Nyayavatara

Author(s): Satyaranjan Banerjee
Publisher: Sanskrit Book Depot P Ltd
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/006770/1

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Mahamahopadhyaya Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana's NYAYAVATARA The Earliest Jaina Work on Pure Logic By SIDDHASENA DIVAKARA (The celebrated Ksapanaka of Vikramaditya's Court) Edited, re-arranged and augmented with an Introduction and notes Vu Dr SATYA RANJAN BANERJEE M.A. (Double), Ph.D. (Calcutta), Ph.D. (Edinburgh) . Department of Comparative Philology and Linguistics, Calcutta University; Quondom Visiting Professor in the Department of South Asia Area Center, University of Wisconsin-Madison, U.S.A.; formerly lecturer at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. SANSKRIT BOOK DEPOT (P) LTD. 28/1, Bidhan Sarani, Calcutta-700 006.

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Published by : Shri Abhoy Kumar Burman, Sanskrit Book Depot (P) Ltd., 28/1, Bidhan Sarani, Calcutta-700 006. First revised and re-arranged edition, September, 1981. Price: Rs. 45.00 PS 3 00 (U.K.) $ 6.00 (U.S.A.) Printed by : Shri Suresh Dutta, Modern Printers, 12, Ultadanga Main Road, Calcutta-700 067.

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CONTENTS ... IV ... VII ... IX ... XXV ... XXVI 1. Preface by the Editor 2. The Doctrines of Jainism and Jaina Logic by Dr S. R. Banerjee ... VII-XXIV I. Siddhasena Divakara II. The Doctrines of Jainism III. Analytical contents of the Nyayavatara ... XVI 3. The Text : Nyayavatara (ed. by S. C. Vidyabhusana) (i) Original Title page of the First Edition (ii) Preface (First edition) (iii) Preface (Second Edition) ... XXVII (iv) Introduction ... XXVIII 1. Siddhasena Divakara, the author of Nyayavatara 2. Candraprabha Suri, author of Nyayavatara-vivsti (v) An Observation by Sarat Chandra Das ... XXX (vi) Nyayavatara Text, Commentary and English Translation and Notes (vii) Appendix A (viii) Sloka-suci (ix) Index of words in English (x) Index of Sanskrit words

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PREFACE BY THE EDITOR I have great pleasure in presenting S. C. Vidyabhusana's Nyayavatara which had practically two editions at the life time of the author. The first edition appeared in 1909 in Calcutta, and the second from Arrah in 1915. In fact, it was S. C. Vidyabhusana who gave a due honour to Siddhasena's work. My esteemed friend Dr Joydeb Ganguly Shastri, M.A., Ph.D, of Calcutta University, drew my attention to the fact that there was a reprint edition of Nyayavatara published in 1971 from Bombay under the able editorship of Dr A. N. Upadhye. He was also kind enough to hand over his personal copy to me for my use. I am really grateful to him for this piece of information. Dr Upadhye's edition is a reprint from the second, while ours is a reprint from the first. Though there is hardly any advance in the second edition, I consider that the first edition has still some value. This edition is entirely re-arranged and re-set. Each verse is followed by an extract from the Nyayavatara-vivrti and an English translation and notes. In the introduction an analytical content of the Nyaya. vatara culled out from S. C. Vidyabhusana's 'A History of Indian Logic' is added for the benefit of the readers. I have also given in the appendix A what S. C. Vidyabhusana has written about Siddhasena in his History of Indian Logic. Though this is almost a repetition of what he says in the Introduction to his Nyayavatara, some new pieces of information are also available there. I hope this will also be beneficial to the readers. I have also presented a chart to show how the Jaina Pramana-Sastra is related to Jaina Philosophy. As Jaina logic is mainly intended to establish the validity of the nine principles of Jaina philosophy, the doctrines of Jainism are presented here for those who are not fully conversant with the technical terms of Jaina principles. In short, I have tried my best to make this edition handy and useful to the scholars. My acknowledgments are due to Shri Abhoy Kumar Burman of Sanskrit Book Depot (Pvt) Ltd. for undertaking such a reprint scheme, and to Pandit Madhusudan Vedantashastri of Sanskrit Sahitya Parishat, Calcutta, for going through the galley proofs of this book. All attempts have been made to make this edition free

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(vi) from printing mistakes, and yet if any misprints have crept into the book through oversight, I hope readers will be kind enough to correct them. My thanks are also due to Shri Suresh Datta for printing this book in a very short time. Lastly, I can say that if this edition proves useful to the students of Jaina logic, I shall consider my labour worth undertaking and the publisher's desire also fulfilled. } University of Calcutta, 20 June, 1981 Satya Ranjan Banerjee

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The Doctrines of Jainism and Jaina Logic Vu Dr Satya Ranjan Banerjee 1. Siddhasena Divakara Siddhasena Divakara alias Ksapanaka (crica 480-550 A.D.), a celebrated logician, is claimed by both the Digambaras and Svetambaras as one of their own authorities. The earlier eminent authorities before Siddhasena were Kundakunda (1st cent. A.D), a pupil of Bhadrabahu II, and his disciple Umasvami or Umasvati (1-85 A.D), Bhattakera (1st Cent. A.D.) and Karttikeyasvami ( 1st Cent. A.D,). According to the evidence of Pattavali's VIddhavadin, Padalipta (- Pkt. Palitta) and Siddhasena Divakara were contemporaries. Siddhasena Divakara is famous both as a logician and a lyrical poet. His book, Kalyana-mandira-stotra of 44 stanzas is a hymnbook addressed to Parsvanatha. His other two books--Dvatrimsaddvatrimsika and Sammati-tarka-sutra-though form a part of his Nyayavatara, exhibit his poetic talent. The work for which Siddhasena Divakara is famous is his Nyayavatara. It is written in 32 Sanskrit stanzas and is a fundamental work on Jaina logic. The book discusses the means of acquiring right knowledge (pramana) and of methods (naya). In Jaina logic Pramanasastra is necessary to establish the validity of the nine categories (nava-tattva) of Jaina Philosophy. The Pramana-Sastra, i.e., the science of right knowledge, discusses mainly the principles of pure logic in order to expound the dogmas of Jaina religion and metaphysics. But, in fact, Siddhasena Divakara and Dinnaga, the Buddhist logician, by about 450 A.D.. differentiated first the principles of Logic from the domain of religion and metaphysics. Gautama, the ancient logician, enumerates the sixteen categories of knowledge, of which pramana is one with other fifteen things. But Siddhasena and Dinnaga discuss only one category, i.e., Pramana, in their treatises in order to establish the doctrines of Jainism and Buddhism respectively. They even excluded prameya, the object of knowledge, from their consideration. 1. Klatt. IA. Vol. 11, p. 257

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(viii) The relationship of Logic with the Jaina Philosophy is shown below: The Doctrines of Jainism (Philosophical and Practical) Practical Ethics [Ethics, Asceticism, Monasticism, & Laity rules] Philosophical [Metaphysics, Ontology & Psychology] A. Metaphysics : (Substance) Navatattva (nine cardinal principles) [Jiva, ajiva, asrava, bandha, punya, papa, sarvara, nirjara & moksa]- For Moksa the necessary elements are (a) tri-ratna (6) tri-gupti (c) panca-samiti to be comprehended by LOGIC B. Philosoyhy : 1. Anekantavada 2. Syadvada (Sapta-bhangi) 3. Jaina-naya (Sapta-naya) [naigama, saingraha, vyavahara, rju-satra, Sabda, samabhirild ha & evambhuta] C. Karmavada : application of the Krma theory to Ethics. Let me discuss the above principles briefly.

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II. The Doctrines of Jainism The foundation of Jaina philosophy is mainly based on the conception of the constitution of the world. To the Jains, the world is eternal and vast, it is beginningless and endless. Time is also eternal and is like a wheel with twelve spokes. The wheel of time is divided into two halves : avasarpini (descending order) and utsarpini (ascending order). The present age is the age of avasarpini. This universe is composed of two things : loka and aloka. Loka consists of living and non-living things and all phenomena around it. Aloka is space which we normally call by the term akasa. It is void and empty, "an abyss of nothing". Having given this description of the world, the Jains have considered the nature of matter or substance (padartha) which is eternal as well as ever-changing. With this idea in their background, they have proceeded to analyse the substance on the one hand and to establish their philosophical speculation on the other. So the doctrines of Jainism will consist of the philosophical and practical utility of their speculations. Jaina philosophy consists of Metaphysics, Ontology and Psychology, while the practical doctrines are concerned with ethics and asceticism, monasticism and the conduct of the laity. Let us first start with Jaina Metaphysics. In the domain of Loka (or lokastikaya, as it is often called), all things (i.e. dravya, substance) are classified into 9 categories: jiva, ajiva, asravo, bandha, punya, papa, samvara, nirjara, and moksa. Jiva (lit. 'lives') is the soul. There are infinite numbers of souls ; the whole world is filled with souls. The souls are eternal, but they can grow, contract or expand according to the necessity of the body in which they are incorporated. The characteristic mark of the souls is intelligence, which is never destroyed, but can be obscured by extrinsic causes. Jiva is of two kinds : Samsari (mundane) and mukta (liberated). Samsari jiva (mundane souls) are the embodied souls of the living beings in the world and they are subject to the cycle of Birth. Mukta jivas are liberated souls and so they will not come to this world again. They are free from the bondage of the world. Man is made up with cetana (consciousness) and jada (unconsciousness). So long as jadatva in man remains, he will come to this world again and again. If jadatva is removed, he will be free (mukta) and will attain nirvana. Asrava means flow of Karmic matter into the nature

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of self or soul. Bandha implies the mixture of the Karmic matter with the nature of the soul on account of which the soul loses its intrinsic purity and brilliance. Samvara represents the act of presenting the inflow of the Karmic matter and hence it is the blocking of Asrava. Nirjara represents the act of destroying the Karmic matter which may adhere to the soul. Each particular karma has been caused by some action, good, bad or indifferent, of the individual being in question, so that karma in return, produces certain painful, or pleasant, or indifferent conditions and events which the individual in question must undergo. If the condition is good, it is called punya, if it is opposite, it is papa. The conception of Jiva may be said to be the central doctrine of Jaina philosophy, all the other categories being merely secondary and subsidiary to the central entity. The samsara jiva is again divided into four classes : deva, manusya, tiryak and naraka. The devas live in the upper world (Devaloka), while the narakas live in hell. Manusya (men) live in this world along with the tiryak animals belonging to the zoological and botanical kingdoms. All beings of these four different groups are called sarsara Jivas, because they are subject to the cycle of birth and death. This samsari jiva associated with its own karmic bondage and its own corporeal existence is considered to be uncreated and therefore beginningless. For the Jaina metaphysican the question when the soul did get associated with material body is a meaningless question, because they say samsara is anadi (beginningless). At the time of liberation of the soul from material and karmic bondage, it is said to attain Moksa, i.e. the cycle of births and deaths is stopped for him. The five categories which are grouped in the ajiva class are distinctly non-spiritual and hence incapable of consciousness. They are therefore acetana. These are-dharma, adharma, akasa, pudgala and kala. The inherent character of dharma is to make move, or to be moved, while adharma is the opposite to it. The idea is that dharma and adharma are necessary conditions for the subsistence of all other things, viz. souls and matter. Akasa is space, while pudgala is matter which is eternal and consists of atoms. There are two kinds of matter : gross (sthula) and subtle (suksma). Gross matter are the things which we perceive, while subtle matter is beyond the reach of our senses. Subtle matter is that matter which is transformed into the different kinds of karma. Kala (time) is a quasisubstance, and its necessity to accept it as a substance is to explain

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(xi) the changing state of the souls and matter. Now the last substance moksa. But before examining the nature of moksa, let us explain some of the fundamental philosophical doctrines associated with it. Let us first take the doctrine of Reality (Sat). The definition of sat as given by Uvasvami is utpata-vaya-dravya-yuktam sat (it is a permanent reality in the midst of change of appearance and disappearance). This conception of reality is peculiar to Jainism. An existing reality in order to maintain its permanent and continued existence must necessarily undergo change in the form of appearance and disappearance. It seems to us a paradox at the very beginning. But a closer analysis and minute observation will help us to appreciate the significance of this description of reality. For example, let us look at the seed of a plant. When the seed is planted in the soil it must necessarily break the shell and sprout out. This is the first step in its attempt to grow. Then the sprouting seed further undergoes change and some portion of it comes out seeking the sunlight and another goes down into the earth. That portion of the sprouting which goes down into the soil will undergo enormous changes into the root system. Similarly, the portion that shoots up into the air and sunlight will also undergo enormous change, of sprouting out in tendrils and leaves finally resulting in branches and stem of the plant all engaged in the task of procuring nourishment with the help of sunlight. At every stage thus we find change, the old leaves being shed off and the new sprouts coming in. This seems to be the general law of Nature. The life of the seed does never die ; it lives even though it is being constantly changed, and this is what is sat. What is true of a plant, is also true with regard to the basic or fundamental things of Nature. In this respect, I believe, Jaina conception of Reality is different from the other Indian philosophies. Some philosophers would only emphasize permanency as the nature of reality, while others would emphasize change alone as the characteristic of reality. The one-sided emphasis either of permanency or change is rejected by Jaina thinkers. They consider this system as anekanta-vada, a system which clings to a partial aspect of the reality. So they call their own system as anekanta-vada, that is to say, a system of philosophy which maintains that Reality has multifarious aspects and that a complete comprehension of such a nature must necessarily take into consideration all the different aspects through which reality manifests itself. Hence the Jaina darsana is technically called

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(xii) Anekantavada, often translated as "Indefiniteness of Being". It tells us that any material thing continues for ever to exist as matter, and this matter may assume any shape and quality. Thus mrttika (clay) as a substance may be regarded as permanent, but the form of a jar of clay (ghata-pasadi), or its colour, may come into existence and perish. The doctrine of anekantavada is upheld by a logical method called syad-vada. According to the doctrine, there are seven forms of metaphysical propositions and all contain the word syat, meaning 'may be'. As it consists of seven propositions, it is known as Saptabhangi. These propositions are (1) syad asti, (2) syan nasti, (3) syad asti nasti ca, (4) syad avyaktavyah, (5) syad asti avyaktavyasca, (6) syan nasti avyaktavyasca, (7) syad asti nasti avyaktavyasca. According to this logical doctripe every fact of reality can be described in two logical propositions--one affirmative and the other negative. We have described before that the ultimate reality is a permanent and changing entity manifesting itself through constant change of appearance and disappearance, then we can understand that a fact of reality when looked at from the underlying permanent substance may be described to be non-permanent and changing. When a substance is described from the aspect of the underlying substance, it is called dravyarthikanaya and when the description is based on the modifications or changes, it is called paryayarthikanaya. As a dravya has two aspects, it should be described logically from two points of view : positive and negative. For example, if a jar is made of clay, then it is possible to describe it as a jar made of clay. But can we describe it as 'a jar made of stone' ? Certainly not. But it must be remembered that to describe every fact of reality, four conditions are to be taken into considerations : dravya, ksetra, kala and bhava. Name of the substance, the place where it is, the time when it exists, and characteristics intrinsically presented in it. Every object from its own dravya admits an affirmative predication and looked at from the paradravya admits of a negative predication. So the example given above from its own substance (clay) admits of affirmative predication, and from the view of paradravya, a negative

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(xiii) predication. Similarly, from the point of view of ksetra, it can be stated in two ways: if a thing is really in the room, then we can say affirmatively it is in the room, and negatively it is not in the verandah. Similarly in other two cases. For want of space I cannot dilate upon this point any more. Supplementary to the doctrine of syad-vada is the doctrine of naya-vada. The nayas are ways of expressing the nature of things. There are seven nayas : naigama, samgraha, vyavahara, rjusutra, sabda, samabhirudha and evambhuta. Without going into detail, it can be said that the nayas are necessary in order to understand the partial true nature of a thing. Now let us come back to the last substanc moksa. The path to Salvation (moksamarga) is different in Jainism from other religious systems. It is the Right Faith (samyag darsana), Right Knowledge (Samyag jnana), and Right Conduct (samyak caritryam). The emphasis is laid on all the three : only when all the three characteristics are combined, they can constitute Moksamarga. Each by itself is imperfect and therefore insufficient. To depend on any of them will not lead one to Moksa. Further, it is emphasized that these three (faith, knowledge and conduct) must be of right type. Hence the word samyak is prefixed to each of these terms. To bring out the force of the meaning of this definition, one metaphorical example is given by the commentator. A person suffering from a disease (if he desires to cure himself of the disease) must have faith in the capacity of a doctor and must know the exact nature of the medicine prescribed by him for his disease and must take the medicine according to the instructions of the doctor. Mere faith in the doctor will be of no use. Faith in the capacity of the doctor and the knowledge of the nature of the medicine would equally be useless unless the patient takes the medicine. In this case beings in the world of samsara are assumed to be patients suffering from a spiritual disqualification or disease who desire to get rid of this disease and to attain perfect spiritual health. Thus for the purpose of helping such persons this Moksamarga is prescribed as a spiritual remedy and the spiritual remedy therefore must be associated with all three characteristics of right faith, right knowledge and right conduct in order to be effective. These three constituent elements of the path to salvation are called Ratna-traya (the three jewels). To effect this ratna-traya the rules of conduct must be observed and corresponding virtues must be acquired. The Jains have

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(xiv) formulated certain vows (vratas) for that. These are : panca mahavrata (five great vows), panca anuvrata (five small vows), tri-guna vrata (three good qualities) and four siksavratas (four educational vows). Of these the first five vratas are mainly and strictly to be observed by the monks while the rest are mainly meant for the laity. The five mahavratas are---(1) ahimsa (abstain from killing, (2) asatya (abstain from telling lies), (3) acaurya (abstain from stealing), (4) abrahmacarya (abstain from sexual intercourse), and (5) aparigraha (to renounce all interest in worldly things, and not to keep any property). For a monk many rules have been laid down, which aim at preventing the destruction of the life of any living whatsoever. But for a layman these vows are also applicable, but in a less rigorous way. A layman may, for a limited time, follow a rigorous practice, but that is to regulate his conduct. But a monk on entering the order (diksa), should practise these vows rigorously. To effectuate them, more regulations are required, and these constitute the disciplin of the monk. These are-three guptis (i.e. guarding of body, speech, and mind) and five samitis (i.e. a monk must be cautious in walking, speaking, collecting alms, taking up or putting down things, and voiding the body). Besides these, a monk should practise other conduct, such as, ksama (forgiveness), mardava (modesty), arjava (simplicity), nirlobhata (not to be greedy), akincanata (to consider worldly things insignificant), satya (to speak the truth), tapasya (penance), sauca (purity) and brahmacarya (abstain from any sexual desire). On the whole, there are innumerable vows laid down for a monk who wants to attain salvation (moksa) which is the ultimate object of a monk. In conclusion, it can be said that Jaina religion is mainly a monastic religion, full of vows and penances, required for a monk as well as for a laity to keep them away from killing of any kind of living beings. Life is very much respected by the Jains. Character has also been given a great prominence, and to control mind from every sphere of life is highly eulogised. The Jains believe that if anybody follows truly their code of conduct, there will be no violence (himsa) in the world and a permanent bliss will pervade throughout the world. It is not the Jains who alone will follow their doctrines, but all the citizens of the world. The Jains also believe that if the peoples of the world can understand Jaina religion as such, then we shall be able to broaden our visions for our future life, to fasten our fraternal ties with our neighbours, to strengthen our minds with a new

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(xv) vigour for our future activities, to deepen our trenchant ideas and reveted thoughts in human beings, to enlighten our future generations for the betterment of our life, and to heighten our ultimate supreme love in mankind. And in this way, we shall be able to slacken completely our narrow-mindedness at the altar of our pride and prejudices, to loosen our beastly acrimony and mental malady for the sake of humanity, and to liken all human beings as belonging to one chum though separated by their natural qualities and environments. After having described briefly the doctrines of Jainism let me now pass on to the study of the Nyayavatara Nine categories of Jaina Philosophy can only be comprehended by pratyaksa vyavaharika | pramana sadharmya svarthanumana sadharmya drstantabhasa paramarthika (kevala) [anumana, sadhya, hetu[linga] paroksa pararthanumana 1. paksa 2. sadhya 3. hetu 4. drstanta and vaidharmya 5, upanaya 6. nigamana [terms of a Syllogism] 1. paksabhasa 2. hetvabhasa vaidharmya drstantabhasa -3. drstantabhasa 4. dusanabhasa Naya [naigama, samgraha. vyavahara, rju-sutra, Sabda, samabhiradha, & evambhuta] Fallacies of pararthanumana Laukika Sabda Sastriya Sabda bahir vyapti | paksa hetu sadhya drstanta hetu sadhya The above chart is explained below. antar vyapti asiddha + Sabda Effects of pramana (Moksa) vyapti viruddha anaikantika

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(xvi) III. Analytical Contents of the Nyayavatara I. Pramana-Right knowledge. 1. Perception Pramana is right knowledg which illumines itself as well as other things without any obstruction. It is of two kinds : (1) direct valid knowledge or perception (pratyaksa) and (2) indirect valid knowledge (paroksa). Direct valid knowledge (pratyaksa) is twofold : (1) practical (vyavaharika) which is the knowledge acquired by the soul through the five senses (the eye, ear, nose, tongue and touch) and the mind (manas), and (2) transcendental (paramarthika) which is the infinite knowledge that comes from the perfect enlightenment of the soul : it is called kevala or absolute knowledge. 2. Verbal testimony Indirect valid knowlege (paroksa) is also of two kinds : (1) inference (anumana) and (2) verbal testimony (sabda). Verbal testimony is the knowledge derived from the words of reliable persons including knowledge from scripture. Suppose a young man coming to the side of a river cannot ascertain whether the river is fordable or not, and immediately an old experienced man of the locality, who has no enmity against him, comes and tells him that the river is easily fordable : the word of the old man is to be accepted as a source of valid knowledge called personal testimony or laukita sabda. Scripture is also a source of valid knowledge for it lays down injunctions on matters which baffle perception and inference : for instance, it teaches that misery is the consequence of vice. Knowledge derived from this source is called scriptural testimony or sastraja sabda. Scripture is defined as that which was first cognised or composed by a competent person, which is not such as to be passed over by others, which is not incompatible with the truths derived from perception, which imparts true instruction and which is profitable to all men and is preventive of the evil path.1 3. Inference Inference (anumana) is the correct knowledge of the major term (sadhya) derived through the middle term (hetu, reason, or linga, sign) which is inseparably connected with it. It is of two kinds : 1 AptopazamanullaGghayamadRSTeSTavirodhakam / aralaru ata gira' 579279574 11 (Verse 9, Nyayavatara)

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(xvii) (1) inference for one's own self (svarthanumana) and (2) inference for the sake of others (pararthanumana). The first kind is the inference deduced in one's own mind after having made repeated observations. A man by repeated observations in the kitchen and elsewhere forms the conclusion in his mind that fire is always an antecedent of smoke. Afterwords, he is not certain whether a hill which he sees has fire on it or not. But, noticing smoke, he at once brings to mind the inseparable connection between fire and smoke, and concludes that there must be fire on the hill. This is the inference for one's own self. If the inference is communicated to others through words, it is called an inference for the sake of others. A type of this kind of inference is as follows: (1) The hill (minor term or paksa) is full of fire (major term or sadhya); (2) because it is full of smoke (middle term or hetu); (3) whatever is full of smoke is full of fire, as, e.g. a kitchen (example or dTstanta); (4) so is this hill full of smoke (application or upanaya); (5) therefore this hill is full of fire (conclusion or nigamana). 4. Terms of a syllogism In a proposition the subject is the minor term (paksa) and the predicate the major term (sadhya). The minor term is that with which the connection of the major term is to be shown. In the proposition "the hill is full of fire," the hill is the minor term and fire major term. The middle term (hetu) is defined as that which cannot occur otherwise than in connection with the major term. Thus in the proposition : "the hill is full of fire because it is full of smoke," smoke is the middle term which cannot arise from any other thing than fire which is the major term. The example (drstanta) is a familiar case which assures the connection between the major term and the middle term. It is of two kinds. (1) homogeneous or affirmative (sadharmya), such as, "the hill is full of fire because it is full of smoke, as a kitchen," and (2) heterogeneous or negative (vaidharmya) which assures the connection between the the middle term and major term by contrariety, that is, by showing that the absence of the major term is attended by the absence of the middle term, such as "where there is no fire there is no smoke, as in a lake,"

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(xviii) In an inference for the sake of others the minor term (paksa) must be explicitly set forth, otherwise the reasoning might be misunderstood by the opponent, e.g. This hill has fire because it has smoke. This instance, if the minor term is omitted, will assume the following form : Having fire, Because having smoke. Here the opponent might not at once recollect any instance in which fire and smoke exist in union, and might mistake a lake for such an instance. In such a case the whole reasoning will be misunderstood. If that of which the major term or predicate is affirmed, is opposed by evidence, public opinion, one's own statement, etc., we have that which is known as the fallacy of the minor term (paksabhasa) of which there are many varieties. 5. Fallacies of the minor term The semblance or fallacy of the minor term (paksabhasa) arises when one attributes to it as a proved fact that which is yet to be proved, or which is incapable of being proved, or when it is opposed to perception and inference, or inconsistent with public opinion or incongruous with one's own statement, thus : (1) "The jar is corporeal (paudgalika)"-this is a conclusion which is yet to be proved to the opponent. (2) "Every thing is momentary"- this is a Saugata conclusion which, according to the Jainas, is incapable of being proved. (3) "The general particular (samanya visesa) things are without parts, are distinct from each other and are like themselves alone"this is opposed to perception. (4) "There is no omniscient being"--this is, according to the Jainas, opposed to inference. (5) "The sister is to be taken as wife"- this is inconsistent with public opinion. (6) "All things are non-existent"- this is incongruous with one's own statement. 6. Inseparable connection Inseparable connection or invariable concomitance (vyapti) is the constant accompaniment of the middle term by the major term. In the inference : "this hill is full of fire, because it is full

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(xix) of smoke," the connection between fire and smoke, that is, the constant presence of fire with smoke, is called vyapti or Inseparable connection. It is of two kinds : (1) Intrinsic, and (2) Extrinsic. 7. Antar vyapti Intrinsic inseparable connection (antar-vyapti) occurs when the minor term (paksa), itself as the common abode of the middle term (hetu) and the major term (sadhya), shows the inseparable connection between them, thus : (1) This hill (minor term) is full of fire (major term); (2) because it is full of smoke (middle term). Here the inseparable connection between fire and smoke is shown by the hill (minor term) in which both of them abide. . 8. Bahir Vyapti Extrinsic inseparable connection (bahir-vyapti) occurs when an example (drstanta) from the outside is introduced as the common abode of the middle term (hetu) and the major term (sadhya) to assure the inseparable connection between them, thus : (1) This hill is full of fire (major term); (2) because it is full of smoke (middle term); (3) as a kitchen (example). Here the reference to the kitchen is no essential part of the inference, but is introduced from without as a common instance of a place in which fire and smoke exist together, and so it reaffirms the inseparable connection between them. Some logicians hold that that which is to be proved, that is, the major term (sadhya), can be established by intrinsic inseparable connection (antar-vyapti) only : hence the extrinsic inseparable connection (bahir vyapti) is superfluous. 9. Fallacies of the middle term The semblance of reason or fallacy of the middle term (hetva. bhasa) arises from doubt, misconception or non-conception about it (the middle term). It is of three kinds : (1) The unproved (asiddha): This is fragrant, because it is a sky.lotus. Here the reason (middle term), viz. the sky-lotus, is unreal. (2) The contradictory (viruddha): "This is fiery, because it is a body of water."

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(xx) - Here the reason alleged is opposed to what is to be established. (3) The uncertain (anaikantika). "Sound is eternal, because it is always audible." Here the reason or middle term is uncertain, because audibleness may or may not be a proof of eternity. 10. Fallacies of homogenous examples The Fallacy of example (distantabhasa) may arise in the homogeneous or heterogeneous form, from a defect in the middle term (hetu) or major term (sadhya) or both, or from doubt about them. Fallacies of the homogeneous example (sadharmya-drstanta bhasa) are follows : (1) Inference is invalid (major term), because it is a source of knowledge (middle term), like perception (homogeneous example). Here the example involves a defect in the major term (sadhya), for perception is not invalid. (2) Perception is invalid (major term), because it is a source of valid knowledge (middle term), like a dream (homogeneous example). Here the example involves a defect in the middle term (hetu) for the dream is not a source of valid knowledge. (3) The omniscient being is not existent (major term), because he is not apprehended by the senses (middle term), like a jar (homogeneous example). Here the example involves a defect in both the major and middle terms (sadhya and hetu), for the jar is both existent and apprehended by the senses. (4) This person is devoid of passions (major term), because he is mortal (middle term), like the man in the street (homogeneous example). Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of the major term, for it is doubtful whether the man in the street is devoid of passions. (5) This person is mortal (major term), because he is full of passions (middle term), like the man in the street (homogeneous example). Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of the middle term, for it is doubtful whether the man in the street is devoid of passions. (6) This person is non-omniscient (major term), because he is full of passions (middle term), like the man in the street (homogeneous example).

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(xxi) Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of both the major and middle terms, for it is doubtful whether the man in the street is full of passions and non-omniscient. It is stated in the Nyayavatara-vivrti that some unnecessarily lay down three other kinds of fallacy of the homogeneous example (sadharmya-drstantabhasa), viz. : (1) Unconnected (ananvyaya), such as: This person is full of passions (major term), because he is a speaker (middle term), like a certain man in Magadha (example). Here though a certain man in Magadha is both a speaker and full of passions, yet there is no inseparable connection between "being a speaker" and "being full of passions". (2) Of connection unshown (apradarsitanvaya), such as : Sound is non-eternal (major term), because it is produced (middle term), as a jar (example). Here though there is an inseparable connection between "produced" and "non-eternal", yet it has not been shown in the proper form as : "Whatever is produced is non-eternal, as a jar." (3) Of inverted connection (viparitanvaya), such as: Sound is non-eternal (major term), because it is produced (middle term). Here if the inseparable connection (vyapti) is shown thus "Whatever is non-eternal is produced as a jar," instead of"Whatever is produced is non-eternal as a jar," the example would involve the fallacy of inverted connection. 11. Fallacies of heterogeneous example Fallacies of the heterogeneous example (vaidharmyadrstantabhasa) are of six kinds, thus: (1) inference is invalid (major term), because it is a source of knowledge (middle term) : whatever is not invalid is not a source of knowledge, as a dream (heterogeneous example). Here the example involves in the heterogeneous form a defect in the major term (sadhya), for the dream is really invalid though it has been cited as not invalid. (2) Perception is non-reflective or nirvikalpaka (major term), because it is a source of knowledge (middle term): whatever is reflective or savikalpaka, is not a source of knowledge, as inference (heterogeneous example).

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(xxii) Here the example involves in the heterogeneous form a defect in the middle term (sadhana), for inference is really a source of knowledge it has been cited as not such. (3) Sound is eternal and non-eternal (major term, because it is an existence (middle term): whatever is not eternal and noneternal is not an existence, as a jar (heterogeneous example). Here the example involves in the heterogeneous form a defect in both the major and middle terms (sadhya and sadhana), for the jar is both "eternal and non-eternal" and "an existence". (4) Kapila is not omniscient (major term), because he not a propounder of the four noble truths (middle term): whoever is omniscient is propounder of the four noble truths, as Buddha (the heterogeneous example). Here the example involves in the heterogeneous form a doubt as to the validity of the major term (sadhya), for it is doubtful whether Buddha was omniscient. (5) This person is untrustworthy (major term), because he is full of passions (middle term): Whoever is trustworthy is not full of passions, as Buddha (heterogeneous example). Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of the middle term (hetu), for it is doubtful whether Buddha is not full of passions. (6) Kapila is not devoid of passions (major term), because he did not give his own flesh to the hungry (middle term): Whoeve is devoid of passions gives his own flesh to the hungry, as Buddha (heterogeneous example). Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of both the major and middle terms (sadhya and sadhana), for it is doubtful whether Buddha was devoid of passions and gave his own flesh to the hungry. It is stated in the Nyayavatara-vivrti that some unnecessarily lay down three other kinds of fallacy of the heterogeneous example (vaidharmya-drstantabhasa), viz. (i) Unseparated (avyatireki): This person is not devoid of passions (major term), because he is a speaker (middle term) : Whoever is devoid of passions is not a speaker, as a piece of stone (heterogeneous example). Here, though a piece of stone is both devoid of passions and "not a speaker," yet there is no invariable separation (vyatireka vyapti) between "devoid of passions" and "a speaker".

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(xxiii) (ii) Of separation unshown (apradarsita-vyatireka): Sound is non-eternal (major term), because it is produced (middle term); as ether (example). Here, though there is an invariable separation between "produced" and "eternal", yet it has not been shown in the proper form, such as: "Whatever is non-non-eternal is not produced, e.g. ether". (iii) Of contrary separation (viparita-vyatireka): Sound is non-eternal (major term), because it is produced (middle term): Whatever is not produced is non-non-eternal, e.g. ether (example). Here the example has been put in a contrary way, for the proper form should have been : hatever is non-non-eternal is not produced, e.g. ether." 12. Refutation Refutation (dusana) is the pointing out of defects or fallacies in the statements of the opponent in any of the forms enumerated above. The semblance of a refutation (dusanabhasa) is the contrivance to allege defects where there are no defects at all. 13. Consequence of Pramana The immediate effect of pramana (valid knowledge) is the removal of ignorance. The consequence of the transcendental perception (paramarthika pratyaksa pramana) is bliss and equanimity consisting in salvation (Moksa or final emancipation), while that of the other kinds of pramana (direct and indirect knowledge) is the facility which they afford us to choose the desirable and reject the undesirable things. II. Naya--the method of descriptions Naya is the method of comprehending things from particular standpoints. Thus we may conceive rose either as a flower possessing the attributes common to all flowers or as a thing possessing attributes which are peculiar to the rose as distinguished from other flowers. The Naya is of seven kinds : naigama, samgraha, vyavahara, rju-sutra, sabda, samabhirudha, and evambhuta. 1. Syadvada Knowledge which determines the full meaning of an object through the employment, in the scriptural method, of one-sided

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(xxiv) nayas, is called Syadvada-sruta. It is the perfect knowledge of things taken from all possible standpoints. Thus a thing may be, may not be, both may or may not be, etc., according as we take it from one or other standpoint. The soul (Jiva) is the knower, the illuminator of self and non-self, doer and enjoyer. It undergoes changes of condition and is selfconscious, being different from the earth, water, etc. This system of pramana and Naya, with which all of us are familiar and which serves to perform all practical functions, cannot be traced to its beginning or followed to its end.1 1 Adapted from S. C, Vidyabhusapa's A History of Indian Logic.

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Original Title Page of the First Edition NYAYAVATARA The Earliest Jaina Work on Pure Logic By SIDDHASENA DIVAKARA (The celebrated Ksapapaka of Vikramaditya's Court) With Sanskrit Text and Commentary Edited for the first time with notes and English Translation - By Mahamahopadhyaya SATIS CHANDRA VIDYABHUSANA M.A., PH.D., F.I.R.S. Professor of Sanskrit and Pali, Presidency College, Jt. Philological Secretary, Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta and Fellow of the Calcutta University. PUBLISHED BY THE INDIAN RESEARCH SOCIETY, 32, CREEK ROW, AND PRINTED AT THE BAPTIST MISSION PRESS, 41, LOWER CIRCULAR ROAD. 1909.

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PREFACE ( First Edition ) . Professor Peterson, in his Fifth Report on the Search for Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Bombay Circle, mentions a Jaina Sanskrit work called Nyayavatara by Siddha Sena Divakara. A manuscript of this work, together with a commentary on it called Nyayavatara-vivsti, was kindly procured for me from a private library in Bhavanagar, Bombay, by the well-known Svetambara Sadhus, Muni Dharmavijaya and Indravijaya. Seeing that the Nyayavatara is a very important work, being the earliest known Jaina treatise on Pure Logic, I have, in the present volume, attached the text of it with extracts from its verbose commentary. I have also included in the volume an English translation which I prepared for the "Journal" of the Indian Research Society of Calcutta. The notes which I have added to elucidate the translation are based on the commentary already referred to. I acknowledge with thanks that Mr. C. Russel, M.A., Principal, Patna College, has kindly helped me with a number of suggestions while the translation was passing through the press. My thanks are also due to Rai Sarat Chandra Das, Bahadur, C.I.E., at whose instance I undertook this work, and who, at the suggestion of the Government of Bengal, forwarded its advance proof to the International Congress of Orientalists held at Copenhagen in August 1908. It was kindly accepted by that learned body as a contribution on the Jaina philosophical literature. SATIS CHANDRA VIDYABHUSANA PRESIDENCY COLLEGE, CALCUTTA. February, 1909.

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PREFACE (Second Edition ) The second edition of this treatise on Jaina Logic is intended to * be included as a volume of the Library of Jaina Literature in the publication of the Sacred Books of the Jaina Society, Arrah. I take this opportunity of expressing my sincere thanks to my friend Kumar Devendra Prasad, Managing Director of the said Society, at whose suggestion this edition was undertaken. I hope the work, which as a treatise on Jaina Logic is unique in its character will in this way obtain a wider circulation. SANSKRIT COLLEGE,,) CALCUTTA. December, 1915. SATIS CHANDRA VIDYABHUSANA

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INTRODUCTION 1. Siddha Sena Divakara, the author of Nyayavatara. Logic was mixed up with metaphysics and religion in the ancient writings of the Jainas as in those of other sects in India. The first Jaina writer on Pure Logic appears to have been Siddha Sena Divakara. It was he who, for the first time among the Jainas, distinguished logic from the cognate branches of learning by composing a metrical work called Nyayavatara on Logic in thirtytwo couplets (slokas). Siddha Sena Divakara is the famous author of the Sammatitarka-sutra, which is a Praksta work on philosophy containing an elaborate discussion on the principles of logic. This author, who belonged to the Svetambara (white robed) sect,. has been mentioned by Pradyumna Suri (980 A.D.) in his Vicara-sara-prakarana." He was a pupil of Vrddha-vadi Suri, and received the name of Kumuda-candra' at the time of his ordination. He is said to have plit, by the efficacy of his prayers, the Linga (Brahmanical symbol) of Rudra in the temple of Mahakala at Ujjaini, and to have called forth an image of Parsvanatha by reciting the hymn Kalyanamandira-stava. He is believed to have converted king Vikramaditya to Jainism, 470 years after the Nirvana of Mahavira." The Jainas believe that he was the spiritual tutor of that famous king, as is evident from the Kumara-pala-caritra and other works. It may be noted here that Vikramaditya of Ujjaini has been considered by some scholars to be identical with Yasodharma Deva, king of Malwa, who, according to Alberuni, had defeated the Huns at Korur in 533 A.D. The Chinese pilgrim Hwen-tshang (Yuan chwang), who came to India in 629 A.D., says that a very powerful king (presumably Vikramaditya) reigned 60 years before his arrival there. From these it appears that Siddha Sena Divakara, who was a contemporary of Vikramaditya, must have lived at Ujjaini about 550 A.D. 1 paMceva ya varisasae siddhaseNa-divAyaro ya jypyddo| chaccasae vIsahie sakkathu U ajjarakkhipahU / / 26 / / (Vicara-sara-prakarana, noticed by Peterson in his Third Report, p. 272.) * Cf, Prabhavakacarita VIII. V. 57. * See Klatt's Patta vali of the Kharatara Gaccha in the Indian Antiquary, Vol. XI, Sept. 1882, p. 247. Vide Beal's Buddhist Records of the Western World, Vol. II, p. 26.

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(xxix) Legends and historical accounts show that Siddha Sena was the well-known Ksapanaka (the Jaina sage), who adorned the court of Vikramaditya and was one of the Nine Gems (Nava Ratna).1 Varahamihira, the famous astronomer, who also was another of the Nine Gems of the court of Vikramaditya, lived between A.D. 5052 and A.D. 587. We are told that Ksapanaka alias Siddha Sena was a contemporary of Varamihira; so he must have flourished about the middle of the 6th Century. 2. Candraprabha Suri, author of Nyayavatara-vivrti (?) There is an excellent commentary on the Nyayavatara called the Nyayavatara-vivrti possibly by Candraprabha Suri, who also belonged to the Svetambara sect and founded the Purnima Gaccha1 in Samvat 1159 or A.D. 1102. He was a pupil of Jayasimha Suri and preceptor of Dharmaghosa. He wrote another logical treatise called Prameya-ratna-kosa and a philosophical treatise called DarsanaSuddhi otherwise called Samyaktva-prakarana. He was a great logician, and in controversy appeared as a lion before the opponents, 1 The Nine Games are: dhanvantariH kSapaNako'marasiMhaH zaGka urvetAlabhaTTaghaTakharpa rakAlidAsAH / sarai azigfafgei qqa: amai zaifa a azefaHa fanne 11 (Jyotirvidabharana). 2 Vide Dr. Thibaut's Introduction to Pancasiddhantika, p. xxx. Varahamihira chose Saka 427 or A.D. 505 as the initial year of his astronomical calculation, showing thereby that he lived about that time. So saptAzviveda - saMkhyaM zakakAlamapAsya caitrazuklAdau / arddhastamite bhAnau yavanapure saumyadivasAdye // 8 // (Pancasiddhantika, Chap. I, edited by Dr. G. Thibaut and Sudhakara Dvivedi.) 3 For Candraprabha Suri see Peterson's Fourth Report, p. xxvii, and Peterson 3, xvi. In the Nyayavatara-vivrti itself there is no mention of Candraprabha Suri. I remember to have found somewhere that he was the author of it. The authorship of the Nyayavataravivrti must however for the present remain an open question. In the colophon of the Nyayavatara-vivrti it is stated that it was the work of Siddhasena-Divakara-vyakhyanaka, or simply Siddha-vyakhyanaka, which was evidently a surname. Muni Dharmavijaya and Indravijaya, relying on the line infufasana: (quoted from Ratnaprabha Suri's Upadesa-malavisesa-vrtti in Peterson's Third Report, p. 168) are inclined to identify Siddhavyakhyanaka with Siddharsi who lived in Samvat 962 or 905 A.D. (as is evident from Peterson's Fourth Report, p. cxxix). There is another commentary on the Nyayavatara by Haribhadra Suri. See Dr. R. G. Bhandarkar's Report 1883-84, p. 147. * Vide Jainagama List, Bombay, p, 77, and Peterson's Third Report on Sanskrit MSS., Appendix. p. 9.

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(xxx) who resembled elephants. In the introduction to his Nyayavataravivrti (q. v.) he has quoted the Buddhist logicians, Dharmottara and Arcata, and in the concluding lines has craved the mercy of Jina. PRESIDENCY COLLEGE, CALCUTTA. The 12th June, 1908. SATIS CHANDRA VIDYABHUSANA AN OBSERVATION. Mahamahopadhyaya Dr. Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana maintains here that Siddhasena Divakara was identical with the well-known Ksapanaka. This view perfectly commends itself to me. There is proof enough that Siddhasena was a Jaina sage and lived in the court of Vikramaditya. That Ksapanaka was one of the Nine Gems of the court of Vikramaditya is also very widely known, and it remains only to prove that he was a Jaina sage. We have instances enough in the Pancatantra and the Mahabharata where the Jaina ascetics are nicknamed as Ksapanaka. The following instances from the Avadanakalpalata will show that the Buddhists also designated, rather nicknamed, the Jaina ascetics as Ksapanaka: bhagavadbhASitaM tattu subhadreNa niveditam / zrutvA kSapaNaka: kSipramabhUd dveSaviSAkulaH / / 6 / / tasya sarvajJatAM vetti subhadro yadi mgiraa| tadeSa kSapaNazraddhAM tyakSyati zramaNAdarAt / / 12 / / mUrkhakSapaNabhaktana tagirA hatayoSitA / tvayA tyaktasvaputreNa kiM nAma sukRtA kRtam / / 40 // (Jyotiskavadana). INDIAN REASERCH SOCIETY) SARAT CHANDRA DAS CALCUTTA. 1 tIrthe vIravibhoH sudharmagaNabhRt santAnalabdhonnati zcAritrojjvalacandragacchajaladhiprollAsazItadyutiH / sAhityAgamatarkalakSaNamahAvidyApagAsAgaraH zrIcandraprabhasUriradbha tamatirvAdIbhasiMho'bhavat / / 1 / / (Dasavaikalika-tika by Tilakacarya, noticed in Peterson's Fifth Report, p. 65.)

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siddhasenadivAkarakRtaH nyAyAvatAraH 1981

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nyAyAvatAraH pramANaM svaparAbhAsi jJAnaM bAdhavivarjitam / pratyakSaM ca parokSaM ca dvidhA meyavinizcayAt // 1 // nyAyAvatAravivRtiH [ aMzatA gRhItA ] aviyutasAmAnyavizeSadezinaM vardhamAnamAnamya | nyAyAvatAravivRtiH smRtibIjavivRddhaye kriyate || 'pramANetyAdi' anena ca tAdAtmya tadutpattilakSaNasaMbandhavikalatayA dhvanerbahirarthaM prati prAmANyAyogAd abhidheyAdi sUcanadvArotpannArthasaMzayamukhena zrotAraH zravaNaM prati protsAnte iti dharmottaro manyate / ... arcaMTastu Aha / na zrAvakotsAha kametat prAmANyAbhAvAt teSAM cApramANAdapravRtteH / sva AtmA svarUpaM, paro'rthaH / tau AbhAsayituM prakAzayituM zIlaM yasya tat / tathA jJAyate nirNIyate tattvaM yena tat jJAnam / bAdhyate aneneti bAdhaH, viparItArtho - pasthApaka pramANapravRttiriti yAvat / tena vizeSeNa varjitaM rahitaM yat jJAnaM tat pramANamiti saMTakaH / svaparAbhAsItyanena ye svAbhAsyeva jJAnaM manyante te jJAnavAdino bauddhavizeSAH ; ye ca parAbhAsyeva mImAMsakanaiyAyikAdayaH te nirastAste hi bahirarthAbhAvAt jJAnaM svAMzaparyavasitasattAkam ityAcakSIran / tadayuktam / jJeyArthAbhAve jJAnAbhAvaprasaGgAt / ...parAbhAsyapi svaprakAzAbhAvAt abhidadhIran tadapyasambaddham / svaprakAzAbhAve paraprakAzAyogAt ; na hi pradIpaH svarUpamanudyotayan ghaTAne vyApriyate / tatra siddhAntaprasiddhapAramArthikapratyakSApekSayA'kSazabdo jIvaparyAyatayA prasiddhaH / iha tu vyavahArikapratyakSa prastAvAd akSadhvanirindriyavacano gRhyate tatazca akSaM prati gataM pratyakSaM yadindriyamAzritya ujjihIte artha sAkSAtkArijJAnaM tat pratyakSamityarthaH / ... tatazca sarvajJAnAnAM yat svarUpasaMvedanaM tadapi pratyakSamityuktaM bhavati / tatrApi svarUpasya grAhyasya sAkSAtkaraNasadbhAvAditi / akSebhyaH parato vartate iti parokSamakSavyApAranirapekSaM manovyApAreNa asAkSAdaparicchedakaM yat jJAnaM tatparokSamiti bhAvaH / dvidhaiva ... dvAbhyAmeva prakArAbhyAM meyasya grAhyArthasya vinizcayAt svarUpanirNayAt // 1 // ... Nyayavatara-vivrtih [Extracts] Translation with notes: 1. Pramana (valid knowledge) is the knowledge which illumines itself and other things without any obstruction: it is divided as ...

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nyAyAvatAraH . pratyaksa (direct knowledge or perception) and paroksa (indirect knowledge) as knowables are ascertained in two ways. This definition sets aside the view of those Buddhists (Yogacaras) who maintain that knowledge illumines itself alone, inasmuch as there is, according to them, no external object beyond it. The same definition is also in direct opposition to the doctrine of the Naiyayika, Mimamsaka and others who hold that knowledge illumines external objects alone, as it cannot illumine itself. The Jainas maintain that it is only when knowledge illumines itself that it can take cognizance of external objects. So according to them knowledge, like a lamp, illumines itself as well as objects lying outside it. Those whose sight has been obscured by darkness often see many false images, such as two moons, etc.; and men bewildered by sophism are found to believe that every thing is momentary or the like. With a view to differentiate such kinds of false knowledge from pramana (valid knowledge) the phrase "without obstruction" has been used. - Pramana (valid knowledge) is divided here into pratyaksa (direct knowledge) and paroksa (indirect knowledge) including in the latter anumana (inference) and Sabda (verbal testimony). This division contravenes the conclusion of Carvaka that there is only one pramana, viz., pratyaksa (perception or direct knowledge). Carvaka's view is unreasonable, for pratyaksa cannot be established as a pramana except through the medium of paroksa (indirect knowledge). It also sets aside the view of the Saugatas (Buddhists) who divide pramana into pratyaksa (direct knowledge or perception) and anumana (inference) without any notice of Sabda (verbal testimony). prasiddhAni pramANAni vyavahArazca tatkRtaH / pramANalakSaNasyoktau jJAyate na prayojanam // 2 // . prasiddhAni prarUDhAni, nAdhunA sAdhyAvItyarthaH / pramANAni pratyakSAnumAnazabdAni / ... ... yadarthaM pramANaparIkSaNamasAvapi jalapAnazItatrANAdirvyavahAro'nAdiprarUDhaH / tannirarthakaM pramANalakSaNAbhidhAnamiti / / 2 / / - 2. Pramanas and the practical use made of them are well known : there appears no necessity for giving any definition of pramana. ___There was never a time when the acts of seeing, inferring, etc., were not performed. The use of these acts is also well known, for it is through them that we can choose one thing and reject another thing. So it appears superfluous to explain the nature of pramana (valid knowledge).. . prasiddhAnAM pramANAnAM lakSaNoktau prayojanam / tadvayAmohanivRttiH syAd vyAmUDhamanasAmiha // 3 // ..yadyapi pratiprANiprasiddhAni pramANAni / anyathA tatkRtanikhilavyavahAroccheda

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Translation with Notes prasaMgAttaducchede ca dRSTahAnyAdyApatteH / ... vyAmUDhaM viparItagrastaM vicitratAM gataM mano'ntaHkaraNaM yeSAM te tathA teSAm, iheti loke / ... yadyanAdiprasiddhaM pramANalakSaNaM prati na kecit api vyAmuhyeyustadA yad bhavadbhiH prAgudagrAhi nirarthakaM pramANalakSaNamiti tad yuktameva syAt / na caitadevam, tatra vyAmUDhAnAM darzanAt / / 3 / / ... 3. The necessity here for giving the definition of the well-known pramanas is to remove stupidity from the mind of stupid people. Pramana (valid knowledge), though well known, is explained here to warn foolish people against taking false knowledge as true. .. aparokSatayA'rthasya grAhakaM jJAnamIdRzam / pratyakSamitarajajJeyaM parokSaM grahaNekSayA // 4 // parokSo'kSagocarAtItastato'nyo'parokSastadbhAvastattA tayA sAkSAtkRtatayeti yAvat / . tasya [ arthasya ] grAhaka vyavasAyAtmakatayA sAkSAt paricchedakaM yat jJAnaM tadIdRzamiti IdRgeva pratyakSamiti saMTaMkaH / ... arthasya grAhakamityasya grahaNekSayeti vakSyamANapadasApekSatvAdamunA bahirapi ye'rthakAlAkalanavikalaM sakalamapi jJAnaM pralapanti tAnirasyati / ... ... grAhakamiti ca nirNAyakaM draSTavyaM nirNayAbhAve'rtha grahaNAyogAt / tena yat tathAgataiH pratyapAdi pratyakSaM kalpanApoDhamabhrAntamiti tadapAstaM bhavati / tasya yuktirikttvaat| tathAhi, te nirvikalpakatve'dhyakSasya yuktAH kheTayanti kiledamarthasAmathunodIyate sannihitArtha kriyAsamarthArthagrAhakatvAt / ... tasmAt / pratyakSAt ] itarad asAkSAdarthagrAhakaM jJAnaM parokSamiti jJeyamavagantavyametadapi svasaMvedanApekSayA pratyakSameva / bahirarthApekSayA tu parokSavyapadezamaznute iti darzayannAha grahaNakSayeti / iha grahaNaM prakramAd bhiHprvrtnmucyte| anyathA vizeSaNavaiyarthyAt tasyekSApekSatayA bahiHpravRttiparyAlocanayeti yAvat / tadayamoM yadyapi svayaM pratyakSaM tathApi liMgazabdAdidvAreNa bahiviSayagrahaNe'sAkSAtkAritayA vyApriyate iti parokSamityucyate / ... tadyathA anumAnaM zAbdaM ceti / / 4 // 4. Such knowledge that takes cognizance of objects, not beyond the range of the senses, is pratyaksa (direct knowledge or perception); the other is known as paroksa (indirect knowledge) in reference to the manner of taking the cognizance. The words pratyaksa (direct knowledge) and paroksa (indirect knowledge) have been used here in their ordinary acceptations, namely, the first for senseperception, and the second for inference and verbal testimony. In the ancient Jaina scriptures, however, pratyaksa (direct knowledge) signified perfect knowledge acquired by the soul direct through meditation and not through the channels of the senses, while paroksa (indirect knowledge) signified knowledge derived through the medium of the senses or signs comprising perception, inference and verbal testimony.

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nyAyAvatAra! sAdhyAvinAbhuno liGgAt sAdhyanizcAyakaM smRtam / anumAnaM tadbhrAntaM pramANatvAt samakSavat // 5 // sAdhyAvinAbhuna ityanena parapraNItaliMgalakSaNavyudAsamAcaSTe / tatazca yat pare procuH / pakSadharmAnvayavyatirekalakSaNarUpatayopalakSitAni trINi eva liMgAni anupa - labdhi: svabhAva: kAryateti / taduktaM "anumeye'tha tattulye sadbhAvo nAstitA'sati / nizcitAnupalambhAtmakAryyAkhyA hetavastrayaH " / / iti // tathA'nye'syedaM kAryaM kAraNaM saMyogi samavAyi virodhi ceti liMgikamiti / tathA pUrvavat zeSavat sAmAnyatodRSTamityAdi / tadvAlapralapitaprAyamityavagantavyam / pakSadharmatvavirahespi anumimImahe kAlAdikasUtradharmI samastyeva tatra pakSadharmatA liMgasya gRhyate iti cet na, atiprasaGgAt / evaM hi zabdasya anityatve sAdhye kAkakAyaderapi gamakatvaprasakteH / tatrApi lokAderdharmiNaH kalpayituM zakyatvAt / adhunA yat zauddhodana ziSyakairnyagAdi yaduta bhrAntamanumAnaM sAmAnyapratibhAsitvAt tasya ca bahiH svalakSaNe vyatirekAvyatirekavikalpAbhyAmapAkriyamANatayA yogAttadrUpatayA vata na tasyAdhyavasAyAdatasmin tadgrahasya ca bhrAntilakSaNatvAt taduktam "atasmin tadgraho bhrAntirapi saMbandhataH pramA" iti tadapAkartumAha tadabhrAntamityAdi / / 5 / / 5. Knowledged eterminant of that which is to be proved (i.e., the major term called in Sanskrit sadhya), derived through the mark (i.e. the middle term called in Sanskrit linga) which is inseparably connected with the same, is known as anumana (inference): being a pramana it is free from invalidity like perception (pratyaksa). Inference is of two kinds (1) svarthanumana, inference for one's own self, and (2) pararthanumana inference for the sake of others, The first kind is the inference drawn in one's own mind after having made repeated observations. Suppose that having repeatedly seen in the kitchen and other places, that where there is smoke there is fire, and having realised in his mind that there is a universal antecedence of fire in respect of smoke, a man afterwards goes to a hill and entertains a doubt as to whether or not there is fire in it. Instantly, when he observes smoke on it, he recollects the inseparable connection between fire and smoke, and concludes in his mind that the hill has fire in it, as it has smoke on it. This is an inference for one's own self. Inference for the sake of others will be defined later on. This definition of inference, says the commentator, sets aside the view of certain writers [ such as Dharmakirti the Buddhist ] who maintain that nonperception (anupalabdhi), identity (svabhava) and causality (karya) are the marks or grounds of inference, or of certain other writers who hold the effect (karya), cause (karana), conjunction (sariyoga), co-existence (samavaya), and opposition (virodha) to be such marks or grounds. The division of inference as (1) a priori (purvavat, from cause to effect), (2) a posteriori (Sesavat from effect to cause),

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Translation with Notes and (3) from analogy (samanyato-drsta, perception of homogeneousness, that is, the recognition of the subject as being referrable to some class, and as being thence liable to have predicated of it whatever may be predicable of the class) (as given in the Nyaya-sutra of Aksapada Gautama) is also hereby set aside. .. na pratyakSamapi bhrAntaM pramANatvavinizcayAt / / bhrAntaM pramANamityetad viruddhavacanaM yataH // 6 // na kevalamanumAnaM bhrAntaM kiM tarhi yadbhavadbhiH dRSTAntatayA upAttaM pratyakSaM tadapi bhrAntameva "sarvamAlambane bhrAntam" iti vacanAt / ... lokasaMvRti ghaTayanto vayaM dRDhataravAsanAprabodhasaMpAditasattAkayoH pratyakSAnumAnayoH pramANatAmAcakSmahe / / 6 // 6. Since it is a pramana, pratyaksa (perception), too, is not invalid, for "a pramana is invalid" is an absurd expression. .. Some (Buddhists) who maintain that the world is true only from the practical or illusory point of view (lokasarvrti), but false from the transcendental or absolute standpoint (paramarthika), consider perception (pratyaksa) to be merely illusory and consequently invalid from the absolute standard of truth. But this view is opposed by the Jainas who maintain that the world is real from all standpoints and consequently perception is not invalid. sakalapratibhAsasya bhrAntatvAsiddhitaH sphuTam / pramANaM khAnyanizcAyi dvayasiddhau prasidhyati // 7 // sakalapratibhAsasya samastasaMvedanasya bhrAntatvAsiddhito viparyastatvAniSpatteH yat sphuTaM svAnyanizcAyi sunizcitatayA svaparaprakAzakaM tat pramANamiti sambandhaH / tacca dvayasiddhau svarUpArthalakSaNayugmaniSpattau prasidhyati niSpadyate nAnyathA prameyAbhAve pramANAbhAvAt // 7 // 7. Owing to the impossibility of all phenomena (external objects) being invalid, pramana is evidently a determinant of self and other things and serves to establish both. The world is not an illusion : knowledge and its objects are all real. dRSTeSTAvyAhatAdvAkyAt prmaarthaabhidhaayinH|| tatvagrAhitayotpannaM mAnaM zAbdaM prakIrtitam // 8 // dRSTena pramANAvalokitena iSTaH pratipipAdayiSito'vyAhato'nirAkRtaH sAmarthyAdarthA yasmin vAkye tat tathA pramANanizcitArthAbAdhitamiti yAvat / tasmAt paramo'kRtrimaH puruSopayogI zakyAnuSThAno vA'rtho vAcyastamabhidhAtuM zIlaM yasya tat paramArthAbhidhAyi viziSTArthadarza kmityrthH| tatastattvagrAhitayA utpannaM prakRtavAkya

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nyAyAvatAra: pratipAdyArthAdAnazIlatayA labdhAtmasattAkaM yanmAnaM tat zAbdamiti prakIrtitam / ... tadaprAmANye parArthAnumAnapralayaprasaMgAt tasya vcnruuptvaat| ... zAbdaM ca dvidhA bhavati / laukika zAstrajaM ca / .. yAdRzaH zAstrAt tajjAtaM pramANatAmanubhavati taddarzayati // 8 // 8. Knowledge arising from words, which taken in their proper acceptance express real objects not inconsistent with what are established by perception, is known as sabda (verbal testimony). Sabda (the word or verbal testimony) is of two kinds, viz., (1) laukika (knowledge derived from a reliable person), and (2) Sastraja (knowledge derived from scripture). AptopajJamanullaGyamadRSTeSTavirodhakam / tattvopadezakRt sAvaM zAstra kApathaghaTTanam // 6 // AptaH prakSINAzeSarAgAdidoSagaNastenopajJam Adau upalabdham anena apauruSeyApohamAha ; tasya pramANabAdhitatvAt puruSavyApArAbhAve vacanAnupalabdharupalambhe'pi tadarthAnavagamAt tadarthanizcayArtha pUruSAzrayaNe gajasnAnanyAyaprasaMgAt / ... ullaGghayate prAbalyena gamyate abhibhUyate anyarityullaGghara tato'nyadanullaGghana sarvavacanAtizAyIti yAvat / ... dRSTena pramANa nirNItena iSTasya tadvAcyasya virodho yasmin tat tathA tadeva / yadi cAdRSTaH pramANena iSTo vacanAntareNa tayovirodhakaM tadviruddhArthAbhidhAnAt / tato'nyat adRSTeSTavirodhakam abaadhaarthaabhidhaayiityrthH| .... tattvaM jIvAdayaH padArthAH pramANapratiSThitatvAt teSAm upadezaH svarUpaprakAzanaM tadrakSaNAdividhAnaM vA taM karotIti tattvopadezakRt ataeva sArvaM sarvasmai hitaM ... / kusitAH panthAnaH kApathAstIrthAntarANi teSAM ghaTTanaM vicAlakaM nirAkArakaM sarvajanApakArikumatavidhvaMsakamityarthaH / / 6 / / 9. Scripture (sastra) is that which was first known by a competent person, which is not such as to be passed over by others, which is not incompatible with the truths derived from perception, which imparts true instructions and which is profitable to all men and is preventive of the evil path. This definition sets aside the view of those [Mimamsakas) who maintain that scripture (such as the Veda) is eternal and was not composed by any human being. Scripture could not have been called a verbal testimony (Sabda or word), unless it embodied the words of any particular person or persons, khanizcayavadanyeSAM nizcayotpAdanaM budhaiH| parArthaM mAnamAkhyAtaM vAkyaM tadupacArataH // 10 // sva AtmA tasya nizcayaH prameyAdhigamaH tadvadanyeSAM pratipAdyAnAM nizcayotpAdanaM

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Translation with Notes prameyaparicchedakajJAnaprAdurbhAvanaM yathA''tmano'rtha nirNayastathA pareSAM nirNayajananamityarthaH / budhaividvadbhiH parasmai artha : prayojanaM yena tat parArthaM mIyate'neneti maanm| nanu ca yadi nizcayotpAdanaM parArthamAnaM tadA jJAnamapi parapratyAyanAya vyApriyamAnaM parArthaM praapnotiityaah| vAkyaM parArthaM na jJAnaM tasyaiva AnantaryeNa vyApArAt paraprayojanamAtratvAcca itarasya tu vyavahitatvAt svaparopakAritvAt ca / kathaM vacanamajJAnarUpaM pramANamityAha / tadupacAratastasya jJAnasya upacAro'tadrUpasyApi tadaGgatayA tadrUpatvena grahaNam tataH idam uktaM bhavati pratipAdyagatamutpatsyamAnaM yat jJAnaM tadavyavahitakAraNatvAt vacanamapi upacAreNa pramANamityucyate / / 10 // 10. Like the decision for oneself, the production of a decision in others is called by the learned 'knowledge for the sake of others (pararthamana): speech is designated as such by metaphor. .. * Knowledge is of two kinds : (1) knowledge for one's own self (svartha mana), and (2) knowledge for the sake of others (parartha mana). The second is defined as that which produces decision or belief (niscaya) in others, i.e., which enables others to ascertain the nature of things. The "word" or "speech" (Sabda) or vakya) comes under this class, that is, it is knowledge for the sake of others, for it produces decision in others, it is true the "word" itself is not knowledge, but being the medium through which knowledge is conveyed to others, it is figuratively identified with knowledge. pratyakSeNAnumAnena prasiddhArthaprakAzanAt / parasya tadupAyatvAt parArthatvaM dvayorapi // 11 // pratyakSeNApi anumAneneva prasiddhArthaprakAzanAt svapratItaprameyapratyAyanAt parArthatvaM pratipAdyaprayojanatvaM dvayorapi pratyakSAnumAnayostulyakAraNatvAnnAnumAnasyaivaikasyetyabhiprAyaH / ... tadyathA'numAnapratIto'rthaH parasmai pratipAdyamAno vacanarUpApannaH parArtha manumAnam tathA pratyakSapratIto'pi parArthaM pratyakSaM parapratyAyanasya tulyatvAt vacanavyApArasyaiva bhedAt / tathAhyanumAnapratItaM pratyAyannevaM vcnyti| agniratra dhUmAt / yatra yatra dhUmastatra tatrAgniH / yathA mhaansaadau| vaidharyeNa vA agnyabhAve na kvacid dhUmo yathA jlaashyaadau| tathA ca dhUmo'yaM tasmAt dhUmAdagniratreti / ... pratyakSapratItaM punardarzayan etaavdvkti| pazya rAjA gcchti| tatazca vacanAt vividhAdapi samagrasAmagrIkasya pratipAdyasya. anumeyapratyakSArtha viSayA yataH pratItirullasatyato dvayorapi parArthatA ityAha ca / parasya tadupAyatvAt pratipAdyasya pratItipratipAdakasya prtykssaanumaannirnniitaarthprkaashnkaarnntvaadityrthH| etena pUrvakArikoktopacArakAraNaM : ca lakSayati / / 11 // 11. Perception and inference having disclosed objects with which we are familiar and they being the means of communication to other people, both of them are knowledge for the sake of others."

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8 nyAyAvatAraH Perception and inference are as much knowledge for one's own self (svartha mana) as for the sake of others (parartha mana). They are called "knowledge for the sake of others" because the results of perception and inference arrived at by one's own self can be communicated to others through words. pratyakSapratipannArthapratipAdi ca yadvacaH / pratyakSaM pratibhAsasya nimittatvAttaducyate // 12 // yadvacaH pratyakSapratipannArthapratipAdi sAkSAtkArijJAnagocarakathanacaturaM tat pratyakSamucyate / vacanaM kutaH pratyakSamityAha / pratibhAsasya nimittatvAt pratipAdyapratyakSaprakAzahetutvAd upacAreNa ucyate / / 12 / / 12. A statement expressive of the object ascertained by perception is also called perception: it is so called being the cause of the object's manifestation. As the result of perception can be communicated to others through word, the word itself is figuratively called perception. For instance, the deposition of a witness is taken by the judge as equivalent to perception, though in truth the judge has not perceived the fact deposed to. sAdhyAvinAbhuvo hetorvaco yat pratipAdakam / parArthamanumAnaM tat pakSAdivacanAtmakam // 13 // pakSo vakSyamANalakSaNaH sa AdiryeSAM hetudRSTAntopanayanigamAdInAM tAni tathA teSAM vacanAni pratipAdakA dhvanayaH tAnyevAtmasvarUpaM yasya tatpakSAdivacanAtmakaM na tu ca hetupratipAdakaM vacaH parArthamanumAnamityabhidhAya tatpakSAdivacanAtmakamiti vadataH pUrvAparavyAhatA vAcoyuktiH / naitadasti / evaM manyate / naikaH prakAraH parArthAnumAnasya kiM tarhi yathA parasya sukhena prameyapratItirbhavati tathA yatra saH pratyayAyanIyaH tatra dazAvayavasAdhanaM pratipAdanopAyaH tadyathA pakSAdayaH paJca tacchuddhayazca / / 13 / / 13. A statement expressive of the reason (i.e., mark or the middle term called hetu) which is inseparably connected with that which is to be proved (i.e, the major term called sadhya) having been composed of the minor term (called paksa signifying a side or place), etc., is called an inference for the sake of others (pararthanumana). * In an " inference for the sake of others" the minor term (paksa), etc., must be explicitly set forth. The major term (sadhya) is that which is to be proved. The middle term or reason (hetu, linga or sadhana) is that which cannot exist in connection with the major term (sadhya or lingi). The minor term, locus or abode (paksa), is that with which the reason or middle term ( hetu ) is ccnnected, and whose connection with the major term (sadhya) is to be proved.

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Translation with Notes In a proposition the subject is the minor term (paksa), and the predicate the major term (sadhya). The following is an "inference for the sake of others" : (1) This hill (minor term) is full of fire (major term)-proposition (pratijna); (2) because it is full of smoke (middle term); (3) whatever is full of smoke is full of fire, e.g., a kitchen (example, drstanta); (4) so is this hill full of smoke (application, upanaya); (5) therefore this hill is full of fire (conclusion, nigamana). The above is a mediocre (madhyama) form of an "inference for the sake of others." Here the minor term (paksa), the major term (sadhya), the middle term (hetu) and example (drstanta) have been used. The worst (jaghanya) form of an "inference for the sake of others" consists in a mere statement of the reason or middle term (hetu) in addition to the major term (sadhya) and minor term (paksa), thus : (1) This hill (minor term) is full of fire (major term). (2) because it is full of smoke (middle term). The best (uttama) form of an inference for the sake of others consists in the statement of the following ten parts or members (dasavayava): (1) proposition (pratijna); (2) correction of the proposition (pratijna-Suddhi); (3) reason or middle term (hetu); (4) correction of the reason or middle term (hetu-Suddhi); (5) example (drstanta); (6) correction of the example (drstanta-Suddhi); (7) application (upanaya); (8) correction of the application (upanaya-Suddhi); (9) conclusion (nigamana) and (10) correction of the conclusion (nigamana$uddhi). Any form containing less than ten members down to five is called mediocre (madhyama). sAdhyAbhyupagamaH pakSaH prtykssaadyniraakRtH| tatprayogo'tra kartavyo hetorgocaradIpakaH // 14 // sAdhyasya anumeyasya abhyupagamo'GgIkaraNaM prAznikAdInAM purataH pratijJAsvIkAra ityrthH| ... pratyakSAdyanirAkRta iti pratyakSaM sAkSAtkArisaMvedanamAdizabdAdanumAnasvavacanalokA gRhyante tai: anirAkRtaH abAdhitaH / ... tadyathA sarvamanekAntAtmakam astisarvajJa ityAdi / tasya pakSasya prayogo'bhidhAnamana parArthAnumAnaprastAve kartavyo vidheyaH / hetorgocaradIpaka iti nirdezasya viSayasaMdarzakatvAt ityarthaH // 14 // 14. Paksa (the minor term) is that which is asserted to be connected with the major term or) sadhya and is not excluded by perception, etc. : it is to be used here (in an inference for the sake of others) as exhibiting a locus or abode of the reason (i.e., the middle term called hetu). Some philosophers hold that the minor term (paksa) is not an essential part of an inference. But this view, according to the Jainas, is untenable, it being absolutely necessary to state the minor term (paksa) in an inference,

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10 nyAyAvatAraH anyathA vAdyabhipretahetu gocaramohitaH / pratyAyyasya bhaveddheturviruddhArekito yathA // 15 // anyathetyuktaviparItAzrayaNe pakSaprayogAkaraNe ityartha: / vAdino hetUpanyAsakartura bhipreto'bhimataH sa cAsau hetugocarazca vAdyabhipretahetugocarastatra muhyati dolAyate tacchIlazca yastasya pratyAyasya prativAdino hetuviruddhArekito bhavet virodhazaGkAkalaGkitaH syAdityarthaH / tatazca samyag hetAvapi vipakSe evAyaM vartate iti vyAmohAt viruddhadUSaNamabhidadhIta | pakSopanyAsAttu nirNIta hetugocarasya naiSa doSaH syAdityabhiprAyaH / amumevArthaM spaSTaM dRSTAntenAha / / 15 / / 15. Otherwise owing to a misconception as to the locus or abode of the reason (i.e, paksa or minor term) as intended by the disputant, his reason (hetu or middle term) may appear to his opponent as absurd. If any disputant does not explicitly state the minor term (paksa), his reason might be misunderstood by his opponent, e.g. : (1) This hill (minor term ) is full of fire (major term ) (2) because it is full of smoke (middle term ). The above inference, if the minor term is omitted, will assume the following form -- (1) Full of fire (major term ) : ( 2 ) because full of smoke (middle term ). Here the opponent might not at once recollect any locus or abode (minor term, paksa) in which the fire and smoke abide in union, and might mistake a lake for such a locus or abode. In such a case the whole argument will be misunderstood. dhAnuSkaguNasaMprekSijanasya parividhyataH / dhAnuSkasya vinA lakSyanirdezena guNetarau / 16 // yathA lakSyanirdezaM vinA dhAnuSkasya iSu prakSipato yau guNadoSau tau taddarzijanasya viparyastAvapi pratibhAtaH / guNo'pi doSatayA doSo'pi vA guNatayA tathA pakSanirdeza vinA hetumupanyasyato vAdino yau svAbhipretasAdhyasAdhanasamarthatvAsamartha svalakSaNau guNadoSa tau prAznikaprativAdyAdInAM viparItAvapi pratibhAta iti bhAvArthaH / / 16 / / 16. A man who has come to behold the excellence of an archer will have to behold the opposite of it, if the archer hits without fixing an aim. Just as a clever archer, with a view to preventing his arrow from going to a wrong direction, fixes his aim before hitting, so a skilful disputant in order to avoid being misunderstood, should in stating an inference mention the minor term (paksa) with which the major term (sadhya) and the middle term (hetu) are both connected,

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Translation with Notes tostathopapattyA vA syAt prayogo'nyathApi vA / dvividho 'nyatareNApi sAdhyasiddhirbhavediti // 17 // svArthAnumAna prastAve hi parapraNItalakSaNAntaravyapohena sAdhyavyatirekAt sAmastyena hetorvyAvRttirevaikaM lakSaNamiti nirNItaM parArthAnumAne'pi tadeva prakAzanIyaM vacanaracanA tu kvacit pravartate ityabhiprAyavAMstadddvaividhyamAha / hetodvividhaH prayogaH syAditi sambandhaH / kathamityAha / tathaiva sAdhyasadbhAve eva upapattividyamAnatA tayA tathopapattyA yathA agniratra dhUmasya tathaiva upapatteriti / anyathApi vA ityanenAvayave samudAyopacArAt anyathAnupapatti lakSayati anyathA sAdhyavyatireke anupapattiH avidya- . mAnatA eva tathA vA anyathAnupapattyA hetoH prayogaH syAt / yathA agniratra dhUmasya anyathAnupapattiriti ete ca dve api ekasmin sAdhye prayoktavye iti manyeta / tathopapattiprayogeNa anyathA'nupapattyaprayogeNa vA sAdhyasya pratipipAdayiSitArthasya siddhiniSpatti: ... bhavet // 17 // 17. The reason (or the middle term i.e., hetu) may be used to show connection or the opposite of it: in either of these two ways the sadhya (that which is to be proved ) can be proved. The reason or middle term (hetu) can be used in two ways as follows: (1) the reason or middle term ( hetu) may exist only if the major term (sadhya) existed, such as in the proposition "here there is fire because there is smoke," the smoke (middle term) may exist only if there is fire (major term); and (2) the reason or middle term (hetu) cannot exist if the major term (sadhya ) does not exist, such as in the proposition "here there is fire because otherwise there could not be any smoke" the smoke (middle term) could not have existed if there had been no fire (major term). 11 sAdhyasAdhanayorvyAptiryatra nizcIyatetarAm / sAdharmyeNa sa dRSTAntaH sambandhasmaraNanmataH // 18 // sAdhyaM jijJAsitArthAtmakaM sAdhanaM tadgamako hetuH tayoH sAdhyasAdhanayoH vyAptiH idamanena vinA na bhavatItyevaMrUpA yatra kvacinnizcIyatetarAm atizayena nirNIyate sa sAdharmyadRSTAntaH / yathA agniratna dhUmasya tathaiva upapatteH mahAnasAdivat / ityayaM ca avismRta pratibandhe prativAdini na prayoktavya ityAha / / 18 / / 18. Where the inseparable connection of the major term (sadhya) and the middle term (sadhana or hetu) is ascertained by homogeneousness (sadharmya), the example is called a homogeneous one on account of the connection (between those terms) being recollected. An example (drstanta) is a familiar case which assures the inseparable connection (vyapti) between the major term (sadhya) and the middle term ( hetu).

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12 nyAyAvatIra It is of two kinds : (1) homogeneous (sadharmyavat), and (2) heterogeneous (vaidharmyavat). The homogeneous example is that which assures the connection (vyapti) by homogeneous (sadharmya) thus: (1) This hill is full of fire (major term); (2) because it is full of smoke (middle term); (3) as a kitchen (homogeneous example). Here the fire and smoke abide homogeneously in the kitchen. sAdhye nivartamAne tu sAdhanasyApyasambhavaH / .. khyApyate yatra dRSTAnte vaidhamryeNeti sa smRtaH // 16 // __ sAdhye gamye nivartamAne asaMbhavati tu zabdo'vadhAraNAoM bhinnakrama: sa ca sAdhanasya asaMbhava eva ityatra draSTavyaH / khyApyate pratipAdyate yatra kvacit dRSTAnte sa vaidhahNa bhavati iti zabdena sambandhasmaraNAd iti idamatrApi saMbadhnAti asyApi smaryamANe saMbandhe aprayogAd iti kimarthaM vismRtasaMbandhe eva prativAdini dRSTAntaH prayujyate nAnyadeti paravacanAvakAzamAzaGkayAha // 16 // 19. The heterogeneous example is that which shows that th. absence of the major term (sadhya) is followed by the absence of the middle term (sadhana). The heterogeneous example assures the connection (vyapti) by contrariety, that is, by showing that the absence of the major term (sadhya) is attended by the absence of the middle term (hetu), thus : (1) This hill has no smoke (major term); (2) because it has no fire (middle term); (3) as a lake (heterogeneous example). antarvyAptyaiva sAdhyasya siddharbahirudAhRti / vyarthA syAttadasadbhAve'pyevaM nyAyavido viduH // 20 // anyadA hi smaryamANe vA saMbandhe aprayujyetAgRhIte vA ... tatazca antaH pakSamadhye vyAptiH sAdhanasya sAdhyAkrAntatvam antarvyAptistasyaiva sAdhyasaMgamyasaMsiddheH pratIteH bahirvivakSitarmiNo'nyatra dRSTAntamiNi udAhRtiH vyAptidarzanarUpA vyarthA nisspryojnaa| tadasadbhAve'pyeva saMbandhAd grahaNAd antAptyabhAve'pyevamiti vyarthaMva bahirudAhRtiH / nahi sahadarzanAt / kvacit sarvatra tadrUpatA sidhyati vyabhicAradarzanAt / tasmAd agRhItasambandhe pratipAdye pramANe na prtibndhH| sAdhyastatsiddhau tata eva sAdhyasiddharakiJcitkarI dRSTAntodAhRtiriti nyAyavidvAMso viduravabudhyante iti / iha ca prakaraNe zeSAvayavAnAM upanayanigamanazuddhipaJcakalakSaNAnAM saMkSiptarucisattvAnugrahaparatvAd asya yadyapi sAkSAllakSaNaM noktaM tathApyata eva pratipAditAvayavatrayaM buddhimadbhirunneyam / yato'vayavApekSayA jaghanyamadhyamotkRSTAH tisraH kathA bhavanti iti /

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Translation with Notes 13 tatra hetupratipAdanamAnaM jaghanyA, vAdyavayavanivedanaM madhyamA, sNpuurnndshaavyvkthnmutkRssttaa| tatra iha madhyamAyAH sAkSAt kathanena jaghanyotkRSTa arthataH sUcayati ; tatasaddhAvasya pramANasiddhatvAditi / / 20 // 20. Logicians maintain that to cite an example from outside is useless as that which is to be proved (sadhya) can be proved through internal inseparable connection (antar-vyapti) even without such example. Internal inseparable connection (antar-vyapti) occurs when the minor term (paksa) itself as the common abode of the middle term (hetu) and the major term (sadhya) shows the inseparable connection between them, thus : (1) This hill (minor term) is full of fire (major term); (2) because it is full of smoke (middle term). Here the inseparable connection between fire and smoke is shown by the hill (minor term) which is their common abode. External inseparable connection (bahir-vyapti) occurs when an example (drstanta) from outside is introduced as the common abode of the middle term (hetu) and the major term (sadhya) to assure the inseparable connection between them thus : (1) This hill is full of fire (major term); (2) because it is full of smoke (middle term); (3) as a kitchen (example). Here the kitchen, which forms no essential part of the inference, is introduced from outside as the common abode of fire and smoke to assure the inseparable connection between them (the fire and smoke). Some logicians (such as Vasubandhu) hold that that which is to be proved, that is, the major term (sadhya) can be established by the internal inseparable connection (antar-vyapti) alone, so the pointing out of the external inseparable connection (bahir-vyapti) is superfluous. Other logicians go so far as to say that even if the minor term (paksa) is not used, there will be no impossibility in establishing the major term (sadhya). Cf. (1) This hill (minor term) is full of fire (major term); (2) because it is full of smoke (middle term); (3) as a kitchen (example). In the above example "as a kitchen," that is, the example, is, according to these logicians, superfluous. Even the minor term (paksa) can, according to them, be dispensed with thus : (1) Full of fire (major term); (2) because full of smoke (middle term). Even here, where there is no minor term (paksa), the example (drstanta), according to them, is useless. pratipAdyasya yaH siddhaH pakSAbhAso'sti linggtH| lokasvavacanAbhyAM ca bAdhito'nekadhA mataH // 21 // pratipAdyasya prativAdinaH yaH kazcit siddhaH pratItAvAruDha eva sa pakSAbhAsaH /

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nyAyAvatAraH sAdhyasyaiva pakSatvAt siddhasya sAdhanAnahatvAd atiprasaktastathA'kSaliMgato'dhyakSahetubhyAM lokasvavacanAbhyAM ca bAdhitastiraskRto yaH sa pakSAbhAsastatra pratipAdyasiddho yathA paudgaliko ghaTaH / saugataM vA prati sarva kssnnikmityaadi| pratyakSabAdhito yathA niraMzAni svalakSaNAni parasparaviviktau vA sAmAnya vizeSAviti / anumAnabAdhito yathA nAsti sarvajJa iti / lokabAdhito yathA gamyA mAtA iti / svavacanabAdhito yathA na santi sarve bhAvA iti / / 21 / / ___21. If that of which the major term or predicate is affirmed is opposed by evidence (linga), the public understanding, one's own statement, etc., we have that which is known as the fallacy of the minor term or thesis (paksabhasa) of which there are many varieties. The semblance or fallacy of the minor term or thesis (paksabhasa) arises when one predicates of the minor term (paksa) that which is yet to be proved to the opponent, or which is incapable of being proved, or when it is opposed to perception and inference, or inconsistent with the public understanding or incongruous with one's own statement, thus (1) "The jar is animate (paudgalika)"-this is a conclusion which is yet to be proved to the opponent. (2) "Every thing is momentary"--this is a Saugata (Buddhist) doctrine which, according to the Jainas, is incapable of being proved. (3) "The general (samanya) and particular (visesa) things are without parts, are distinct from each other and are like themselves alone" this is opposed to perception. (4) "There is no omniscient being" -- this is, according to the Jainas, opposed to inference. (5) "The sister is to be taken as wife"-this is inconsistent with the public understanding. (6) "All things are non-existent"-this is incongruous with one's own statement. anyathAnupapannatvaM hetorlakSaNamIritam / tadapratItisandehaviparyAsaistadAbhatA // 22 // hetorlakSaNam asAdhAraNadharmarUpaM yadIritaM gamitam anekArthatvAdvA dhAtoH pratipAditaM svaarthaanumaanprstaave| yadutAnyathAnupapannatvamiti / tasya apratItiranadhyavasAyaH, saMdeho dolAyamAnatA, viparyAso vaiparItyanirNayo'pratItizca saMdehazca viparyAsazceti dvandvaH / tadAbhatA hetvAbhAsatA // 22 // __22. The reason (i.e., the middle term called hetu) has been defined as that which cannot exist except in connection with the major term (sadhya): the fallacy of the reason (hetvabhasa) arises from non-conception, doubt or misconception about it (the middle term).

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Translation with Notes 15 (1) This hill is full of fire (major term); (2) because it is full of smoke (middle term). In this example "smoke" is the middle term or reason (hetu) which cannot exist except in an inseparable connection (union) with "fire" which is the major term (sadhya). - asiddhastvapratIto yo yo'nythaivoppdyte| viruddho yo'nyathApyatra yukto'naikAntikaH sa tu // 23 // yaH kazcidapratItaH pratItyA'gocarIkRto'nizcitaH so'siddhanAmA hetvAbhAsaH / ... yastu anyathaiva sAdhyaM vinaiva vipakSa eveti yAvad upapadyate sambhavati sa viruddhAbhidhAnaH / yaH punaH anyathApi sAdhyaviparyayeNApi yukto ghaTamAnako'pi zabdAt sAdhyenApi so'tra vyatikare'naikAntikasaMjJo jJAtavya iti / tatra pratiprANiprasiddhapramANapratiSThitAnekAntaviruddhabuddhibhiH kaNabhakSAkSapAdabuddhAdiziSyakairupanyasyamAnAH sarva eva hetavaH / tadyathA ekAntena nityaH zabdo'nityo vaa| sattvAt utpattimattvAt kRtakatvAt pratyabhijJAyamAnatvAd ityAha / ... kalpanAracitasattAkAnAM ca sarvazaktiviraharUpatayA niHsvabhAvatvAt / tathApi teSAM sAdhanatve sAdhyamapi niHsvabhAvamiti / kharaviSANaM zazaviSANasya sAdhanamApadyate iti zobhana: sAdhyasAdhanavyavahAraH / ... evaM hi nabha:puNDarIkaM tatra nAstIti sattAdikamapi kalpayituM na zakyamiti prasajyeta / ... anityavAdI nityavAdina prati pramANayati / sarvaM kSaNika sattvAt ... ... nityavAdI punaH evaM pramANayati / sarvaM nityaM sattvAt / tasmAd amI sarva eva hetavaH santo'nekAntamantareNa nopapadyante iti tameva pratipAdayitum Izate vimUDhabuddhibhiH punaH vipakSasAdhanArtham upanyasyamAnA vivakSayA asiddhaviruddhAnakAntikatAmAbibhratIti sthitam / / 23 / / 23. That which has not yet been established is called "the unproved" (asiddha); that which is possible only in the opposite way is called "the contradictory" (viruddha); and that which can be explained in one way as well as in the opposite way is called "the uncertain" (anaikantika). Semblance of the reason of fallacy of the middle term (hetvabhasa) is of three kinds, as follows :(1) The unproved (asiddha) such as : "this lotus is fragrant because it is a sky-lotus." Here the reason, viz., the sky-lotus (which is unreal] is unproved. (2) The contradictory (viruddha) such as : "this is fiery because it is a body of water." Here the reason alleged is opposed to what is to be established. (3) The uncertain (anaikantika) such as: "all things are momentary because they are existent." Here the reason alleged is uncertain because 'existence' may or may not be a proof of momentariness, for, an opponent might equally argue : "all things are eternal because they are existent."

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16 . nyAyAvatAraH sAdhamryeNAtra dRSTAntadoSA nyaayvidiiritaaH| apalakSaNahetUtthAH sAdhyAdivikalAdayaH // 24 // dRSTAntadoSA dRSTAntAbhAsA ityarthaH / ... sAdhyaM gamyam AdizabdAt sAdhanobhayaparigrahaH / tadvikalAstacchnyA AdizabdAt sandigdhasAdhyasAdhanobhayadharmA gRhyante / kiMbhUtA ete ityAha / apagataM lakSaNaM yebhyaste tathA ca te hetavazca tebhya utthA utthAnaM yeSAM te apalakSaNahetUtthAH / idaM ca prAyakaM vizeSaNaM, samyaghetAvapi vaktRdoSavazAt dRSTAntAbhAsatopapatteH yathA nityAnityaH zabdaH zrAvaNatvAt ghaTavaditi / tatra sAdhyavikalo yathA, bhrAntam anumAnaM pramANatvAt pratyakSavat pratyakSasya bhrAntatAvikalatvAt... / sAdhanavikalo yathA, jAgratsaMvedanaM bhrAntaM pramANatvAt svapnasaMvedanavat svapnasaMvedanasya pramANatAvaikalyAt ... / ubhayavikalo yathA, nAsti sarvajJaH pratyakSAdyanupalabdhatvAt ghaTavata ghaTasya sattvAta pratyakSAdibhirupalabdhatvAcca / sandigdhasAdhyadharmoM yathA, vItarAgo'yaM maraNadharmatvAt rathyApuruSavat rathyApuruSe vItarAgatvasya sandigdhatvAt... / sandigdhasAdhanadharmo yathA, maraNadharmA'yaM puruSoM rAgAdimattvAt rathyApuruSavad draSTavyaH puruSe rAgAdimattvasya sandigdhatvAt vItarAgasyApi tathA sambhavAditi / sandigdhobhayadharmo yathA, asarvajJo'yaM rAgAdimattvAt rathyApuruSavad iti rathyApuruSe pradarzitanyAyena ubhayasyApi sandigdhatvAditi / nanu ca parairanyadapi dRSTAntAbhAsatrayamuktaM tadyathA ananvayo'pradarzitAnvayo viparItAnvayazceti / tatra ananvayo yathA, rAgAdimAn vivakSitaH puruSo vaktRtvAd iSTapuruSavaditi yadyapi kileSTapuruSe rAgAdimattvaM vaktRtvaM ca sAdhyasAdhanadhamauM dRSTau tathApi yo yo vaktA sa sa rAgAdimAniti vyAptyasiddharananvayo'yaM dRSTAntaH / tathA apradarzitAnvayo yathA, anityaH zabdaH kRtakatvAt ghaTavaditi / atra yadyapi vAstavo'nvayo'sti tathApi vAdinA vacanena na prakAzita iti apradarzitAnvayo dRSTAntaH / viparItAnvayo yathA, anityaH zabdaH kRtakatvAd iti / hetumabhidhAya yadanityaM tat kRtakaM ghaTavaditi viparItavyAptidarzanAd viparItAnvayaH // 24 // 24. Logicians have declared that fallacies of the example (drstantabhasa) in the homogeneous form arise here from an imperfect middle term or from a defect in the major term, etc. Pallacies of the homogeneous example (sadharmya-drstantabhasa) arise from a defect in the major term (sadhya) or middle term (hetu) or both or from doubt about them, thus : (1) Inference is invalid (major term), because it is a source of knowledge (middle term), like a perception (homogeneous example). Here the example involves a defect in the major term (sadhya), for perception is not invalid. (2) Perception is invalid (major term), because it is a source of true knowledge (middle term), like a dream (homogeneous example).

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Translation with Notes 17 Here the example involves a defect in the middle term (hetu), for a dream is not a source of true knowledge. (3) The omniscient being is not existent (major term), because he is not apprehended by the senses (middle term), like a jar (homogeneous example). Here the example involves a defect in both the major and middle terms (sadhya and hetu), for the jar is both existent and apprehended by the senses. (4) This person is devoid of passions (major term), because he is mortal (middle term), like the man in the street (homogeneous example). Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of the major term, for it is doubtful whether the man in the street is devoid of passions. (5) This person is mortal (major term). because he is full of passions (middle term), like the man in the street (homogeneous example). Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of the middle term, for it is doubtful whether the man in the street is devoid of passions. (6) The person is not omniscient (major term), because he is full of passions (middle term), like the man in the street (homogeneous example). Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of both the major and middle terms, for it is doubtful whether the man in the street is full of passions and not omniscient. Some unnecessarily lay down three other kinds of fallacy of the homogeneous example (sadharmya-drstantabhasa), viz. : (1) Unconnected (ananvaya), such as: This person is full of passions (major term), because he is a speaker (middle term), like a certain man in Magadha (example). Here though a certain man in Magadha is both a speaker and full of passions, yet there is no inseparable connection between "being a speaker" and "being full of passions." (2) Of connection unshown (apradar sitanvaya), such as : Sound is non-eternal (major term), because it is a product (middle term) as a jar (example). Here though there is an inseparable connection between "product" and "noneternal" yet it has not been shown in the proper from, as : "Whatever is a product is non-eternal as a jar." [Dinnaga the Buddhist urged the necessity of converting the example into a universal proposition with a view to showing the connection between the middle term and the major term in the proper form.] (3) Of contrary connection (viparitanvaya), such as : Sound is non-eternal (major term), because it is a product (middle term). Here if the inseparable connection (vyapti) is shown thus"Whatever is non-eternal is a product as a jar." instead of thus 3 "Whatever is a product is non-eternal as a jar," the example would involve the fallacy of contrary connection,

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nyAyAvatAraH vaidhayeNAtra dRSTAntadoSA nyaayvidiiritaaH| sAdhyasAdhanayugmAnAmanivRttezca saMzayAt // 25 // sAdhyAbhAvaH sAdhanAbhAvavyAptau darzayitumabhipreyate yasmin tad vaidharmyam / tenAtra dRSTAntadoSA nyAyavidIritA iti dattArtha sAdhyasAdhanayugmAnAM gamyagamakobhayAnAm anivRtteH avivartanAt, cazabdasya vyavahitaprayogatvAt saMzayAcca nivRttisaMdehAccetyarthaH / tadanena SaD dRSTAntAbhAsAH sUcitAH / tadyathA sAdhyAvyatirekI(1), sAdhanAvyatirekI (2), sAdhyasAdhanAvyatirekI (3), tathA sandigdhasAdhyavyatireka: (4), sandigdhasAdhanavyatirekaH (5), sandigdhasAdhyasAdhanavyatirekazceti (6) / tatra sAdhyAvyatirekI yathA, bhrAntamanumAnaM pramANatvAd ityatra vaidharmyadRSTAnto yat punarbhrAntaM na bhavati na tat pramANaM tadyathA svapnajJAnamiti svapnajJAnAd bhrAntatAnivRtteH sAdhyAvyatirekitvamiti / sAdhanAvyatirekI yathA, pratyakSaM nirvikalpaka pramANatvAditi / atra vaidhaHdRSTAnto yat punaH savikalpakaM na tat pramANaM tadyathA'numAnamanupramANatA'nivRtteH sAdhanAvyatirekitvam / ubhayAvyatirekI yathA, nityAnityaH zabdaH sattvAd ityatra vaidharmAdRSTAnto yaH pUnarna nityAnityaH sa na sana tadyathA ghaTa: ghaTAbhayasyApi avyAvatterubhayAvyatirekitvamiti / tathA sandigdhasAdhyavyatirekaH, asarvajJA anAptA vA kapilAdayaH AryasatyacatuSTayApratipAdakatvAditi / atra vaighaHdRSTAntaH yaH punaH sarvajJa Apto vA asau AryasatyacatuSTayaM pratyapIpadat tadyathA zauddhodaniriti / ayaM ca sAdhyavyatirekI vA AryasatyacatuSTayasya duHkhasamudayamArganirodhalakSaNasya pramANabAdhitatvena tadbhASakasya asarvajJatAnAptatopapatteH ... ... tasmAt zauddhodaneH sakAzAd asarvajJatAnAptatAlakSaNasya sAdhyasya vyAvRttiH sandigdheti sandigdhasAdhyavyatirekitvamiti / sandigdhasAdhanavyatireko yathA, anAdeyavAkyaH kazcidvivakSitaH puruSo rAgAdimattvAdityatra vaidharmya dRSTAnto yaH punaH AdeyavAkyo na sa rAgAdimAn tadyathA sugata iti ... sugatAt rAgAdimattvavyAvRttisaMzayAt sandigdhasAdhanavyatirekitvamiti / sandigdhasAdhyasAdhanavyatireko yathA, vItarAgA: kapilAdayaH karuNAspadeSu api akaruNAparItacittatayA dattanijakamAMsazakalatvAditi / atra vaidharmyadRSTAnto ye punarvItarAgAste karuNAparItacittatayA dattanijamAMsazakalAH tadyathA bodhisattvA ityatra sAdhanasAdhyadharmayorbodhisattvebhyo vyAvRttiH sandigdhA tataH pratipAditapramANavaikalyAta na jJAyate kiM te rAgAdimantaH uta vItarAgAstathA'nukampyeSu kiM svapizitakhaNDAni dattavanto neti vA ataH sandigdhasAdhyasAdhanavyatirekitvamiti / paraiH pare'pi dRSTAntAbhAsAstrayo vimRzyabhASitayA darzitAstadyathA'vyatireko'pradarzitavyatireko'viparItavyatirekazceti / te asmAbhiH ayuktatvAttu darzayitavyAH / tathAhi avyatirekastairdazito yathA, avItarAgaH kazcid vivakSitaH puruSo vaktRtvAdityatra vaidharmyadRSTAnto yaH punaH vItarAgo na sa vaktA yathopalakhaNDa iti ; yadyapi kilopalakhaNDAd ubhayaM vyAvRttaM tathApi vyAptyA vyatirekA siddheH avya tirekitvamiti / ... tathAhi apradarzita

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Translation with Notes vyatirekastairukto yathA, anityaH zabdaH kRtakatvAt AkAzavadityatra vidyamAno'pi vyatireko vAdinA vacanena udbhAvita iti dusstttaa| viparItavyatirekaH punarabhihito yathA, anityaH zabdaH kRtakatvAd ityatra vaidharmyadRSTAnto yadakRtakaM tannityaM bhavati yathA'kAzamiti ityatra viparyastavyakirekapradarzanAt viparItavyatirekitvam // 25 // 25. Logicians have declared that fallacies of example in the heterogeneous form arise when the absence of the major term (sadhya) or the middle term (sadhana or hetu) or both is not shown or when there is a doubt about them. The fallacy of heterogeneous example (vaidharmya-drstantabhasa) is of six kinds, thus:(1) Inference is invalid (major term), because it is a source of true knowledge (middle term); whatever is not invalid is not a source of true knowledge as a dream (heterogeneous example). Here the example involves in the heterogeneous form a defect in the major term (sadhya), for a dream is really invalid though it has been cited as not invalid. (2) Perception is non-reflective or nirvikalpaka (major term), because it is a source of true knowledge (middle term); whatever is reflec.ive or savikalpaka is not a source of true knowlege, as inference (hetero geneous example). Here the example involves in the heterogeneous form a defect in the middle term (sadhana), for inference is really a source of true knowledge though it has been cited as not such. (3) Sound is eternal and non-eternal (major term), because it is an existence (middle term); whatever is not eternal and non-eternal is not an existence, as a jar (heterogeneous example). Here the example involves in the heterogeneous form a defect in both the major and middle terms (sadhya and sadhana), for the jar is both "eternal and non-eternal," and "an existence." (4) Kapila is non-omniscient (major term), because he is a non-propounder of the four noble truths (middle term); whoever is not nonomniscient is not non-propounder of the four noble truths, as Buddha (the heterogeneous example). Here the example involves in the negative form a doubt as to the validity of the major term (sadhya), for it is doubtful whether Buddha was omniscient. (5) This person is untrustworthy (major term), because he is full of passions (middle term); whoever is not untrustworthy is not full of passions, a Buddha (heterogeneous example). Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of the middle term (hetu), for it is doubtful whether Buddha is not full of passions. (6) Kapila is not devoid of passions (major term), because he did not give his own flesh to the hungry (middle term); whoever is devoid of passions gives his own flesh to the hungry, as Buddha (heterogeneous example).

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20 nyAyAvatAraH Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of both the major and middle terms (sadhya and sadhana), for it is doubtful whether Buddha was devoid of passions and gave his own flesh to the hungry. Some unnecessarily lay down three other kinds of fallacy of the heterogeneous example (vaidharmya-drstantabhasa), viz.:(1) Unseparated (avyatireki) : This person is not devoid of passions (major term), because he is a speaker (middle term); whoever is devoid of passions is not a speaker, as a piece of stone (heterogeneous example). Here though a piece of stone is both "devoid of passions" and "not a speaker," yet there is no unavoidable separation (vyatireka-vyapti ) between "devoid of passions" and "a speaker." (2) Of separation unshown apradarSita-vyatireka: Sound is non-eternal (major term), because it is a product (middle ___term); as ether (example). Here though there is an unavoidable separation between "product" and "eternal", yet it has not been shown in the proper form, such as: "Whatever is eternal is not a product, as ether." [Dinnaga the Buddhist urged the necessity of converting the heterogeneous example into a universal negative proposition with a view to pointing out the connection of the middle term and the major term). (3) Of contrary separation (viparita-vyatireka) : Sound is not eternal (major term), because it is a product (middle term); whatever is not a product is eternal, as ether (example). Here the example has been put in a contrary way, for the proper form should have been : "Whatever is eternal is not a product, as ether." vAdya kta sAdhane proktadoSANAmudabhAvanam / dUSaNaM niravadya tu dUSaNAbhAsanAmakam // 26 // sAdhyate pratipAdyapratItau Arohyate tu meyaM yena tat sAdhanaM tacca anekarUpaM prAk prtypaadi| tdythaa| kvacit heturevaikaH, kvacit pakSahetU, kvacit pakSahetudRSTAntAH kvacit te eva sopanayAH, kvacit sanigamanAH, kvacit ekaikataccha ddhivRddhyeti / ... tatreha samyaksAdhanasya dUSayitumazakyatvAt sAdhanAbhAsa eva tatsAmopapatteH ... / tatra proktadoSANAM pratyakSAdinirAkRtapakSAsiddhAdihetusAdhyAdivikaladRSTAntAdyupanyAsalakSaNAnAmudbhAvanaM prAznikAnAM purataH prakAzanaM yat tad dRSyate svAbhipretasAdhyapratyAyanavaikalyalakSaNaM vikRti nIyate sAdhanamaneneti dUSaNamiti jJeyam / / 26 // 26. Refutation (dusana) is the pointing out of the aforesaid fallacies in the reasoning of an opponent; but it is called a semblance of a refutation (dusanabhasa) when the reasoning is really devoid of defects.

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Translation with Notes 2i A disputant is said really to refute his opponent, if the former can detect in the reasoning of the latter any of the fallacies aforementioned. But it will be a mere semblance of refutation if he ascribes to his opponent fallacies which he has not really committed. sakalAvaraNamuktAtma kevalaM yat prakAzate / pratyakSa sakalArthAtmasatatapratibhAsanam // 27 // sakalaM samastam AvRNoti Aviyate vA anenetyAvaraNam / tat svarUpapracchAdanaM karmetyarthaH / sakalaM ca tadAvaraNaM ca sakalAvaraNaM tena mukto rahitaH AtmA svarUpaM yasya tat tthaa| ataeva kevalam asahAyam AvaraNakSayopazamavicitratayaiva bodhasya nAnAkArasya pravRtteH / sAmassyena punaH AvaraNanirdalane vibandhakAraNavaikalyAd ekAkAratayaiva tasya vivartanAd ato jJAnAntaranirapekSaM yat prakAzate prathate nirupAdhika motate ityarthaH / tat paramArthataH pratyakSaM tadidaM sakalAvaraNamuktAtmeti hetudvAreNa tathA kevalaM tat prakAzate iti svarUpato nirUpya adhunA kAryadvAreNa nirUpayannAha / sakalArthAtmanAM samastavastusvarUpANAM satatapratibhAsanam anavarataprakAzanaM sakalArthAtmasatatapratibhAsanamiti pratibhAsyate'neneti pratibhAsanam Atmano dharmarUpatayA bhedavadvivakSitaM jJAnamiti yAvat / asya ca pAramArthikatvaM nirupacaritazabdArthopapatteH / tathAhi / akSazabdo jIvaparyAyastatazcAkSaM prati vartate iti pratyakSaM yatrAtmanaH sAkSAdvApAraH / vyavahArika punarindriyavyavahitAtmavyApArasampAdyatvAt paramArthataH parokSameva ghUmAdagnijJAnavattirodhAnAvizeSAt // 27 // 27. That which is characterised as free from all obstructions and shines as the absolute is called (supreme or transcendental) perception; it uninterruptedly illumines the nature of all objects. Perception (pratyaksa) is used in two senses : (1) supreme or transcendental (para-marthika), and (2) practical (vyavaharika). The practical perception consists of knowledge acquired by the soul through the channels of the senses such as the visual knowledge, auditory knowledge, etc. The transcendental perception is knowledge acquired by the soul direct through meditation without the intervention of the senses or signs. pramANasya phalaM sAkSAdajJAnavinivartanam / kevalasya sukhopekSe zeSasyAdAnahAnadhIH // 28 // dvividhaM hi pramANasya phalaM sAkSAd asAkSAcca anantaraM vyavahitaM cetyarthaH / tatra sAkSAd ajJAnam anadhyavasAyaH prameyAparicchittistasya vinivartanaM vizeSeNa pralayApAdanaM pramANasya phalam ajJAnoddalanadvAreNa tasya pravRtteH tasya sarvAnarthamUlatayA pramAtrapakAritvAt tannivartanasya prayojanatA yuktv| etaccAnantaraprayojanaM sarvajJAnAmekarUpatvAt

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22 nyAyAvatAra: sAmAnyenoktam / vyavahitaprayojanaM punaH vibhaagenaah| kevalasya sarvajJa-jJAnasya sukhaM vaiSayikaM sukhAtItaparamAhlAdAnubhava upekSA sAkSAt samastArthAnubhave'pi hAnopAdAnopAdAnecchAbhAvAnmadhyasthavRttitA te sukhopekSe phalamityarthaH / zeSasya tadvAtiriktaprAkRtalokapramANasya AdAnaM grahaNaM hAnaM parityAgastayorAdAnahAnayordhIH buddhirAdAnahAnadhIH, sA phala miti yAvat / tatazca AdeyAnAM samyagdarzanasrakcandanAdInAM yA ditsA tathA, heyAnAM mithyAdarzanAdiviSakaNTakAnAM yA jihAsA pramANasAdhyA pramANAttatsiddheH // 28 // 28. The immediate effect of pramana (valid knowledge) is the removal of ignorance; and the mediate effect of the absolute knowledge is bliss and equanimity while that of the ordinary practical knowledge is the facility to select or reject. Pramana (valid knowledge) is of two kinds : (1) kevala, absolute and (2) a-kevala, ordinary. The immediate effect of both is the cessation of ignorance. The mediate effect of the absolute knowledge is happiness and equanimity, while that of the ordinary knowledge is the facility which it affords us to choose the desirable and reject the undesirable. anekAntAtmakaM vastu gocaraH sarvasaMvidAm / ekadezaviziSTo'rtho nayasya viSayo mataH // 26 // aneke bahavo'ntA aMza dharmA vA AtmanaH svarUpANi yasya tad anekAtmakaM ki tadvastu bahirantazca gocaraH viSayaH sarvasaMvidAM samastasaM vittInAmanena anekAntamanta reNa saMvedanaprasaravyavacchedaM darzayati ... / eka ityAdi anantadharmAdhyAsitaM vastu sAbhipretakadharmaviziSTaM nayati prApayati saMvedanamArohayatIti nayaH pramANapravRtteruttarakAlabhAvI parAmarza ityarthastasya viSayaH pramANasya gocaro mato'bhipreta ekadezena anityatvAdidharmalakSaNena viziSTaH pararUpebhyo vyavachinnetyarthaH / ... sarvasaMgrAhisattAbhiprAyaparikalpanAdvAreNa sapta nayAH pratipAditAH, tdythaa| naigama-saMgraha-vyavahAra-RjusUtra-zabda-samabhirUr3haevaMbhUtA nayA ityato'smAbhirapi te eva varNyante kathamete sarvAbhiprAyasaMgrAhakA iti cet| ucyate / iti prAyastAvad arthadvAreNa zabdadvAreNa vA pravarteta gatyantarAbhAvAt / arthazca sAmAnyarUpo vizeSarUpo vA zabdo'pi rUDhito vyutpattitazca vyutpattirapi sAmAnyanimittaprayuktA tatkAlabhAvinimittaprayuktA vA syAt / ... ye'pi parasparavizakalito sAmAnyavizeSau icchanti tat samudAyarUpo naigamaH / ... ye punaH kevalaM sAmAnyaM vAcchanti tat samUhasaMpAdyaH saMgrahaH / ye punaranapekSitazAstrIyasAmAnyavizeSaM lokavyavahAramavatarantaM ghaTAdika padArtham abhiprayanti tannicayajAtyA vyvhaarH| ye tu kSaNakSayiNaH paramANulakSaNA vizeSAH satyA iti manyante tatsaMghAtaghaTita RjusUtra iti / tathA ye rUDhitaH zabdAnAM pravRtti vAcchanti tannivahasAdhyaH zabda iti /

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Translation with Notes 23 ye tu vyutpattito dhvanInAM pravRtti vAcchanti tAnyathA taddvArajanyaM samabhirUDha iti| ye tu vartamAnakAlabhAvivyutpattinimittamadhikRtya zabdA: pravartante nAnyatheti manyante tatsaMghaTitaH khalvevaMbhUta iti / tadevaM na kazcana vikalpo'sti vastugocaro yo'tra nayasaptake nAntaryAtIti sarvAbhiprAyasaMgrAhakA ete iti sthitam / ... tathAhi naigamanayadarzanAnusAriNau naiyAyikavaizeSikau, saMgrahAbhiprAyapravRttAH sarve'pi advaitavAdAH sAMkhyadarzanaM ca, vyavahAranayAnupAtiprAyazcArvAkadarzanam, RjusUtrAkUtapravRttabuddhayaratAthA Tar:, Toatfentharaffaat &TUTIGT: 11 - Jarfa pufa fafara TTA viziSTamarthaM prApayati yo'bhiprAyaH sa nayaH // 26 / / 29. Since things have many characters (that is, may be conceived from many points of view), they are the objects of all-sided knowledge (omniscience); but a thing conceived from one particular point of view is the object of naya (or one-sided knowledge). Objects, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, possess many different characteristics may be taken from different standpoints. They are understood in their entire character by omniscience alone, while to take them from one particular standpoint is the scope of naya (the one-sided method of comprehension). Naya (the one-sided method of comprehension) is of seven kinds mentioned below : (1) Naigama (the non-distinguished) is the method by which an object is taken in its generic and specific capacities not distinguished from each other. For instance, by the term "bamboo" one may understand a number of properties, some of which are peculiar to its own species, while the remaining ones are possessed by it in common with other trees such as a mango, jack, banyan, etc., without any distinction being made between these two classes of properties. The Nyaya and Vaisesika schools of philosophy follow the Naigama naya. (2) Sangraha (the generic) is the method by which the generic properties alone are taken into consideration without any cognizance of the particular properties which, independent of the former, are non entities, like sky-flowers. Thus, when we speak of a mango, jack or bamboo, we mean that it is a tree, The Advaita and Samkhya systems of philosophy follow the Sangraha naya. (3) Vyavahara (the practical) is the method by which the practical or particular alone is considered, for the general without the particular is a non-entity like the horn of a hare. On being asked to bring a tree, can anybody bring the tree in general ? No, he can bring only a particular tree such as a mango, jack or bamboo. The Carvaka philosophy follows the Vyavahara naya. (4) Rju-sutra (the straight expression) is the method by which a thing, sa it exists at present, is considered without any reference to the past or future. It is useless to ponder over things as they were in the pastor will become in the future. All practical purposes

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24 nyAyAvatAraH use to me now. are served by the thing itself as it exists at the present moment. For instance, a man, who was formerly (in a previous birth) my son, is now born as a prince somewhere else; he is of no practical So the Rju-sutra recognises only the entity itself (bhava) and does not consider the name ( nama), image ( sthapana) or the constituent cause (dravya). For instance, a poor cowherd, if he bears the name of Indra, does not thereby become the lord of heavens. An image of a king cannot accomplish the function of the king himself. The causes in me which will lead to my accepting a different kind of body in a future birth cannot enable me to enjoy that body now. Some hold that the atoms alone are true, and aggregates or lumps of them constitute things. This doctrine is followed by the Buddhists. (5) Sabda (the verbal) consists in using a word in a conventional sense and not according to its etymological derivation. Thus the word satru usually, or in its conventional sense, means "enemy," while etymologically "a destroyer." The grammarians are the followers of this method. ( 6 ) Samabhiradha (the subtle) consists in making nice distinctions among the synonyms, applying each name appropriately according to their etymological derivation. The grammarians are the followers of this method. (7) Evambhita (the such-like) consists in naming a thing only when it possesses its practical efficiency. Thus a man should be named Sakra, if he actually possesses strength (Sakti) implied by the name. The grammarians are the followers of this method. nayAnAmekaniSThAnAM pravRtteH zrutavartmani / sampUrNArthavinizcApi syAdvAda tamucyate // 30 // etacca trividhaM zrutam / tadyathA / mithyAzrutaM nayazrutaM syAdvAdazrutam / tatra zrUyate iti zrutamAgamaH / mithyA'lIkaM zrutaM mithyAzrutam / tacca durnayAbhiprAyapravRttaM kisambandhi nirgocaratvAt / tathA nayaiH hetubhUtaiH zrutaM nayazrutam / arhadAgamAntargatameva ekanayAbhiprAyapratibaddham / .... tathA nirdizyamAnadharmavyatiriktAzeSadharmAntarasaMsUcakena syAt yukto vAdo'bhipretadharmavacanaM syAdvAdaH / tadAtmakaM zrutaM tat kiMbhUtamucyate ityatrAha / saMpUrNo vikalaH sa cAsAvarthazca tadvinizcAyi nirNayahetutvAd evamabhidhIyate / .... nayAnAM naigamAdInAm ekaniSThAnAM ekadharmagrahaNaparyavasitAnAM zrutavatrtmani AgamamArge pravRtteH pravartanAnna tadekaikAbhiprAyapratibaddha saMpUrNArthaM vinizcAyi tatsamudAyasyaiva saMpUrNArthavinizcAyakatvAd ityAkUtam / / 30 / / 30. Knowledge which determines the full meaning of an object through the employment, in the scriptural method, of one-sided nayas, is called Syadvada-sruta,

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Translation with Notes 25 The fruta or scriptural knowledge is of three kinds, viz, (1) false hearing or knowledge (mithya-sruta), such as that derived from the scripture of the bad Tirthikas; (2) hearing of the one-sided method (naya-sruta), that is, knowledge derived from that part of the Jaina scripture which teaches us to comprehend things from any particular standpoint; and (3) hearing of the all-sided method (syad-vada-sruta), that is, knowledge derived from that part of the Jaina scripture which teaches us to comprehend things from all-sided standpoints. The naya-sruta (knowledge of the one-sided method) has been described in the previous verse. The syad-vada (knowledge of the all-sided method) is described below :Syad-vada, which literally signifies assertion of possibilities, seeks to ascertain the meaning of things from all possible standpoints. Things are neither existent nor non-existent absolutely. A thing may be said to exist in a certain way and to be non-existent in another way, and so forth. Syad-vada examines things from seven points of view, hence the doctrine is also called sapta-bhangi-naya (seven-fold paralogism). It is stated as follows: (1) May be, it is (syad-asti); (2) may be, it is not (syad-nasti); (3) may be, it is and it is not (syad-asti-nasti); (4) may be, it is indescribable (syad-avyaktavyam); (5) may be, it is and yet indescribable (syad-asti ca avyakta vyanca); (6) may be, it is not and also indescribable (syad nasti ca avyaktavyanca); (7) may be, it is and it is not and also indescribable (syad asti ca nasti ca avyaktavyahca). When a thing is to be established we say "it is," when it is to be denied, we say it is not." When a thing is to be established and denied in turn, we say "it is and it is not." When a thing is to be established and denied simultaneously, we say "it is indescribable." When a thing is to be established and yet to be described as indescribable, we say "it is and yet indescribable." When a thing is to be denied and also declared as indescribable, we say "it is not and also indescribable." When a thing is to be established and denied as well as declared indescribable at the same time, we say "it is and it is not, and also indescribable." Syad which signifies "may be" denotes all these seven possibilities, that is, a thing may be looked upon from one of the above seven points of view, there having been no eighth alternative. pramAtA svAnyanirbhAsI kartA bhoktA vivRttimAn / svasaMvedanasaMsiddho jIvaH kSityAdyanAtmakaH // 31 // svAnyau Atmaparau nirbhAsayitum udmotayituM zIlamasyeti svAnyanirbhAsau svasvarUpArthayoH prakAzaka iti yAvat / ... vivartanam aparAparaparyAyeSu gamanaM vivRttiH pariNAmaH sA vidyate yasyeti vivRttimAn / sva AtmA saMvedyate aneneti svasaMvedenaM tena samyak siddhaH pratiSThitaH pratIto vA svasaMvedanasaMsiddhaH / kSitiH pRthivI AdiryeSAM tAni kssityaadiini| AdizabdAd ambu-tejo-vAyyAkAzAni gRhyante /

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26 nyAyAvatAraH na vidyate AtmA svarUpamasyeti anAtmaka: ... kSityAdisvarUpo na bhavati ityarthaH / ... svAnyanirbhAsItyanena prAguktasvaparAbhAsipramANavizeSavanmImAMsakAn parokSabuddhivAdino yogAcArAMzca jJAnamAtravAdinaH pratikSipati / kathaM jJAnajJAninoH kathaMcidabhedena taduktanyAyAvizeSAditi kartA bhoktati vizeSaNadvayena sAMkhyamataM vikuTTayati / vivRttimAnityamunA tu ekAntanityaM apariNAminaM naiyAyikavaizeSikAdiprakalpitaM pramAtAraM nirasyati sarvathA'vicalitarUpasya arthagrahaNapariNAmAnupapatteH / / 31 // ___31. The spirit (soul or jiva) is the knower, doer and enjoyer, illumines itself and others, undergoes changes of condition, is realised only in self-consciousness and is different from the earth, etc. The soul (atman or jiva) has knowledge and so is different from knowledge itself. As an enjoyer and doer the soul of the Jaina philosophy is different from that of the Samkhya philosophy. The soul of the Jainas is described as undergoing changes of condition. In this respect it is different from that of the Nyaya and Vaisesika philosophy. pramANAdivyavastheyamanAdinidhanAtmikA / sarvasaMvyavahartRNAM prasiddhApi prakIrtitA // 32 // kRtiriyaM zrIsitapaTTasiddhasena divAkarasya // pramANAni pratyakSAdIni aadishbdaannyprigrhH| teSAM vyavasthA pratiniyatalakSaNAdirUpA maryAdA sA iyamanantaroktasthityA prkiirtiteti| ... sarvasaMvyavahartRNAM laukikatIthikabhedabhinnasamastavyavahAravatAM prasiddhApi rUDhApi tadaprasiddhau nikhilavyavahArocchedaprasaMgAt / ... prakIrtitA saMzabditA avyutpanna vipratipannavyAmohApohAyeti gamyate // 32 // syAdvAdakesarisubhISaNanAdabhIteruttastalolanayanAn prapalAyyamAnAn / he durnayAzritakutIthimRgAnananyatrANAn vihAya jinametya tamAzrayadhvam / / 1 // bhaktirmayA bhagavati prakaTIkRteyaM tacchAsanAMzakathanAnna matiH svkiiyaa| mohAdato yadiha kiMcidabhUdasAdhu tat sAdhavaH kRtakRpA mayi zodhayantu / / 2 / / nyAyAvatAravivRti vidhinA vidhitsoH siddhaH puna rya iha puNyacayastato me| nityaH parArthakaraNodyatamAbhavAntAd bhUyAjjinendramatalapaTameva cetaH / / 3 // iti nyAyAvatAravivRtiH smaaptaa| kRtiriyaM sitapaTTa zrIsiddhasenadivAkaravyAkhyAnakasya tarkaprakaraNavRtteriti / 32. This system of pramana, etc., is beginningless and endless; and though familiar to all persons in every day practice it is yet explained here. This shows that the world as conceived by the Jainas is eternal.

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APPENDIX A SIDDHASENA DIVAKARA alias KSAPANAKA (ABOUT 480-550 A.D.) [from S. C. Vidyabhusana's A History of Indian Logic ] The first Jaina writer on systematic logic was Siddhasena Divakara. It was he who for the first time laid the foundation of a science called Logic among the Jainas by compiling a treatise called Nyayavatara1 in thirty-two short stanzas. Siddhasena Divakara is also famous as the author of the Sammatitarka-sutra which is a work in Prakrta on general philosophy containing an elaborate discussion on the principles of logic. This author, who belonged to the Svetambara sect, has been mentioned by Pradyumna Suri (980 A.D.) in his Vicara-sara-prakarana and by Jinasena Suri in the Adipurana dated 783 A.D. Siddhasena, who was a pupil of Vrddha-vadisuri, received the name of Kumudacandra3 at the time of ordination. He is said to have split, by the efficacy of his prayers, the Linga, the Brahmanical symbol of Rudra, in the temple of Mahakala at Ujjaini, and to have called forth an image of Parsvanatha by reciting his Kalyana-mandirastava. He is believed by Jainas to have converted Vikramaditya to Jainism 470 years after the nirvana of Mahavira, that is, 57 B.C.4 But Vikramaditya of Ujjaini does not seem to be so old, as he has been identified by scholars with Yasodharma Deva, King of 1 Vide No. 741 in the list of Mss. purchased for the Bombay Government as noticed by Peterson in his 5th Report, p. 289. A manuscript of the Nyayavatara with Vivrti was procured for me from Bhavanagara, Bombay, by Muni Dharmavijaya and his pupil Sri Indravijaya. The Nyaya-vatara with commentary and translation edited by Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana is available in Calcutta and Arrah. 2 The verse da (26) etc. quoted from Vicara-sara-prakarana, and noticed by Peterson in his 3rd Report, p. 272, is already quoted in the introduction foot note 1, p. 28. 3 cf. Prabhavakacarita VIII. V. 57. 4 For other particulars about Siddhasena Divakara see Dr. Klatt's Pattavali of the Kharataragaccha in the Indian Antiquary, Vol. XI, Sept. 1882. p. 247. Vide also Dr. R. G. Bhandarkar's report on Sanskrit Mss., during 1883-84, p. 118, 140. Also the Prabandha-cintamani translated by Mr. Tawney in the Bibliotheca Indica series of Calcutta, pp. 10-14.

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28 Malwa, who, on the authority of Alberuni, defeated the Huns at Korur in 533 A.D. This view of scholars agrees well with the statement of the Chinese pilgrim Hwen-thsang, who visited India in 629 A.D. and says that a very powerfull King, presumably Vikramaditya, reigned at Ujjaini 60 years before his arrival there.5 Moreover, Varahamihira, who was one of the nine Gems at the court of Vikramaditya, is known to have lived between 505 A.D. and 587 A.D.6 It is therefore very probable that Vikramaditya and his contemporary Siddhasena Divakara lived at Ujjaini about 530 A.D. I am inclined to believe that Siddhasena was no other than Ksapanaka? (a Jaina sage) who is traditionally known to the Hindus to have been one of the nine Gems that adorned the court of Vikramaditya. Siddhasena Divakara seems to have been a senior contemporary of Jinabhadra Gani Ksamasramana (484-588 A.D.) who criticises Dvatrimsat-dvatrimsika of which the Nyayavatara is a part. 5 Vide Beal's Buddhist Records Vol. II. p. 261. 6 Varahamihira chose sak 427 or A.D. 505 as the initial year of his astronomical calculation, showing thereby that he lived about that time. afaca'ui etc. is already quoted in the introduction p. 29. (Pancasiddhantika, Chap. I, edited by Dr. G. Thibaut and Sudhakara Dvivedi). Vide also Dr. Thibaut's Introduction to the Pancasiddhantika, p. XXX. . The nine Gems are qaraf etc. from Jyotirvidabharana is already quoted in the introduction p. 29. In the Pancatantra and other Brahmanic Sanskrit work as well as in the Avadapakalpalata and other Buddhist Sanskrit works the Jaina ascetics are nicknamed as Ksapanaka. The verse agurfga etc. (Avadanakalpalata, * Jyotiskavadana) is already quoted in the introduction p. 30.

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anekAntAtmakaM vastu antAptyaiva sAdhyastha anyathAnupapannatvaM anyathA vAdyabhipretahetugocaraaparokSatayArthasya asiddhastvapratIto AptopajJamanullaDdhyam dRSTeSTAvyAhatatvAd dhAnuSkaguNasaMprekSi na pratyakSamapi bhrAntaM nayAnAmekaniSThAnAM pratipAdyasya ya: pratyakSapratipannArtha pratipAdi pratyakSeNAnumAnena pramANasya phalaM pramANaM svaparAbhAsi zloka-sUcI pramANAdi vyavastheyam pramAtA svAnyanirbhAsI prasiddhAnAM pramANAnAM prasiddhAni pramANAni vAdyukta sAdhane vaidhayeMNAtradRSTAntadoSA sakalapratibhAsasya sklaavrnnmuktaatmsaadhyennaatr dRSTAnta sAdhya-sAdhanayoAptiH sAdhyAbhyupagamaH pakSa: sAdhyAvinAbhuno sAdhyAvinAmuvo sAdhye nivartamAne svanizcayavadanyeSAM hetostathopapatyA

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INDEX OF WORDS IN ENGLISH. ... ... 8 5 . .. 15 Advaita ... ... 23 Aksapada ... ... 5 Anaikantika ... Ananvaya ... Antarvyapti ... Apradarsitanvaya Apradarsitavyatireka Asiddha Atman Avyatireki .. Bahir-vyapti ... Buddha Carvaka ... Contradictory Dasavayava ... Dharmakirti Dinnaga 17, 20 Dsstanta 9, 11, 13 Dsstantabhasa Dusana ... Dusanabhasa Evambhuta ... 23 Example .. 9-11 External inseparable connection ... 13 Fallacy of example ... 16 Fallacy of heterogeneous example 19, 20 Fallacy of homogeneous example ... ... 16 Fallacy of middle term 14, 16 Fallacy of minor term ... 14 Hetu 15-19 Hetvabhasa ... 14, 15 Inference for one's self 4, 7 Inference for the sake of others ... 4-15 ... 16 Inseparable connection 11-17 Internal inseparable connection Jiva Kapila Kevala Knowledge Linga Lingi Lokasamvsti Major term ... 4, 8--19 Middle term 4,8--19 Mimamsaka ... - 2,6 Minor term ... 8-13 Naigama ... 11 Naya 23, 21 Nigamana ... 9 Nyaya 21, 25 Nyayasutra ... ... 5 Paksa 8--13 Paksabhasa ... Pararthamana 7,18 Parathanumana ... 8 Paroksa ... ... 2 Perception 2--7,16, 21 Pramana 2, 5, 20, Pratijna Pratyaksa 2, 5, 21 Proposition ... Purvavat Reason 8-15 Refutation ... ... 20 Rju-sutra ... 21 Sabda 2,23 Sabda ... 6 Sadhana ... 1, 18, 19, 20 Sadharmyadpstantabhasa 16 ... 20 ... 20 ... 9 ... 9

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4,8--20 ... 24 ... 5 Sadhya Samabhirudha Samanyatodssta Samgraha ... Samkhya ... Saptabhargi-naya Sastra Scripture Sesavat Soul Sruta Svarthamana Svarthanumana Syadvada ... Thesis Upanaya Vaidharmya-drstanta bhasa Vaisesika ... Vasubandhu ... Verbal testimony Viparitanvaya Viparitavyatireka Viruddha Vyapti Vyatireka-vyapti Vyavahara ... Vyavaharika ... Word Yogacara

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INDEX OF SANSKRIT WORDS. Words Page ... ... 10 ... 5 3,4,8, 21 3 ... ... 9 8, 10 akRtaka akRtrima akSa akSagocara akSapAda agRhIta agni aGgIkaraNa ajJAna ajJAnarUpa atadrapa atasmina atiprasakti atiprasaGga atizaya atizAyi atula adRSTa adRSTeSTa advaitavAda adhigama Words Page anAtmaka ... 22, 26 anAdi ... 2, 15 anAdeya anApta anitya 15, 16, 19 anityatva .... 4, 11 anityavAdina ... 15 anirAkRta 5,9 anivatti .... 15, 18 aniSpatti anugraha anupapatti ... 11, 26 anupapannatva anupalabdha anupalabdhi ... anupalambha ... anupramANatA ... .... 16 anubhava anumAna 1, 2, 3, 8, 11, 16 anumAnabAdhita ... ... 14 anumeya ... 4, 7, 9 anullaGghana anekadhA anekarUpaM anekAtmaka anekAnta 3, 14, 15, 22 anekAntAtmaka anaikAntika 22 adhyakSa adhyavasAya adhyAsita anadhyavasAya ... 22 21, 22, 26 ananta anantaraM ananvaya anartha anarthamUla anta ... 22 ..... 11, 12 antaH antaHkaraNa

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Index of Sanskrit words. 33 Page .... 1 ___7, 22, 26 ... 11 Word abhidheya abhiprAya abhiprAyavat abhipreta abhimata abheda abhyupagama abhrAnta ambu aMza ayuktatva ayoga arcaTa artha arthakriyA arhat Word Page antareNa ... 22 antarvyApti ... 11, 12 anya ... 1, 15 anyatara ... 11 anyathA 10, 14, 11, 15 anyathAnupapannatva ... ... 14. anyadA ... 12 anvaya ... ... 4, 16 apakAritva apara ... ... 11, 26 aparicchitti aparicchedaka apariNAmin ... aparokSa ... 1,3 apalakSaNa ... 16 api ... 11, 26 apekSA ... 1, 3, 12 apor3ha .... 6 apoha ... 626 apauruSeya .. 6 apratIta ... 15, 12 apratIti apradarzitavyatireka apradarzitAnvaya ... apramANa aprayoga apravRtti / aprasiddhi aprAmANya abAdha ... ... 14 abAdhita __ ... ... 5,9 abhAva 1, 4, 7, 15, 18, 21 abhidhAna ... ... 1,9 abhidhAyi ... ... 5 alIka avakAza avadhAraNa ___23 .... 11 ... 4, 8, 4 avayava avikala avicalita avidyamAnatA ... avinAbhU aviparItavyatireka aviyuta avivartana avizeSa avismata avItarAg2a avyatireka avyatirekitva avyavahita avyAvRtti ... .... 21, 26

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34 Index of Sanskrit words Word Apta AptatA AptopajJa AbhavAnta Page 6, 6 12 Page 5,5 26 ... 4 ... 1, 2, 12 10 6 26 8.20 10, 10 Word avyAhata avyutpanna asat asadbhAva asamarthatva asambaddha asambhava asambhavat asarvajJa asarvajJatA ... asahAya asAkSAt asAkSAtkAritA asAdhAraNa asAdhu asiddha asiddhi AbhAsa AbhAsi Arekita Aryasatya Alambana AvaraNa AvaraNakSayopazama AvaraNamukta ... AhlAda 5 ... 1, 5, 21 ... 13. 20 5.5, 16, 20 icchA itara iti indriya iSu iSTa iSTapuruSa : : : : : : : ... 2 .... 1, 21 ... 10 ... 22,5,6 16 Akalana ... 3 * 19, 25 ___... 22, 26 AkAza Akata AkrAntatva AkhyAta IkSA * : : 3 Agama Irita .... 14, 11 24 ... 22, 8 24-6, 21-25 __21, 6, 22 .... 16, 6,9 22 ... Atmaka Atman AdAna Adi AditsA AdeyavAkA Anantarya Apatti 2.26 uccheda ucchedaprasaMga utkRSTa uttara uttarakAla uttasta utthA " : : : : 18 ApAdana

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Index of Sanskrit words 35 Page Word Page Word utpattimatva utpanna utpAdana ..... ... 6 ... 22 ekAnaSTha eka ekadeza / ekaniSTha ekarupa ekAkAratA ekAnta : :: :: :: :: : eva evaM . evaMbhUta evaMrupa udabhAvana udAhRti uddalana udmotana udbhAvana unneya upakAritva upacAra upajJa upadeza upanaya upanyasyamAna upanyAsa upapatti upapadyate upala upalakSita upalabdha upalambha upazama upasthApaka ... 6, 7, 11 ... 6,6 .. 6,6 __8, 12, 20 ___15 .... 10, 20 11, 11, 18 kaNabhakSa ... -- 15 kaNTaka 22 : :: :: :: :: :: :: : * kathana kathA kapila kata karma kalaGkita kalpanA kAkakArthya kApatha kAraNa kArikA : :: :: :: :: :: : __... 3, 15 upAtta 5 ... ... 6,6 ... 4, 7, 21 ... 7 ... 4, 21 .... 7,7,8 21, 22 kArya kAryatA upAdAna upAya upekSA ubharyAvakala ubhayAvyatirekina ullaGkA kAla ___... ... ... ... 3, 22 23 kibhUta kutIthin : :: :: : kumata 16 Rja sUtra ... ... 22 kRtaka kRtakatva 15, 16, 19

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36 Index of Sanskrit words Word. Word. kRti kRpA kevala kesarina Page ... 25, 27 ... 27 21, 21, 22 catura candana caya cArvAka citta kSaNa kSaNika cetaH kSaya kSayin kSiti jaghanya jana jalAzaya kharaviSANa kheTayanti khyApyate jAgrat gajasnAnanyAya gatyantara gamaka g2amakatva jAgratsaMvedana jAti jijJAsita jina jinendra jihAsA ... 25, 1, 6,21 jJAna 1, 1, 3, 6, 21, 21, 25 jJAnamAtravAdin ... ... 25 jJAnavAdin ... ... 1 jJAnin .... 25 jJeya ... 3, 3, 1 jIva gamana gaNa gamita gamya 10, 12, 18 10, 10 gocara 10, 22, 3, 8, 9, 22 gocaradIpaka ... ... 9 grahaNa ... 3, 7, 12, 22, 25 grahaNekSA ... ... 3, 3 grAhaka ... ... 3,3 grAhitA ..... ... 5 grAhya .... 5, 1,6 tattva tattvagrAhi tattvagrAhitA tattvopadeza tathA tathAgata tathopapatti ghaTa ... 1, 14, 16, 22 ... ... 6,6 11,8 ... 3.23 __... 11, 11 ghaTTana

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Index of Sanskrit words Page 7 Word. daSTeSTa Pagc 5 ... ... ... 14, 14 dezin dolAyamAnatA ...... 14 , 10, 16, 20 doSa Word. tadaGgatA tadAbhatA tadgraha tadpatva tarka tahi tiraskRta tirodhAna tIrtha tIthika draSTavya dvandva dvaya dvayasiddhi ... ... ... 1, 21, 22 dvAra tulyakAraNatva dvidhA dvidhAnyatara dvividha . dvaividhya tejas traya ... 8, 13 dazan dazAvayava darzaka darzana divAkara dIpaka duHkha dharma dharmarUpatA dharmin dhAnuSka 3, 12, 16 21, 22 ____ 21 ... 4, 12 ___... 10, 10 ... 21, 22 __7, 11, 21 ... 1,8, 23 ... 26 dhama dhvani durnaya duSTatA dUSaNa nabha:puNDarIka naya nayana dUSaNAbhAsa dRDhatara dRSTa dRSTahAni dRSTAnta dRSTAntadoSa dRSTAntAbhAsa ... dRSTAntAbhAsatA ... nayazruta 5,3,5,6 ... 3 11, 16,5 16, 16, 18 ... 16, 18 ... 16 nAda nAnAkAra nAmaka nAstitA

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38 Word. niHsvabhAva ni:svabhAvatva nigama nigamana nicaya nitya nityavAdin nityAnitya nidhana nibandha nimitta niraMza nirapekSa nirarthaka niravadya nirasta nirAkAraka nirAkRta nirupacarita nirupAdhika nirgocara nirNaya nirNAyaka nirNIta nirdalana nirdeza nirbhAsin nirvikalpaka nivartana nivaha nivRtti nizcaya nizcAyaka nizcita ::: :::: :::: Index of Sanskrit words Page 15 15 8 12, 20 22 15, 18, 25 15 16 26 21 8, 23 14 1, 21 1 20 1 6 20 21 18 24 1, 14, 24 3 6, 10 21 10 25 3, 18 12 22 2, 18 6 1 4 ... ... Word. nizcIyatetarAm niSpatti naigama naiyAyika nyAya nyAyavid nyAyavidvas nyAyAvatAra nyAyAvatAravivRti pakSa pakSadharmatA pakSadharmatva pakSAbhAsa paJca paJcaka paTTa pada padArtha para paramaprakAza parama paramANu paramArtha paramArthAbhidhAyi parAbhAsi parAmarza parArtha parArthatA parArthatva parArthamAna parArthAnumAna parikalpanA ... 5, 11 22 1, 23, 25 6, 12, 18, 25 12, 16, 18 12 1, 26 4, 26 ... ... Page 11 pa 4, 8, 9, 14, 20 4 4 13 25 6, 22 1, 4, 5, 7, 8, 21, 25 1 5 22 ... 8 12 26 :: 5, 21 5 1 22 6, 7, 8, 26 7 7 7 6, 8 22

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Index of Sanskrit words Page Page ... 16, 26 ... 3,7 26 7,8 ... 7.8 ... 8 Word. parigraha paricchedaka pariNAma parityAga parividhyata parIkSaNa parokSa paryavasita paryAya pAramAthika pAramArthikatva puNya purataH 12, 18, 22 1,3,21,25 ___... 1, 24 1, 21, 25 20, 23, 26 ... 14 ... 5, 11 ... 2 11, 12 puruSa 16. 18 puruSavyApAra Word pratiniyata pratipadamAna pratipanna pratipAdaka pratipAdana pratipAdi pratipAdita pratipAda pratipAdasiddha ... pratipipAdayiSita pratiprANi pratibaddha pratibandha pratibhAta pratibhAsa pratibhAsana pratibhAsitva pratipAdin pratiSThita pratIta pratIti pratyakSa pratyakSabAdhita pratyabhikSAyamAnatva pratyayat pratyAya pratyAyana pratyAyanIya pradIpa prapalAyamAna prabodha pUrva ... 21 va ... 10, 13 6, 15, 25 7, 20, 25 7, 8, 12 1, 9, 20 pUrvavat pUrvAparavyAhata ... pRthivI paudgalika prakaTIkRta prakaraNa prakalpita prakAra. prakAza prakAzana prakAzanIya prakItiti ... 6, 21 6,7, 20 ... 11 ___... 7, 20 ... 5, 26 5 ____... 26 prakRta prakrama prakSipat pracchAdana praNIta pratijJA pramA pramANa ... 4, 11 .... 9 1, 5, 12, 18, 26 pramAtA

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40 Index of Sanskrit words Page 15, 22, 26 Page ... 21, 26 5, 6, 8, 21 ..... 11 ... 11, 11 2, 7, 21 Word buddhi budha bodha bodhisattva bauddha ... 21 Word pramAta prameya prayoktavya prayoga prayojana prayojanatA prarur3ha pralaya pravartana pravRtti prasaGga prasara prasiddha prasidhyati prastAva bhakti bhagavatI ___... 2 ... 6, 21 ... 24 .... 3, 21, 23, 24 1, 6, 26 .... ... 23 .... 1, 2, 7, 26 ... 5 __1, 9, 14 bhava bhAva bhAvArtha bhASaka 'bhinna bhinnakrama bheda ... 10, 15 ......10 ... 18 __... 12, 26 ... 12 ___... 21, 26 ... 25, 26 __3, 5, 16 prAkRta prAmANya bhokta bhAnta prAyaka prAptika prokta bhrAntatA bhrAntatva bhrAnti phala ____ 21 mata 22, 23,26 mati bahiH ... 3, 22 madhya .... 3 bahiH pravartana bahiH pravRtti bahirartha vahirupAhRti bAdha bAdhita bAdhitatva bIja ... 12 madhyama madhyastha madhyasthavRttitA manaH manovyApAra maryAdA mahAnasa mAna 13, 14, 18 .. 18 ... 7, 11 ... 3, 5,7

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Index of Sanskrit words 41 Page Word Page ____18 lakSaNa Word mAMsa mArga mithyA mithyAdarzana mithyAzruta mImAMsaka mukta mukha mala 2, 4, 8, 11, 12, 16, 20, 22, 26, ... ... 10 ... 3, 4, 13, 14 lakSya liGgika : :: :: :: :: :: : : 5, 9, 13, 14 loka lokabAdhita lokavyavahAra lokasaMvRti lola laukika maga meya mAha ... ... 6, 26 mohita vakta ... 16,18 ... . 18 vaktatva vakSyamANa ... yantra yayA yAvat yukta yukti yugma ... 8, 10 26 3, 15, 21 vacaH :: :: :: : 6, 8, 13 6, 9, 13, 16, 19 3,8 vacana vacanarupa ... 5,18 yoga yogAcAra vacanAtmaka vartamAna varmana varddhamAna vastu vahiH vahirudAhRti ... 1 ... 21, 22 ... 16 rakSaNa racanA rathyA rathyApuruSa rAg2a rAjan vA : :: :: :: :: vAkya vAca vAcoyukti vAcya rudra rupa ... 22, 26 21, 26 4 rUpanaya vAda

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42 Index of Sanskrit words : ... 26 ... 10 __... 6, 10 Word Page vAdin ... 10, 16, 19, 26 vAyu vAsanA vAstava vikala 4, 16, 20 vikalpa vikuTTayati vikRti vicAlaka vicitra vicitratA vidyamAnatA vidvas vidhAna vidhi vidhvaMsaka vinA vinivartana vinizcaya vinizcAyin ... ... 24 vipakSa viparIta viparItagrasta ... viparItavyatireka viparItavyatitekitva viparItavyApti ... viparItAnvaya ... biparyaya viparyasta ... 10, 19 viparyastatva viparyastavyatireka viparyAsa vipratipanna vibandha :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: : Word Page vibhAga vimRzyabhASitA ... ... 18 virUddha 6, 10, 15 viruddhavacana viruddhokti virodha virodhaka virodhi vivakSA vivartana ... 21, 25 vivati ... 26 vivRtti ... 1, 25 vivRttimat vizakalita viziSTa vizeSa 1, 14, 16, vizeSaNa ... 3, 26 ___... 22 viSakaNTaka viSaya ... 3, 9, 22 vismRta vItarAga vatti vaddhi vaikalya vaidharma _12, 18,7 vaidharmadRSTAnta vaiparItya vaiyarthya vaiyAkaraNa ... 23 vaizeSika ... 23, 26 vaiSayika vyattikara vyatireka viSa ___... 22 :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: : :: ::

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Index of Sanskrit words 43 43 Page Page Word zUnya 16 zeSa Word vyapohi vyabhicAra vyartha vyavacchinna vyavatcheda vyavasAya vyavasthA vyavahata vyavahAra vyavahita vyAkhyAnaka vyApAra vyApti vyAmuda vyAmoha vyavahArika vyAvRtta vyAvRtti vyatapatti vyadAsa zeSavat zauddhodana zauddhodanaziSyaka zauddhodani zrAvaka zrAvaNatva zrI zruta zrutavarman ... 1, 2, 15, 22, 26 ...... 7, 21, 22 .... .... 26 1, 7, 21 ... 11, 12, 16, 18 .... 2, 3 ... 10, 26 ... 1, 21 .... 18 11, 18,25 ... ... 23 .... .... 4 :: .. 1,3 18 zakti zaGkA 12,5 saMkSiptaruci saMgamya saMgraha saMgrAhaka saMghAta saMjJA saMTaMka saMdeha saMprekSi saMbandha saMyogi saMvitti saMvipra saMvRtti saMvedana saMvyavahatta saMzabdita saMzaya saMsiddha saMsiddhi sakala ... 15 .... 12 1, 3, 9, 16, 19, 22 ... 15 3, 5, 6, 15 ::::::::: zabda zazaviSANa zAbda zAsana ___1, 3, 16, 22, 25 26 2 zAstra zAstraja zAstrIya zIla zuddhi zuddhipaJcaka ... ___... 1, 18 ___... 25 12 ... 12 ... ... 3, 21

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44 Index of Sanskrit words ... 13 ... 20 : :: ... 16, 18 Word Page sat sattA 1, 12, 22 sattva ... 12, 16 sattya .... 22 sannAva 1, 3, 11, 13 sandarzaka ... 9 sandigdha samakSa sandigdhasAdhyavyatireka sandigdhasAdhanavyatirekitva ... samagra samabhirUr3ha samarthatva samavAyi samApta samudaya samudAya ... 11, 22, 24 samAdatva ... 21 sampUrNa sambandha ... 11, 12 samyaka samyakasAdhana samyagdarzana ___ ... 22 zamyaghetu ...1, 9, 14, 16, 22 sarvajJajJAna sarvathA savikalpaka ... ... 18 sahadarzana sAkSAt ... 3, 13, 21 sAkSAtkaraNa ... 1 sAkSAtkAri sAkSAtkRtatA ... sAkSAdvavyApAra ... :: :: :: :: :: :: :: : Word Page sAkSAllakSaNa ... ... 12 sAMkhya ... ... 23, 26 sAdhana 8, 11, sAdhanatva ... .... 15 sAdhanavikalpa ... ... sAdhanAbhAsa sAdhanAvyatirekin sAdharmara ... 11, 16 sAdharmyadRSTAnta ... 11 sAdhu ... 26 sAdhya 4, 11, 12, 16, 18, 22 sAdhyavikalpa .... sAdhyanAvyatirekiNa sApekSa sAmagrIka sAmarthya __.... 3, 10, 20 sAmastya ___ ... 11, 21 sAmAnya ... 1, 4, 14, 22 sAmAnyatIdRSTa ... sAmAnyaprItamAsi sArva __... 25 sita sitapaTTa ... 26 11. 13,26 ... 26 sarvajJa ... 26 26 5, 11, 12,22 :: :: siddha siddhasena siddhasenadivAkara siddhi ... sukha sukhAnIta sugata sunizcitatA ... sUcana ... 21,22 1.8,9 :: :: sUtra saugata

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Index of Sanskrit words 45 Page 23 Word sthita sthiti spaSTa sphuTa smaraNa smaryamANa smRta smRti syAdvAda syAdvAdazruta ... 11, 12 :: :: :: :: :: : Word Page . svarupa 1, 5, 6, 21. 22, 25 svalakSaNa ... 4, 14 svaMcana svAvacanabAdhita svAMvedana svAMza svAnyamizcayi .... svAbhAsi svArthAnumAna ... ... 11, 14 svIkAra ... 9 ... ... 12 4 12 ... ... 24, 26 stra 1, 6,9,13,25 sva svaparAbhAsi svapna ... hAna hita 16 ... 21, 22 5, 6, 14 5, 6, 26 hetu svapnajJAna svapnasaMvevana ... 16, 25 svaprakAza svabhAva svayaM hetugocara hetutva hetvAbhAsa hetvAbhAsatA ...

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