nothing to do with the creator's private emotion which his diary might record. Abhinavagupta emphatically 'asserts : One should not take it as the personal sorrow of the sage'.. Why?-one might ask. Abhinava's answer is: 'If it were personal sorrow on his part, Anandavardhana would have no reason to regard rasa as the atman or soul of literature. For, no sorrow-stricken person turns suddenly creative like this. '12 I need not labour this point any more. Whatevar be the worldly emotion in question-love or sorrow-, the creative state of rasa is identical in each case; that is why the poet and the critic can both share in that 'tragic pleasure' which is not at all a paradox. Only this common rasa state, which is creative through and through, and underlying all worldly emotions, pleasurable or otherwise deserves the status of atman or life-essence of literature. In the 7. Sarasvatyastattvam kavi-sahsdayakhyam vijayate-Ibid., Invocatory verse. 8. cf. jagad gravaprakhyam nija-rasa-bharat sarayati ca-op. cit. 9. karuna-rasa-rupatam laukika-soka-vyatiriktam svc-citta-drti-samasvadyasaram pratipa nno rasa...-op. cit., p. 31. 10. rasollasi kaveratma svacche sabdarthadarpane! madhuryaujoyuta-praudhe prativindya prakasatel --Laghuvrtti on Udbhata's Kavyala katasangraha, N. S. P. edn., pp. 79-80. 11. na tu muneh soka iti mantavyam-Loc. cit. 12. evam hi sati...so'pi duhkhita iti rasasya atmeti niravakasam bhavet; na ca duhkha-samtap tasya esa daseti. -Loc. cit.

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THE RELEVANCE OF RASA THEORY TO MODERN LITERATURE 85 words of T. S. Eliot, it is significant emotion and in the words of Jacques Maritain, it is 'creative emotion.' Rasa is absolutely impersonal and free from worldly associations, and is consummated only with the creation of the artobject. Rasas should not be mistaken for life-emotions which are raw emotions or brute emotions, which have no place in literature. To show rasa's further relevance to modern literature, I shall now cite a passage from W. H. Auden. He describes Wagner's music almost in the same language that Abhinava uses to describe Valmiki's expression of karuna-rasa : In the expression of physical suffering, the suffering of unrequited love, the suffering of self-love, the suffering of betrayed love, the sufferings, in short, of failure Wagner is one of the greatest geniuses who ever lived. But only in the expression, 'the imitation of suffering. Happiness, social life, mystical joy, and success were beyond him.13 But whether one should call it good or bad art is another question and it involves questions of response linked with personal belief or unbelief of the critic. Auden has explained this very penetratingly : We have two kinds of experiences : the first, objective experience of the world outside consciousness, entering as sensory images or as memories from our unconscious; this kind of experience is governed by causal necessity, that is, it is presented to us independently of our will, and it is either pleasant or unpleasant. The second, subjective, or consciousness of our own conscious faults; this kind of experience is accessible to the will; and is governed by whatever is our conception of logical and moral necessity; it is here that ethical judgements are made, and conduct decided-experience here is either good or evil. Similarly there are two classes of events : those which we cannot alter or prevent by our own actions, and those which we can. If we call unpleasant events which are unalterable tribulations, and evil events which are preventable temptations, then science and art are both concerned primarily with tribulations, but in different ways. The aim of science is to convert tribulations into temptations, an insoluble problem of 13. Ed., W. K. Wimsatt, Literary Criticism, Idea and Act, California, 1974, p. 38.

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SOME ASPECTS OF THE RASA THEORY passive endurance into a soluble problem of conduct, the unpleasant into the evil.... But there are always tribulations which science has not yet been able to change into temptations and which it will never be able to change because they have already happened. It is with these that art is concerned; the Muses are the daughters of memory. For if past events cannot be altered, our attitude towards them can. They can be accepted. Their relation to each other and the present can be understood. The moralist's attack on art comes from his confusion of art with science.14 The romantic movement in the West advocates the autonomy of the poeticart; and raises its banner of revolt against conformity to any external norms. It makes the poet the 'unacknowledged legislator of the world'. Anandavardhana too asserts in the same strain : In poesy's unlimited estate, the poet is the Creator sole! As he pleases, so things mutate in this universe whole !15 His poet obeys no law which is not intrinsic to his inspired vision. This law itself is the integral norm of propriety (aucitya) to rasa. It is at once a-logical and a-moral. Any theme is grist to the poet's mill. What makes it aesthetically viable and valuable is only rasa-aucitya. That is the reason why rasabhasa has an honoured place alongside of rasa in literature, according to Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta. The latter insists on the condition that the sahrdaya should be free from inhibitions imposed by his personal beliefs and unbeliefs, to make his response genuinely aesthetic. Against the background of Auden's penetrating analysis of experience, it will be easy to see how the Indian conception of thematic "rasadis" alongside of the over-all creative rasa is both meaningful and significant. The former are governed by the law of unity, symmetry, harmony, and propriety while the over-all rasavesa or creative afflatus is a law unto itself.16 The question of the poet's belief is not brought into literary criticism or value judgement. What is ever insisted upon is the commonality of interest between the poet and his reader, since art, by definition, is a shared thing. This is a point admitted by Auden also. If it cannot be shared, "poetry would be no more than a personal allegory of the 14. Ibid., p. 39. 15. apare kavyasamsare kavireva prajapatih/ yathasmai rocate visvar. tathedam parivartate// -Loc. cit., p. 250. 16. The following citation found in Pratiharenduraja shows how rasa and rasadi were not always kept distinct even in early times : rasadyadhisthitam kavyam jivadrupataya yatah/ ucyate tadrasadinam kavyatmatvam vyavasthitam//

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THE RELEVANCE OF RASA THEORY TO MODERN LITERATURE 87 artist's individual dementia, of interest primarily to the psychologist and the historian".17 Some ultra-modernist literary trends in Western literature seem to be experimenting with this extreme idea. But the other extreme would mean a photographic copy of the accidental details of life. The rasa-theory holds a golden mean between the two, because its recognition of navarasas is wide enough to do justice to all the major emotional experiences in man's life, with an underground connection involving one of the four purusarthas or life-values, in an unobtrusive manner though. 2. Next I take up a view expressed by a famous French poet-critic, Yves Bonnefoy in the Encounter :18 Poetic creation, in short, is hieratic, it makes an inviolable place, and while the rite of reading continues, it draws its mind into this illusory communion.. Are we not reminded here of Kalidasa's description of drama as a "ritual feast for the eye of gods "19 and that it is a singular source of satisfaction to all the spectators with varied tastes ?20 Among the theorists, both Bhatta Nayaka and Abhinavagupta bring in their Kashmir Saiva metaphysics to explain the experience of rasa which is nothing but a sudden flash of bliss, innate in the Atman, and which is realised by the powerful impact of music and dance on the stage etc., while witnessing a drama or by responding to poetry. This rasa is described as svarupananda which is infinite subjectivity of the soul, void of all objectivity; and which is of the same nature as the bliss of yogins. Bhatta Nayaka, as quoted by Mahimabhatta states : When rasa is thus made to immerse (the playhouse) with recitations from the drama-text and melodious singing of dhruva songs (i. e. rhythmic musical sets) by the actors, the spectator concentrates himself solely in its irresistible appeal and turns inward for a moment. When the objective things outside thus disappear from his field of attention, he attains the state of his inmost spiritual being. Then the true bliss of his inner spirit is manifested, a bliss which only yogins know !21 That Abhinava is only confirming this Vedantic view of rasa which is esoteric is evident in his 17. See note 13 above; Ibid., p. 43. 18. Encounter, London, June 1962, p. 39. 19. Cf. "devanamidamamananti munayah kantam kratum caksusam." The word krctu in Sanskrit means not only an act of holy sacrifice but also something most cherished or longed for : ruceratisayah kamye visaye kraturisyate -Radhakanta Dev, Sabdakalpa druma. Vol. II, p. 212. 20. "natyam bhinnarucerjanasya bahudhapyekam samaradhanam" Malavikagnimitra, I. 4. 21. pathyadatha dhruvaganattatah sampurite rase/ tadasvada-bharaikagro hrsyatyantarmukhah ksanam// tato nirvisayasyasya svarupavasthitou nijah/ vyajyate hladanihsyando yena trpyanti yoginah// Vyaktiviveka, Chov.khamba Edn., p. 94.

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88 SOME ASPECTS OF THE RASA THEORY expressions already noted, viz. nijarasabharat, etc. This unique Indian context of Yoga-cum-Vedanta cannot be forgotten while estimating the concept of rasa in its final phase in Indian poetics. Bhatta Nayaka also states unequivocally that rasa essentially, is an in-depth response to poetry : Rasa or the experience which is one of perfect delectation and which arises only in the wake of an overwhelming experience evoked by the (represented) multi-feeling complex, comes to be termed the essence of poetry.22 Even direct perception of beauty in nature cannot yield the kind of supreme rasa or aesthetic delight which only the representation of it by a consummate poet can give by virtue of his creative or artistic power : Because of this process of einfuhlung or aesthetic empathy, things presented by the poet's creative power acquire a vividness which is indeed far greater than that of things directly perceived.23 Now we have landed in the tangled web of tanmayi-bhava, whose consideration we have been postponing all along; because it is the master-key utilized by both Bhatta-Nayaka and Abhinavagupta in explaining the apparently mysterious nature of rasasvada. As we shall see presently, it is a synonym of hrdaya-samvada as well as sadharanikarana. To take the last in isolation from its Kashmir Saiya context and to attach it modern meanings like 'universalization' is not warranted by the texts., Even in modern Western aesthetics, the traditional conception of the "aesthetic object" as anything towards which a certain disinterested attitude is adopted, is in trouble as Richard W. Lind demonstrates in a recent article entitled "Attention and the Aesthetic Object" in the Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism. He has referred to several studies in the last two decades as converging to this conclusion.24 He comes to the conclusion that the term "aesthetic" is vacuous and that "aesthetic objects are not merely illuminated by attitude; their very structure and texture are both constituted and made intelligible by discriminating attention." Spontaneous elicitation of attention is its distinguishing feature. The crude psychology of I. A. Richards has been 22. bhava-samyojana-vyangya-parisamvitti-gocarah/ asvadanatmanubhavo rasah kavyartha ucyatel/-Ibid., p. 67. Quoted also by Abhinava in his commentary on Natyasastra, GOS, Vol. I, p. 277. The slightly variant readings therein do not affect the main argument here. 23. kavi-saktyarpita bhavastanmayabhava-yuktitch/ tatha sphurantyami kavyanna tathadhyaksatah kila// -Ibid., p. 73. 24. Vol. XXXIX, No. 2, 1980, p. 131 f. Some of the studies referred to are 1. George Dickie, 'The Myth of the Aesthetic Attitude', Introductory Reading in Aesthetics (ed. John Hesper, New York, 1969), pp. 28-45; 2. Marshal Cohen, 'Appearance and the aesthetic attitude', Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 56 (1959), pp. 915-25. 3. Robert Mac-Gregor, 'Art and the Aesthetic', Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. XXXII (1973-74), pp. 549-559.

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THE RELEVANCE OF RASA THEORY TO MODERN LITERATURE 89 discarded long ago by philosophers like Maritain. To Richards there is no aesthetic emotion peculiar to art: "When we look at a picture or read a poem or listen to music, we are not doing something quite unlike what we were doing on our way to the gallery or when we dressed in the morning."25 Even art-critics like Roger Fry have shown how transmutations of sensations of experience take place in art. Our reaction to works of art is a reaction to a relation and not to sensations as such or even to objects or persons. I have been struggling all the time to highlight the fact that rasa as explained by Bhatta Nayaka and Abhinava does not exist outside the percipient. It is to be discovered or intuited within by an inward directed process, which is non-empirical and hence called alaukika or lokottara; these terms should not be interpreted as .super-normal because intuitive apperception is quite a normal feature in all aesthetic contemplation. One more digression from texts bearing on sadharanikarana in Sanskrit. I might be permitted, to build up the right atmosphere for the understanding of the intended purport of the texts. That is the modern idea of symbol. Susanne Langer is the reputed exponent of the theory that all art is essentially symbolic.26 She has drawn inspiration from the Indian rasa theory also. According to her all artistic creation consists of only "forms of human feeling." Art does not represent actual things and events but ideas of them. It has import without conventional reference. The symbol has a special sense of "significant form" where "significance" is a quality felt by the percipient while "form" is that art-object outside which expresses feeling. This feeling is not communicated but revealed. The aesthetic emotion is not expressed in the work, but belongs to the percipient.27 The correspondence of all this with the postulates of the dhvani theory is obvious. When widely interpreted in the context of modern thought, dhvani or abhi-vyakti is nothing but a sudden revelation; the sahrdaya's response is a fresh discovery of rasa. The poem is only a stimulus. But then there would arise the philosophical problem as to how rasa would be a valid experience in the absence of the subject-object relationship. This is dismissed by Sankuka with a mere assertion : Who can challenge an experience which is validated by the testimony of being clearly felt ?'28 But Anantadasa, son of Visvanatha, commenting on his father's Sahityadarpana29 quotes two verses which offer this svatah 25. See, Principles of Literary Criticism, New York, p. 16 ff. 26. Vide-1. Fecling and Form, New York, 1953. 2. Philosophy in a New Key, Cambridge (Mass.), 1942. 3. Problem of Art, New York, 1957. 27. For further details, see Richard Courtney, On Langer's Dramatic Illusion, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. XXIX, No. 1 (1970). 28. Cf. yuktya paryanuyujyeta sphurannanubhavah kaya ? -Abhinavabharatz (GOS), Vol. I, 1956, p. 273. Locana on Sahityadarpana, Ed. Devadatta Kaushik, Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, 1978 Delhi, p. 7.

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SOME ASPECTS OF THE RASA THEORY pramanya-vada (thesis of self-validity) the support of tadatmya or tanmayibhavana All poetry, in our view, is exquisitely valid; since it comes forth only due to the valid experiencing of rasa which is self-illumined. That rasa is of the nature of a unique consciousness will be established in the sequel. Rasaconsciousness or experience is not invalid like the illusion of silver in a shell, because it is never subsequently sublated as in the case of the silver-shell illusion.30 It remains now to be stated that the word sadharanikarana is conspicuous by its absence in all Indian poetical works till Bhatta Nayaka coined it. And he coined it as a synonym of bhavakatva-vyapara of kavya in relation to rasa as distinguished from bhojakatva-vyapara in relation to the sahsduya, and abhidha-vyapara in relation to rhetorical or aesthetic use of language in poetry (with gunas and alankaras). These two unique vyaparas or functions of poetic language are postulated by him to serve as better explanations than the one of dhvani proposed by Anandavardhana. According to him, the dhvani function or vyanjana-vyapara cannot adequately highlight the imaginative and contemplative state which is exclusive to the realisation of rasa. This new poetic function envisaged by him is called by names like bhavana, bhavakatva and sadharani-karana. All the three refer to the same phenomenon. The word sadharana in this context means just "common" vibhavas etc. delineated in a play or poem, vibhavas etc. which are common to two or more constituents in the aesthetic situation. We have already seen the commonness of feeling between the poet and the sahTdaya. The characters described in literature are common to several readers or spectators. Rasa is thus a common or shared experience. The etymology of the word sadharanikarana (abhuta-tadbhave cvih) is selfexplanatory. What is not common is made to become common. The imaginative experience of the poet, as well as the experience of characters as fashioned by him and that of the actors who represent these and of the spectators or readers are all strictly speaking non-common or different; but they are made common as it were, by the magic power of art. This power inherent in'art is, strictly speaking, one aspect (amsa) only like the other two aspects mentioned, viz., rhetorical (abhidha) and delighting (bhojakatva) of a unitary kavyavyapara. "In poetry which involves a threefold functional aspect of language. viz., denotation, evocation and delectation..."31 is Abhinava's citation. As in Mimamsa injunctions or prohibitions i. e. do's and dont's, are the results of the power called bhavana inherent in scriptural 30. suvidagdha-prama kavyam pramanah sarvameva nah/ sva-prakasa-rasasvada-pramiti-prabhavam yatah// rasasya jnanarupatvam tadatmyaditi vaksyate/ na caprama rasa-jnanam suktau rajata-dhirival/ tasmin na jayate hadho yasmadauttarakalikah// -Lou, cit. 31. "abhidha-bhavana-rasacarvanatmake'pi tryamse kavye" - Locana, Madras, p. 273. Cl. also Abhinavabharati, I (GOS), p. 277 for full citation of the verse.

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THE RELEVANCE OF RASA THEORY TO MODERN LITERATURE 91 statements, so too the rasas like srngara are the results of the bhavanaoyapara indigenous to kavya. Since kavya is a conscious creation of a poet, the kavya-vyapara of bhavani ultimately means kavi-vyapara only. The sahTdaya -oriented vyapara has been separately called bhojakatva; and hence bhavakatva cannot be sahTdaya's. By the same token, it cannot be ascribed to the character (anukarya) created by the poet or the actor (anukarts) who represents him. We are left only with the creative agent, the poet and his pratibhavyapara oriented to rasa; this alone comes to be designated bhavakatva. It is this bhavakatva, and none other, which is held to be synonymous with sadharanikarana. The noncommon is made commonly shareable. By whom? Obviously, by the poet's imaginative and creative activity. The love and suffering of Rama and Sita, when treated thematically, are regarded as vibhavas etc. of sthayibhavas, viz., rati, soka etc. No one, not even the poet, has seen the actual life-emotions of these legendary persons. He only imagines them and gives them a coherent form in his work. In the former state (laukika), we have only causes, associates, etc. of mental states. But in their imagined state (alaukika), they are re-designated as vibhava, anubhava, etc., of sthayibhava. That means once again that they come to have an existential status only when they are imaginatively conceived and artistically objectified by a poet. These can be shared now by any number of readers or spectators. Vibhavas etc. are thus sadharanikTta or rendered shareable by one and all sahsdayas, transcending the boundaries of even time and space : "By the function called bhavakatva whose essence lies in making vibhavas etc. commonly shared "32 is Abhinava's summary of Bhatta Nayaka's position. In a way, they might become archetypal or typical human conditions with arrested movement as in Keats's Grecian Urn in the Ode. But is this exactly "universalization" in the logical sense? I don't think so. When the poet has not seen even the particular, what can he universalize? Dhananjaya's explanation of Bhatta Nayaka is imprecise, leading to this confusion among scholars : "Words like Sita denote only a woman in general, divested of particular attributes like being daughter of Janaka, etc."33 The right interpretation is indicated by Simha-bhupala in his Rasarnavasudhakara :34 Particular attributes so divested are only the ones that might obstruct the reader's self-identification with the character (viz., Sita here), such as "being the daughter of Janaka ", "being the wife of Rama" etc. (and not the other ones which are unobstructive). Individual attributes such as "being 32. "vibhavadi-sadharanikaranatmana bhavakatva-vyaparena" -Loc. cit. 33. Sitadi-sabdah parityakta-Janaka-tanayadi-viscsah stri-matra-vacinah -Dasaruraka, IV. 40. 34. Janaka-tanayatva-Rama-parigrahatvadi-viruddha-dharma-pariharena lalitojjvala-suci darsaniyatvadi-visista eva...Sitadi-vibhavo yositsamanyam tadrsameva jnapayati, na punah stri-jati-matrain. -Rasarnarasudhakara, Ed. T. Venkatacharya, Adyar, 1979, p. 299.

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SOME ASPECTS OF THE RASA THEORY endowed with grace, liveliness, chastity, winsomeness, etc.", are indeed very much present in the denotation of the word in question. A character-stimulant such as Sita calls forth to our mind only a particular woman endowed with such unobstructive epithets, and not the genus of all women. III Now let us turn to Abhinavagupta. He could take over Bhatta Nayaka's findings, lock, stock and barrel, because both were Kashmir Saivas.35 But he does not accept the kavya-vyapara of bhavakatva or sidharanikarana, since in his poetics vyanjana-vyapara is a better substitute for both bhavakatva and bhojakatva. Abhinavagupta's sadharanikarana is only an implication contained in poetic suggestion or manifestation, and not its whole nature. All his accounts of saksatkara (intuitive actualization), camatkara (esoteric flash), bhogavesa, (afflatus of enjoyment), eka-ghana-samvit, (consciousness absolute), etc. are couched in terms common to Kashmir Saivism and aesthetics, used repeatedly for the first time by Abhinava. The corrupt reading of the available Abhinavabharati on sadharanikarana cannot permit any ready translation unless the whole background is grasped. The passage in question is -Hence it is that commonness is not limited at all, but quite unlimited. This is even like the relation of invariable concomitance between the syllogistic probans, viz., smoke and the probandum, viz, fire. Or it may be compared with the invariable relation between a stimulus like fear and its response like a shiver. Towards this apparently "intuitive actualization", the whole paraphernalia of actors etc. on the stage is contributory. When, in a dramatic performance, all limiting factors like place, time and cogniser, both real and poetically conceived, become completely annihilated because of their mutual opposition, the aforesaid state of "commonness' alone will stand out. Hence it is that the common experience of all connoisseurs adds up to a perfect state of rasa.36, The context is of fear becoming a rasa in the connoisseur while witnessing the scene of the hunted deer in Sakuntala etc., as described by,Kalidasa. It should be very clearly noted that the word used here is sadharanya and sadharani-bhava but not sadharanikarana It is a state of unlimited extension even like the relation of invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum. The actors on the stage etc. only contribute to the spectacle taking the form of a self-actualization. It is not any outside 35. Bhatta Nayaka's faith in sakti theology is clear in a citation from him in Abhinava's commentary on the Para-trimsika, p. 17: napumsakamidam nama parabrahma phalet kiyat! tat-paurusa-niyokta, cenna syat tacchakti-sundari// 36. Cf. tata eva na parimitameva sadharanyam; api tu vitatam. Vyaptigraha iva dhumagnyoh, bhaya-kampayorva; tadatra saksatkarayamanatve pariposika natadi-samagri. Yasyam vastu-satam kavyarpitanam ca desakala-pramatradinam niyamahetunam anyonya-pratibandha-balad atyantam apasarane sa eva sadharanibhavah sutaram pusyati. Ata eva saryasamajikanam ekaghanatayaiva pratipattih sutaram rasa-pariposaya. Abhinavabharati, Vol. I (GOS), p. 279.

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THE RELEVANCE OF RASA THEORY TO MODERN LITERATURE 93 object like a deer they perceive. They realize within themselves the very mental state of fear in all its depth. The conditioning elements of an object-consciousness like time, space and subject are totally annihilated by reason of their mutual cancellation (anyonya-pratibandha); and the resultant, which is divested of all elements of individuality, shines out in its general form only. That is why all the spectators beget a singularly unified identical awareness and this adds exceedingly to the nourishment of rasa. This is my translation of the passage in question. I have not found it necessary to bring in "universalization" of any kind. As the further exposition of Abhinava reveals, he is at pains to adduce a number of reasons to establish the fact that (self-repose sasvid-visranti), the very core of rasa cannot be attained by stopping short of anything secondary, (apradhana), the only primal entity in his idealistic philosophy being the undifferentiated Self or Absolute; and all sthayins are in essence aspects of this inmost self. Again, they are practically conceded to assume prominence for the time being by their serving as means to the recognised purusarthas only. Nothing unimportant to the Inner Self can usher in rasa is the argument.. Finally, I shall now set forth the relevant passages from Abhinava's philosophical works which throw light on what he means by sadharanibhava : A taster of a sweet recipe, etc., is rightly so designated only because he enjoys chiefly the aspect of his own inmost self-delight while judging the given recipe in the form : "this tastes exactly this way", a form totally other than that of a tasteless glutton. Even in the case of plays and poems, etc., the separate identity (of the perceiver and the perceived) is totally superceded and only pleasure is tasted, because the joy of rasas like the erotic is very much unlike that of sensual joy--all impediments incidental to the attainment of the latter in mundane life being overcome in the former-and is nothing but self-repose inherent in the very attitude of the percipient himself when he is freed from the tentacles of all intruding impediments and is designated by different names such as tasting, chewing, and supreme gratification. . Therefore, it is also called sahsdayata (lit, common-heartedness) since it is predominantly a function of the heart or repose in the experiential aspect (paramarsa) of the perceiver qua perceiver. The objective aspect of it, though present in the object perceived, is ignored for the nonce. Thus such mental states as are entirely free from impediments and yield always a very delectable taste, and that too, only during the state of aesthetic contemplation..are but nine. As this idea has been explained at length by us in our Abhinavabharati, a commentary on the Natya-sastra, inquisitive readers might refer to it for further details. .. While one is tasting a sweet recipe, etc,, there is the marginal intrusion of the sense of touch (by the tongue); but while one tastes a poem or a play, even that gross sense-intrusion disappears. Yet a subtle trace of it in the form

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94 SOME ASPECTS OF THE RASA THEORY of mental impression is discernible even there. But there are percipients who are capable of transcending the impeding aspect of even that mental impression; and they indeed experience supreme delight by acute alertness in overcoming the subtlest impediments (in the way of rasa) 37 In this self documented summary of his idea of rasa, Abhinava explains how a glutton's eating of food differs from that of a gourmet - taster. The glutton is attentive to the food object outside; but the taster is inattentive, to it, though it is present (this is technically called vyavadhana); but the latter is most attentive to its taste within himself. In poetry and drama too the feeling of separate identity (anyathabhava) is overshadowed and only the taste of joy remains. In empirical life there is the inevitable pull of activities for securing desired ends. This obstacle is transcended by becoming a spectator, and hence the joy in seeing a drama is different from sensual joy. Here again, the joy is nothing but self-repose. The word sa-hrdaya means etymologically one who can find joy within himself. The seen objective entity is ignored by him; he is concentrated in attending only to spiritual joy. In relishing the flavour of sweetness, the sense of touch is a marginal intruder (vyavadhina), which is superceded to reach the relishing self within. This gross intrusion of sense-object is absent in poetry and drama: yet the mental impressions of these may remain as marginal intruders there also. Only those who can ignore them and turn their full attention to the relishing self within, do indeed attain supreme delight: While in Advaita Vedanta the self within is just passive though svaprakasa in sivadvaita of Kashmir, vimarsa or paramarsa is real as Siva's inseparable sakti. So in Sankara's thought bhoga-viraga is a pre-condition for self-realisation. But in Abhinava bhoga itself in its intensity can be enjoyed in the spirit of a released soul, i. e, transmuted into moksa. The words Anyathabhava, Vyavadhana, their transcendence or neglect (anadara) and inward directed attention (avadhana) are, all technical terms and nowhere is the implication of "universality" in the modern sense present in all this, as it can be easily seen. True, sadharanya is mentioned in connection with the vyavadhana 37. Cf. madhuradau rase audarikabhyavahara-vailaksanyena pravstta idam itthamiti pramatari visramayan pramats-bhagameva pradhanyataya vimrsan bhunjana iti ucyate. Yatrapi atyantam anyathabhavam atikramya sukham asvadyate, arjanadi-sambhavyamanavighnantara-nirasat vaisayikananda-vilaksane srngaradau natya-kavyadi-visaye, tatra vitavighnatyadeva asau rasana-carvana-nirvstih pratitih pramatsta-visrantireva. Tata eva htdayena paramarsa-laksanena pradhanyat vyapadesya-vyavasthithsyapi prakasabhagasya vedya -visrantataya anadaranat sahsdayata ucyate iti nirvighnah svada-rupasca rasana-tadgocarikaryascitta-vsttayo rasa nava ityayam-artho 'bhinava-bharatyam natyaveda-vivrtau vitatya vyutpadito'smabhiriti tat-kutuhali tam eva avalokayet. madhuradi-rasasvade tu visaya-sparsa-vyavadhanam; tato'pi kavyanatyadau tasvyavadhana-sunyata. Tad-vyavadhana-samskaranuvedhastu tatrapi; te tathodita-vyavadhanamsa-tiraskriya-savadhana-hsdayah labhanta eva paramanandam. isvara-pratyabhijna-vivrti-vimarsini. Vol. II, pp. 180-181.

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THE RELEVANCE OF RASA THEORY TO MODERN LITERATURE 95 tirodhana or vighna-nirasa. This is a corollary of the rule that private and personal attitudes in empirical life must be consciously or unconsciously shed. Those who cannot shed them are not sahsdayas; and they cannot attain rasa which is a spiritual experience. Abhinava's classification of ego-centric associations in empirical life, positive and negative, under just three heads-mine or my friend's, my enemy's and an unconcerned one's may be imperfect, but that cannot vitiate the main argument that the aesthetic attitude ignores the empirical attitude, even if it be marginally present. Nor does it substantiate "universalization" of any kind. Even the ancient commentator on Kavyaprakasa38 who is aware of Abhinava's tradition, viz., Bhatta Gopala, explains Abhinava's theory by alluding to passages from Spanda-karika of Kallata (14-16) and isvara-pratyabhijna (I. V. 15).39 A much later author, Vidyabhusana (c. 1550 A. D.) states in his Sahitya-kaumudi that the function in question belongs to vibhavadis and that its nature is to effect oneness of the connoisseur with them.40 I shall conclude this paper by referring to two more passages, from the Abhinavabharati. One is his comment on Natyasastral Since a play is to be seen by one in the company of the members of his family like) father, son, daughter-in-law, mother-in-law, etc., all the obscenities mentioned should be avoided with effort.11 If obscene things were allowed, says Abhinaya :rasa would be destroyed, 42 Why ? The answer isThe vital essence of rasa depends on common shareability of experience as pointed out repeatedly by me;43 . Can this common shareability by any chance refer to "universalization"? This idea is repeated in the Tantraloka also44 It is more like 'aesthetic distance' which provides for both "involvement" and "detachment". One is psychologically involved, though practically detached and impersonal. For want of space, I could not enter into details regarding the precise implication of bhava etc. I just draw your attention to one pithy comment. This is on Bharata's text (XXV. 41)45 38. Kavyaprakasa, IV. 4-5. 39. Ed. R. P. Dvivedi, Varanasi, 1981, p. 121 40. Cf. saktirasti vibhavadeh kapi sadharanikstini pramata tadabhedena svar yaya pratipadyate ! -Meerut Vishvavidyalayc-Sansksta-sodha-patrika, Jan-Dec. 1980, p. 75. pita-putra-snusa-svasru-drsyam yasmattu natakam tasmadetani sarvani varjaniyani yatnatah 11-Loc. cit. 42. tatasca raso bhajyeta-Loc. cit. 43. Sa hi sadharanyo'nyonyanupravesa-prana iti pratipadam vadamah-Loc. cit. 44. X. V. 85 ff.

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96 SOME ASPECTS OF THE RASA THEORY One's own experience is bhava while experience arising on seeing another is vibhava.45 Abhinava comments: To those who are forgetful by nature, the author is indicating hy way of a telling analogy the exact nature of emotion (bhava), stimulant (vibhava) and ensuant (anubhava). That experience which is personally lived through, e. g., pleasure and pain, is bhava. The word atma or personal". here rules out categorically the experiencing of things like a pot from the province of bhava.46 And that is his last word on the subject. The main thrust of this paper is to expose how Abhinava has been more often than not misunderstood by modern scholars. Sadharanikarana is not a differentia of rasa; it is only a half-way house leading to the destination of rasa proper. Even if it be subjected to a critique and found inadeguate, it cannot affect the validity of the theory of rasa which rests on the unshakable foundation of the ever-blissful self, allowing us glimpses of its ecstasy in the state of deep poetic response. Rightly understood, his philosophy grounded on the bed-rock of "spiritual pre-conscious," transmuting a finite conscious being (parimita-pramats) into an infinite subject of all-consciousness (aparimitapramatr), if I can borrow a phrase from Maritain, remains relevant to modern literature also. 45. atmanubhavanam bhavo vibhavah paradarsanam-Loc. cit. 46. atha vismaranasilan prati srnga-grahikaya bhava-vibhayanubhava-svarupam darsayati atmanubhavana bhava ityadi, Atma-visrantam yadanubhavanam sukha-duhkhasamvid-rupam sa bhavah ityarthah. Atma-grahanat ghatadyanubhavanam na bhavah ityuktam bhavati.-Loc. cit.

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"Catharsis and Rasa" C. N. PATEL beauty of not the West, called thecussion among Catharsis and rasa are related concepts, in that they seek to explain the central feature of all aesthetic experience, namely, that it is so basically different from ordinry experience that, whatever the subject or object which stimulates it, it is always pleasurable. This feature of aesthetic experience arrests attention with striking vividness in our response to tragedy in which emotions which would be painful in real life are so transformed as to excite a pleasurable thrill ending in a feeling akin to "The still sad music of humanity" to which the beauty of nature opened Wordsworth's ears. Aristotle, the first systematic literary critic in the West, called this process catharsis. He did not define the term and there has been a long discussion among critics and students of poetry about what he may have meant. Similarly, in the Indian tradition, too, Bharata, the first systematic writer on poetics, merely mentions how rasa is generated without explaining what he means by rasa and how it differs from the pleasurable emotions of ordinary experience. Later writers took up the concept and made it the subject of an absorbing speculation about the nature of aesthetic experience. Though Western and Indian writers on poetic experience thus deal with the same problem, their treatment of the subject differs completely from each other's. The difference springs from a more fundamental difference between the two philosophical attitudes, the transcendental and the empirical. The former looks upon the waking state as an aspect of a larger reality not accessible in full to that state. whereas the latter confines itself to man's experience in the waking state, and even when it concerns itself, as it does in some areas of modern psychology, with unconscious or subconscious levels of the human psyche which reveal themselves in dream experiences, it seeks to understand those experiences in terms of standards and principles derived from the waking state. The Western philosophical tradition oscillates between these two poles, Plato being the typical representative of the transcendental pole and Aristotle of the empirical. Indian tradition remained anchored to the transcendental framework and produced no thinker corresponding to the figure of Aristotle in the West. This difference in approach reflected itself in the field of aesthetics. The transcendental view regards the experience of beauty as a reflection on the human plane of a spiritual state, whereas the empirical view of it regards it as one expression of man's emotional nature to be understood in terms of its other expressions. Plato, however, did not extend this aesthetic principle to the experience of poetry or the arts. On the contrary, he regarded them as obstacles to the realization of pure truth and spiritual freedom. Western poetics, beginning with Aristotle, has developed in reply to this view of Plato.

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98 SOME ASPECTS OF THE RASA THEORY The theory of catharsis is part of that reply. The Indian theory of rasa also is a reply to the Platonic view, though not intended as such, for no argument corresponding to Plato's was advanced by any writer in India. The two replies differ from each other, in that the Aristotelian reply shifts the argument from the transcendental to the empirical, normal human plane whereas the Indian reply is on the purest transcendental plane. Plato had indicted art on two grounds. First, art is an imitation of the phenomenal world of appearnces which, in turn, is an imperfect copy of reality. Art therefore is twice removed from truth. Secondly, art strengthens man's emotional nature and thereby weakens the rational principle in the human soul which alone can give true knowledge. In other words, art, in the language of Indian philosophy, strengthens man's bondage to the world of may, both intellectually and emotionally. Aristotle's reply seems to be that poetry represents individual facts not in themselves but in their general, universal significance and is therefore more philosophical than history, and further that it purifies man's emotional nature. Catharsis refers to this process of emotional purification. There has been a long argument among critics whether Aristotle meant catharsis as a medical metaphor in the sense of purgation of excessive emotional impulses, or whether he simply meant by it the psycholo. gical process of purification of the emotions of pity and fear of their selfish elements. But the point is not really important. Probably Aristotle himself had no clear idea of what he meant by the term catharsis. He uses it in an earlier treatise, Politics, to describe the effect of certain kinds of music on: persons overcome by religious frenzy, saying that he will explain the term in another work. But Aristotle gives no such explanation in Poetics. Whatever meaning Aristotle attached to catharsis, it is clear that he had in mind not any benefit of poetry in man's spiritual quest, but its effect on his conduct in ordinary human affairs. In the language of the Indian tradition, Aristotle was interested in the effect of poetry on man's behaviour in the world of vyavahara and not on his pursuit of paramartha. Even his stress on the philosophical content of poetry refers to the general significance of concrete individual facts grasped by the intellect and not to the intuitive perception of the eternal forms or ideas of Plato's vision of divine truth. The Indian theory of rasa is a more satisfying reply to the Platonic position. It unequivocally asserts that art is a means of spiritual experience and gives one a taste of the bliss of divine realization. In the moments of artistic enjoyment the consciousness of the individual transcends its sense of separate identity, becomes sadharana or pure human consciousness in a state of being watching the world of becoming without being involved in it. In other words, jiva ceases to feel itself as a karta and has a momentary glimpse of its true state as the atman, the anumanta, upadrsta and bhokta of the Bhagavad-Gita. The Upanisadic view of reality asserts that all pain and sorrow are the consequence of self-forgetfulness, of the individual consciousness feeling itself alienated from the universal consciousness which is its source. In the enjoyment of art, this alienation is overcome and the individual's

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"CATHARSIS AND RASA" 99 consciousness feels the bliss of its union with its source. This bliss is the most ecstatic in our response to an artistic' representation of tragedy, whether in drama or any other literary genre, because fear is the most basic emotion of the alienated consciousness and tragedy helps us to face that existential fact and rise above it. Aristotle saw this truth, but only partially. According to him, tragedy effects the catharsis of the emotions of fear and pity, but by fear he means only the fear aroused by events in the lives of certain types of individuals. In giving this explanation of the cause of fear, Aristotle ignores the religious background of Greek drama. The latter was a collective experience in the form of an annual ritual representing certain mythic events or legends embodying the fear of the whole race, namely, the fear of invisible forces inflicting inexplicable calamities on man. All Greek tragedies are pervaded by a sense of doom or inescapable fate. The Greek mind seems to have been profoundly troubled by a sense of the hostility or indifference of the gods to man, and the Greek drama was a ritual representation of this collective fear so as to overcome it. Indian aestheticians also stress the special significance of karuna rasa and its transformation into santa rasa. The Indian mind, though not troubled by the destructive aspect of the gods and goddesses, was profoundly convinced that all life was sorrow and suffering. In dramatic art, sorrow and suffering lost their painfulness and subsided into a sense of pleasurable calm. at masa is produceras, vibhavas oy creative act, How did art perform this miracle? Neither Western nor Indian writers answer this question directly, though they do indicate the lines along which the solution may be sought. Aristotle stresses the importance of unified structure in tragedy and of rhythm and harmony in its language, and Bharata says categorically that rasa is produced by the samyoga or harmonious repre*sentation of the three types of bhavas, vibhavas vyabhicaribhavas and anubhavas. Both, it seems, refer to the same feature of creative act, namely, apprehension and representation of pattern and order in the flow of experience. Aristotle stresses the unity and order of the whole material of the dramatic representation, while Bharata refers to the unified perception of every component unit in the total series of events constituting the drama. What is important in both is the fact of apprehension of unity in the diverse elements in the matter of representation. This apprehension is an act of the imagination, through which both the artist and the spectators participate in the divine power of creation. The basic fact of the universe is the creation of order at all levels of reality, from the microscopic world of discrete atoms formed by patterns of electromagnetic waves, to the telescopic world of stars and galaxies, from the unicellular world of germ-plasm to the infinitely complex structure of the human body and the still greater miracle of the human mind. In artistic creation man, created, according to the Bible, in the image of his Maker, exercises for his pleasure through self-expression the same power that has created the universe. The pratibha which creates

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100 SOME ASPECTS OF THE RASA THEORY ever new artistic forms, navanavollekhasalini prajna, is a manifestation in the individual consciousness of the power of universal self which said "ekoham bahu syam." According to the English the poet-critic Coleridge, the imagination which creates art and poetry is a repetition in the finite mind of the Infinite "I am." The Infinite "I am," according to the Upanisad, is rasa, "raso vai sah," and the kavi and the bhavaka, by imitating the creative act of that "I am" share in his rasa. Confronted with this explanation of the pleasure of poetry and art, Plato would probably have asked, how can we be sure that this rasa of poetic enjoyment is the rasa of momentary participation in spiritual being and not merely an abhasa of it? Judged by the conduct in life of men in love with the pleasure of poetry and the arts, do the effects of poetic enjoyment seem spiritually beneficial? It is a challenging question to lovers of art, particularly to the advocates of "art for art's sake" doctrine.

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Appendix-1 The Relevance of Sanskrit Poetics to Contemporary Practical Criticism * UMASHANKAR JOSHI I am aware of the honour the authorities of the Asiatic Society of Bombay have done me by inviting me to preside over the function, for the award of medals to three outstanding scholars for their service in Oriental Research. If I did not hesitate to accept the invitation, even though not qualified as an Oriental Researcher, it was just with a view to paying my humble homage to the Bombay Asiatic Society, which has become during the past 175 years of its existence almost a legend in the academic life of our country. While conveying that I could choose any date in April or May, the invitation letter carried a post-script that in case May 7 was convenient to me, my address would be termed Kane Memorial Lecture as that date coincided with the birthdate of the great scholar. The moment I agreed to speak on the seventh of May, in order to be able to honour the memory of MM. P. V. Kane, the subject of my lecture had almost suggested itself. It could be one related to either of his loves, Sanskrit Poetics or Dharma Sastra. It seems, you have only to be well-meaning to find yourself in deeper and deeper waters. I like to play with the idea that I should rather have spoken on Dharma Sastra, if only because it is always far easier to speak on a subject, the complexities of which one is not sufficiently aware of. Knowing full well as I do, how the field of Sanskrit Poetics bristles with problems and even conundrums which would require in-depth philosophical, metaphysical, psychological, linguistic and literary, study that should have been the last thing for me to get involved in. But I hazarded it, my purpose being a limited and specific one, that of investigating how far those of us, who are interested today in the critical activity in the various languages of India, can benefit from the ideas and tools made available by ancient Indian writers on Poetics. Perhaps it is more than a hazard inasmuch as I can hardly claim to be a regular student of Sanskrit Poetics or of Philosophy, of which Poetics forms a legitimate part. Even though I might have to stray far, sometime perilously far, into these fields, my main concern will be with the possible enrichment of the contemporary critical activity. And in that context, I feel, lies the hope for Sanskrit Poetics to survive. If it is not to be studied by a few specialists of a past cultural phase only and is to form a part of mankind's living knowledge, it is only by proving itself to be a rich resource to practising critics in the various languages. that Sanskrit Poetics can flourish as a Lecture delivered at the Asiatic Society of Bombay on 7th May 1980.

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102 SOME ASPECTS OF THE RASA THEORY body of dynamic ideas. Even if those ideas are not frequently invoked, it would be enough if they are at the back of the mind; for that too is a use. If I put stress on the need for the awareness of the seminal ideas of Sanskrit Poetics, it is more with an eye on the sharpening of aesthetic sensibility and equipping the mind with the capacity for discerning beauty in whatsoever manner it manifests itself in a literary work. It seems the study of Sanskrit Poetics has reached a stage where we can take stock of things, define fresh needs in terms of the pursuit of knowledge and try to visualize how possibly the ideas of the Acaryas-great writers of treatises on Poetics can be best availed of. Our current critical endeavour has to keep pace with that in the Western world, as our creative writing during the past hundred and fifty years or so has been, by and large, under the influence of the West. We have freely borrowed genres, models and techniques from Western literature. While our critical writings mainly follow Western norms, the critical terminology employed by us is, as it would be in the nature of things, more or less borrowed from the works of the ancient Acaryas. Terms like 'aucitya 'vakrokti', riti', 'upama', 'rupaka', 'sahsdaya', 'dhvani' and the most enigmatic of them all 'rasa', along with 'rasanubhava', 'rasasvada are freely used, most of them not always strictly in the sense in which the Acaryas used them. In fact, we are in a fortunate position. We have at our disposal the whole critical usage of the West, which has relevance to our modern creative writing, and we also have a rich critical tradition of our own from which, at least, we pick up terms in howsoever a casual manner. It is open to us to make a comparative study of the two traditions and forge a critical apparatus and a critical idiom which would meet the present need for enjoying and evaluating literary works of any age or language. Let me hasten to add at the very outset that such a comparative study is beset with great difficulties. The ideas and the technical terms used are rooted in different cultural milieus. One such term is Tragedy. In order to make Sakuntalam a tragedy, the ringing down of the curtain at the end of the fith act will not do. Tragedy is a concept, interwoven with the fabric of Greek life and is totally unknown to Indian culture. One should take care not to be taken in with apparent or superficial similarities. Take the term 'metaphor'in Aristotle. Prof. D. R. Mankad argues how the metaphor is usually referred to in India as rupaka', but it might be sometimes a 'samasokti' as in unbridled rage.'1 It is said : metaphor is implied simile. Aristotle considers it by far the best gift of the poet-his ability to find similitude in dissimilar things. The Acaryas look upon upama - simile as the greatest gift of a poet and Kalidasa the greatest poet is accredited with the best use of the simile, which is normally described as sadharmyam-similitude, sharing of the same 1. D. R. Mankad, Kavyavivecana (Gujarati), Vallabha Vidyanagar, Charutar Prakashana. 1949, p. 116.

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APPENDIX-I 103 properties. Instead of getting bogged down into details of nomenclature or semantic quibblings, it would be worthwhile to look rather for the informing aesthetic principle. The sagacious Hemacandracarya calls the simile 'hrdyam sadharmyam'-pleasurable (heart-pleasing) similitude, and this should lead us to the modern exploring of the link of analogy in feeling. Even if the concept of tragedy is foreign to India, and the 'tragic' is not exactly 'karuna-rasa,' there is an aesthetic principle which is common to both. Plato talked of 'tragic pleasure' (Philebus, 47-8). Aristotle says that tragedy does not depress one, it raises the spirits of men.2 The Sanskrit writers (except Ramacandra-and-Gunacandra) have constantly maintained that Pathos (the karuna-rasa) also pleases, that all rasas are dominated by plcasure, that all art-experience ends in beatitude. Every critic who deals with a poem has to keep in his view the trinity of (1) the poet, (2) the poem, and (3) the reader. Where does he actually start from ? Perhaps he thinks he starts from the second-the poem itself. But, what is a poem ? Is it just a piece of paper with marks of ink on it or a video-tape ? Valery said, "It is the reading of the Poem that is the Poem". In other words, it is in somebody's experience of poem that 'the poem' becomes itself. So, the critic, while dealing with a poem, has always to start with the third-the reader, himself, i.e. his own experience of the poem. The Sanskrit writers on Poetics, especially those who testify to rasa, could not be more right. One can speak about the poem and even the poet only after one's experience of the poem. It is surprising that no less an expert on Sanskrit poetics than the late S. K. De should chide the Acaryas for their preoccupation with the under standing of the nature of art-experience. He says,4".. they consider the problem indirectly and imperfectly from the standpoint of the readers and not directly and completely from that of the poet", and adds, "they are concerned mainly with the question of the reader's reproduction but not of the poet's production". But, there is no way of dealing with the poet's production but through the reader's reproduction. Even if the poet himself chooses to say something about his production, outside of the production itself, he cannot be treated as a final authority. His account would be one of many such accounts available from discerning readers and the final authority has to be the critic himself engaged in the task of judging it aesthetically. However, it is not correct to say that the Acaryas have neglected the problem of poetic creation. In fact, their concern with it is interconnected with their concern with the problem of poetic experience. For, when the rasasutra 'vibhavanubhava-vyabhicari-samyogad rasa-nispattih' lays down 2. Aristotle, The Works of Aristotle Vol. II, William Benton, Publisher, Encyclopaedia Britanica, Inc., 1952, p. 688. 3. Paul Valery, "A Course in Poetics : First Lesson," Southern Review, 5 (Winter 1940), p. 409. . 4. S. K. De, Sanskrit Poetics as a Study of Aesthetics, Oxford University Press, 1963, p. 74.

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104 SOME ASPECTS OF THE RASA THEORY that art experience is the result of the co-mingling rather compounding of the vibhavas (the characters and the environment), anubhavas (the bodily manifestations of emotions) and ryabhicari-bhavas (temporary states or emotions feeding the dominant emotion), it has already hinted at the process of the poetic creation as well. For example, the vibhavas, the hero, the heroine and other characters and the environment, the situation and events that follow-all should be adequate if the work is to satisfy as a work of beauty. If one looks at how a competent modern critic of the stature of T. S. Eliot gropes for neatly articulating what involves the creative process, one would feel grateful to the Acaryas for having given a clear and authentic description of it. Eliot has a difficulty with Hamlet.' He lays the blame at the door of Shakespeare's creative faculty and suggests that we are let down by it. Somewhere it falters, he feels, and locates it in the poet's inability to discover, to use Indian terminology, an appropriate or adequate vibhava. Let us hear. him as he struggles to articulate it with the help of the, by now, popular phrase 'Objective Correlative,' which, incidentaily, was, not his coinage but was first used in 1850 by Washington Elston in his 'Lectures on Art'-a fact later acknowledged by Eliot also. Eliot says: "The only way of expressing emotion in the form of art is by finding an, objective correlative', in other words, a set of objects, a situation, a chain of events which shall be the formula of that particular emotion such that when the external facts, which mustterminate in sensory experience, are given, the emotion is immediately evoked."5: Eliot succceds in formulating the need for finding vibhavas, commensurate with the original emotion, which is to be expressed in the form of art. Thus far his account of the process of poetic creation is correct and finds support in the words of the Acaryas. But he is on no sure ground if he means that the Vibhavas when presented will evoke the same emotion in the mind of the reader or the spectator, for the emotion while being presented through the medium of the 'Objective correlative,' the vibhavas, has suffered a seachange. It is now no more the original emotion. (This is one example of how the fullest understanding of the reader's art-experience is necessary for a proper understanding of the creative process). Valery knew better. He alerts us, "We must contrast as clearly as possible poetic emotion with ordinary emotion." Valery's statement of the creative and reproductive processes (for it aims possibly at covering both) comes very near to the truth of the matter. He says that a sort of a 'sense of a universe' is characteristic of poetry and adds: "I said: sense of a universe. I meant that the poetic state or emotion seems to me to consist in a dawning perception, a tendency toward perceiving a world, or complete system of relations, in which beings, things, events and acts, although 5. T. S. Eliot, Selected Essays, Faber and Faber Ltd., London, 1953, p 145. 6. Paul Valery, The Art of Poetry, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1958, p. 179.

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APPENDIX-I 105 ing of the rise or beings Wised, i.e. un they may resemble each to each, those which fill and form the tangible worldthe immediate world from which they are borrowed-stand, however, in an indefinable, but wonderfully accurate, relationship to the modes and laws of our general sensibility. So, the value of those well-known objects and beings is in some way altered. They respond to each other and combine quite otherwise than in ordinary conditions." Kuntaka, who flourished in the tenth century, refers to the veiling of the real nature of objects (samacchadita-svabhavah), when they are presented, by a sudden inspiration, in the poet's imaginative world. He adds that when this special predicament (tathavidha-visesa) finds a masterly utterance in words, it becomes a thing of wondrous beauty to the mind. It was Bhatta Nayaka who had, a century before Kuntaka, enunciated the idea of generalised emotion (sadharanikarana), which proved to be the greatest aid in unlocking the meaning of the rasa-theory. It showed how the aesthetic consciousness resulted when objects or beings were visualised not as related to the immediate tangible world, but in a generalised, i.e. universal manner. Valery almost suggests this when he says that the poetic state or emotion occurs when the values of the objects and beings of the world are altered because of their relationship to the laws of our general sensibility, i.e. when they cease to have personal or individual interest and appear in a generalised, universal way. Eliot also hints at the same thing when he talks of an escape from personality. Abhinavagupta and his guru Bhatta Tauta say that this poetic emotion or aesthetic consciousness or rasa is primarily of the poet. The actor on the stage as well as the spectator or the reader of the work consequently attain it. The generalised consciousness pertaining to the poet (kavi-gata-sadharanibhutasamvit) alone is in reality rasa (paramarthatah rasah). So, those who appreciate the work of a poet need an equal measure of genius. Rajasekhara calls the creative genius 'karayitri pratibha' and the appreciative genius bhavayitri pratibha.' One, who experiences the work of art, has to re-live the poetic emotion of the creator. He has to re-evoke the aesthetic consciousness of the poet, re-construct the aesthetic object. : The best connoisseur of aesthetic beauty is called 'sahrdaya'one who is of the same heart. Abhinavagupta describes him as one, the mirror of whose mind has become clear due to constant contact with poetic works and who has the capacity to identify himself with what is presented i.e. with the heart of the poet. The art-experience of such a sahrdaya is, indeed, subjective. Abhinavagupta describes it as ending in prakasa'-illumination and ananda'beatitude. 7. Paul Valery, Ibid, p. 138.

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106 SOME ASPECTS OF THE RASA THEORY The poem, the word-construct has also received a fair amount of attention. Some of the writings on Poetics were of the nature of manuals for prospective writers. The discussions on alamkaras, gunas, riti, vakrokti and aucitya were meant to be a valuable help, though it was maintained that when the creative spirit worked, all the embellishments and graces and properties entered the composition in an onrush vying with one another (ahampurvikaya parapatanti) and they did not remain exterior (na tesam bahirangatvam) to the poem, which was an organic whole. For the organic unity there is a happy expression - ekavakyata' which literally means one-sentence-ness. The ancients consider even a long work, if it is a creative work, to be just one sentence. Even the Mahabharata with its more than one hundred thousand verses is just a one-sentence piece. The very term 'sahitya'-togetherness is most fortunate and it at once emphasises the crucial fact about a poetic composition that the verbal correlative is commensurate with the poetic emotion and it is this sahitya - togetherness which the aesthetic object is.." The seminal ideas in Sanskrit poetics are three: 1. First and most significant is the rasa-sutra, which has come to enjoy the status of a kind of an Einsteinian formula in the realm of poetic theorization. It seems to be the distillation of the aesthetic thinking of generations. Though it occurs in the encyclopaedic Natyasastra of Bharata, it may as well have been picked up from an earlier work, for Bharata refers to Druhina as an authority regarding even the names of the eight sasas. 2. The second important idea is that of 'dhvani'- suggestion. Rasa came to be associated with plays or other entire works and a need was felt for accounting for the beauty of smaller compositions or even single stanzas. The alamkara school came into existence cutting rasa to size, by naming a 'rasavat' alamkara also. The gunas (qualities) and riti (composite poetic diction) came to be emphasised later. It was Anandavardhana, who laying his hand on dhvani, succeeded in explaining the presence of beauty in all'kinds of compositions, muktakas-single stanzas as well as prabandhas -- entire works, by referring it to either vastu-dhvani, alamkaradhvani or rasa-dhvani. It was also he who reconciled the claims of rasa with other approaches, by yielding in no ambiguous terms that even though varieties of dhvani were mentioned they were all to be comprehended through the medium of rasa and bhava which were preponderant. Since the alamkara-school started, the emphasis came to be laid on stanzas rather than entire works. The wood was lost for the trees. Anandavardhana was the first to discuss an entire work, as a practical critic. He raised the important question of what the rasa of Mahabharata was and answered by saying that it was santarasa. Kuntaka, who followed him, was perhaps the greatest practical critic amongst the Sanskrit writers on poetics and the fourth chapter of his Vakroktijivita has a freshness about it and throws up a number of hints for the artistic structuring of entire works.

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APPENDIX-I 107 3. The third great idea is that of sadharanikarana'-- the generalized or universal apprehension of the poetic feeling and the poet's world. These ideas have survived and contributed effectively to a clearer understanding of the aesthetic object due to the astute and vigorous presentation by a master-synthesizer of the stature of Acarya Abhinavagupta, who is the greatest single name in Sanskrit Poetics. He eagerly seized upon the reconciliatory approach of Anandavardhana bringing rasa again into the focus. Instead of attempting a new work of his own, he chose to write commentaries Abhinava-Bharati on Bharata's Natyasastra and Locana on Anandavardhana's Dhvanyaloka and used both texts for highlighting his own special predilection for rasa, whose secret he unravelled with the help of Bhatta Nayaka's ideal of sadharanikarana. Abhinavagupta is one of the tallest thinkers not only of India but of the world. His apt utterances on Poetics have gone on ringing in the ears of generations after generations. It is a pity that even though during his life.time, during the eleventh century, a philosophical dialogue was possible between him and the great Muslim thinker Avicenna (Ibn Sina) of West Asia,8 a worth-while dialogue is yet to start with Western thinkers of today. (Incidentally, I took an opportunity to draw Dr. I. A. Richards' attention to Abhinavagupta's work in early 1956, at Harvard, and later wrote to him about Dr. R. Gnoli's translation of a portion of Abhinava-Bharati which was just published.) Once the texts are critically edited and annotated, they should leave the hands of the Sanskritists and reach the experts in the various disciplines. I hate the idea of the Arthasastra' being studied only by the Sanskrit graduate students, and never forming a legitimate part of the curriculum for advanced studies in Political Science. So also, the more important work in Sanskrit Poetics could be better studied by advanced students of Philosophy, for, problems of Poetic Theory form a legitimate part of Philosophy and not of one language or another, nor even of literature as such. I hope, it would be interesting to refer here to what a modern philosopher, Roman Ingarden (picking up one by random sampling), has to say about Aesthetic Experience and Aesthetic Object's from (as it happens) a phenomenological approach. It would remind one again and again of the observations of the Sanskrit writers on Poetics. Prof. Ingarden carefully distinguishes between the ordinary perceptful experience and aesthetic experience. He shows how a composite structure of aesthetic experience has three kinds of elements: "(a) emotional (aesthetic excitement), (b) creative (active) constitution of an aesthetic object, (c) passive- perception of the qualities already revealed and harmonized." 8. Nilla Cram Cook, The Way of the Swan, Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1958, p. 18. 9. Roman Ingarden, "Aeshthetic Experience and Aesthetic Object" in 'Readings in Existential Phenomenology "--edited by Nathiniel Lawrence, Daniel" "Connor, Prentic Hall, Inc. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1967, pp. 318-319.

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108 SOME ASPECTS OF THE RASA THEORY Prof. Ingarden says that "in the final phase of an aesthetic experience there ensues an appeasement in the sense that, on the one hand, there is a rather quiet qazing upon (contemplating) the qualitative harmony of the aesthetic object already constituted and a 'taking in' of these qualities. On the other hand, along with this, there proceeds what I have named the second form of emotional response to a harmony of qualities. And namely there arise some feelings in which an acknowledgement of the value of the constituted aesthetic object is taking place." He says that in experiencing feelings of admiration and rapture, while directly confronting an aesthetic object, one pays, so to say, homage to it. It is the sequence of prakasa' and 'ananda' for which he seems to vouchsafe. I may be permitted to repeat what I have said earlier that one can get at the poem only by experiencing it. And it inevitably follows from this that practical criticism presupposes such an experience of the aesthetic object. Prof. Ingarden states that "it is only in such direct intercourse with an aesthetic object that a primary and vivid emotional response is possible" and adds, "To evaluate" without being moved, i.e. to form a judgment of the aesthetic value of something is possible, when using proper technial criteria even without the accomplishment of an aesthetic process, and thus also without waiting for a harmony of qualities to be constituted in an evident way." Some persons, who have much to do with works of art, are not easily enraptured by anything' and develop a peculiar routine of dealing with subsidiary details. Practical criticism, that does not flow from bhavana - a state of bhava (bhavayanti rasan), is, to use a rather strong term, suspect. Prof. Ingarden calls it an intellectual exercise, 'an inferred judgment.' He maintains that only those value-judgments which result from a state of feeling and are based on the aesthetic process of experiencing the art-object are valid and justified: "the experience which alone, and in an essential way, makes this judgment valid lies in the final phase of the aesthetic process, and, in particular, in the acknowledgement of an aesthetic object, an acknowledgement which has the character of feeling and is grounded in the 'seeing of a harmony of qualities.' Therefore, strictly speaking, it is only those judgments concerning value, which are given on the basis of an aesthetic process, and when such a process has been accomplished, that are justified." The discerning reader, the sahrdaya, the critic, reproduces-re-creates the art-object created by the poet, the kavi, by passing through the aesthetic process and while acknowledging the presence of the aesthetic object pays joyful "homage' to it. At this point the poet and critic the kavi and the sahrdaya meet and the karayitri-creative faculty in one and a matching reciprocating or receiving

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APPENDIX-I 109 (bhavayitri) faculty in the other partake of the nature of pratibha -- intui * tional apprehension. As a matter of fact, the two had symbolically met when the poem originally came to be written - when the composer laid down his pen after writing the last word and making final touches, if any. Only at the final moment of the composition the poet can realize what poem he was trying to write, what the kavigatasadharanibhutasamvit-generalized consciousness of the poetactually was. It must have been the enjoyer, the critic, the sahrdaya in him who must have borne out the creator in him and reassured him of the finality of the outcome. Abhinavagupta seems to suggest as much when he says in the opening stanza of Locana, 'Sarasvatyastattvam kavisahrdayakhyam vijayate'- victorious is the essence of Speech called kavisahrdaya, for he has so worded his say that the compound kavisahTdaya also means 'the creatorenjoyer, the poet, who himself is the discerning reader,' over and above referring to the inevitable pair involved in all aesthetic activity - 'the poet, the artist and the discerning enjoyer, the critic.'

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Appendix-11 Does the Rasa theory have any modern relevance ? R. B. PATANKAR In modern times the rasa theory appears to have suffered at the hands of two groups of critics. (a) Those who are totally ignorant of the literary thought in pre-British India do not feel the need to develop any acquaintance with it. They find the Western critical framework adequate for their purposes. In his The Languages of Criticism and the Structure of Poetry, R. S. Crane could argue convincingly for the readoption of the Aristotelian approach to the problem of poetic structure on the ground that the modern contrastive and assimilative methods do not lead to the discovery of the particular structuring principles underlying individual literary works as does the Aristotelian method. Readoption of the rasa theory cannot be recommended on similar grounds, although the moderns might find something thoughtprovoking in it. It does not appear to satisfy an urgent need of Westernized people as perhaps does yoga. (b) Most of the Sanskritists have started looking upon the theory as a sacred relic of the past which has to be studied, labelled, and preserved in a museum but which is not supposed to be put to mundane uses like analysis and evaluation of modern literary works, even of works produced in Indian languages. However, a comparative study of the Western and the ancient Indian critical traditions is worth attempting. It will show that there are significant points of contact between the two, and this might lend support to the view that there is a universal human mind which responds to similar situations in similar ways, irrespective of age and country. The comparison might also make an interaction between the two traditions possible. Modern Indian thinkers would profit a great deal if this were to take place. A bridge would thereby be built, not only between India and the West but also, between ancient India and modern India. When we study a conceptual structure like the rasa theory across many centuries, we find that it contains parts which are completely unintelligible to us, and others which possess only historical interest. Consider, for example, the lists Bharata has given of sthayibhavas and vyabhicaribhavas. The first list includes mental occurrents like fear and mental dispositions like love. And the second includes mental states like joy and bodily states like languor and sleep. If we take into account the all-round intellectual achievement of the ancient Indians we shall see why it would be wrong to dismiss the preceding classification as patently absurd. All that we shall be justified in saying is that we are unable to understand the principles of classification that Bharata used. The problem regarding the number of rasas is one of historical significance only. On one view, Bharata studied the dramatic compositions which were available to him and saw that most of them expressed eight for nine)

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APPENDIX-II 111 emotions/sentiments. On another view, the number is based on psychological findings about what constitutes the relatively permanent part of the structure of the human mind. Much has happened in the fields of literature and psychology since Bharata wrote; and perhaps he would have changed his views if he had known all that later critics and psychologists know about dramatic works and the human mind. But the rasa theory also contains a part which is not restricted in like manner to a particular age. It consists of certain clusters of concepts which are very basic to the theory. I propose to discuss two such clusters, one at some length, and the other rather briefly at the end. I shall also try to show that these clusters have their counterparts in the Western critical tradition, and indicate the points where a fruitful interaction between the two traditions can take place today. The first cluster centers round the concept of sodharanikarana (universalization). On this concept is based Abhinavagupta's triple claim that (a) the rasa experience is alaukika (sui generis), that (b) it is essentially pleasurable and that (c) the spectator does not contemplate it as something outside himself but undergoes it. Universalization can be interpreted as (i) a oneway process, from a particular to the universal which subsumes it, or as (ii) a two-way process, from a particular to the universal, and back again to a particular-the second particular not being the same as the first particular. That Abhinavagupta most probably had the second interpretation in mind is indicated by the example of Samba cited by Hemacandra, who follows Abhinavagupta very closely. The three stages in the process are as follows: (a) Samba worshipped the sun and was restored to good health; (b) everyone who worships the sun is restored to good health; (c) if I worship the sun, I too will be restored to good health. Subsumption of particular human beings under a common universal explains the possibility of communication between them. They have a common meeting ground in their humanity. All that is human is, at least potentially, followable/shareable by all men. This explanation can be extended to the act of watching a play. Although the characters on the stage differ from the spectator in one important respect, they have in common their human qualities. The spectator can understand and/or undergo the experiences presented on the stage because they ary universally shareable/ followable. Sadharanikarana, as we saw, can also be regarded as a one-way process from a particular to the universal (interpretation 1). The best example of this is available in the empirical sciences. Scientists are primarily concerned with the discovery of universal laws, in the formulation of which particulars as particulars have no place. If sadharanikarana is interpreted as a one-way process, the characters in literary works will become abstractions on account of the sadharanikarana which they undergo. It is a fact that characters answering to this description do exist in literary works; it is also a fact that some of these works are good. On the other hand, it will be wrong or say

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112 SOME ASPECTS OF THE RASA THEORY that literary works cannot be good unless the characters are abstractions. For, in a very large number of literary works the characters are individualized. This is particularly true of literary works produced during and after the Romantic age. As a matter of fact the presence of individualized characters is often regarded as a source of literary value. It is true that example of Samba suggests that Abhinavagupta most probably had in mind the second interpretation of sadharanikarana. It is also likely that there is something in the distinction such Sanskritists as R. Gnoli have made between sadharanya and samanya, that is, between the universal in literature and the universal in logic. But these two facts do not constitute a sufficient reason for completely rejecting the first interpretation of sadharanikarana. For, as we shall see later in this article, some claims made about the nature of the rasa experience cannot be sustained if the first interpretation is totally rejected. Let us now see how the concept of universalization has fared in the Western critical tradition. In the ninth chapter of his Poetics, Aristotle has said : "Poetry, therefore, is a more philosophical and a higher thing than history: for poetry tends to express the universal, history the particular. By the universal I mean how a person of a certain type will on occasion speak or act, according to the law of probability or necessity." That Aristotle is taking a universalist stand is clear. The question is whether he wants particularity of characters to be completely transcended, and abstractions to be presented on the stage. If it is found that particularity cannot be completely transcended, at what degree of universalization does he expect the poet to aim ? Aristotle has not made any explicit statement about these issues. The problem of reconciling the claims of universality and particularity has been exercising the minds of critics during and after the Romantic age. For example, S. H. Butcher, a post-Hegelian interpreter of Aristotle, writes, But though it (poetry] has a philosophic character it is not philosophy : It tends to express the universal....Philosophy seeks to discover the universal in the particular; its end is to know and to possess the truth, and in that possession it reposes. The aim of poetry is to represent the universal through the particular, to give a concrete and living embodiment of a universal truth. The universal of poetry is not an abstract idea; it is particularized to sense, it comes before the mind clothed in the form of the concrete, presented under the appearance of a living organism....The meaning is not that a general idea is embodied in a particular example--that is the method of allegory rather than of poetry--but that the particular case is generalized by artistic treatment.3 1. R. Gnoli, The Aesthetic Experience According to Abhinavagupta, (Rome : 1956), p. 44. 2. S. H. Butcher, ed. and trans., Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art, 4th ed. (New York: Dover publications, 1951), p. 35. 3. Ibid pp. 191-194.

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APPENDIX-II 113 The problem continues to exercise the minds of modern critics also. Dr. Avner Zis, a Marxist critic, writing in 1977, has taken a position similar to that of Butcher, when he says, .... the artistic image presents us with an indivisible unity of features of cognition intrinsic both to immediate contemplation and abstract thought.... Yet concepts do not enjoy an independent life of their own in art. They cannot replace images... The artist as it were divests' the phenomenon which interests him from random and particular features that might obscure the essence of what he is seeking to portray. He does not reproduce phenomena of life in their actual entirety, but only those characteristic features which constitute their 'living soul.94 The balance between the universal and the particular is not easy to maintain; there is always the danger of slipping into either the universalist position, or the Crocean particularist position that the function of art is to reveal the individual physiognomy of things. Every individual combines both, the universal and the particular. The dispute between universalists like Aristotle and particularists like Croce may therefore be regarded as a dispute about the relative importance of the two, the Aristotalians subordinating the particular to the universal, the Croceans doing exactly the opposite. This shows that universalization, like particularization might be obtainable in different degrees. What degree of universalization do the defenders of sadharanekarana expect? This is an important issue because not only the characters (vibhavas), emotions, and so on, but also the spectators (rasikas) are supposed to undergo sadharanikarana. That excessive preoccupation with his own personal problems would come in the way of the spectator's aesthetic experience may be readily granted. It would also come in the way of various other activities like watching a cricket match, solving a mathematical problem or taking part in a discussion. Excessive preoccupation with oneself is an obstacle because it makes concentration on anything other than the self, practically impossible. But this does not mean that complete transcendence of the empirical self is a precondition of literary experience. Careful observation will reveal that our empirical self is actively involved in the literary experience in varying degrees. In his well-known paper on "The Relation of the Poet to Day-dreaming " Freud has shown that readers of one variety of literary works derive vicarious satisfaction through the fantasy world the writer has created. Such literature is a universalized and beautified version of the writer's daydream. Owing to the reduction of what is too personal in it, a daydream becomes universally shareable. Of course, this shareability is also dependent on the reader's capacity for partial self-transcendence. If he is excessively preoccupied with his own self he may find it impossible to slip 4. Avner Zis, Foundations of Marxist Aesthetics (Moscow, 1977), pp. 77, 79, 82. 5. Benedetto Croce, Aesthetic, trans. Douglas Ainslie (London: Vision Press, Peter Owen, 1953), p. 5. 6. Sigmund Freud, Collected Papers (London: Hogarth Press, 1925), Vol. IV, pp. 173-183.

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114 SOME ASPECTS OF THE RASA THEORY into the role designed for him by the writer to facilitate vicarious wishfulfilment. This cannot, of course, mean complete self-transcendence; for wish-fuifilment presupposes the presence of mundane wishes in the reader. It might be objected that the Freudian theory covers only escapist, and therefore valuationally inferior, literature; what is true of it might not be true of great literature. In reply, it may be pointed out that escapist literature does not cease to be literature because it is escapist. Again, self-involvement may be present even in the experience of great literature. At the conscious level we remain detached spectators, hence we do not easily become aware of this fact. We know that we are in the auditorium watching an emotional drama in the life of characters being enacted on the stage. But this does not rule out the possibility of our being involved at a deeper level in that emotional drama Different parts of our personality might react in strikingly different ways to a complex object of experience like a literary work. If we analyze our reaction to Satan's character in Paradise Lost we realize the truth of this. On the con: scious plane we do not belong to Satan's party; and, as a religious man, Milton could not have espoused Satan's cause. Nevertheless, Satan's character fascinates the reader. We realize that a strong emotional force must have gone into the making of the character. Perhaps in the depth of our psyche there is a primitive, unsocialized element, which resents restraint of any sort; and it is this element which dervies satisfaction from Satan's rebellion. This shows that we might be detached on one level and deeply involved on another. Abhinavagupta also could not have expected complete self-transcendence on the part of the rasika. First of all, he does not want him to lose the consciousness that he is watching a play. Further he wants the xasika to bring with him the traces of past experiences (vasanarupa-samskaras). It is reasonable to suppose that these include traces of past emotional experiences, enduring dispositions, moral evaluations, knowledge of the world and men, ideological commitments, and world views. If the spectator brings all this structure to the theatre with him, how can he be said to transcend his empi. rical ego completely, or even to an appreciable extent? The defenders of Abhinavagupta point out that although activization of past experiences is expected to take place, the experiences undergo a qualitative change because of sadharanikarana. Our everyday experience, we are told by followers of Abhinavagupta, depends upon egocentric relations between individuals; these individuals are related to our ego in three ways, and these relations determine our attitudes to them: (a) they belong to us or to our friends, (b) they belong to our enemies, (c) they are such as do not concern us. Our attitude to people and things in category (a) is friendly; to those in category (b), it is hostile; and those in (c) it is completely indifferent. The rasa experience is said to be sui generis because it is not based on these egocentric relations. The first objection to this argument is that the threefold division of human relations is too cynical to be acceptable. Although many human attitudes are egocentric, there are many others which are not so. Only a cynic will interpret altruism as egocentric. Again, if we analyze the

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APPENDIX-II 115 presuppositions of our moral life we shall realize the importance of universalization in our everyday life. Universalizability of principles of human action is often regarded as the very condition of the possibility of moral experience. The preceding discussion shows that (a) universalization in literature in the sense in which we have taken the term admits of degrees, (b) it is not always the highest degree of universalization that is expected either of characters or of the spectator, nor is it desirable to achieve it; (c) universalization is not peculiar to literary experience; (d) if universalization explains how the rasa experience becomes shareable, it also explains how any experience is rendered shareable. Two further claims are made on behalf of the rasa experience. It is said to be (a) necessarily pleasurable, and (b) in a class by itself (alaukika). Both these claims are, in Abhinavagupta's system, ultimately based on sadharanikarana. We have examined the second claim and seen that it cannot be maintained because sadharanikarana is not peculiar to the rasa experience alone. We shall now briefly examine the first claim. If sadharanikarana of experience means rendering it universally shareable it is obvious that sadharanikaranaby itself cannot make an experience pleasurable; this is particularly true of experiences which are indifferent in their affective tone and those which are decidedly unpleasant. The following example of the repulsive (the bibhatsa) will make this amply clear. Bhartahari says in his vairagyasataka "A woman's breasts really are only protruberances of flesh, but the poets have likened them to golden pitchers; her face is a place filled with saliva and.mucus, but the poets have compared it to the moon; her hips and loins are made wet by urine, but the poets have compared them with the frontal globe on the forehead of an elephant. That which is repulsive in reality has been shown to be great by the poets." The description is universalized and made applicable to all women. The feeling of disgust, thus universalized and transformed into the bibhatsa rasa cannot be said to have become in any way pleasurable. It is indeed doubtful whether the bibhatsa rasa can ever be pleasurable if experienced by itself. It might become bearable, and perhaps even pleasurable only if it gives rise to the feeling of indifference to worldly objects (nirveda) and leads to the creation of santa rasa. It therefore appears that at least some rasa are not pleasurable by themselves; they can, however, become pleasurable by being subordinated to other rasas or to ends which are not peculiar to literature, for example, moral or religious values. Another way of making the rasa experience pleasurable is to raise it to a qualitatively higher level, where it acquires a universal significance. Here universalization does take place, but not in the limited sense of making something universally shareable. Some problems are universally shareable but they are not called universal problems. Losing a job is an example of a universally shareable problem. But "What is the place of human goodness in the ultimate scheme of the world?" is a universal problem, a problem with a

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116 SOME ASPECTS OF THE RASA THEORY universal significance. A universal problem is not necessarily a problem which is actually raised by all men; it is such as can be raised by all men, but is actually raised only by a few mature men with a philosophical bent of mind when confronted with the central mysteries of human life. The fear of the young deer described in act one of Sakuntala is often cited as an example of the bhayanaka rasa. The experience is universal in the sense that it is universally communicable; but it does not have the universal significance of the anguish of Oedipus. This discussion shows that in the context of literature "universalization" can be taken to mean (i) "making something universally followable, shareable / applicable" or (ii) "endowing something with universal significance." Butcher most probably wants to emphasize the second meaning when he writes about the tragic hero. "So much human nature must there be in him that we are able in some sense to identify ourselves with him, to make his misfortunes our own. At the same time he is raised above us in external degree and station .... there is a gain in the hero being placed at an ideal distance from the spectator. We are not confronted with outward conditions of life too like our own.... [The tragic emotions] are disengaged from the petty interests of self, and are on the way to being universalized .... In the spectacle of another's errors or misfortunes, in the shocks and blows of circumstance, we read the 'doubtful doom of human kind'.... The spectator who is brought face to face with grander sufferings than his own experiences a sympathetic ecstasy, or lifting out himself.... The tragic katharsis requires that suffering shall be exhibited in one of its comprehensive aspects; that the deeds and fortunes of the actors shall attach themselves to larger issues, and the spectator himself be lifted above the special case and brought face to face with universal law and the divine plan of the world." Universalization in the sense of investing an experience with universal significance can plausibly be regarded as a way of making it pleasurable; that which elevates us 'mentally is often a source of pleasure. The satisfaction which attends a moral experience can be cited as an example. (Incidentally, this shows that "universalization" in Butcher's sense also does not make the literary experience sui generis.). The Sanskritists do not appear to use sadharanikarana in Butcher's sense. But then if we take sadharanikarana as a process which depersonalizes an experience or renders it universally shareable/followable we shall not be able to prove either that the rasa experience is necessarily pleasurable or that it is sui generis, or that it is valuationally superior to everyday experiences. We shall now consider two other arguments put forward to prove that the rasa experience is sui generis. The substance of the first argument is that the means-end category has no application in the context of rasa experience. Where this category has an application, the means can be discarded after the end is achieved. But vibhavas and so on are not the means to achieve the end, namely, the rasa experiece. For the rasa experience is coterminus with the 7. Butcher, op. cit., pp. 260-271.

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APPENDIX-II 117 presence of the vibhavas and so or before us. It is vibhavadijivitavadhi. It comes into existence with the vibhavas, and ends when the vibhavas are removed from the stage. The argument perhaps aims at distinguishing between the sthayibhavas, which are permanently there in the human mind in a dormant state, and the rasa experience, which occurs only when the vibhavas are present before us. But then this distinction holds good even outside the literary context, for it is the distinction between dispositions and occurrents which is familiar to all psychologists. An irascible man is not angry all the time; he has a disposition to get angry at the least provocation; and the anger, which is an occurrent and not a disposition, lasts only so long as the cause for provocation lasts. When we say that "X enjoys music" we are talking about X's disposition, we can use this exrpession even if, at the moment, no musical concert is in progress. But it would be logically odd to say "X is enjoying a musical concert which is not now in progress." The same is true about enjoying a particular performance of a play or a cricket match that is just not there. According to the logic of the verb "to enjoy" when used in the context of an episode, enjoyment and the thing which is enjoyed are coterminus. At one stage in this article it was shown that sadharanikarana is not peculiar to the Tusa experience, for universalization is a precondition of the ethical experience also. But the supporters of Abhinavagupta might say that despite this similarity the two experiences are different because the ethical experience issues into action but the rasa experience is an end in itself It might be readily conceded that the rasa experience does not give rise to immediate overt action. But that is because the peculiar ontological status of vibhavas rules out the very possibility of any such action with regard to them. Even if we wish to, it is logically impossible for us to interfere in the lives of the characters' on the stage. The world in which the characters move is structured like the world in which real men move; but there is no continuity between the worlds. That we should be able to see the former and that it should be able to induce emotional states in us creates peculiar epistemological and ontological problems. Sri Sankuka's theory of citraturagapratiti shows that the Sanskritists were aware of these problems. We see a configuration of pigments to be a horse, although we know that a real horse is not made of pigments. In the same way we see an actor as a character like Rama. Seeing one thing as another thing is not a variety of ordinary seeing. As Sri Sankuka has shown, it does not belong to the four known categories of perception : (a) veridical perception (b) illusory perception (c) perceiving something as resembling something else (d) perception which leaves us in doubt about the identity of what we perceive. What we see has a peculiar ontological status; the status would not have been peculiar .if we had before us an actor merely as a man following a particular profession. Again, there would have been no problem if Rama, whose role the actor is supposed to play, were actually present before us. What we see on the stage is sui generis; and our seeing it is also sui generis. It should be evident that Sri Sankuka's theory bears a striking resemb gical proemotionaluld be able ve; but

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118 SOME ASPECTS OF THE RASA THEORY lance to the Kantian theory of "distinterestedness" and Aldrich's theory of "categorical aspection." It is true that neither of these theories has anything to do with watching a play on the stage; but they are both concerned with the peculiar ontological status of the object of aesthetic contemplation. And one cannot avoid facing this problem when one tries to give a logical account of "watching a play." Since Plato, Western aestheticians have been discussing the ontological status of the aesthetic object. Plato concluded that the aesthetic object is ontologically inferior to things in the phenomenal world and is thus twice removed from the ultimate reality. Kant removed the aesthetic object from the Platonic ontological order by declaring that the aesthetic delight is "disinterested" in the sense that it does not depend upon the actual existence of the aesthetic object. We neither affirm nor deny that it exists. In the aesthetic context we contemplate not a physical object but an "aesthetic semblance." That which is an "aesthetic semblance" in the aesthetic context may turn out to be an actually existing physical object in the cognitive or the practical context. While determining the ontological status of the aesthetic object, we must see that the contexts are not confused. The world of imagination is not an imaginary, false world to be contrasted with the "real" world. It is one aspect of the same world whose other aspect is the so-called "real" world. The knower, the practical agent, and the aesthetic contemplator deal with the same world under different aspects. About the phenomenon of changing the aspects Aldrich writes, "What I am approaching is the phenomenon of categorial aspection,... Categorial aspection : involves a change of categorial aspects; the same material thing is perceived now as a physical object, now as an aesthetic object, neither of which involves seeing it as another thing. The difference between categorial aspects has to do with modes of perception and the kinds of space in which their objects are realized." To see a configuration of pigments only as a configuration of pigments is to see under one aspect; to see it as a horse is. to see it under a different aspect. This theory can be extended to cover the act of "watching a play on the stage." To see an actor as an actual human being and to see him as a "character" are two different varieties of seeing, although the same sense organs are involved in the two seeings; the difference between the two is based on categorical aspection. Sri Sankuka was laying a foundation for an autonomist theory of art when he propounded the theory of citraturagapratiti. Of course, this by itself cannot prove the validity of the autonomist stand. For that we also need the deconceptualization of the aesthetic experience, as Kant has maintained.10 The first step which Sri Sankuka took in the direction of autonomism was retracted by Abhinavagupta. For once the actor, the character, the spectator, and the emotional experiences are universalized, the concepts of "playing a 8. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Aesthetic Judgement, First Moment. 3. Virgil C. Aldrich, Philosophy of Art (Englewood Cliff, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), pp. 21-22 10. Immanuel Kant, op. cit., Second Moment.

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APPENDIX-II 119 role," "seeing" a real human being "as a character" lose all meaning. For if air share the same universalized emotion, who can be said to imitate, to play the role of, whom? Abhinavagupta really has no use for the notion of imitation, which is so central to the world of drama, and to the world of representional art as a whole. Not only does Abhinavagupta retract the step taken by Sri Sankuka, he actually takes a step in the opposite direction. For through sadharanikarana we can go from the world of art back to the world of "real" men and women. For although the "characters" in a play do not inhabit the "real" world, "real" men who resemble the "characters" in many respects do live in the same "real" world in which we live. "Characters" thus direct our attention to "real" men. That is why we often exclaim "How true!" while watching a play. Futher, if the rasa experience is claimed to be an end in itself, why does the Abhinavagupta school attach importance to the ultimate goals of human life (the purusarthas) while deciding upon the number of rasas? If the rasas are expected to be conducive to the basic goals of life, the longterm conative-affective effects of the rasa experience will have to be taken into account while discussing the intrinsic nature of that experience. This position is different from A. C. Bradley's stand in his well-known article "Poetry for Peotry's Sake."11 Bradley admits that poetry may have ulterior ends like softening of passions in addition to its sole legitimate end of being "a satisfying imaginative experience." However, for Bradley these ulterior ends of poetry are totally irrelevant in a discussion of poetry as poetry. The case of Abhinavagupta is entirely different. For him the rasas depend on sthayibhavas; and sthayibhavas are sthayi, that is, permanent and dominant sentiments/emotions because they promote the basic goals of life. Some bhavas are not given the status of sthayin, and are not regarded as sources of rasas only because they are not conducive to these goals. This connection between rasas and the basic goals of life goes counter to the autonomist stand. To accept the theory of sadharanikarana and to insist on the close connection between 'rasas and the basic goals of life is to weaken the claim that the rasa experience is in a class by itself (alaukika). That there are points of close similarity between the Western and the ancient Sanskrit traditions should be evident from the preceding discussion. Topics such as watching a theatrical performance, emotionality of literature, autonomy of the world of literature, degree of universalization involved in literary experience, aesthetic pleasure, and the nature of aesthetic perception are of living interest today. About all of them the ancient Sanskritists have said something that the moderns will find relevant and thought-provoking, if not acceptable. Of course, to be relevant, it is not necessary for a theory to be acceptable. The modern Sanskritists can, and should, take part in the dialogue between India and the West. They can contribute something to the modern theory of literature, if they stop being mere exponents of the ancient critical thought. Let them continue to owe allegiance to Sri Sankuka and Abouture, and in of univertion 11. A. C Bradley, Oxford Lectures on Poetry (London: Macmillan, reprinted., 1962), pp. 4-5.

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120 SOME ASPECTS OF THE RASA THEORY Abhinavagupta. But let them also take on the task of restating and defending the ancient theories in the context of contemporary literary thought. They will then be required to meet new objections and give an adequate account of modern aesthetic data. They might also realize that it is necessary to modify the ancient theories. For example, a mere juxtaposition of the ways Abhinava" gupta and Butcher have treated the problem of universalization in literature will force them to do radical rethinking about the whole issue. If the modern Sanskritists want to be part of the world critical tradition, they will have to assume a new role; they will have to become moulders and not merely discoverers of critical concepts. An active dialogue with Western aestheticians will bring them close, as living minds, to their own past. The past in its turn will become living if they approach it in this way. POST-SCRIPT : In the discussion during the Patan Seminar and elsewhere I have made the following additional points about Sanskrit:Poetics. (1) In modern times, particularly after the emergence of the Novel as a distinct and important form of literature, we often evaluate literary works in terms of the insight they give into reality. We cannot do this from within the Sanskrit Poetics. There is provision for this in Aristotle's Poetics; for example, see chapter IX of Poetics. (2) A play like Sophocles's Antigone is rated very high for the moral problem it presents with great force. Again, one cannot do this with the critical tools ancient Sanskrit Poetics has given us. It is not as if there were no moral problems in ancient Sanskrit literature; nor is the case that moral problems were not dealt with in ancient literary works. Mahabharata is full of moral problems. And yet Sanskrit poetics does not tell us how to discuss them or how to bring out their bearing on the literary excellence of poetic works which deal with them. Aristotle must have given thought to the moral aspect of literature, as can be seen from his theory of Catharsis. (3) When the rasa theory is sought to be applied outside Drama and Poetry, care should be taken to see whether this application involves any metaphorical extension of the meanings of terms like vibhava, sthayibhava. (4) While discussing the nature of literary experience we should regard our own experience as of supreme importance. A priori reasoning such as the following will not convince/deceive any modern reader : 'rasa is by definition pleasurable; karuna is a rasa; karuna is therefore pleasurable.'

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Srngararnavacandrika of Vijayavarni: A work dealing with Sanskrit poetics, critically edited on the basis of a very rare manuscript, published by Bharatiya Jnanapitha, Delhi, 1969. Jayadeva's Gitagovinda with a hitherto unpublished commentary of King Mananka, published by L.D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad, 1965. An Anthology of Jain Texts (Sahityaratna-kose Jain Sangrahah) published by Sahitya Akademi, New Delhi, 1978. Acarya Hemachandra's Kavyanusasana (with Alamkaracudamani and Viveka) : Second revised edition (in collaboration with Prof. R. C. Parikh), Bombay, 1964. Some Aspects of the Rasa Theory: A Collection of Research Papers, read at the Rasa Seminar, organised by the B. L. 'Institute of Indology, Patan (North Gujarat), published by the B. L. Institute of Indology, Delhi, 1986. He has also contributed : A Critical Introduction (dealing with the Origin and Development of the Story of Rama in Jain Literature - in Sanskrit, Prakrit and Apabhramsa languages) to Pauma-cariya of Vimala Suri, published by Prakrit Text Society, Varanasi, 1962. A Critical Introduction, Critical Notes and several useful Appendices to Mallika-Makaranda, a brilliant Prakarana form of play by Ramacandra, a renowned disciple of Acarya Hemacandra, and published by the L. D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad380 009, 1983. A Critical Introduction to Pancasutraka of Cirantanacarya, critically edited by Muni Sri Jambu Vijayaji and published by the B. L. Institute of Indology, Delhi, 1986.

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