Kundakunda And Umasvati On Anekanta Vada

Author(s): Jayendra Soni
Publisher: Jayendra Soni
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/269519/1

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Kundakunda and Umäsväti on Anekanta-vāda
JAYANDRA SONI
The two revered thinkers Kundakunda and Umásvāti in Jainism are unique figures in the sense that both have laid the foundation for most of the issues that have emerged gradually in the history of Jaina philosophy. There is no doubt that in several cases the source of their ideas are taken from the canonical literature, c.8. the emphasis on ahimsa and the view of different standpoints from which an object of inquiry may be undertaken. However, it is well known that Mahavira's philosophical ideas in the canonical literature are scattered all over and one needs to read a vast amount of material to extract the essence of his teaching. Moreover, one needs a fine sieve to filter out the crucially significant philosophical issues from among long and repeated descriptions of rules for ascetics and the Jaina religious code of conduct in general. These two thinkers have done this for us, cach in his own way, whilst at the same time indirectly telling us how they understand Mahavira's teaching
One of the significant differences between the two is that Kundakunda wrote in Prakrit and Umäsväti in Sanskrit. This is significant for two reasons on the one hand, Kundakunda has clearly shown how the Prakrit language can also be used for philosophical ideas and not only for beautiful Prakrit poetry) and Umäsväti, on the other hand, was the first Jaina thinker to have written a philosophical work in the sutra style. It is unfortunate that we hardly have any biographical information about these two giants in Jainism and hence we do not know when exactly they lived.
If, however, recent research is correct then Kundakunda lived in the second or third century CE and this would make him the first significant and independent thinker of the post-canonical period whose views are accepted as representing the essence of Jaina thought. Moreover, it is generally believed that he was a
See A.N. UPADHYE (1935:5), who first published his views in 1935. His dating of Kundakunda was, however, not left uncontested, especially by contemporary Svetambara scholars and there ensued a great deal of debate regarding this early date. See DHAKY (1991: 193) where he also suggests that Kundakunda's date can only be the latter half of the 8th cent. CE. See also JOHNSON (1995: 95): 'early fifth century or later, and its review by DUNDAS (1997: especially 507 1.).
Eynuy in Juin Philosophy and Religion Warsaw Indological Studies, Volume 2 (2002), pp. 25-35

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JAYANDRA SONI
KUNDAKUNDA AND UMĀSVĀTI ON ANEKANTA-VADA
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1. Kundakunda on anekanta-vāda
pioneering Digambara thinker who probably lived in the South, with appreciation for his views also coming from the Svetāmbaras. It seerns certain that he was also known as Padmanandin. A.N. UPADHYE has shown that possibly apart from the hame Elācārya, all the other names ascribed to Kundakunda or Padmanandin (Vakragriva, Grdhrapiccha or Mahāmati) go against the tradition of the early epigraphic records. The name Grdhrapiccha erroneously used for him since about the fourteenth century has led to confusion because this name is also an alias for Umásvāti.
Umasväti, on the other hand, is said to have lived in the North. His dates vary from the second to the fifth centuries CE with recent preference for the fourth or fifth centuries. Also in his case biographical details are scanty and both the sects of Jainism claim him as one of their own (with the Digambaras also calling him Umāsvāmin), and both regard his work, in traditional Indian manner, as an authority On Jaina thought. His name too is indelible in history of Jaina philosophy, especially for the pioneering work of the now famous Tattvartha-sutra (TS). If there is anything anyone knows about Jaina philosophy then it is certainly from this work. The problem concerning the first commentary on TS seems to be irreconcilable, hamely whether Umäsväli wrote an auto-commentary, the Swopajna-bhasa, as the Svetämbaras say, or whether Pujyapada's Sarvartha-siddhi ("Attainment of the Meaning of Everything') is the first commentary, as the Digambaras say, written in the fifth or sixth century. In any case both commentaries are available and the Comment by Suzuko OHIRA (1982:42) is relevant here: 'The prime contribution of the Sarvartha-siddhi is that it revised and improved the Bhaswa by way of clearly elucidating its general contents in the current language and concept of the time.
There are at least three crucial areas in Jaina thought for which a comparison of the views of Kundakunda and Umāsvāti may be fruitfully undertaken: anekantavada, pramāna and upayoga. To this may also be added an observation about the humber and exact sequence of the basic Jaina categories (attva/ padártha). In this paper I am concerned with only the first in which the terms nuya and spát play key toles. In other words what I am attempting here is to collect together the most Significant references to naya and/or syāt that can be found of these two thinkers and to compare the ways in which they use (or do not use)
Three works by Kundakunda are especially praised as philosophical masterpieces: Panicastikava-samava-sara (PSS), Pravacana-sara (PS), and Samaya-sára (SS). These works are all in Prakrit and they contain not only one of the carliest interpretations of svad-vida but also give one a good impression of how the Prakrit language was used to express philosophical ideas. For his ideas related to anekantavada reference will be made only to Kundakunda's PS, and PSS. In PSå 2.22-23 Kundakunda says:
davvalfhiena savam davvan tart paijayathiena puno / havadi ya annam anannam takkale tammavallado // 22 // [dravarthikena sarvam dravyan tat paryayarthikena punah / bhavati cânyud anyat tar-kāle tan-mayatvát // - p. 144] *All substances are non-different from the substantial view.point, but again they are different from the modificational view.point, because of the individual modification pervading it for the time being' (p. 394). atthi iti va natthi ya havadi avattavvam idi puno davvam/ paijapena du kena vi tad ubhayam aditham annan và // 23 // [astiti ca nástiti ca bhavaty avaktavyam iti punar dravyam/ paryawena iu kenapi tad ubhayam adistam anyad will - p. 146] According to some modification or the other it is stated that a substance
exists, does not exist, is indescribable, is both or otherwise' (p. 394). The last point is repeated in Kundakunda's PSSå 14:
siva athi natthi uhayam avvallavam puno ya tartidayam/ davam khu sattabhamgam adesa-vasena sambhavadi //14/1 svad asti násty ubhayam avaktavpam punas ca tal-Iritayam / dravvanı khalu sapla-bhangam adeśavasena sambhavarill-p. 9) According as Dravya is viewed from different aspects of reasoning it may be described in the following propositions: 1) Perhaps it is; 2) Perhaps it is not: 3) Perhaps it is both (is and is not); 4) Perhaps it is
them.
See UPADHYE (1935: 5) where he draws his conclusions after discussing the Various names
I have hinted at this in the conclusion below. A slightly more detailed account, using the same biographical information given above, can be found in SONI (2001).
For both texts I am supplying the Prakrit text, with the Sanskrit translation in brackets) from the commentary by Amitacandra (tenth century), with UPADHYE's English translation

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JAYANDRA SONI
KUNDAKUNDA AND UMĀSVĀTION INEKANTA-LADA
latter being synonyms of the suddha or paramarthika nava); and (3) with reference to nava in the context of naigana, sangraha, etc.
In order to better understand the difference between Kundakunda and Umásvāti on anekanta-vada we have also to take recourse to the commentaries on TS, because the sülra alone is too brief for any comparison.
indetinable; 5) Perhaps it is and is indefinable; and 6) Perhaps it is not and is indefinable; and 7) Perhaps it is and is not and is
indefinable' (p. 9). Although Kundakunda does not use the word anekanta-vāda, two points are noteworthy here: the word nava is used with reference to an object depending on the standpoint which emphasises it as a substance (drava) or a mode (parvava). Secondly, Kundakunda explicitly mentions the sevenfold predication (sapla-bhangi) in PSS 14, and again in PSSa 72 where it is stated that the soul (jiva) 'is capable of admitting the sevenfold predication' (p. 61), namely that the soul is capable of grasping the nature of an object in all its aspects at once. On the basis of what Kundakunda says above, it cannot be decided whether nava or spat has priority. Hence, it seems they would have to be taken together, as the one being implicit in the other.
3. Anekanta-vada in two Commentaries on TS
2. Umāsvāti on anekanta-vada
It is noteworthy that although the word svat appears in the canonical literature, and Kundakunda uses it too, it does not feature in the first Sanskrit work presenting Jaina philosophy in the traditional sutra style, namely, in TS. Commentators to TS regard spád-vada as being 'implied in TS 5.32 (or 5.31 in the Svetämbara version) arpitánarpila-siddheh--[The contradictory characteristics are established) from different points of view (vide infra, p. 29). In TS 1.33 (or 1.34 in the Svetärbara version) Umasvati mentions only the standpoints (nayas), and they are not statements or assertions that may be made about an object of investigation, cach of which is qualified by the word spāt. They are the standpoints which reflect the common or non-distinguished (naigama), general or collective (sangraha), practical (vyavahāra), etc., positions from which an object may be ascertained. The word naya in the canonical literature also refers to two other contexts, with reference to vyavahāra-naya and/or niscaya-nava, or to the two standpoints with reference to dravya and parvava mentioned above. In other words, when dealing with the word naya, one has to distinguish three contexts in which it is used: (1) with reference to dravya and paryaya; (2) with reference to vyavahāra-naya and/or niscaya-nava (the
Pujyapada, also called Devanandin, is generally believed to have belonged to the fifth or sixth century and to have been a renowned grammarian. His philosophically celebrated work is the Sarwartha-siddhi which is for the Digambaras the first commentary on TS. The following are references to the problem under discussion, taken from S.A. Jain's translation of the work. S.A. JAIN (1960: 157-158) translates Pujyapada's commentary to TS 5.32(31) arpitánarpita-siddheh--The contradictory characteristics are established) from different points of view'-in the following way":
'Substances are characterised by an infinite number of attributes [anekantármakasya vastunah). For the sake of use or need, prominence is given to certain characteristics of a substance from one point of view. And prominence is not given to other characteristics, as these are of no use or need at the time. Thus even the existing attributes are not expressed, as these are of secondary importance (anarpita). There is no contradiction in what is established by these two points of view. For instance, there is no contradiction in the same person Devadatta being a father, a son, a nephew and so on. For the points of view are different. From the point of view of his son he is a father, and from the point of view of his father he is a son. Similarly with regard to his
A.N. UPADHYE (1935: 83).
TATIA's (1994: 136) translation: The ungrasped unnoticed) aspect of an object is attested by the grasped (noticed) one."
See BHATT (1974)
He wrote the Jainendra-nakarana (JV). On p. 32 Nathūrāmji Premi comes to the conclusion that 'Samantabhadra and Devanandi belong to the sixth century and were contemporaries.
For the Sanskrit text see the reference given under SSi. In some cases I am supplying the Sanskrit words in square brackets from the Sanskrit original. All references to Pujyapada are from S.A. JAIN's translation of TS which he supplies.
"Here the key word to be noticed is anekanta -it has already been stated that svádwida is regarded as being implicit in this súlra, since Umasväti does not mention il anywhere in TS

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JAYANDRA SONI
other designations. In the same manner, substance is permanent from the point of view of general properties. From the point of its specific modes it is not permanent. Hence there is no contradiction. These two, the general and the particular, somehow, are different as well as identical [kathamcid bhedabhedabhyam]. Thus these form the cause of worldly intercourse..."
Although Pujyapada uses the word anekanta here in the commentary, the sevenfold statements with the word syat are not given as we find them in Kundakunda. Even though it is important that the word is explicitly used, it is puzzling that he does not make any reference to the use of syat. Pujyapada belongs to the Digambara tradition and certainly lived after Kundakunda whom all Digambaras revere profoundly. If indeed this sutra of TS really implies' syād-vāda, one would have expected Pujyapada to have clinched the opportunity to mention the sapta-bhangi, easily taking it over from Kundakunda (as he does so in the case of dravyarthika-naya and paryayarthika-naya, see n. 11).
With regard to the word naya, Pujyapada explains it in his commentary on TS in two places (TS 1.6 and in TS 1.33/34). TS 1.6 (p. 9) says: pramāṇa-nayair adhigamaḥ Knowledge [of the seven categories] is attained by means of pramāņa and naya.' A part of his commentary to this sutra reads in the translation of S.A. JAIN (1960: 10):
...it has been said that "pramana is a comprehensive view, whereas naya is a partial view." Naya is of two kinds, dravyarthika and paryāyārthika. The former refers to the general attributes of a substance, and the latter to the constantly changing conditions or modes of a substance. Bhava nikṣepa must be ascertained by the standpoint of modes, and the other three by the standpoint of substance." For the latter refers to general characteristics. That which has the substance as its object is the standpoint of substance. That which has the mode as its object is the standpoint of modes. Both the substance and the mode are ascertained by pramāna (comprehensive knowledge).
11 This refers to the previous sutra, TS 1.5: nama-sthapana-dravya-bhavatas tannväsaḥ These [categories, jiva, etc., given in TS 1.4] are installed (in four ways) by name, representation, substance (potentiality) and actual state. Nvasa is a synonym for nikṣepa, which is a typical Jaina way of presenting a topic of discussion. Bhava is a synonym for parväva which refers to the object as it is at a particular moment, i.e. the mode or modification (parváva) taken on by a particular substance (dravya).
KUNDAKUNDA AND UMASVATI ON ANEKANTA-VĀDA
The other place where Pujyapada has to comment on naya is at TS 1.33. In the Digambara version this closes the first chapter of TS, whereas it represents TS 1.34 of the Svetambara version, with the difference that the Svetambara version has only the first five nayas, omitting samabhirudha-naya and evam-bhūta-naya. The Svetambara version closes the chapter with sutra 35, which, for the full understanding of nayas according to the Svetämbaras, has to be read together with 1.34 which merely enumerates the five nayas."2 In the Digambara version Umäsväti enumerates the seven nayas in TS 1.33: naigama, sangraha, vyavahāra, rju-sūtra, sabda, samabhirudha, evam-bhuta, namely, the standpoints which are generally discussed in Jainism.
Referring to TS 1.33, where the seven nayas are enumerated, Pujyapada says, see JAIN (1960: 41 f.):
'The general and specific definitions (samanya-viseṣa-lakṣaṇam) of these [seven nayas] must be given. First the general definition. Objects possess many (anekanta) characteristics. Naya is the device which is capable of determining truly one of the several characteristics of an object (without contradiction) from a particular point of view. It is of two kinds, namely statements which refer to general attributes of a substance and those which refer to the constantly changing conditions or modes of a substance. Dravya means general or common, a general rule or conformity. That which has these for its object is the general standpoint (dravyarthika naya). Paryaya means particular, an exception or exclusion. That which has these for its object is the standpoint of modifications (paryayarthika naya).
Their specific definitions are given now. The figurative standpoint (naigama naya) takes into account the purpose or intention of something which is not accomplished. ...'
31
The commentary then goes on to explain each of the nayas, and thereby ends the chapter. From this it seems that Pujyapada is the only one who uses the word anekanta with a clear hint of the sense in which the term came to be applied as a synonym for the Jaina approach with its epistemological significance. The word naya is used both with reference to dravya and paryaya and with reference to the seven beginning with naigama, sangraha, etc.
As already stated, the Svetambaras believe that Umasvati himself wrote a commentary to his TS and it is now necessary to see what, if any, reference to
12
For the different traditions of the types of nayas see Pt. SUKHLALJI (1974: 56).

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JAYANDRA SONI
KUNDAKUNDA AND UMÄSVATION ANEXANT-LADA
nothing else significant for the context under discussion here. In Umasväti's commentary to the sülra mentioned above the word anekanta does not appear. although it seems easy to read this into it. Hence, although neither Kundakunda nos Umásvāti uses the word anekanta explicitly, it is evident that the theory is implicit in their ideas
4. Differences between Kundakunda and Umásvati
anekanta there is in Umasväti's commentary to the sutras which Pujyapada commented on above."
TS 5.32 (arpitanarpita-siddheh) corresponds to TS 5.31 of the Svetambara version, for which SUKHLALI (1974: 211, 212) gives two interpretative translations: *Each thing is possessed of a number of properties for as viewed from the standpoint adopted and as viewed from another standpoint it proves to be something self-contradictory' and 'Each thing is liable to be a subject matter of usage in various ways, for usage is accounted for on the basis of arpana and anarpana-that is, on the basis of a consideration of chief or subordinate status depending on the desire of the speaker concerned.' The context here is existence (sat) which has already been defined as being characterised by origination, destruction or disappearance) and permanence (TS 5.30(29): utpada-vyaya-dhrauva-yuktam sar). In his commentary Umásvati begins by saying that there are three kinds of existence, namely, as characterised in the sutra, all of which are eternal in so far as they occur continually. Each of these may be established through arpita or anarpita, which he equates with the practical (vyavahárika) and the non-practical (avvavahărika). The commentary continues with an explanation of what existence means on the basis of this classification, in which he mentions, for example, dravyasrika, utpannàstika and paryayastika, viz. existence as a substance, as origination (ie, as a particular object), and as a modification. Although Umasväti neither uses the word naya nor anekanta here, it is clear that the idea is intended, namely, that the nature of an object or existence as such can be ascertained depending on the standpoint from which one approaches the subject, i.e. on the basis of what is given a primary or secondary significance.
Umäsväti's commentary on TS 1.6 is relatively short, in which pramāna is said to be of two kinds, indirect (parokşa) and direct (pratyaksa) and that the nawas (seven for the Digambaras and five for the Svetambaras), such as naigama, etc., will be discussed later, i.e. in TS 1.33 (34 in the Svetambara version, see above)." There is
The significant difference between these two thinkers lies in detail: (1) Kundakunda explicitly uses the word spät in the context of the five statements given in Psa 2.23 and seven in PSS 14 above (p. 27 f.) that can be made about an entity, and Umásváti on the other hand, does not use the word svār; (2) the word nava is used in different contexts by them: Kundakunda uses naya with reference only to dravva and paryaya in the stanzas considered above and these are also used by Pujyapāda in his Sarvartha-siddhi on TS 1.6), whereas Umasvati uses it in the context of the well-known navas (naigama, etc., either 7 or 5). In the context of pramana in TS 1.6 there is no reference to dravva nor parvava in Umasväti's commentary, although it is found in Pujyapada's Sarvártha-siddhi.
As for the word anekanta itself in the sense in which it can be associated with the theory of manifoldness unique to the Jainas, it seems that Pujyapada was the first person to explicitly use it. By the eighth century, however, the theory was undoubtedly already established in this sense, as is evident in Akalanka's works
In conclusion it is noteworthy to mention one more point of difference between Kundakunda and Umäsväti, not directly related to anekanta-vāda, but significant because it concems the enumeration of the basic categories in Jainism:" in his PSS 108 (and SS 1.13) Kundakunda explicitly mentions punya and papa as the third and fourth padarthas (ivasiva-punya-papásrava-samvara-nirjara-bandhemoksah). Umasväti enumerates not only seven of these, omitting punya and papa, but the sequence is slightly different in TS 1.4 (jivajivásrava-bandha-samvaranirjara-moksáh): in the TS bandha is number four (after asrava) and in PSS 108 it is number eight before the last, moksa). Here Umasväti's enumeration seems more logical if one takes into account the role of karman as soon as jiva becomes associated with ajiva. The association is responsible for an inflow of matter which then binds the soul (the karman can be stopped and gradually completely obliterated). On the other hand, without explicitly mentioning punya and papa in the sutra itself Umásváti leaves little room for the ethical role of these categories in the
"I am consulting the following two editions of TS from the same publisher: Sabhasyo-larvárthadhigama-sūtram Rayacandra Jaina Sastramala, published in sriviranirvana-samvat 2432 (CE), and the one published in srivira nirva-samvat 2458 (CE 1932).
"It is interesting to note that Pujyapada says the following about pramana at TS 1.6 (tr. JAIN (1960: 10)): "Pramana is of two kinds, namely for oneself (svártha) and for others (parartha). All kinds of knowledge except scriptural constitute pramana for oneself. But scriptural knowledge is of two kinds, namely for oneself and for others. Moreover, Umäsväti does not mention dravarthika nava and parvavarthika-nava, as Pojyapada does.
See footnote 3 above.

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34 JAYANDRA SONI KUNDAK UNDA AND UMASVATI ONNEK ANTA-LIDA 35 SSA context of the ascetic discipline. Perhaps Umasvati does not mention karman explicitly in the sutra, because it may be regarded as being implicit in asrava. But then these would be implicit also in Kundakunda's gatha, who also does not mention karman explicitly, but instead punya and papa. Furthermore, Kundakunda mentions bandha and moksa together at the end, one after the other in that sequence, perhaps in order to highlight the soul's liberation from the bondage of karman, i.e. to emphasise that without bandha there cannot be moksa. = Kundakunda: Sumuyu-suru. Achuru Kundukundu's Sumuyusuru, with English translation and commentary based upon Amrtacandra's Atmakhruti by A. Chakravarti, Bharatiya Jnanpith, New Delhi 1989. = Ohira, Suzuko: A Study of the Tuttvarthusutru with Bhusyu with Special Reference to Authorship und Dute. L.D. Scries 86, L.D. Ohira 1982 SSi BIBLIOGRAPHY SONI 2001 BHATT 1974 = Pujyapada: Survurthu-siddhi. 5th ed., Bharatiya Jnanapitha Prakasana, Delhi 1991. -- Soni, Jayandra: "A Note on the Jaina tuttval pudurthu' in Vasuntuguuruvum. Essuys In Jainism Felicituiing Professor M. D. Vasunthu Raj of Mysore on the Occusion of his Seventy-fifth Birthday, ed. Jayandra Soni. Vakils, Feffer and Simons Ltd., Mumbai 2001. = Sukhlalji, Pandit: Commentury on Tuttvarthu Sutru of Vucuku Umasvati. L.D. Series 44, L.D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad 1974. = Umasvati: Tuttvarthu-sutru. Subhusyu-tuttvarthudhigumu-sutrum. Rayacandra Jaina Sastramala, published in (1) Srivira-nirvanasamvat 2432 (CE 1906), and (2) Srivira-nirvana-samvat 2458 (CE 1932). SUKHLALJI 1974 DUNDAS 1997 TS DHAKY 1991 Tatia 1994 = Tatia, Nathmal (tr.): Tattvarthu Sutra: That Which Is. Umasvati! Umusvumi; with the combined commentaries of Umasvatil Umasvumi, Pujyapudu und Siddhusensguni. The Sacred Literature Series, Harper Collins Publishers, San Francisco-LondonPymble 1994. JAIN 1960 = Bhatt, Bansidhar: "Vyavahara-naya and Niscaya-naya in Kundakunda's Works.' In: Wolfgang Voigt (ed.): XVIII. Deutscher Orientalistentug vom 1. bis 5. Oktober 1972 in Lubeck, Vortrage. Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenlundischen Gesellschufi, Supplement II, Franz Steiner Verlag, Wiesbaden 1974: 279-91. = Dundas, Paul: "The Laicisation of the Bondless Doctrine: A New Study of the Development of Jainism.' In: Journul of Indian Philosophy 25 (1997) 495-516. (This is a review of JOHNSON (1995)]. . = Dhaky, M. A.: 'The Date of Kundakundacarya.' In: M.A. Dhaky and Sagarmal Jain (eds.): Aspects of Juinology Vol. III: Pt Dulsukhbhai Malvunia Felicitation Volume 1. P.V. Research Institute, Varanasi 1991: 187-206. = Jain, S.A. (tr.): Reality: English Translation of Pujyupadu's Survurthusiddhi. Vira Sasana Sangha, Calcutta 1960. (Reprinted: Jwalamalini Trust, Madras 1992). := Johnson, W. J.: Hurmless Souls. Kurmic Bondage und Religious Chunge in Eurly Juinism with Special Reference to Umasvati und Kundukundu. Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1995. = Pujyapada Devanandin: Juinendru-vyukurunu, ed. Sambhunatha Tripathi and Mahadeva Caturvedi, Bharatiya Jnanapitha, Kasi 1956. = Kundak unda: Puvurunu-suru (Pruvucunu-surul. A.N. Upadhye (ed.): Sri Kundukundacuryu's Prurucunusuru (Puruyunusuru), u Pro-Cunonicul Text of the Juinus, the Prukrit Text criticully edited with the Sanskrit Commenturies of Amrtucundru und Jurusenu. Parama-Sruta-Prabhavaka Mandal, Shrimad Rajachandra Ashrama, Agas-Gujarat 1984. (First edition: Bombay 1935]. = Kundak unda: Puncustikuvu-Sumuyu-suru. A. Chakravartinayanar and A.N. Upadhye (eds.): Puncustikuvusuru. The Building of the Cosmos. Prakrit text, Sanskrit chura, English commentary ctc. Bharatiya Jnanpith Publication, Delhi 1975. UPADHYE 1935 JOHNSON 1995 A.N. Upadhye: 'Introduction, See: PSa. PSa PSS