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Pramāņa and Naya in Jaina Logic
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Pramana and Naya in Jaina Logic
V. K. Bharadhwaja Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Simla.
(1) Pramāna and Naya are two cardinal concepts in the Jaina theory of knowledge of what there is or what the Jainas say there is. It is almost impossible to say as to what the Jaina thinker is doing in the vast literature on the methodology of knowledge without our having a reasonably clear idea of his usage of the terms Pramāņa and Naya. But when one wants to seek clarity on the issue of distinguishing Pramāna from Naya and the two from their related concept spät one feels simply baffled. At least, this is how I felt when I found myself confronted with the following statements of the Jaina position on the question whether Naya is or is not a Pramāna and what after all is the connection, if any, between the two :
(T) The class of Pramana sentences includes the whole class of Naya sentences. Only
when the word syāt or kathamcit is prefixed to a Naya sentence that it acquires the
logical status of a Pramana. (T.) The Naya consists in the particular intention of the knower who, suspending his
judgment about the other parts, takes notice of one particular aspect of an object
which is known through the Pramāņa of the scriptures. (T2) The Naya sentences are used to communicate knowledge, but they cannot be said to
be either Pramāņa or Apramāna.
The above three theses T, T, and Ty, it seems to me, are quite different from one another. The thesis T suggests that, unless a Naya sentence is prefixed by the word syāt or kathamcit, the naya sentence will not qualify to be a pramāna-vakya. The thesis T, treats a naya sentence as a claim to knowledge, that is, a pramāņa, and when it is conjoined to the thesis T..
(T.) As Pramăna adds to knowledge by removing ignorance, so does Naya adds to know
ledge by removing ignorance.
The obvious thing that strikes one's mind is that a naya sentence communicating as it does knowledge of only one aspect of any thing must itself be a pramāna. It is plain then that if you accept the thesis Ti you just cannot subscribe to the thesis T, conjoined to the thesis T. And conversely also. Faced with the dilemma of choosing one or the other alternative you are offered the thesis Ty, namely, that a naya sentence cannot be said to be either pramāņa or apramāņa. Apparently, the Jaina thinker has a way out of this discomforting situation. He may point out that we have misunderstood his position altogether. Prefix the word syāt or kathamcit to the naya sentence.
(A) A naya sentence is a pramāņa
and to (B) A naya sentence is not a pramāņa
and you obtain three perfectly consistent sentences
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(C) Syát, a naya sentence is a pramāņa
and
(D) Syät, a naya sentence is not a pramāna
or (E) Syāt, a naya sentence is pramāna as well as apramäna.
I do not think that this way of going about one's business in a discussion on the methodology of knowledge or the logic of evidence with which the Jaina thinker obviously is concerned will solve or help to solve the problem. My own feeling is that one feels cheated when a solution of this kind is presented to one who is seriously engaged in understanding what the Jaina thinker is really doing when he makes the two notions of naya and pramāna as the core concepts of his theory of knowledge. I propose therefore to follow a different tack to explicate the distinction exploiting of course whatever the relevant texts there are that are available to me.
(2) Consider a few examples that the Jaina thinker has given in order to illustrate his conception of the notion of naya, pramāna and syāt. To say that "Sadeva" or that "This object has existence as its only property" is to exemplify a durnara sentence. Again, to say that "Sat" or "This object has existence" is to exemplify a naya sentence. Finally, to assert “Syát Sat" or that This object has existence as one of its infinite properties" is to make a statement which properly belongs to the class of pramāna sentences. These examples do throw some light on what the Jaina thinker had in mind when he used the words naya and pramana. But, at the same uime, these raise the question, namely; If prefixing syāt or kathamcit to any sentence make it a pramāņa sentence, then how are we going to reconcile this with the other position, namely, that while in a naya sentence one only aspect or property or relation of something is asserted to be known, while in a pramāna-vāk ya, the whole of something is asserted to be known ?? This question arises because the logical form and function of a naya sentence does in no way suggest that the sentence is used to communicate information about the object of knowledge as a whole, that is, about whatever aspects, properties, or relations that object may have either in itself or as it is related to the other objects. And, this is one condition which a pramāna vākya is supposed to satisfy. It is possible that the way I have stated the condition which distinguishes a pramāna vākya from a nuya vākya makes it a very stringent requirement to be satisfied by a pramāna vākya. And, hopefully, it is very likely that the Jaina thinkers never meant it is exactly the way as I have put it. However, in the rich philosophical literature which deals with the question of differentiating a naya vākya from a pramāņa vākya, they have tried to exploit the notion of adeśa in outlining the features which are distinctive of a naya vākya but not of a pramāņa vākya, and also those which are distinctive of a pramāna vāk ya but not of a naya vākya.
(3) The relevant Dictionary meaning of the word adeśa is 'advice, instruction, precept, or rule'. But by an adeśa, the Jaina thinker means a 'point of view. We can look upon some particular thing from different points of view. Observing an object from one and only one point of view to the exclusion of every other, according to the Jaina thinker, does not enable us to describe an object as adequately as one may wish it to be described. It is a different thing altogether that we may be interested in knowing and describing only one aspect or property of the object. But, knowing and describing only one property of the object does not mean knowing and describing its other properties also. This idea of differentiating a specific description of only one property from a general description of an object of knowledge is of the fundamental importance to the Jaina thinker. He employs this idea to divide all adeśa sentences into two sub-types : First sakalādeśa sentences and secondly, vikalādeśa sentences. A vikalādeśa' sentence is used to describe one and only one dharma or property of sat or what is real, while a sakalādesalo sentence is used to give a general description of sat or what is real. To put it differently, a sakalādeśa sentence describes what is real synthetically; it communicates information about the entire, undivided reality, while a vikaladeśa sentence describes the various dharmas or properties of sat analytically it communicates information about an amsa, an aspect or
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Pramāna and Naya in Jaina Logic
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a part of what is real. This is how the Jaina thinker differentiates a sakalādeśa vakya from a vikalādeśa vākya. This distinction, however, is expressed in the traditionalistic jargon ; but it may be stated in the ordinary language as the distinction between a specific description and a general description of what is real. A sakaladeśa sentence is used to give a general description; while a sentence is employed to give a specific description of what is real. Both the types of sentences, however, are used to describe what the Jaina thinker calls satil or reality. And, it seems to me that differentiating these two types of description sentences is a perfectly legitimate thing to do for purposes of describing reality. But unfortunately the distinction cannot be exploited to explicate the logical difference between a Pramāna vākya and a naya vāk ya. Logically, both a sakalādesa sentence and also a vikalādeśa sentences are bearer of true (of course, contingently true) information. Whether the information communicated by means of them in true or false is something which depends entirely upon what pramāna is adduced in support of them. If the sentences are well-supported by one or more pramāna they are said to be true, and if they are ill-supported they are said to be false. The Jaina assertion 2 that a sakalādeśa vākya is a pramāņa vākya while a vikalādeśa vakya is a naya vākya is simply untenable. Differentiating a pramāna vākya from a naya väkya on the basis merely of the extent or quantum of information they are used to communicate, will not do. We need a different criterion for distinguishing a pramāna vāk ya from a naya vākya from the criterion on the basis of which we differentiate a sakalādeśa vākya from a vikalādeśa väkya. The Jaina thinker, it seems to me, has failed to see that the distinction between the first type of sentences necessarily requires the notion of truth or confirmation, while the distinction between the second type of sentences really does not. And if he uses the same criterion of division in both the cases, the Jaina logician could then be accused of having committed what in the traditional logic is known as the fallacy of cross division.
(4) Now, consider an example of a vikalādesa sentence : (F) This object has existence.
Consider also an example of a naya väkya : (G) This object has existence.
If you look at (F) and (G), both are identical sentences; and logically also they have the same status. The Jaina thinker, however, classifies them differently. Why he does this, is not at all clear. It is not clear at least to me. He may have very good reasons for doing this; but no where, so far as I know, does he state or even suggest what reasons he has to characterise them differently. At the same time, he would not identify them as the same sentences. If he did this he will have to say that, as a naya vāk ya when prefixed by the word syāt or kathamcit becomes a pramāna vāk yal' so in the same manner a vikaladeša vākya when prefixed by the word syät or kathamcit would acquire the status of a sakaladeśa sentence. But, I do not think that this consequence is acceptable to the Jaina thinker. This can be shown as follows. Consider an example of a sakaladeša vākya :
(H) This object has infinite properties.
This sentence satifies the condition of a sakaladeśa sentence.
Prefix now the word syāt or kathamcit to the vikalādesa sentence an example of which is the sentence (F) above, and the resulting sentence would be
(I) This object has the property of existence as one of its infinite properties.
The two sentences (H) and (I) are in no way logically equivalent ; nor are they semantically equivalent. Besides, the sentence (I) gives more information than the information given by the sentence (H). It follows that even if the prefixing of the word syāt or kathamcit to a naya sentence turns it into a pramāna väkya, the same device does not turn a vikalädeśa sentences into a sakalādeśa vākya. The point of the argument is that the criterion of distinguishing a pramāna väkya from a naya vakya must be different from the criterion of differentiating a sakalādeśa väkya from a vikalādeśa vākya.
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(5) On my analysis, the distinction between a sakalādesa sentence and a vikalādeśa sentence is a distinction with respect to the quantum or the extent of information communicated by means of these sentences. A vikalādesa sentence is a specific description of some specific aspect of what is real, while, sakalādesa sentence is a general description of what is real. No question whatever of their truth values is involved in so far as we are concerned with a criterion of distinguishing them from each other. The distinction between a pramāna vākya and a naya vākya, on the other hand, involves a criterion which has to do with the truth values of these sentences. And here also my feeling is that the innocent device of prefixing the word syāt or kathamcit to a naya sentence will not turn it into a pramāņa sentence. Or, for that matter, removing the prefix syät or kathamcit from a pramāna sentence will not turn it into a naya sentence. This can be shown as follows:
The notion of naya is tethered to the ways in which Sat may be described. If we make a distinction between dravya and paryāya a distinction frequently made by the Jaina thinker, then Sat may be described either according to the dravyārthika naya or according to the paryāyarthika naya, 15 in other words, either by emphasising on the paryāyas or properties which an object has, or by emphasising on the drayya or substance of which the predicates are asserted to be true or false. 16 The result, however, will be a description of what is real or Sat. Giving a description of Sat is not saying that the given description is true or false. To show its truth or falsity you have to offer one or more relevant pramānas or evidences in confirmation of your description of sat. It is in this way that the notion of pramāṇa is related to the notion of naya. Unless pramāna vākyas are adduced in support of a naya väkya, the naya vākyas remain what they are, neither confirmed nor disconfirmed descriptions. Merely prefixing the word syāt or kathamcit does not transform them into pramāna vākyas. Particularly, under the circumstance that a Jaina statement is a privileged statement in that the word syāt or kathamcit is always prefixed to it either explicitly or contextually or it is just tacitly understood to have been prefixed.? Consider, for instance, the sentence.
(J) Sat is anekāntika.18
This sentence (I) is a pramāņa vākya. The word syat or kathamcit is apparently not prefixed to it. Unless the word is tacitly assumed to have been prefixed to it, the sentence (1) does not qualify to be a pramāna vākya. Then, how is it that it occurs as such without the prefix syāt or kathamcit as a pramāņa vākya in the Jaina literature ? Our answer is: Not that the word syāt or kathamcit when prefixed to it transforms in into a true statement; but it is really the pramāņa or the evidence or the argument that is adduced in favour of it that it makes it a true or an acceptable statement. The point of the argument is that it is the pramāņa alone which transforms a sentence like (J) above into a pramāņa vākya ; the prefixing of the word syāt or kathamcit does not do this, the sentence remains where it is, a mere description only or a naya vākya.
(6) What I have done in this short paper is briefly this : I have argued for the thesis that a vikalādeśa sentence and a sakalādeśa sentence logically stand on a different footing from a pramāna sentence and a naya sentence, and that the criterion of differentiating the first pair of sentences is different from the criterion of distinguishing the second pair of sentences. I have held the thesis that the question of How to describe that is real is conceptually different from the question of How to decide the truth values of sentences which are used to describe what is real. I have maintained the view that a naya sentence whether the word syāt or kathamcit20 is prefixed to it or not, is a sentence which belongs to the set of those sentences that are offered in answer to the first question, namely, How to describe what is real : while pramāņa väkyas with or without the prefix syāt or kathamcit are evaluated true or confirmed descriptions of what is said to be real,
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________________ Pramana and Naya in Jaina Logic Bol Notes and References 1 Mallisena's Syadvadamanjari with Hemacandra's Anyayoga-Vyavaccheda-Dvatrimsika (Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series No. LXXXIII ; 1933) p. 167. 2 Vadideva Suri's Pramana-Naya-Tativalokalamkara (Jain Sahitya Vikas Mandal, Bombay; 1967). p. 508. 3 Yasovijaya Gani's Jainatarkabhasa (Delhi, 1973). p. 21 : Cf. Tattvartha-slokavarttika, 1.6.21.5. 4 Pramana-Naya-Tattvalokalamkara; p. 538. 5 Jain-Tark-Bhasa ; p. 21. 6 Syadvadamanjari ; pp. 159-169. 7 Pramana-Naya-Tattvalokalamkara ; p. 508. Anyayoga-Vyavaccheda-Dvatrimsika ; St. 23; p. 139 of Syadvadamanjari, op. cit. 9 Syadvadamanjari, p. 145. Cf. Ratnakaravatarika, Chapter 4. 10 Ibid, p. 146. 11 Anyayoga-Vyavaccheda-Dvatrimsika ; St. 21 ; p. 133-34 of Syadvadamanjari. Cf. Tattvartha slokavartrika ; V. 29. 12 Syadvadamanjari, pp. 145-46. 13 Syadvadamanjari, p. 167. 14 lbid, p. 161. 15 Ibid, pp. 138-48. Also, Jain-Tark-Bhasa, p. 21. 16 bid, pp. 138-48. 17 Ibid, p. 245. 18 lbid, p. 136. 19 Ibid. p. 137. 20 In this paper, I have not discussed the logic of Syat vakyas. That forms the subject of another paper. ---------------------------------------------------------- N बोवोगे वैसा काटोगे, इसमें कुछ मतभेद नहीं / चाहे कलियुग हो पर होता, धर्म-कर्म विच्छेद नहीं। जिसको सुनकर क्षमा अहिंसा, तप के भाव जगें मन में। वही धर्म है उसे दीजिये, स्थान स्वयं के जीवन में / तत्त्व अहिंसा में सात्त्विकता, सात्त्विकता में सत्य निवास / सत्त्व सहित जीवन होता, बहुत महत्त्व, विशेष विकास / / -0--0--0--0--0- -0--0 --0