Some Amphibious Expressions in Umaswati

Author(s): M P Marathe
Publisher: Z_Pushkarmuni_Abhinandan_Granth_012012.pdf
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/250306/1

Page #1
Some Amphibious Expressions in Umasvati XEUR Some Amphibious Expressions in Umasvati Dr. M. P. Marathe, M. A., Ph. D. (Deptt. of Philosophy, University of Poona.] Umasvati's Tattvarthadhigamasutra (TAS), written in short, pithy sentences is devoted to the statement and elaboration of the threefold Moksamarga. He himself wrote a commentary on it for the purposes of explanation and clarification. But in both these works Umasvati seems to have used certain expressions amphibiously and equivocally. In some places he has attempted to explain the significance of one expression by another expression. This seems to give the impression that he reckons these expressions as synonymous. In some other places he appears to have used certain expressions interchangeably. These instances tend to gen rate certain mbiguities and confusions. It is the object of this paper to focus on some of them and point out that, neither in the TAS nor in the commentary, Umasvati has made any attempt to avert them. It will also be pointed out that he does not clearly demarcate the boundaries of the significances of those expressions. The expressions in question are: Artha, Tativa, Padartha, Dravya and Sat. Of these, the discussion of the first three expressions seems to give rise to one set of amphibious expressions, while that of the last two to another. After dealing with them, we shall hint at one methodologically weak point in Umasvati that seems to emerge. We shall concentrate on the first and the fifth chapters of the TAS. For, it is in these chapters and commentary on them that the discussion of the significances of these expressions figures mainly, if not exclusively. Coming to the first set of amphibious expressions, let us first deal with 'Tattva'. After the prefatory remarks, in which Umasvati tells us that Samyakdarsana, Samyakjnana and SamyakCaritra are the three pillars of the Moksamarga, he begins the discussion of Tativas. For, Samyak darsana, according to him, is nothing else than either acceptance of Tattvas or Arthas, or acceptance of Arthas as they are ! We are not told what the word Artha signifies. Since difference of opinion about the commonly accepted convention is not registered, it seems that by Artha is meant an object, no matter of what kind. Similarly, regarding the significance of the word 'Tattva' too any deviation from the convention is not noticed. This means that Tattva seems to signify that which is the case or that which is accepted to be the case. On the contrary, the word Artha means an object, no matter given or not. It (Artha) can be an object pre-supposed, talked about, mentioned or of any other sort. Umasvati seems to hold that the expressions 'tattva' and 'artha' are loosely interchangeable, if not totally synonymous. Our contention is not that they cannot at all be so, but that they need not necessarily be so. That the expressions 'artha' and 'tattva' cannot necessarily be taken to be synonymous does not seem to have stuck Umasvati. That is why he appears to have taken that which is accepted to be the case and that which is considered to be an object as the same. Something may be pre-supposed to be a case or a fact; but every fact is not an object. For example, it is raining' is a fact, not an object. Again something may be an odject, but need not necessarily be a fact. Nor should it necessarily be taken to be so. For instance, according to some, a proposition is an object, but this need not make it a fact too. Or, according to some, there are negative facts; but that does not signify that there are negative

Page #2
660 zrI puSkaramuni abhinandana grantha : SaSThama khaNDa' objects also. Thus, given objects, that there will be facts is a permanent possibility. Conversely, given facts, that they will comprise of objects is quite understandable. Yet, what facts comprise of are not objects alone. Moreover, facts and objects need not be the same. Umasvati does not merely seem to hold that Tattvas and Arthas are the same. He seems also to favour the view that each one of them should in principle be capable of being given empirically. This view would hold provided we are talking about empirical objects and not about any object whatever. Interchangeability of the expressions Tattva and Artha would be a weak link in Umasvati's explanation. For, that seems to generate the view that the sets of Tattvas and Arthas are co-extensive. And it seems difficult to accept such a view. Again in his commentary on 1.2 he mentions that Jiva etc. are Tativas and in I. 4 he proceeds to enumerate them. He enumerates seven Tattvas,' and in the commentary on I. 4 he writes that these are seven kinds of objects. Here there seems to be a slip. Kinds or sorts can be enumerated, but what is enumerated need not necessarily be sorts or kinds. Such enumeration can even be by naming. Naming is an enumerative device but not necessarily a sortal one. For instance, when I enumerate the persons present at the meeting naming them as Ram, Kiran, Ajit etc., I am not enumerating kinds of persons. Here, then, Umasvati seems to overlook the distinction between enumerated individuals or objects and kinds of objects which can be enumerated. Thus, in the first instance, it is incorrect to equate Tattvas with Arthas; and further maintain that the same basis and pattern of classification would apply to both of them. . Further, in his commentary on I. 4 Umasvati states that these Tativas (which were earlier taken to be objects or their kinds) are Padarthas. That means, he appears to take the terms Tattva and Padartha as synonymous. But this seems to be an error as would be clear in our further discussion. As in the case of the word Artha or Tattva, Umasvati does not register any deviation from the commonly accepted convention regarding the word Padartha. There are three different generally accepted senses of the word Padartha. It may nevertheless be granted that these three senses might not be so understood at the time of Umasvati or perhaps even later. For, Pujyapada, who wrote a commentary on the work of Umasvati also does not shed any light on the issue. Be that as it may. But the general context of the word Padartha leads one to believe that Umasvati perhaps uses it in one sense. viz., 'Padasya padena sucitah va arthah'. this is because as stated earlier, he presumes that the expressions Padartha and Tattva are interchangeable, however loosely they may be. What seems to have guided Umasvati's view is that both Tattvas and Padarthas can be enumerated. Prima facie, this contention is sound as far as it goes. Enumerative, rather than classificatory statement of Padarthas appears to be common to the discussion of Padarthas by the Pracina Nyaya and that by Umasvati. Similarly, the Samkhyas as also Umasvati adopt the enumerative pattern while enlisting their Tattvas. But this seems to be too weak a ground for Padarthas being equated with Tattvas. Equation of Tattvas with Padarthas seems to be Umasvati's innovation. But let it not be forgotten that innovations, philosophical or otherwise, should be meaningful and tenable. The only point which Umasvati seems to bring to the focus successfully is that both Tattvas and Padarthas can be mentioned by enumeration. But this does not warrant the equation of the two. As one proceeds in one's study of Umasvati's works one begins to notice yet weaker links in his explanatory observations. Whereas consideration of Tattvas presupposes no use of communicative language and the scheme of concepts it brings in, that of Padarthas does presuppose them. For, by Tattvas one may minimally mean the topics around which a philosophical discussion is designed to centre. It is irrelevant and redundant whether any statements are made about them or whether anything is attempted to be communicated about them. Regarding Padarthas, on the contrary, the case seems to be different. They presuppose language and communication, no matter whether successful or not. This being the case, it seems misleading to suppose that Tattvas and Padarthas are the same. Further, there can be no language, which is bereft of concepts. Any consideration of and in terms of Padarthas, therefore, presupposes some

Page #3
Some Amphibious Expressions in Umasvati 661 concepts. Perhaps, it presupposes an inter-relation between or among such concepts also. But it is doubtful whether a consideration of Tattvas also presupposes any concepts and the interrelation between or among them. Supposing again, even if one grants, for the sake of argument, that there is some relation, proximate or remote, between Tattvas and Padarthas, it does not follow that one should accept as many Tattvas as Padarthas. Further it is irrelevant for any philosophical inquiry to talk in terms of both of them. The number of items which the employment of significant expressions in a language designates and the number of topics or items that figure in a philosophical discussion need not necessarily bear any relation to one another. Nor should there be one to one correspondence among them. This is not of course to say that they cannot at all be related. The only point is that there is no necessary relation between them and the acknowledgement of a contingent relation between them does not seem to suffice for the establishment of the synonymity or interchangeability of the expressions. This being the case, it seems equally doubtful whether sets of Tattvas and Padarthas could be taken to be co-extensive. As pointed out earlier, Umasvati seems to take the sets of Tattvas and Arthas as co-extensive. Now, since he holds Tattvas and Arthas on the one hand and Tattvas and Padarthas on the other as co-extensive, he seems to favour the view that the sets of Padarthas and Arthas are also co-extensive. Indeed this seems difficult to accept for there is not any additional explanation and clarification in Umasvati's works. Further, Umasvati states that he intends to explain Padarthas in detail, definitionally or symptomatically (laksanatah) and (ca) stipulatively (vidhanatah). There may not be any objection to this procedure provided one does not intend to derive any ontological implication from one's discussion of Padarthas. But it is not correct to hold that the procedure of explaining Padarthas and Tattvas can be the same. Even if the procedure of explaining both of them may contingently meet and tally. it is doubtful whether it would hold universally and necessarily. This seems, therefore, to be another weak link in the procedure of Umasvati's discussion. It seems that Umasvati would adopt the same procedure, with regard to Arthas. One might ignore this as a similar kind of weak point in Umasvati's explanation just mentioned. But it all depends upon how the logical connective and (ca) is to be understood and interpreted. If it is interpreted conjunctively it would lead to one consequence. If, on the contrary, it is interpreted disjunctively, that would lead to another consequence. But more about this, at the end of the paper. II Up to the close of the fourth chapter of the TAS and Umasvati's Bhasya thereon, the discussion centres around the explanation of the nature of Jiva and other related topics. At the very beginning of the fifth chapter he declares his intention of proceeding to consider the nature of Ajivas,' they being the second Tattva. This, as far as it goes, is in line with his declaration of considering various Tattvas or Padarthas in the same sequential order in which they have been mentioned in I. 4. At this juncture, Umasvati seems to introduce another set of amphibious expressions. It is to this set that we now turn. At the beginning of the fifth chapter, Umasvati enumerates four Ajivakayas or Ajivas. He states that he intends to explain them symptomatically or definitionally. In the next Sutra he tells that Jiva etc are Dravyas. 10 In his commentary on V. 2, he states that the four Ajivakayas and living beings (praninasca) are Dravyas. 11 One may not dispute Umasvati's statement that there are five stipulation here seems to disagree with his statement in the first chapter. * Really here Umasvati put the word 'Kaya', Kaya narrates Astikaya. But the author mis-takes it to Dravya. While really Kaya and Dravya have different significance in Jaina technology. -Editor Dravyas.* But his After the enumeration

Page #4
662 zrI puSkaramuni abhinandana prastha : SaSThama khaNDa of Tattvas, which are nothing else then Padarthas, an anticipatory question seems to be answered saying one would be in a position to bring out each one of the Tattvas beginning with Jiva etc. by naming (nama), idolization (sthapana), substantiation (dravya) and consideration of state/ modality (bhava) 18 This seems to indicate that each one of the Tattvas can also be considered as a Dravya. Now, if this contention is juxtaposed with the view that there are five Dravyas, there seems to arise some inconsistency. Perhaps Umasvati did not realise that it so happened. It is likely that Umasvati intends to concentrate only on Ajivadravyas in the chapter under consideration. He also seems to mention in passing that the four Ajiva Dravyas along with the Jivadravya make five Dravyas. This may not perhaps give an impression that Dravyas are just five, no more and no less. Be that as it may. There is another point which Umasvati makes with regard to Dravyas in his commentary on I. 5. He argues that (any) Dravya * is Bhavya.18 While explaining what he meant by this, he states that 'bhavya' is to be understood in the sense of acquirable. Hence, Dravya is that which acquires or can be acquired 14. It is doubtful whether Umasvati would allow this to be applied to Tattvas. If he has no objection in doing so, Tattvas too become either those which acquire or are acquirable. This would perhaps be acceptable to him, if Tattvas and Dravyas are the same. It may, however, be contended that Umasvati did not mean to take seven Tattvas to be Dravyas and to hold that Tattvas either acquire (something) or are acquirable. For, one does not normally raise points of this kind with reference to Tattvas. Perhaps there is a substance in this contention. But Umasvati takes at least some Tattvas to be Dravyas. This should be taken to be just contingent feature. This means that, although Dravya and Tattva need not necessarily be the same, what is called Tartva may be a Dravya. In principle one may not dispute this. Yet one may object that this kind of contingency does not yield any necessary relation between them. It does not give rise to any reciprocity between Tattvas and Dravyas either. It is this which needs to be grasped. Perhaps it is likely that in the initial stages of philosophical inquiry and investigation boundaries of the significances of various expressions were not clearly demarcated. But this should not lead us to continue to do so even now. Ambiguity of expressions in Umasvati does not seem to come to an end here. In the fifth chapter of the Tattvarthadhigamasutra there are in all two statements about a Dravya. They are : (i) Dravya is that which has Gunas (and) Paryayas ;16 (ii) Dravya is Sat definitionally or symptomatically.16 Of these the former is important in one way, the latter in another. In the commentary on the former, Umasvati states that anything is Dravya which has both Gunas and Paryayas 17 It is needless for our present purpose to enter into the other nuences mentioned in the commentary. It seems that this statement is either about any Tativa that is considered to be a Drayya or about five Dravyas 18+ only. Whatever may be the case. We shall concentrate on the latter view, it being the least troublesome one as also being explicitly approved by Umasvati. Even if we delimit our consideration to five Dravyas, there seems to be a certain ambiguity. Out of the five Dravyas, each one is said to have Gunas as well as Paryayas. This may be the case But the question is: does each one of the Dravyas have a Guna as well as a Paryaya in exactly the same way and sense or in different way or sense? It does not seem to be sufficient to say symptomatically or definitionally that each one of the Dravyas has both Gunas as well as Paryayas. For, each one of the five Dravyas is not physical. Where physical as well as extra physical Dravyas are considered together, it seems doubtful whether each one of them has a Guna or a Paryaya or both in exactly the same way. It seems equally doubtful whether mere symptomatic or definitional statement about all of them would establish the point. # Here word Dravya, by Umasvati, is dealt with according to the root, Dravya fluid matter By this explanation he means contiouity. -Editor + There are five Astikayas and not Dravyas, as the writer assumes. - Editor

Page #5
Some Amphibious Expressions in Umasvati 663 But this is a minor point. Let us consider the other way of explaining Dravyas. Here we are told that to be existent is the symptom or definition of a Dravya.10 Understood in this way, anything that is existent is Dravya and anything that is Dravya is existent. This seems to be slippery and ambiguous. It seems difficult to accept that anything that is existent is Dravya, for although there are Gunas, Paryayas etc., just on that count we do not call them Dravyas. Further, when we use 'exists' or its near synonyms with reference to different items, we do not use it in the same sense. For example, we do say, there is a table, there is a ghost, there is an idea in my mind, there is a human society etc. Statement of existence or obtainability does not necessarily seem to have an ontological implication. For, at least sometimes, existential claims are ontologically sterile and impotent. Hence, even if it is said that Dravyas exist, does not entail that each one of them is a part of the furniture of the world. Secondly, it also seems difficult to accept that anything, that is, Dravya is existent. This contention seems to stem from the normal convention that anything that is considered to be a Dravya is mentioned in the nominative case. But unfortunately the converse of this does not hold. For, although Gunas, Pardyayas etc. could be mentioned in the nominative, none of them has a substantial implication. Thus, substantive usage of an expression and its substantial import do not necessarily go hand in hand. Substantive usage, however, has substantival implication but not necessarily a substantial one. The distinction could be brought out in a technical language saying that whereas substantial is objectlinguistic, substantial is metalinguistic. Substantive usage and its substantial implication may seem to meet in some cases; but this is more an accident than a rule. It is for this reason that acceptance of the co-extensivity of the sets of Dravyas and Sats seems very difficult both to entertain and justify. Unfortunately, Pujyapada goes a step further, saying that the expression Sat and Dravya are synonymous.20 And that appears more difficult to sustain. Another anticipatory question is raised by Umasvati. What is Sat? The question is answered saying anything is Sat, provided it is generated or has a beginning in time, undergoes change and yet retains its unity or continuity.21 These features any Sat is supposed to exhibit conjunctively and not disjunctively. Now, if Sat and Dravya are the same, then Dharma, Adharma, Akasa and Pudgala too must exhibit these features of Sat. Now, we are told by Umasvati himself that, of the five Dravyas. every Dravya except Jiva is a Nityadravya." It seems, therefore, difficult to accept Dharma, Adharma, Akasa and Pudgala are Nitya and exhibit the features of Uipada, Vyaya and Dhrauvya. It may be argued that when Utpada is spoken of with regard to Nitya Dravyas it does not mean that they themselves are produced. Rather it means that they have the potentiality of producing others. 23 But this would be the case provided the expression Utpada is used equivocally. And there does not seem to be any indication to that effect. Hence, this argument, designed to give Umasvati a benefit of doubt, also seems to turn out to be an equally weak link. To turn to the other definition of a Dravya. According to it a Dravya is that which has Gunas as well as Paryayas. Taking this definition of Dravya together with that of Sat would raise two questions: (a) how is one to reconcile them? (b) why are these two definitions, if Dravya and Sat are the same? First, coming to the problem of reconciliation. It has been maintained that what are called generation and corruption (to use Aristotelian phraseology) with regard to any Sat are nothing else than what are called Paryayas with regard to a Dravya. What, on the contrary, is called Dhrauvya (continuity or unity) with regard to Sat is nothing else than what is called Guna with reference to a Dravya. Thus, understood, it does not raise any dust of inconsistency. But ambiguity it does not seem to free itself of completely. For, if Dravya is Sat and Sat is Dravya and if difinitions of Dravya and Sat are to be understood with regard to each one of them, there does seem to remain a weak point at least with regard to Dharma, Adharma, Akasa and Pudgala, if not with regard to the Tattvas like Asrava, Bandha, Samvara Nirjara and Moksa, as well. Because, if Tattvas are Dravyas and Dravyas are Sats,

Page #6
664 zrI puSkaramuni abhinandana pantha : SaSThama khaNDa / there seems to be no reason to preclude ascription of Utpada, Vyaya and Dhrauvyatva to each one of the Tattvas. This problem would of course arise provided Taltvas are Dravyas. If, on the contrary, Jiva and AjTvakayas alone are Dravyas such a problem would not arise regarding every Tattva, Dravya and Sat, but rather with regard to some Tattvas, every Dravya and each Sat. That is, it seems that the problem would still remain with regard to Akasa, Dharma, Adharma and Pudgala. Instead of pressing this point further, let us, however, turn to the next problem. The reason why the separate de initions of Sat and Dravya are given is perhaps that, it may be argued, although Umasvati takes every Dravya to be Sar, he does not seem to take every Sat to be a Dravya. But this prima facie plausible line of the explanation of the weak link in Umasvati seems to turn out to be unacceptable one. For, first, Umasvati himself does not seem to favour this defence as he seems to take the sets of things which are Sat and Dravya to be co-extensive. Secondly, both of these could plausibly be taken to be definitions of Dravya or Sat itself. Actually, Pajyapada maintains that, these are not two different things at all. Similarly, he states that these are not two different definitions of different things either. They are the two ways of stating the definition of Dravya itself. But both Umasvati and Puiyapada seem to be silent on the necessity of giving these two definitions of Dravya. Thus Dravya and Sat seems to be another set of amphibious expressions in Umasvati. DII So far we endeavoured to point out two possible sets of amphibious expressions in Umasvati. Our inquiry shows that, even after making sufficient allowance to Umasvati, there appear certain weak points in bis explanation. Before we close, we wish to draw attention to one more weak point that seems to emerge by way of a corollary. In the commentary on I. 4, Umasvati states his intention to explain each one of the Tattvas, Arthas or Padarthas definitionally and stipulatively.27 But in the fifth chapter, while talking about Dharma etc., he states that he would explain their nature definitionally.28 Further, in the same chapter a question is raised : How is one to say that there are Dharma etc.? This question is answered saying definitionally. Now, the two ways mentioned in I. 4 are to be understood conjunctively or disjunctively. On each count, these seems to remain some weakness. If conjunctively understood, Dharma etc., which one is to comprehend definitionally alone, are not to be counted as Tattvas even derivatively. Since Tattva, Artha, Padartha, Dravya and Sat seem to be the same, Dharma etc., cannot be called any of them. Moreover, if stipulation or description is taken as having existential import, then those Tattvas, Arthas, Dravyas etc., which lack this aspect are considered to be so either improperly or metaphorically. Now, if disjunctively understood, the ground for taking each one of them as Tattva, Artha, Dravya etc., seems to be shaky. For, criteria of laksanatah and vidhanatah respectively may bring to the fore two different sorts of Tattvas, Dravyas etc. Even the contention of Pujyapada that whereas 'utpadavyayadhrauvyayuktam sar' is a samanya laksana (generic property) while 'rupinah pudgalah' etc., are visesalaksanas (differentia) of Pudgala etc. too seems to leave a weak link.30 For, while accepting the distinction between two sorts of definitions bringing definienda of both the kinds of definitions under one banner does not seem to be the ground for Tattvas or Dravyas being treated on par. If we are going to count anything as Tativa, Dravya, Sat etc. irrespective of the distinction between those fulfilling and not-fulfilling existential or ontological condition, then we seem to be mixing between them. For, unless Tattvas, Dravyas, etc., are of the same kind, it seems futile to call them to be so. Such way understood there remains a difficulty in the comprehension of Tattvas, Dravyas etc.; for, any mixing up between what is ontological and what is other than ontological seems unreasonable. And therein one is constrained to say that there are certain weak links in Umasvati's explanation of Tattvas, Dravyas etc. O O

Page #7
Some Amphibious Expressions in Umasvati Notes and References 1. Tativanam artbanam sradbanam tattvena varthaoam sradbanam tattvarthasradbanam tat samyakdarsanam. -Tattva bhasya I. 2 Tattvani jivadini vaksyante/ta eva ca arthah tesam sraddhanam tesu pratyayavadharapam. - Tattva bbasya I. 2. 3. Jivajivasravabandhasamvaranitjaramoksah tattvam. --Tattva 1.4. Before Umasvati the Jaina cannon had accepted nine Dravyas. Umasvati, omitting Papa and Punya, enumerates seven. Pujyapada on the contrary, accepts nine. 4. ......iti esa saptavidhah arthastattvam. -Tattva Bhasya I, 4. 5. Pramitivisayah padarthah/ (b) abhidheyah padarthah/ (a) padasya padena sucitah va arthah padrathah. 6. tam laksanatah vidbanatah ca purastat vistarena upadeksyamah. -Tattva Bhasya, I. 4. 7. ukta jivah/ajivan vaksyamah. -Tattva Bhasya V. 1 8. ajivakaya dharmadharmakasapudgalah. -Tattva V. 1 9. tan laksanatah parastat vaksyamah. -Tattva Bhasya V. I 10. Dravyani jivah ca. -Tattva V. 2 11. ete dharmadayah catvarah praninah ca panca dravyani. - Tattva Bhasya, V. 2 12. Namasthapanadravyabhavatah taonyasah. --Tattva I. 5 Bhasya on it too is instructive. 13. Dravya ca bhavye. -Tattva Bhasya, I. 5 14. Bhavyam iti prapyam aha/bhu praptau atmanepadi/tadeva prapyante prapnuvanti va dravyapi. -Tattva Bhasya, I. 5 15. gunaparyayavat dravyam. - Tattva V. 37 16. Sat dravyalaksanam. -Tattva V. 29 This aphorism is not available in the Tattvarthadhigamasutram, (ed ) Keshavalal Prema chand; Bengal Asiatic Society, Samvat, 1959. 17. gunan laksanatah vaksyamah/bhavantaram samjnantaram ca paryayah/tadubhayam yatra vidyatetat dravyam/gunaparyayah asya asmin va santi iti gunaparyayavat. Tattva Bhasya, V. 37 18. Umasvati considers Jiva, Dharma, Akasa, Adharma and Pudgala to be Dravyas, But he also mentions a view that Kala too is a Dravya, without any further comment by way of approval or disapproval. Yet the Vartikakara Pujyapada holds that Kala is a Dravya. He also holds that two definitions of Dravya are applicable to Kala. cf. Sarvarthasiddhi, V. 39 19. Sat dravyalaksanam. -Tattva V. 29 20. Yat sat tat dravyam ityarthah --Sarva. V. 29 (Kolhapur Edition, Samvat, 1825) 21. Utpadavyayadhrauvyayuktam sat -Tattva. V. 29 22. etani dravyani nityani bhavanti/tadbhavavyayam nityam iti vaksyate... Tattva Bhasya, V. 3 23. gunaparyayavat dravyam. -Tattva, V. 38 24. Utpannam va utpanne va utpannani va sat. -Tattva Bhasya, V. 31 25. Devendramuni Shastri : Jaina Darsana : Svarupa aur vislesana, p. 59. 26. Utpadavyayadhrauvyayuktam sat iti dravyalaksanam/punah aparena prakarena dravyalaksanam pratipadayannab guna paryayavatdravyam. --Sarva., V. 37 27. ta, laksanatah vidhanatah ca purstat vaksyamah. -Tattva Bhasya, 1. 4 28. tan laksanatah prastat vaksyamah. - Tattva Bhasya V, 1 atraha-dharmadini santi iti katham gTbyate iti/atrocyate laksanatah..---Tattva Bhasya, V. 28 30. aha--dharmadinam dravyanam visesalaksanani uktani, samanya laksanam na uktani, tadvaktavyam/ucyate sat dravyalaksanam. --Sarva. V. 28-29.