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________________ REFUTATION OF THE JAINA DARSANA BY SANKARACARYA WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO SYADVADA IN THE BRAHMASUTRA SANKARABHASYA 2-2 Vijay Pandya Sankaracarya has refuted some of the tenets of the Jaina system of thought in his bhasya (c. early years of 9th A. D.) on the Brahmasutra 2-2-33 to 36. The second quarter of the second adhyaya of the Brahmasutra has been traditionally designated. as the "Tarkapada", indicating that its content is based on logic. The main thrust of Sankaracarya's arguments is against Anekantavada or Syadvada and Saptabhanginaya which, as terms though not synonyms, are interconnected as one philosopher of this system, Akalankadeva (c. 8th cent. A. D.) puts it: anekAntAtmakArthakathanaM syAdvAdaH) Syadvada and Anekantavada can be said to have the relation of 'Vacyavacakabhava.' Anekantavada is intended to be expressed with the help of Syadvada, as one other work, the Syadavadamanjari of Mallisena (A. D. 1294) explains syAdityayamanekAntadyotakaM tataH syAdvAdo'nekAntavAdaH 12 The most singular contribution of the Jaina system to Indian thought is Anekantavada or Syadvada; and the Jaina system of thought has been almost identified with Syadvada, at times to the exclusion of other important ideas of the system; so, it is not surprising that Sankaracarya has specially targeted Syddvada, arising out of the Saptabhanginaya, for his attack on the Jaina system of thought. First of all, Sankaracarya directs his attack on the Saptabhanginaya, and says that one object cannot contain in itself contradictory attributes simultaneously: af with yugapat sat asattvAdiviruddhadharma samAvezaH saMbhavati / An object cannot be existent and nonexistent at the same time. Moreover, according to Sankaracarya, the corollary of this doctrine would be that, even the seven padarthas, namely jiva, ajiva, srava, samvara, nirjara, bandha, and moksa, would not have any definiteness about them. A doubt will arise regarding, first of all, about the number of the entities, and then their nature and so forth. Hence everything would be of indefinite nature, and so the knowledge would be of doubtful nature, which cannot serve as a means of knowledge. Resultantly, the tirthankara would not be able to lend any certainty to his preachings regarding the valid means of knowledge (pramana), the objects of knowledge (prameya), agent of knowledge (pramata), and the resulting knowledge itself, all of which have a non-determinate form. If there exists any certainty, then alone the people can follow a certain path without any hesitation. So the teacher's preachings would not be acceptable to the people, and hence they are liable to be rejected like the prattling of a maniac'. Sankaracarya's dialectics in his refutation of the Anekantavada is doubtless remarkable; however, it does not take the real position of Anekantavada into account. Sankaracarya's representation of the Anekantavada is rather a simplification
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________________ Vijay Pandya Nirgrantha of its inherent intention and contentation. Sankaracarya seems to identify Syadvada with the agnosticism which in remoter past (C.B.C. 5th-4th cent.) was articulated by one Sanjaya Belatthiputta (asthi pi me no, nasthi ti pi me no asthi ca natthi ca ti pi meM no nevetthi na natthi ti pi me no). Saijaya had said : "I cannot say if it is, and I cannot say if it is not." Syadvada would say 'I can say that the thing in a sense is, and I can say that the thing in a sense is not.' So, this is certainly not the Sansayavada or agnosticism as Sankaracarya would make it out to be. Anekantavada purports to grasp the polarity of the truth. This leads us to Saptabhanginaya, namely, (i) syAdasti ghaTaH, (ii) syAnnAsti ghaTaH (iii) syAdasti syAnnAsti ghaTaH (iv) syAdavaktavyo ghaTa: (v) syAdasti vaktavyo ghaTaH (vi) syAnAsti avaktavyo ghaTaH, (vii) syAdasti nAsti avaktavyo ghaTaH. Now, when a statement is made that a jug exists, it does from its own nature svarUpeNa asti and pararUpeNa nAsti. i.e. it does not exist in the form of paTa. ghaTaH svarUpeNa asti and pararUpeNa nAsti. Both statements are possible at the same time about ghaTa and similarly, other remaining it also can be worked out. So, as it has been explained praznavazAt ekasmin vastuni avirodhena vidhipratiSedhakalpanA saptabhagI / tad yathA syAd ghaTa: svAtmanA, syAd aghaTaH parAtmanA / Everything exists from its own nature and does not exist from the nature different from its own, as has been elucidated in one verse : sarvamasti svarUpeNa pararUpeNa nAsti ca / anyathA sarvasattvaM syAt svarUpasyApyasaMbhavaH // Syadvada is not taken from this point of view, then, as pointed out in the above cited verse, everything would be everything and there would not be any difference between the two things. If the Syadvada arising out of the Saptabhanginaya is taken literally, at its surface value, then there would be anarchy in the world. As Dharmakirti (7th cent. A. D.) would poke fun at the Syadvada in the following couplet: sarvasyo bhayarUpatve tadvizeSanirAkRteH / codito dadhi khAdeti kimuSTra nAbhidhAvati // 4 With the differentiation removed, all things would be having dual nature, then, if somebody is implored to eat curds, why does he not eat the camel ? This indeed is an extreme view taking the Syadvada in a very surfacial manner. If it is said that, an entity is of dual nature, i.e. existing and non-existing, it means applying to an illustration given by Dharmakirti, curds exist from the nature of curds and does not exist from the nature of a camel. So, if a person is asked to eat curds, then why should he run to eat a camel ? Or as Akalanka had issued a rejoinder: pUrvapakSamavijJAya dUSako'pi vidUSakaH / sugato'pi mRgo jAtaH mRgo'pi sugataH smRtaH //
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________________ Vol. II-1996 Refutation of the.... tathApi sugato vandyo mRgaH khAdyo yatheSyate / tathA vastubalAdeva bhedAbhedavyavasthiteH / codito dadhi khAdeti kimuSTramabhidhAvati / / "Without properly understanding the prima facie view, if a person criticises that view, then he is only a vidusaka and not a critic. Buddha was born as a deer and deer was born as Buddha, and yet Buddha is adorable and the deer is only food. Similarly, due to the strength of an entity with its difference and non-difference specified, nobody would eat a camel if he is implored to eat curds." As Amrtacandra (eally 10th cent. A. D.) elucidates : a aa aa 300 den tadevAnekaM, yadeva sat tadevAsat, yadeva nityaM tadevAnityaM, ityeka vastuniSpAdaka prsprviruddhshktidvyprkaashmnekaantH| Or as one acarya clarified with an illustration of a cowherd woman churning the curds: ekenAkarSayantI zlathayantI vastutvamitareNa / antena jayati jainInItirmanthAnunetramiva gopI / ' The Jaina system of thought, while de-emphasizing one strand of thought, emphasizes another thought, just like a cowherd woman, while churning the curds, straightens one end of a rope, loosening the other end. So Saptabhanginaya is employed either from the point of view of Sakaladesa or Vikaladesa, that is, from a holistic point of view or from a partial point of view. Syadvada is a holistic point of view. Syadvada is dependent upon the Saptabhanganaya as acarya Samantabhadra (c.550600 A. D.) says : 794STTATT&T: PIETE: 18 So, Syadvada attempts to accommodate all differing points of view and hence this characteristic is, in fact, an ornament or a plus point, syAtkAra: satyalAMchanaH and not a flaw as Saikaracarya tried to make it out to be. Further, Sankaracarya argues that pursuing the Syadvada to its logical conclusion would lead one to doubt the doubting self, as there would be indeterminacy regarding the number of astikayas and their nature and so forth, and thereby Syadavada would topsyturvy everything in the Jaina system of thought, by its own indeterminate nature. Sankaracarya's incisive logical faculty seems to be flawless; but, he does not seem to notice that such a situation is inherent in the doctrine itself. In fact, this possibility of Syadvada applying its own doctrine to itself has been perceived in the Jaina system of thought. Samantabhadra, perceiving this possibility, or rather contingency, writes : anekAnte'pyanekAntaH pramANanayasAdhanaH / anekAntaH pramANAtte tadekAnte'pitAnnayAt 110 From the point of view of pramana, it is anekanta, and from the point of view
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________________ Vijay Pandya Nirgrantha of naya, it is ekanta. So, anekanta is anekanta as well as ekanta. As noted earlier, naya is a partial point of view. Naya has been explained as TEC CITIET To r fasta: 14: Naya grasps only a part of an object cognised by pramana. Or naya leads an entity to its partial nature excluding various other characteristics as Devasena (c. early 10th cent. A. D.) held : 714 22: R Taf Treats realfa 72: 111 So, naya is neither pramana nor apramana. Naya is a part of a pramana. Naya cognises a thing only partially and not wholly'. Thus Naya is a pramana as well as apramana. Similarly, Anekantavada is also anekanta as well as ekanta. Anekanta reconciles all differing partial positions 3. So, Anekantavada or Syadvada boldly faces and does not shy away from facing its own logical consequences. En passent, it may be remarked that the Jaina system of thought is not anxious to prove their padarthas any more than the Vedantin is inclined to prove the Brahman. The existence of the padarthas depends upon the authority of the Agama as a Vedantin would depend upon the Sruti. Of course, there is a difference, too, between the two systems. As God, the Creator of the Universe, is disrecognized and hence unavailable to the Jaina system of thought, as they do not believe in the creation and hence the Creator of the Universe, God does not lend any authority to the Agamas. But, Sankaracarya, too, does not lay much stress upon this argument. As noted in the beginning of this essay, Sankaracarya's main thrust is against the Syadvada. What is more, Sankaracarya finds fault with one of the Saptabhanginaya i.e. RIGORO: About this, Sankaracarya remarks that, if it is inexpressible, it cannot be expressed and if it is expressible, or expressed, it is not inexpressible : 7 9 padArthAnAmavaktavyatvaM saMbhavati / avaktavyAzcennocyeran / ucyante cAvaktavyAzceti vipratiSiddham 15 But Sankaracarya forgets at that moment that his conception of the Maya is also open to the same charge. Thus, it will be seen that sankaracarya has not been able to do justice to the multilinked splendour of Syadvada. It is quite likely that the great acarya as he was, he might have been led by contemporary considerations (and compulsions) of his days, which were the days of great upheaval, affecting as it did the destiny of an entire nation. But, the Jaina system of thought, and especially its main plank the Syadvada, is a distinct contribution to the Indian thought. In its Syadvada tenet, the Jaina system of philosophy appears most vital and resilient. It can be said to be relevant even today, and Sankaracarya's refutation of it had a little impact on the subsequent course of Indian thought*. * Paper originally presented at the National Seminar (Sponsored by Indian Council for Philosophical Research, New Delhi) on Jaina Logic and Epistemology at Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit, Poona, from 27th to 29th March, 1995. With some revisions it is presented here for the JCJ commemorative issue of the Nirgrantha.
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________________ Vol. II-1996 Refutation of the.... REFERENCES : 1. Laghiyastraya-tika 62. 2. Syadavadamanjari 5. 3. See the Sankarabhasya on 2 - 2 - 33 : niraGakuzaM hyanekAntatvaM sarvavastuSu pratijAnAnasya, nirdhAraNasyApi vastutvAvizeSAt, syAdasti syAnnAstItyAdivikalpopanipAtAdanirdhAraNAtmakataiva syAt / evaM sati kathaM pramANabhUtaH saMstIrthakaraH pramANaprameya pramAta pramitiSvanirdhAritAsUpadeSTuM zaknuyAt kathaM vA tadabhiprAyAnusAriNastadupadiSTe 'rthe :nirdhAritarUpe pravarteran / aikAntikaphalatvanirdhAraNe hi sati tatsAdhanAnuSThAnAya sarvo loko'nAkulaH pravartate, naanythaa| atazcAnirdhAritArthaM zAstraM praNayan mattonmattavadanupAdeyavacanaH syAt / 4. Pramanavartika3-181. 5. Akalanka in his Nyayaviniscaya 203, 204. 6. Amrracandra in his Atmakhyati commentary. 7. Amrtacandra in the Purusarthasiddhi 225. 8. Samantabhadra in his Aptamimamsa 14. 9. tathA paJcAnAmastikAyAnAM paJcatvasaMkhyAsti vA nAsti veti vikalpyamAnA, syAt tAvadekasmin pakSe pakSAntare tu na syAt, jJAyato nyUnasaMkhyAtvamadhikasaMkhyAtvaM vA prApnuyAt | Sankarabhasya. 10. Samantabhadra in the Svayambhustotra, 103. 11. Devasena, Nayacakra. 12. nAyaM vastu na cAvastu vastvaMzaH kathyate yataH / nAsamudraH samudro vA samudrAMzo yathocyate || Tattvarthasloka vartika 13. paramAgamasya bIjaM niSiddhajAtyantasindhuravidhAnam / sakalanayavilasitAnAM virodhamathanaM namAmyanekAntam // Amrtacandra in the Purusarthasiddhi 2. 14. S. K. Belvalkar, The Brahmasutras of Badarayana, 2-1,2, Notes p. 181. 15. Sankarabhasya 2-2-33. We regret, for want of time, we could not prepare the bibliography of works referred to in this article. -Editors