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Dr. Slarma felicitation Vol.
Wezler
... Mutanyalayog asustravivarana
103
world, beginning with the great elements which sustain the various bodies.
who forms the one side of the relation, whereas the other side is made up of the subjects in their totality to whichever varna and āšrama they may belong. It is hence not what one would call probable that this narrower concept of mutual dependence was the starting point for developing the idea we find expressed in the Vivarana.
For this idea is, as we have already seen, characterized I. by referring to the fourfold division of the varnas and of the aśramas, and 2. by the view that each of the 'classes and stages of life equally gives to all the others and takes from them. i.e. that as far as its relation to the others is concerned it is an upakārya as well as an upakäraka. As already stated above, it is a pity that this is only asserted by the author of the Vivarana and not explained in any detail. For one would, of course, very much like to know in addition in what exactly the upakara given by a particular varna and that received by it consists, according to the author's understanding of the social functions of the differens groups. That he must have had a clear notion of these functions can, I think, be taken for granted; for there is no indication whatsoever which would justify the suspicion that what he says in the last two sentences is but the result of an ad hoc extension of the concept of mutual dependence to a domain not intended by the Bhäsyakára, viz. that of society and its hierarchical structure. To say it in other words: There is every likelihood that the Vivaranakära knew what he was talking about.
In perfect agreement with the term dhậti itself in the sense in which it is used here) this cause is, however, conceived of as operating mainly in the sphere of bodily beings as such, ie, of beings endowed with Organs of sense, as having - in accordance with their type and species - a distinctive nature, as characterized by a particular capacity to act, and last but not least, though this holds good for men only, as belonging by birth to a particular varna and by age to a particular asrama. The conception of society attested to in the Vivarana passage thus forms but an integral and harmonious part of a much wider theorem; yet what is perhaps even more noteworthy is the fact that according to this theorem there is no essential difference between the physiological and biological nature of bodily beings, on the one hand, and the social reality - or rather the ideal social functions of the different classes of human beings: Both are equally governed by the law of give and take', by a mutual dependence which alone is able to ensure dhpil to all the individuals. Just as e. g. man qua human being is dependent on animals and gods. so can he qua Brahmin etc. only exist and subsist thanks to the assistance rendered him by the Ksatriyas etc". No matter to which varna an individual belongs, his existence and subsistence depend on the support he gets from the others, and the rights that may accrue to him because of his particular social status are necessarily complemented by certain duties he must not neglect. Yet, what the Vivaranakära says about the classes' and stages of life evidently not meant to motivate rules about the ideal behaviour of the varnas: there can hardly be any doubt that it was, on the contr. ary, the traditional rules in force that paved the way for conceiving society as a whole as a system which is based on mutual depindence.
Yet, no matter how important this conception of society may appear to those interested in traditional Indian-theories of society, one should not lose sight of the fact that it is clearly a philosophical context in which it is attested, viz. that of the systematic distinction of nine different types of causes in general and that of the "cause of sustentation" in particular. When after recognizing this latter to be a cause sui generis Samkhya and/or Yoga philosophers apparently started to investigate it, they came to realize that it works on different levels and in different spheres of the manifest
Space being limited, I can not address myself to this idea in terms of its importance for theories of society. Yet this much I may be permitted to add: Even if this ethicizing of the varna system should turn out to be unique in Indian philosophy, even if no traces