On Upadhi

Author(s): Hidenori Kitagawa
Publisher: Hidenori Kitagawa
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/269240/1

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On " Upadhi" Continued By HIDENORI KITAGAWA The readers are expected to have read my preceding acticle of the same title in the Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies Vol. XIV, No. 1. * Now, if, as is explained, the function of the upadhi is that of the symptom which tells us the invalidity of the argument, it is preferable that its definition should be as generous as possible. For, the more generous the definition is, the easier will it be for us to find a suitable upadhi that satisfies the definition, and the invalidity of the argument may more easily be pointed out. In this connection, the statement of the Siddhantamuktavali is worth to note. Karika 138 of the Siddhantamuktavali reads as follows: sadhyasya vyapako yas tu hetor avya pakas tatha / sa upadhir bhavet, tasya niskarso 'yam pradarsyate / (Now, that which is a pervader of the sadhya (-dharma] and a non-pervader of the hetu as well is the upadhi; its pith will be shown here.) Apparently upadhi is defined here. Since hetu is nothing but the sadhana-dharma, this definition is practically the same as the definition, so far dealt with, i.e. sadhya-vya pakatve sati sadhanavyapakah upadhih (That

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98. H. KITAGAWA which is a pervader of the sadhya [-dharma] and non pervader of the sadhana (-dharma) is the upadhi.). The Siddhantamuktavali consists of verses (called "Karika") and the commentary on them. According to the latter the intended meaning of the above-quoted definition of Karika 138 should be as follows: yad-dharmavacchinna-sadhya-vyapakatvam tad-dharmavacchinna-sadhanavya pakatvam ([That which has] the nature of being a pervader of the sadhya [-dharma) limited by dharma X and has the nature of being a non-pervader of the sadhana [-dharma] limited by the same dharma X [is the upadhi].). In order to avoid unnecessary confusion and make the comparison easier, let us rewrite this in the following manner: yad-dharmavacchinna-sadhya-vya pakatve sati tad-dhar. mavacchinna-sadhanavyapakah upadhih (That which is a pervader of the sadhya (-dharma] limited by dharma X and non-parvader of the sadhana [-dharma] limited by the same dharma X is the upadhi.). his as the exact definition of upadhi offered by the Siddhantamuktavali, and compare it with the definition so far dealt with. The difference is that in the definition offered by the Siddhantamuktavali the words "sadhya[-dharma]" and "sadhana [-dharma] " are modified by the phrases "yad-dharmavacchinna (limited by dharma X)" and "tad-dharmavacchinna (limited by the same dharma X)" respectively. Then why are these modifications necessary ? The Siddhantamuktavali quotes three examples to explain the reason. But in this article I shall deal with only one of them, which, I believe, will be persuasive enough. The Naiyayikas believe that wind is not perceptible and that its existence may be inferred by the touch peculiar to it! As 1. According to the Naiyayikas, the cool touch belongs to water, the hot touch

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On "Upadhi" 99 against this doctrine of the Naiyayikas', some philosophers belonging to other schools maintain the perceptibility of wind on the ground of its being in possession of a perceptible touch. The argument they set forth is: "[Assertion :] Wind is perceptible. [Reason:] Because it is a substratum of a perceptible touch. (Example :) Like water etc." The Naiyayikas must, of course, point out the invalidity of this argument. The recourse is had to the upadhi, and the nature of having a manifested color (udbhuta-rupavattva) is taken up?. The Siddhantamuktavali says to the following effect: The nature of having a manifested color could not satisfy the definition of upadhi if upadhi were defined simply as " that which is a pervader of the sadhya-dharma and non-pervader of the sadhana-dharma"; since, however, the exact definition of upadhi is "that which is a pervader of the sadhya-dharma limited by dharma X and nonpervader of the sadhana-dharma limited by the same dharma X," the nature of having a manifested color can be the upadhi. Then why does the nature of having a manifested color not satisfy the first definition, and how does it satisfy the second one? Again, how that which satisfies the second definition can also be the symptom of the invalidity of the argument? Before I answer these questions, however, I must explain a little about the Naiyayika doct rines. According to the Naiyayikas substances are of nine sorts; i.e. earth, water, fire, wind, ether, time, space, the internal organ (manas), and the soul (atman). Of these nine sorts of substances, the last two, i.e. the internal organ and the soul, are called "internal substances," while the other seven are called "external substances." Again, of these nine sorts of substances, the first three to fire, and the neither-cool-nor-hot touch to wind. 2. According to the Naiyayikas, colors are of two sorts, manifested (udbhuta) and unmanifested (aundhuta). For more detail see next page, line 1ff. 3. The internal organ is, the power of attention conceived of as a sort of substance. It is the bridge between the sense organs and the soul. We can see, for example, only when the visual organ is connected to the soul by the internal organ. See also foot-note 6.

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100 H. KITAGAWA . possess colors, while the rest do not. The colors are of two sorts, manifested (udbhuta) and unmanifested (anudbhuta); and to have a manifested color is a necessary condition for an external substance to be perceptible. The fire found in the kitchen, for example, is perceptible because it is in possession of a manifested color. The fire in our eyes or in the hot water, on the contrary, is not perceptible because its color is unmanifested. Being the propagators of these principles, the Naiyayikas are bound to claim the imperceptibility of wind; for wind is an external substance which does not possess colors. Some philosophers, however, are against this claim of the Naiyayikas', and the argument quoted in the preceding page, "Wind is perceptible, because it is a substratum of a perceptible touch. Like water etc.," is set forth by them. The Naiyayikas, in their turn, try to point out the invalidity of this argument, recour sing to the upadhi--the nature of having a manifested color. However, the nature of having a manifested color does not satisfy the definition of upadhi, if upadhi is defined simply as "that which is a pervader of the sadhya-dharma and non-pervader of the sadhanadharma." Why? Well, here perceptibility is the sadhya-dharma and the nature of being a substratum of a perceptible touch is the sadhana-dharma'. But the nature of having a manifested color is not a pervader of perceptibility, though it is a non-pervader of the nature of being a substratum of a perceptible touch. Indeed, every. thing that possesses perceptibility does not necessarily possess the nature of having a manifested color. The soul, for example, is per 4. The Naiyayikas believe that our visual organ is made of imperceptible fire. 5. Be sure that here neither the perceptible [thing) is the sadhya-dharma nor the substratum of a perceptible touch is the sadhana-dharma. For these may be wind itself but cannot be the properties of wind. In fact, the Sanskrit expression for the English translation because it is a substratum of a perceptible touch" is "pratyaksa-sparsasrayatvat," which, if translated literally, should be "because of [its) nature of being a substratum of a perceptible touch."

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On " Upadhi" 101 ceptible (i.e. possesses perceptibility), but does not possess a manifested color (i.e. does not possess the nature of having a manifested color)? Thus the nature of having a manifested color fails to satisfy the first definition. Then how does it satisfy the second definition? As is already pointed out, the difference between the first and the second definitions lies in the fact that in the latter the words "sadhya [-dharma]" and "sadhana [-dharma]" are modified by the phrases " yad-dharmavacchinna (limited by dharma X)" and "tad-dharmavacchinna (limited by the same dharma X)." So, I must first explain the meaning of the word "avacchinna (limited)." In order to undestand the meaning of the word "avacchinna," however, it is necessary to understand the meaning of the word "avacchedaka (limitor)." For to say, that F is limited by G is to say that F is limited by the avacchedaka G. Then what is the avacchedaka? Any dharma G that resides in the locus of dharma F may be treated as the avacchedaka of dharma F. Suppose there is a black pot; the black color is a dharma (property) of the pot and the pot is the locus of the black color. The pot may have many other dharmas than the black color, of course; of which, for convenience sake, let us pick up potness (ghatatva, the nature of being a pot). If one simply says "black color (nila-rupa)," we don't know what sort of black color is meant by him. But if he says "the black color limited by [the avacchedaka] pot-ness (ghatatvavacchinna-nila-rupa)," we understand the black color that resides in the locus of pot-ness, i.e. the black color of a pot. Or more exactly, we understand the black color of any pot, as 6. According to the Naiyayikas, we can perceive our own soul with our in ternal organ. 7. To say that something possesses a manifested color is to say that it possesses the nature of having a manifested color. For more detail, see footnote (3) of my preceding article mentioned of at the beginning. 8. The Sanskrit word for "locus" is "adhikarana," which we may take as a synonim of "dharmin (possessor of dharma)" or "asraya (substratum)."

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102 H. KITAGAWA every pot is the locus of pot-ness. Thus the meaning of the words "avacchedaka" and "avacchinna" being explained, let us now examine the meaning of the second definition as a whole, i.e. " yad-dharmavacchinna-sadhya-vyapakatve sati tad-dharmavacchinna-sadhanavyapakah upadhih (That which is a pervader of the sadhya (-dharma] limited by dharna X and nonpervader of the sadhana (-dharma] limited by the same dharma X is the upadhi)." As is already said, when the argument "Wind is perceptible, because it is a substratum of a perceptible touch" is set forth, perceptibility (pratyaksatva) is the sadhya-dharma and the nature of being a substratum of a perceptible touch (pratyaksasparsasrayatva) is the sadhana-dharma'. So, if we choose externalsubstance-ness (bahir-dravyatva, the nature of being an external substance) for dharma X, the second definition may be rewritten as follows: bahir-dravyatvavacchinna-pratyaksatva-vyapakatve sati bahir . dravyatvavacchinna - pratyaksasparsasrayatvavya. pakah upadhih (That which is a prevader of the perceptibility limited by external-substance-ness and non-pervader of the nature of being a substratum of a perceptible touch limited by external-substance-ness is the upadhi.). Now, the nature of having a manifested color satisfies this condition. For everything that possesses the perceptibility limited by externa substance-ness possesses the nature of having a manifested color, but everything that possesses the nature of being a substratum of a perceptible touch limited by external-substance-ness does not necessarily possess the nature of having a manifested color. How? The perceptibility limited by external-substance-ness is the percepti 9. Here again, to say that something has the nature of being a substratum of a perceptible touch is to say that it has a perceptible touch. The readers may, therefore, rewrite all the phrases "the nature of being a substratum of a perceptible touch" by "a perceptible touch," if simplicity is preferred. Cf. foot-note 7.

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On " Upadhi" 103 bility in whose locus external-substance-ness also resides; in other words, the perceptibility limited by external-substance-ness is the perceptibility that belongs to external substances. If so, that which possesses the perceptibility limited by external-substance-ness is nothing but a perceptible external substance. Now every perceptible external substance possesses the nature of having a manifested color. Look at water, for example. Thus the nature of having a manifested color satisfies the first half of the second definition. Then how does it satisfy the second half? Well, the nature of being a substratum of a perceptible touch limited by external-substance-ness is the nature of being a substratum of a perceptible touch in whose locus external. substance-ness also resides; in other words, it is the nature of being a substratum of a perceptible touch that belongs to external substances. So, that which possesses the nature of being a substratum of a perceptible touch limited by external-substance-ness is nothing but the external substance that is serving as a substratum of a perceptible touch, or more beiefly, the external substance that has a perceptible touch. Now, every external substance that has a perceptible touch does not necessarily possess the nature of having a manifested color. Look at wind, for example'l. Thus the nature of having a manifested color satisfies the latter half of the second definition also. 10. We may put this in another way: The dharma F limited by dharma G is nothing but the dharma F in whose locus dharma G also resides. So, anything that possesses both dharma F and dharma G may be said to possess the dharma F limited by dharma G. A perceptible external substance possesses both perceptibility and external-substance-ness and, therefore, may be said to possess the perceptibility limited by external-substance-ness. 11. Some readers may think that we should not refer to wind as an example here because it is the very thing that our dispute is concerned with. The answer to this question is as follows: Our dispute is concerned with the question whether wind possesses perceptibility or not, but neither is it concerned with the question whether it possesses the nature of being a substratum of a perceptible touch limited by external-substance-ness nor with the question whether it possesses the nature of having a manifested color. We know for

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104 H. KITAGAWA It is to be noted that by the modifications "yad-dharmavacchinna (limited by dharma X)" and " tad-dharmavacchinna (limited by the same dharma X)" the second definition is made more generous than the first. The nature of having a manifested color, which does not satisfy the first definition, satisfies the second one. But here remains the question how that which satisfies the second definition, which is more generous than the first, can as well be the symptom of the invalidity of the argument. Look at Figure V, which shows how the areas occupied by the entities concerned actually include or exclude one another when the nature Ol BT of having a manifested color is taken up as a upadhi against the argument, "Wind is perceptible, because it is a substratum of a perceptible touch." Here the letters "B," "b," "C," "C," "D," "d" are used in the same manner as in Figures I ~ IV of the preceding article. Area B - the area enclosed by line b- is the area where all the entities that possess dharma B (the sadhana-dharma, i.e. the nature of being a substratum of a perceptible touch) exist. Area C-the area enclosed by line c-is the area where all the entities that pos sess dharma C (the sadhya-dharma, i.e. perceptibility) exist. Area D --the area enclosed by line d-is the area where all the entities that Figure V sure that wind is a substratum of a perceptible touch as well as it is an external substance and that it does not possess a manifested color. We cannot, of course, refer to wind as an example of an entity that possesses or does not possess perceptibility. But we can surely refer to it as an example of an entity that possesses the nature of being a substratum of a perceptible touch limited by external-substance-ness and does not possess the nature of having a manifested color.

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On "Upadhi" 105 possess dharma D12 (the upadhi, i.e. the nature of having a mani. fested color) exist. A part of area B is shown to be outside area D because there exists such a thing as wind that possesses the nature of being a substratum of a perceptible touch but does not possess the nature of having a manifested color. A part of area C is shown to be outside area D because there exists such a thing as soul that possesses perceptibility but does not possess the nature of having a manifested color. It is to be noted that although in Figure V a part of area B happens to be outside area C, there is no assurance that a part of area B should always be outsied area C in a figure where a part of area B and a part of area C are shown to be outside area D. For instead of Figure V we can also have Figure VI, where also a part of area B and a part of area C are shown to be out. side area D but no part of area B is shown to be outside area C. But if there is a possibility that area B may be completely included in area C as is shown by Figure VI, then the relation that dharma C is a pervader of dharma. B may hold and Figure V the invalidity of the argument cannot be pointed out for sure. Then what should we do to bar out the case shown by Figure VI? Look at Figure VII. The area inside the largest rectangle drawn with the thickest line represents the whole universe. This rectangle is divided into two smaller rectangles by a dotted line in the middle. Let's call this dotted line" line m." The area inside the right-side smaller rectangle 12. It is to be noted that dharma D and dharma X are not necessarily the dharmas of dharmin A as dharmas B and C are. Cf. foot-note (6) of the preceding article.

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106 H. KITAGAWA -- ----- Figure VI is the area where all the entities that possess dharma X exist. The area inside the left-side smaller rectangle is the area where all the entities that do not possess dharma X exist. It is to be noted that in Figure VII the part of area B outside of area D is shown to be in the right-side rectangle and the part of area C outside of area D is shown to be in the left-side rectangle. This is important because if the part of area B outside of area D is in the right-side rectangle and the part of area C outside of area D is in the left side rectangle, there is no possibility that we may have such a case as shown by Figure VI, i.e. the case that the part of area B outside of area D is included in the part of area C outside of area D and thus the relation that dharma C is a pervader of dharma B may hold. Then why is the part of area B outside of area D shown to be in the right-side rectangle, and the part of area C outside of area D in the left-side rectangle in Figure VII? The reason is that Figure VII shows the situation when external-substance-ness is chosen for dharma X. Indeed, that which possesses the nature of being a substratum of a perceptible touch and does not possess the nature of having a manifested color possesses external-substance-ness13, while 13. Look at wind for example.

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On "Upadhi" 107 that which possesses perceptibility and does not possess the nature of having a manifested color does not possess external-substanceness.4,15 Now it is to be remembered that all we need to do to disprove the validity of the argument of the type, "There is dharma C in dharmin A, because of dharma B," is to show that at least some part of area B-any part will do-is outside of area C. If so, we do not need Figure VII. Figure VIII will do. For, as long as J----- Figure II we know for sure by Figure VIII that a part of area B is outside area C, we do not have to pay attention to the inclusion-and-exclusion situation inside the left side rectangle. The device of " yad-dharmavacchinna (limited by dharma X)" and "tad-dharmavacchinna (limited by the same dharma X)" adopted in the second definition was for the obtainment of Figure VIII, or more exactly, for the obtainment of Figure IX. In fact, Figure IX is the exact represen 14. Look at the soul, for example. 15. It is to be noted that if we fail to find out a suitable dharma for dharma X, the upadhi cannot be found out. If we choose, for example, substance-ness for dharma X, the nature of having a manifasted color does not satisfy the definition. In fact if substance-ness is chosen for dharma X, both the parts of areas B and C that are outside of area D fall in the right-side rectangle, and we shall again have the possibility that area B may be completely included in area C as is shown by Figure VI.

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108 H. KITAGAWA tation of what the second definition says. Here area BX-the area enclosed by line b and line m-is the area where all the entities that possess both dharma B (the sadhana-dharma) and dharma X exist, i.e. the area where all the entities that possess dharma B limited by dharma X exist16. Area CX-the area enclosed by line c and line m-is the area where all the entities that possess both dharma C (the sadhya-dharma) and dharma X exist, i.e. the area where all the entities that possess dharma C limited by dharma X exist. Area D-the area inside the circle enclosed by line d--is the area where all the entities that possess dharma D (i.e. the upadhi) exist. Remember the second definition, "yad-dharmavacchinnasadhya-vyapakatve sati tad-dharmavacchinna-sadhanavyapakah upadhih (That which is a pervader of the sadhya [-dharma] limited by dharma X and non-pervader of the sadhana [-dharma] limited by the same dharma X is the upadhi)." Figure IX is the exact representation of this definition. For in Figure IX no part of area CX d CX BX C Figure IX is found to be outside area D and some part of area BX is found to be outside area D. It is to be noted that while area D may stretch over both the right-side and the left-side rectangles, areas BX and 16. Cf. foot-note 10

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109 On "Upadhi" CX are confined in the right-side rectangle only. Now, if no part of area CX is allowed to be outside area D and some part of area BX must be outside of it, at least the very part of area BX outside of area D is bound to be outside area CX. Since areas BX and CX are parts of areas B and C, this means that at least some part of area B is bound to be outside area C. (Remember that the inclusionand-exclusion situation inside the left-side rectangle is out of question and that the very part of area BX that is outside of area CX is always to be found in the right-side rectangle.). Well, this is all that we need to know. For, if we know this much, we can safely say that the relation that dharma C is a pervader of dharma B does not hold, and thus the invalidity of the argument of the type, "There is dharma C in dharmin A, because of dharma B," can be pointed out for sure.