On Varna System As Conceived Of By Author Ofpatanjala Yoga Sastra Vivarana

Author(s): A Wezler
Publisher: A Wezler
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/269543/1

Page #1

Dr. B.R.Sharma Felicitation Volume (The editors never cared (Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha,
to send proofs, and I Tirupati Series No. 46)
have equally to apoloTirupati 1986
gize for the rather poor quality of the printing. 1
Wezler -.... Patañjalayogaśāstravivarana
173
It is against this background that the passage to be discussed in what follows deserves especial attention.
ON THE VARNA SYSTEM AS CONCEIVED
OF BY THE AUTHOR OF THE PATANJALA-YOGA-SASTRA-VIVARAŅA (Studies in the Patañjalayogaśástravivarana IV)
by Albrecht Wezler, Hamburg
1. The credit for having critically re-examined the old contention that society as such, social facts and problems, etc., did not arouse the interest of classical Indian philosophers, entirely goes to W. Halbfass. Unfortunately, however, his perceptive article "On the Theory of the Caste System in Indian Philosophy" has not yet been translated into English, and its reception must hence be regarded as rather limited. In his introduction Halbfass rightly states that the time has come to collect and interpret without bias all the relevant passages found in philosophical texts, albeit they are found only sporadically. He himself did not, however, aim at a complete inventory of such passages, but starts from the assum. ption that the material selected and discussed by him is nevertheless "representative and authoritative and that it forms "a basis sufficient for the characterization of the principal lines of develop ment and the problems involved":
2. It is found in the Pātañjalayogaśast ravivarana, viz. on the Yogabhâsya on YS 2.28 : yogārgānusthänad asuddhik saye jñana. diptir i vivekakhyateh. The problem of the authorship and consequently of the probable date of the Vivarana can by no means be regarded as settled. This was not only shown by me on an earlier occasion, but emphasized by Halbfass' also who bas recently called attention to additional material which I had failed to notice and which is indeed apt to render the chronological problem still more puzzling. I do not want to enter here again into a discussion of this question, but in passing I should like to make just one remark. Halbfass concludes his "Notes..." by stating : "Hacker's challenging and intriguing hypothesis' that Sankara, the author of the Brahmastrabhāsya, wrote this text as a Yogin and before 'converting' to Advaita Vedanta is just this: a hypothesis, One possibility among others". However, T on my part am not any longer convinced that this can for the time being be regarded even as a serious possibility, and I should think that we are not at all in a position to maintain with Halbfass' that "there is nothing in the form or contents of the Vivarana that would exclude the possibility that it is a work by the author of the Brahmasūtrabhāsya." For, the more I get acquainted with this text, the larger grows the number of quotations of which I notice that they were not yet identified or even recognized as such by the editor, and some of them seem to stem from texts quite conceivably later than Sankara: So long as not all of them have been systematically collected and traced to their original sources, I should, otherwise than Halbfass, prefer to regard the argument "that Kumärila is the latest author explicitly referred to in the Vivarana as extremely weak, especially since I am unable to persuade myself to believe that for solving problems of relative chronology we should concentrate on explicit references only.
Yet inspite of the continuing uncertainty about the date of the Vivarana and inspite of the fact that "basic questions concerning
I do not by any means want to query the theoretical and practical legitimacy of his procedure nor to dispute that he has indeed succeeded in redeeming his promise to an impressive degree. Yet, when going through the 3. chapter of his article which bears the heading "Caste-theoretical Applications of the Doctrine of the three gunas", one cannot, I think, but be rather disappointed at the scarcity of the material Halbfass was able to adduce from Samkhya (and Yogi) sources proper, though the heading itself prepares the reader to reckon rather with passages from texts which do not belong to Samkhya in the sense of the Samkhya school of thought,

Page #2

174
Dr. Sharma JenChunTON Yur.
its philological status. its historical role and its philosophical teachings are still open", as aptly remarked by Halbfass, the text as it stands does not give grounds for the suspicion that its author was not remarkably well acquainted with the tradition of Patañjala Yoga and quite at home in this 'ambiance', although it is for the time being not possible to answer the question whether and, if at all, to which extent the explanations he offers are also based on or at least partially influenced by personal Yogic practice and corresponding experiences. Except for this proviso, however, there is nothing in the Vivaraná which could prevent us from regarding it as an authentic Yoga text, as a trustworthy source of information about traditional Yoga thought, albeit at a particular point of time and
perhaps with a certain degree of originality still to be determined. . I deem it therefore legitimate to start from the assumption that the
passage I am going to analyse does not from an exception in this regard, i.e. that it may indeed be looked upon as representative for the manner in which (the) very adherents of Yoga - apd most probably also of Samkhya, - itself attempted to cope with the theory of the four varnas within the framework of their own philosophical doctrine.
Wezler ... Parañjalayogaśästravivarana 175 '. The key word 'cause' (karana) leads to a digression, i.e. its mention is regarded by the author of the Bhäşya as the right opportunity to deal in a systematic and comprehensive manner with all the different types of 'causes' recognised in the system. To this topic he proceeds by simply continuing with the--general and at the same time principal -- question (209.3): kari caitäni käranäni śāstre santi, which is answered concisely: navaiveti aha, but only to add immediately afterwards, introduced only by "namely" (tadyatha), a verse which indeed looks very much like a samgrahaslokal handed down by tradition for it reads thus (209.4-5):
3. After having explained YS 2.28 word for word, the author of the Bhasya adds the following remark, evidently meant to clarify a particularly important aspect of what is stated in this satra (209, 1-2):11
Uipattisthityabhivyaktivikärapratyayāptayah
Viyogányatvadhrtayaḥ karanam navadha smpiam As the nine causes said to be distinguished in the Yoga-Sastra are here merely enumerated, by means of a complex compound at that, they are subsequently named and explained one after the other in the Bhasya itself. When coming to the last, viz. dhrtikärana. "the cause of sustentation, the Bbāşyakära states (210-3-5):
dhrtikäranam sariram indriyanam ! tani ca tasya mahabhūtāni sariranām tāni ca parasparam sarvesam tairyag yonamānuşadaivatāni ca parasparartharvat...
The cause of sustentation is for instance) the body as the cause wbich sustains) the sense-organs, and these (organs as the cause sustaining] this [body], [and again, the great elements (as the sustaining cause] of bodies," and these [bodies as the cause sustaining) each other; and (finally) animal and human and divine (bodies as the cause sustaining) all (the other objects), since they] exist for each other/serve each the purpose of the others'. • This rather detailed, ie rather well illustrated explanation of the cause of sustentation" is in its turn made further clear by the Vivaraṇakāra (210. 16-26, 211, 6-7).
dhrteh käran a m' dharaṇam dbftih, tasyah karanam sariram indriyana mi nabi sariram
yogäriganusthānam asuddheh viyogakäraṇam, yatha para-.. - yh chedyasya / vivekakhyātes tu praptikäranam, yarha
dharmah sukhasya / nanyatha karanam I.
"The following up of the aids to Yoga is the casue of discorrelation (viyoga) with impurity, just as an axe [is the cause of the disjunction (vi yoga) of a tree) which is to be cut [from its root). Now [the eight aids) are the cause of attaining discriminative discernment, just as right-living (dharma) is (the cause of getting) happiness, in other ways it is not a cause", 11

Page #3

176
Dr. Sharma felicitation Vol. , . apräpyendriyäni dhrtim labhante täni cendriyani tasya sarirasya dhrtikāraṇam bhavanti | Indriyavsttidvāreņa bi śariram dhriyate |
tatham ah a bhutan yākāšadini sariranam dhștikäranam mahābhotārabdhāni hi sarfrani brahmadistambāvasanäni [tan llc à 7" parasparam upakāryopakārakatvadvāreņa dhrtikäraņam
Wezler .... Patanjalayogaśāstravivarana 177 exist for each other serve each the purpose of the others : The animal (body) is the sustaining cause of the human and divine (bodies) in that it renders assistance to them) by being used for) riding or [functioning as) draughtanimals, by giving milk, by sgiving clarified butter used as oblation in sarcifice), etc.
Similarly, the human (body) is the sustaining cause of the divine and animal (bodies in that it renders assistance to them) by sacrificing (to the former), taking care of the latter). ctc. Similarly the divine (body) is the sustaining cause of the other two (in that it renders assistance to them ) by cold, heat, by causing to rain etc.
tatbā sarve sam padarthānām tairagyona - manu sada i vatani dhștikäraņam' kutah? parasparartha två titairyagyonam mănuşadaivatayor vāhanadohana havirädibhir upakurvat dhrtikäranam II tatha mănuşam ijyaraksaņādibhir daivarair yagyonayoh dhrti
karanam 1 tatha daivam itarayoh sitosnapravar sanādina dhrtikäranam II
evam varnaśramanām apy anyonyopakārena dhrtikaranatvam! parasparopäśrayena hi jagad akhilam api dhriyate I......
...... For the sense-organs' do not obtain sustentation (i.e. can. not exist and subsist) unless they have reached the body (ie witbout a body). And these, [i.el the sense-organs are its, [i. e. the body's cause of sustentation. For it is by means of the function (s) of the sease-organs that the body is sustained.
In this (very) manner, the different) varnas and stages of life, too, are the sustaining cause of each other) in that they support each other. For (ultimately) the whole world without exception exists and subsists by mutual support.
4. Although one would, of course, very much like the author of the Vivarana to have been less concise in his explanations, especially as regards the penultimate sentence, his comments are per fectly clear except for what he says on the words sarvesām tairyag. yonamānusadaivaräni ca paraspararthatvat of the Bhasya. Evidently, he is ot' the opinion that sarveşam is to be construed with what follows, thus deviating from the other commentators like Vacaspati. miśra and Vijñanabhiksu. I do not want to discuss here whether this interpretation is really justified, i.e. meets the Bhäsyakära's intention; what I want to point out instead is that if the Vivarana. kära's construction is taken for granted, one cannot spare him the reproach of having failed to make sufficiently clear what according to him is ultimately meant by this sentence. For he not only confines himself to just adding padarthänām to sarvesam, but he also neglects, in what he says subsequently, to consider in detail in which regard precisely "animal and human and divine bodies are the sus. taining cause of all padärthas". And this failure seems not to be made good by his explanation of paraspararthatvar; on the contrary, to be given the information that each of these three types of bodies
Similarly the great elements, [i-e.] the ether etc, are the sustaining cause of the bodies, for the bodies from (that) of (god) Brahma dowa to (those) of grass are made up of the great elements. And these (bodies) are each the sustaining cause of the others by standing [to each other) in the relation of that to which assistance is rendered and that which renders assistance.
. Similarly, animal and human and divine (bodies) are the cause sustaining all, i.e. (all the other) objects. Why? Because they

Page #4

178
Dr. Sharma felicitation Vol.
"is the sustaining cause of the other two" rather adds to the confusion at least at first sight. On closer inspection, however, it becomes apparent that the fact that one and the same entities are first said to be the dhṛtikarana "of all padarthas" and then the sustaining cause "of cach other", is the clue to the solution of the problem: What the Vivaraṇakara obviously means is that animal" etc. bodies are in so far the sustaining cause of all padarthas as they sustain each other by various means, and it is only due to this mutual support that these bodies themselves exist and subsist; yet their existence and subsistence form also the necessary precondition for unfolding their specific activities on which in their turn depend "all the things" of this world, be they 'natural', man-made or god-made.
This interpretation is not only plausible in itself, but it is also confirmed by the text of the Bhasya-as construed by the Vivaranakara, for afterall, it is the reason that is stated when it is said that "these bodies serve each the purpose of the others' (paraspararthatvät). The author of the Vivarana hence seems to draw a distinction between the totality of bodies as such beginning with that of the demiurg Brahma and ending with those of plants, on the one hand, and "animal and human divine bodies", on the other. Whereas all bodies of whatever kind support each other and thus function mutually as cause of sustentation, those of aninals, men and gods are distinguished by the fact that by supporting each other in this manner they are at the same time the sustaining cause of all theother-things of this world which owe their existence solely to these three highest classes of living beings.
One need not be a biologist or ecologist in order not to miss the enormous significance both these ideas undoubtedly have, quite apart from their importance for our knowledge and understanding of the Samkhya and Yoga systems. For what is testified to in them is a conception of 'nature' which not only comprises human beings as well as plants, bat is also a complex whole which is essentially and basically characterized by a mutual dependence of the diffrent classes and species of living beings, i. c. by the fact that each of the
Patanjalayogaśāstravivaraṇa
179
various "bodily" beings irrespective of its place within the given. hierarchy is dependent on others for its very existence and subsistence, though it should not be overlooked that the author of the Vivarana when speaking of animals evidently thinks of domestic cattle only. It has probably gotten around in the meantime that western civilization has almost totally neglected this old truth and that it is only now, viz. when faced with the disastrous results of its suicidal shortsightedness, that it is re-discovering it, though, of course, on the basis of a distinctly different conception, and stage of development, of 'natural' sciences.
Wezler
5. It is. however, the concluding sentences of the Vivarana passage quoted above to which I want to draw particular attention here, viz. evam varṇāśramaṇām apy anyonyopakāreņa dhṛtikaranatvam parasparopäśrayena hi jagad akhilam api dhri yate . As in many other instances of commentarial explanations going beyond a mere paraphrase of the elements of the mula text, one is faced here too with the elementary, yet nonetheless intricate problem whether one may look upon what is said by the commentator as a faithful interpretation of the ideas of the Bhāṣyakāra, or at least of what he meant to imply, or whether one has to do with an entirely new idea of the Vivaraṇakāra himself. I do not see any possibility of reaching an objective decision in the present case ;** but this much can be said without provoking the reproach of arbitrary interpretation: What is stated by the author of the Vivarana in these two sentences perfectly agrees with the Bhasyakara's explanation of dartikarana: at worst, it has to be styled as the outcome of thinking congenially along the very lines of the Bhasya.
Ignoring in what follows the final sentence, for it forms but a generalizing, albeit emphatic and impressive résumé of the contents of the passage taken together. let me concentrate on the first sentence. It refers not only to the four varnas, i.e. the wellknown division of Indian society into Brahmanas, Ksatriyas, Vaisyas and Sadras (which was not merely a theoretical concept,

Page #5

180
Dr. Shirmfelicitrion Vol.
Wezler -... Patañjala yogašāstravirarana
181
but a social fact of immense importance), but it also includes the distinction between the four stages of life in the developed, i.e. final theoretical form of this conception according to which ideally one has 10 run through four successive and different ways of life of both these quadruple divisions it is said that each member is the sustaining cause of the reminig three, respectively, owing to the fact that each of them helps or supports all the others. .
A modern exegete, at least in the West, might feel tempted 10 take this statement to mean that the four rarnas and the four aśramas are here considered to be on a par with each other. It is, however, evident that such an interpretation would be utterly wrong. Clearly any idea of social equality was absolutely alien to the Vivaranakāra, too," who cannot but have shared the conviction that hierarchical value is intrinsic to the 'classes' as well as to the stages of life, - a conviction not only common to Hindus in general. but also regarded by many classical Indian authors as the essential constitutive element of Hindu society. Clearly the Vivaranakära does not think in the least of calling into question this hierarchical structure, not to speak of criticizing or refuting it. It is more than probable that he would have uncompromisingly attacked anyone who dared to come up with such an idea.
yatha va yum samāśritya sarve jivanti jantavah 1 tathā grhastham asritya varianta itarasramah // yasmåt.frayo 'py aśramino jnanenanena canyalam
grhasthenaiva dharyante tasmaj jyesthāśramo grham 11 but they are all evidently intended to counter the tendency to a onesided over-evaluation of the various forms of ascetic life and to give instead the householder's life and his production capacity its due by cmphasizing his overall economic importance for the other, viz. non-productive' sections of society. In the present case this intention could hardly be more explicit than in Manu 3.78d, i.e. by claiming - with marked selfconfidence the highest rank for gårlasthya," and in Manu 3.78b, i.e. by pointing out the important role the (Brahmanical) householder plays in transmitting the Veda and imparting knowledge of the vedartha." But to remind the bralımacarins, vanaprasthas," and sarnyasins of the fact that the food they eat is given to them and ultimately produced by the grhastkas and that the Vedic knowledge they are to acquire is imparted to them) by this group alone), is tantamount 10 pointing out to then they depend on the householders for their very subs. istence, Yet that the dependence is clearly conceived of here not as a mutual, but as a unilateral one, is strikingly confirmed by the comparison in verse 3.77ab, ie, by paralleling the function of the grhastha to that of prano, on which Medhatithi aptly remarks " na hy aprūnasya jivitam asti, pränadharaṇam eva jivanam. Just as in terms of physiology the life of each and every "breathing being" (prānin) depends completely on prāna, so too the other aśramas depend completely on the grhastha as regards their subsistence etc..
There is hence nothing 'revolutionary' in what the Vivaranakära says about the varna and aśrama systems, but nevertheless there is something in it which deserves our full attention, viz. the explicitly stated idea, which forms the very gist of the sentence under discussion here, that the four varnas and the four aśramas support and thus sustain each other mutually, that none of them is able to get along without the others. This is, indeed, something excitingly new, for, as far as I can see, no such idea is found expressed anywhere else, including the vast Dharma śāstra literature.
The concept of mutual dependence is, however, met with within the framework of traditional Indian ideas about kingship. The (lawful) ruler is entitled to claim a particular gift from his subjects, and even from hermits," as compensation for his affording protection to them, etc, Yet, in this case, too," what we have to do with is a dichotomic division of society, although it is an individual, viz. the king, and not a group of people
There are admittedly statements like that of Manu 3.77 and 78:

Page #6

182
Dr. Slarma felicitation Vol.
Wezler
... Mutanyalayog asustravivarana
103
world, beginning with the great elements which sustain the various bodies.
who forms the one side of the relation, whereas the other side is made up of the subjects in their totality to whichever varna and āšrama they may belong. It is hence not what one would call probable that this narrower concept of mutual dependence was the starting point for developing the idea we find expressed in the Vivarana.
For this idea is, as we have already seen, characterized I. by referring to the fourfold division of the varnas and of the aśramas, and 2. by the view that each of the 'classes and stages of life equally gives to all the others and takes from them. i.e. that as far as its relation to the others is concerned it is an upakārya as well as an upakäraka. As already stated above, it is a pity that this is only asserted by the author of the Vivarana and not explained in any detail. For one would, of course, very much like to know in addition in what exactly the upakara given by a particular varna and that received by it consists, according to the author's understanding of the social functions of the differens groups. That he must have had a clear notion of these functions can, I think, be taken for granted; for there is no indication whatsoever which would justify the suspicion that what he says in the last two sentences is but the result of an ad hoc extension of the concept of mutual dependence to a domain not intended by the Bhäsyakára, viz. that of society and its hierarchical structure. To say it in other words: There is every likelihood that the Vivaranakära knew what he was talking about.
In perfect agreement with the term dhậti itself in the sense in which it is used here) this cause is, however, conceived of as operating mainly in the sphere of bodily beings as such, ie, of beings endowed with Organs of sense, as having - in accordance with their type and species - a distinctive nature, as characterized by a particular capacity to act, and last but not least, though this holds good for men only, as belonging by birth to a particular varna and by age to a particular asrama. The conception of society attested to in the Vivarana passage thus forms but an integral and harmonious part of a much wider theorem; yet what is perhaps even more noteworthy is the fact that according to this theorem there is no essential difference between the physiological and biological nature of bodily beings, on the one hand, and the social reality - or rather the ideal social functions of the different classes of human beings: Both are equally governed by the law of give and take', by a mutual dependence which alone is able to ensure dhpil to all the individuals. Just as e. g. man qua human being is dependent on animals and gods. so can he qua Brahmin etc. only exist and subsist thanks to the assistance rendered him by the Ksatriyas etc". No matter to which varna an individual belongs, his existence and subsistence depend on the support he gets from the others, and the rights that may accrue to him because of his particular social status are necessarily complemented by certain duties he must not neglect. Yet, what the Vivaranakära says about the classes' and stages of life evidently not meant to motivate rules about the ideal behaviour of the varnas: there can hardly be any doubt that it was, on the contr. ary, the traditional rules in force that paved the way for conceiving society as a whole as a system which is based on mutual depindence.
Yet, no matter how important this conception of society may appear to those interested in traditional Indian-theories of society, one should not lose sight of the fact that it is clearly a philosophical context in which it is attested, viz. that of the systematic distinction of nine different types of causes in general and that of the "cause of sustentation" in particular. When after recognizing this latter to be a cause sui generis Samkhya and/or Yoga philosophers apparently started to investigate it, they came to realize that it works on different levels and in different spheres of the manifest
Space being limited, I can not address myself to this idea in terms of its importance for theories of society. Yet this much I may be permitted to add: Even if this ethicizing of the varna system should turn out to be unique in Indian philosophy, even if no traces

Page #7

should be discovered of its reception in later texts, it cannot be disputed that it is a remarkable attempt to take into account what seems to have been regarded as social reality by the author, within the framework of a particular system of philosophical thought, ie. that of Samk ya-Yoga. In addition, I hope to have shown once more that there is still much we can learn about these schools of thought when reading the relevant sources, if only we recognize their inherent eloquence.
NOTES
1. Wilhelm Halbfass: Zur Theorie der Kastenordnung in der Indischen Philosophie, Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften, in Göttingen, I. Philologisch bistorische Klasse, Jahrgang 1975, Nr. 9. Göttingen 1976.
2. O. c., p. 6.
3. On the title cf. Wezler in: IIJ 25 (1983), p. 17 f
4. See the article referred to in note 3; cf. also the article "On the Quadruple Division of the Yogaiastra, the Caturvy a hatva of the Cikitsaa. stra and the 'Four Noble Truths' of the Buddha", which will be publi. shed in volume XII of the 'Indologica Taurinesia' to be issued in 1984 or 1985.
5.
W. Halbfass: Studies In Kumarila and Sankara. Reinbek 1983, pp. 106 ff. (= Appendix: Notes on the 'Yogasutra-bhasyavivaraqa').
O. c. (cf. note 5), p 123.
7. Halbfass refers here to Hackers's article "Sankara der Yogin und Sadkara der Advaitin, Einige Beobachtungen" published in: WZKSO 12/13 (1968) [ Festschrift B, Frauwallner] pp 111-148, and reprinted in: P. Hacker: Kleine Schriften, ed. L. Schmithausen. Wiesbaden 1978, pp. 213-242.
8. O. c. (cf. note 5), p. 108.
9. O. c. (cf. note 5), p. 120.
6.
0. O. e. (cf, note 5), p. 123,
11. The edition I use in quoting from the Bhasya as well as from the Vivarapa is: Patanjala-Yogasütra-Bhasya-Vivara pam of SankaraBhagavatpa da, critically ed. Ly Polakam Sri Rama Sastri and S. R. Krishnamurthy Sastri, (MGOS No. XCIV), Madras 1952.
12. Quoted from J. H. Woods: The Yoga System of Paranjait... (HOS Vol. 17). Harvard 1927, p. 173.
13. Cf. Vivarap1 209. 12: tatra kara paprasangena Astraprasiddhani karapani vyacaste...
14. My attenton has been drawn by my friend L. Schmithausen to the fact that a very similar list of different causes is found in Buddhist texts also [viz. the Abhidharmasamuccaya (ed. Pradhan, Santiniketan 1950), p. 28. 12 ff. and the Madhyantavibhaga-bhi sya (ed. Nagao, Tokyo 2964). p. 31. 10 ff.] and that one of them is precisely the 'cause of sustentation, (dhrtika rapa). But it is defined there as the support or basis (adhara/ bhajanaloka) of the living beings (sattva /sattvaloka) This additional material and the problem of the relation in which the Yogabhasya's list stands to it, I hope to discuss in an article still in preparation.
15. As was already observed by Woods, o. c...c..
16. Up to this word the translation is Woods' (o:c., p. 174). As for the remaining part of this passage, I am not able to follow Woods who -evidently letting himself be guided by Vacaspatimiśra- renders it thus "and these [elements] reciprocally of all [elements], since human and animal and supernormal bodies depend on each other". Woods does not adduce any reason for taking täni (of tani ca parasparam) to refer to the "great elements"; yet only very strong reasons could persuade. one to disregard the clear parallelism to be observed between sartram indriya pam/tani ca tasya on the one hand, and mahabhutani dartrapamani ca parasparam/, on the other; and, to be sure, the explanation given by Vacaspatimisra - and other commentators - who take tani ca parasparam to refer to the so called accumulation theory does not by any means form a strong reason; it is, on the contrary entirely unconvincing. Woods' translation is problematic also in that one would, if it were correct, rather expect to find tairyagyonami
24

Page #8

187
186
Dr. Sharma felicitaion Vol.
Wezler -... Patanjalayogaśāstravivarana
nuşadaivatanim and no ca at all. Note also that he construes sarvepim with th: preceding.
upakaryopatarokatvadvirepa in explaining the first sentence. Io aby case, my Interpretation would be affected only partially, the main correction necessary being that no such distinction is drawn and that plants too are cause of sustentation of all padarthas.
17 This is printed in the edition in bold type. Yet, there is not sufficient
evidence to permit the assumption that this is not already the vigraha vakya of the Vivara pakaia's, or to preclude the possibility that the text has to be emcoded here to dhrtikara pam.
23. The use of the particle api is by itself not sufficient evidence.
18. This is an emendation of the editor which is indeed necessary, unless
one wants to go even a step further and coasider the possibility that bere some words have dropped out e.g. due to aberratio oculi,
24. Cf c.g. Vivarana 66.22, where in the context of proving the existence
of Isvara among others the following pratijai is met with: anekakartbhoktkriyasadhanapbalasambandhaviesaj kanavadupadispani varpiframidyausthanani.
19. Most probably the term indriya is used here to cover both the
buddhindriyas as well as the karmendriyas. Nevertheless, to make things easier I render it, following Woods, by "sense-organs".
25. As it was done e.g. by certain Buddhist authors.
20. The fact that the bodies are here said to be arabdha by the elements
does not, of course imply that the author adopted the asambhavada.
26. As is to be expected, the various commentators seem not to be of one
opinion about the general purpose of these two verses. Yet, RaghavaDioda explicitly states: grhasthasramam prakara pikatyst stauti, and Nandana and Mapirima clearly agree with him.
21. I am far from being convinced that the term tairyagyona, as far as
its use in Sakbya - Yoga texts is concerned, does not also include plaats; aod e. g. Yuktidepika (ed. Pandey) 137. 26 f.: tairyagyonas ca parcadha bhavati-Pasu drapaks isarts pasthavarib will definitely lead one to the view that it certainly does. But in view of what the Vivara pakara subsequently states with reference to the tairyagyona bodies, viz. và hapadohanahaviridibhir, one cannot but gather the impression that at this point he did not have plants in mind.
27. Cf. e. g. Medhatithi's explanation of jainena by vedarthavyakhyana
janyena or Sarvajanraya pa's remark: grhasthasyaividhyapansdhikarit trayo'pi jnanena.
22. It should be noticed here that I start from the assumption that the
Vivara pakara for onc trok the sentence sarvesam tairya Ryona minus daivatani etc. of the Bhagya to be, not an explication of the prece ding one, viz. täni ca parasparam, but a specification with regard to certain, i.e. the most important bodily beings. Should this interpretation be wrong in itself and also not meet the intention of the Bbssyakira, one would have to assume that by tair yagyobaminusadaivatani the whole range of 'bodily beings' is covered (cf. also fa 21) and that the second of the two sentences of the Bhagya under discussion is added in order to point out that the bodily beings' in their totality are not only each the sustaining cluse of the others, but also the dhrtikaTapa of all the remaining things of the manifest world Unfortunately the author of the Vivaraga confines himself to the rather vague
28. That by the expression traye 'py asramico in the present context the
Vi uprasthes are included cannot be disputed. Hence, one is confronted with the problem in which sease they too, "are sustained by the householder with knowledge and food". Among the different commentators it seems to bave been only Raghavanaoda who was aware of this problem; for, in commenting on verse 77 he states: taddattabhiksopaji vitvid brahmacarisamay sinam Vinaprasthasyviraktasya porvam grhasthavidyadyupa yogitvat/viraktasya tu 'grhamedbiņu ca' (Manu 6. 27 edityadivakayamaçarity grhasthopajivitvic call. The reference to Manu 6. 27 and 28 (which latter is evid ently meant by adi) is admittedly useful; yet can we be sure that Manu 3.77 and 78 were formulated by an author who had in fact in View the very practice prescribed in the two verses of the 6. Adhyaya?
29. The edition used by me in quating from the commentaries is always:
Maou-Smpiti with Nine Commentaries .... ed. by J.H. Dave (Bharatiya Vidya Series), Bumbay 1972 ff.

Page #9
188 Dr. Sharma felicittion Vol. 30. Cf my article" Sanika und scngin, Zum Verstandnis einer askese kritischen Erzahlung aus dem Mababharata" in: WZKS XXIII(1979), pp. 29-60. 31. It should be noted that in Manu 3.77 and 78 the three other asramas are taken together and thus opposed as one group to that of the housebolders. 32. I am, of course, aware of the fact that there is no lack of material testifying to the idea that Brahmins and Ksatriyas render certain services to each other. But statements about a/the mutual dependence of these two or any other group of two are still something distinctly different from the concept attested to in the Vivaraga, for this latter consists in recognizing such a dependence 1.,10 exist between cach varga taken by itself and all the other and 2. to bu the cause of sustentation of all the varoas taken together. In this connection it is perhaps useful to note that Raghavananda concludes his remarks on Manu 3.78 by explicitly stating: atraisam parasparopakarakati airasta, By the way, does the use of the concept paraspa ropakarata and the rather polemical nirasta indicate that Ragh avananda knew of the view of the mutual dependence of the vargas and asramas?