Jain Journal 1998 07

Author(s): Jain Bhawan Publication
Publisher: Jain Bhawan Publication
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/520131/1

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ISSN 0021-4043 A QUARTERLY ON JAINOLOGY VOL XXXIII No. 1 JULY 1998 10 lucht JAIN BHAWAN PUBLICATION

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Contribution of the Jaina Logicians to Indian Epistemology Dharam Chand Jain Lord Mahavira on Pramada D.S. Baya Shreyas Contents The Followers of Parsvanatha Binod Kumar Tiwari News on Jainism around the world 1 24 28 32

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JAIN JOURNAL Vol. XXXIII No. 1 July 1998 CONTRIBUTION OF THE JAINA LOGICIANS TO INDIAN EPISTEMOLOGY* DR DHARM CHAND JAIN PART-I A BRIEF SURVEY OF LITERARY CONTRIBUTION Before I enter into the problem, I would like to say first of all that the term 'epistemology encompasses two dimensions of philosophy, i.e. Jnana-mimamsa and Pramana-mimamsa. To some extent, both the dimensions are intermingled. Pramana is not absolutely different from knowledge or congnition. Particularly in Jaina tradition pramana is always accepted as a kind of congnition. Hence all the descriptions made in Jaina canons regarding knowledge come under the scope of pramana. When we discuss pramana, we have to resort to the theory of knowledge. There is only one difference in pramana and right knowledge (samyag-jnana) that the right knowledge depends on right view (samyag-darsana), but pramana does not require any such view. Pramana is a kind of knowledge which is devoid of doubt (samsaya), illusion (viparyaya) and indetermination (anadhya-vasaya). In Jaina philosophy pramana has been accepted as a definitive cognition of knowable thing and knowledge itself. The Jaina logicians are almost unanimous on this characteristic of pramana. Although at the early time of Tattvarthasutra, there was no difference between pramana and right knowledge, that is why, Umasvati, the author of Tattvarthasutra had clearly divided five types of knowledge into two kinds of pramana without mentioning any difference between right knowledge and pramana. He kept matijnana (sensuous knowledge) and srutajnana (scriptural or verbal knowledge, succeeding matijnana) under the category of paroksa pramana (indirect pramana) and the other three of knowledge i.e. avadhinana (visual intuition), manahparyayainana (intuition of mental modes) and kevalajnana (pure and perfect knowledge) had been placed in the category of pratyaksa pramana * This is a Mahasati Tarabai Svami lecture given by the author at Chennai.

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JAIN JOURNAL: Vol-XXXIII, No. 1 July 1998 (perception). This division proves that there was not any difference between right knowledge and pramana. Tattvarthasutra is the first work of Jaina system which propounded the right knowledge as pramana (an organ of valid cognition) and divided them into two typespratyaksa and paroksa. This division of pramana is based on the process of knowledge. The right knowledge which occurs directly through the soul had been called as pratyaksa pramana (perception) and the right knowledge which occurs through sense organs and quasi-sense had been called as paroksa pramana (other than perception or indirect knowledge). 2 In Indian Philosophy all the systems other than Jaina, consider that the knowledge acquired through sense organs comes under the category of perception, but the view of earlier Jaina thinkers like Umasvati and Pujyapada Devanandin who followed the notion of Jaina canonical literature, considered it in the category of paroksa. They explain that the knowledge occurs directly through soul without the help of sense-organs comes under the concept of pratyaksa or direct cognition. The Jaina logicians, after interaction with other schools, accept the sensuous knowledge under the category of empirical perception or samvyavaharika pratyaksa. This development is first seen in the Visesavasyakabhasya of Jinabhadragani Ksamasramana. He says jam indiyamanobhavam tam samvavaharapaccakkham (Visesavasyakabhasya, 95) which means knowledge occurring through sense organs and quasisense is called as samvyavaharika pratyaksa (empirical perception). Bhatta Akalanka and other Jaina logicians followed him. Hence they considered two types of pratyaksa as mukhya pratyaksa and samvyavaharika pratyaksa. The perception occurred directly through the soul comes under the category of mukhya-pratyaksa and the perception occurred through sense-organs and mind comes under the category of samvyavaharika pratyaksa (empirical perception). At this stage, the Jain logicians entered into dialogue with other Indian logicians. It may be noted that in the Anuyogadvarasutra the word pramana is used in the meaning of measurement and we find four types of that pramana there i.e. dravyapramana, ksetrapramana, kalapramana and bhavapramana. Somewhere in the Bhagavatisutra and Anuyogadvarasutra the four types of pramana propounded by the Naiyakikas are mentioned i.e. pratyaksa (perception) anumana (inference), upamana (comparison) and agama (tesimony). (Bhagavatisutra 5.3.192) In the Sthanangasutra these four types of pramana are mentioned

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JAIN : CONTRIBUTION OF THE JAINA LOGICIANS TO INDIAN EPISTEMOLOGY 3 as the four types of hetu- (Sthanangasutra, 245, Suttagame, p. 215). Sthanangasutra has also mentioned three types of vyavasaya i.e. pratyaksa, pratyayika and anugami- (Sthanangasutra, 245). Pandit Dalsukha Malvaniya has mentioned in his 'Agama Yuga ka Jain Darsana' (pp. 138-139) that these three types of Vyavasaya have got a place in Siddhasena's Nyayavatara and Haribhadra's Anekantajayapataka as the developed form of pramanai.e. pratyaksa, anumana and agma It is true that the seeds and roots of Jaina concept of pramana are found in Jaina canons. The Anuyogadvarasutra and Sthanangasutra have great importance in this context. In the Sthanangasutra perception is divided into two types i.e. kevala and nokevala. In the later development of pramanasastrathe Jaina logicians termed these types as sakala and vikala perception. In the Anuyogadvarasutra and Nandisutra perceptual knowledge is divided into two types i.e. indriya-pratyaksa and no-indriya pratyaksa. This division shows that in the later canonical literature the knowledge occurred by sense organs was included in perception. This division of perception is not mentioned in the Tattvarthasutra So it seems that this addition was made in the canons at a later stage. It is possible that Jinabhadraganin (6th century) developed a concept of sanuyavaharika pratyaksa on the basis of the above mentioned division of perception in the Nandisutra and Sthanangasutra. Jaina epistemology regarding pramana was actually systematized by Bhatta Akalanka in the eighth century A.D. The main contribution of Bhatta Akalanka was to establish smrti (recollection) pratyabhijnana (recognition) and tarka (inductive reasoning) as independent pramanas under the category of paroksa. This is also one of the main contributions of Jaina epistemology to Indian philosophy. Before the advent of Akalanka (720-780 A.D.), Umasvati (2nd-3rd century A.D.), Pujyapada Devanandin (5th century A.D), Samantabhadra (6th century A.D.), Mallavadi Ksamasramana (5th century A.D.), Jinabhadragani Ksama-sramana (6th-7th century A.D.), Simhasuri (7th century A.D.) Sumati (7th-8th century) Patrasvami (7th century), Shridatta, Kumaranandin (7th century) and Haribhadrasuri (700-770 A.D.) also contributed their mite to the Jaina epistemology to some extent. Acarya Kundakunda attempted to prove the nature of knowledge illuminating itself and object. One of the prominent philosophers Mallavadi Ksamasramana flourished in the 5th century A.D. discussed all the main philosophical tenects in his famous work Dvadasaranayacakra. He refuted several times the epistemology of other systems. Simhasuri's commentary on

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JAIN JOURNAL: Vol-XXXIII, No. 1 July 1998 it is also an authouritative work for understanding Dvadasaranayacakra. Siddhasena Divakara was a great logician who flourished before Bhatta Akalanka in 5th century A.D. and wrote an independent work on Jaina logic known as Nyayavatara. It is a systematic work comprising 32 karikas (Stanzas) presents a brief description of Jain pramana-sastra. S.C. Vidyabhusana mentioned Siddhasena Divakara as a father of Jaina Logic and recognised his Nyayavatara as the first work of Jaina Logic (A History of Indian Logic p. 173). Hence it is an important work for Jaina Logic. Siddharsigani, a philosopher of the 9th century A.D., wrote a comprehensive commentary on it. M.A. Dhaky is of the view that Siddharsigani, the commentator of Nyayavatara, was himself the writer of Nyayavatara (Nirgranth, Ahmedabad, Vol. I), but his opinion does not seem acceptable, because if Siddharsigani (9th century) would have written it, then he must have mentioned smriti, pratyabhijnanaand tarka as pramana, because before the advent of Siddharsigani, Bhatta Akalanka emphatically established them as pramana. Santisuri of Purnatalagacchiya wrote a varttika and commentary on Nyayavatara, which is also an important work for the study of development of Jaina logic. Santisuri defined the perception as clarity of knowledge and propounded three types of it i.e. indriya pratyaksa (sensuous perception), aninindriya pratyaksa (quasisensuous perception) and yogaja pratyaksa. (Nyayavatara varttika, 17). He defined vaisadya or vividity of knowledge as the apprehension of its content as this (Nyayavatara-varttika, 17) definition has been followed by Hemacandra in his Pramana-mimamsa, (Pramanamimamsa 1.1.14) 4 Sanmatitarka-prakarana is also an important treatise consisting of three chapters namely-Naya-mimamsa, Jnanamimansa and Jneya-mimamsa. Siddhasena was a great philosopher who also contributed to the establishment of the theory of non-absolutism. Like Siddhasena Divakara, Samantabhadra's main contribution was to establish Anekantavada or non-absolutism, but occasionally he discussed some concepts of pramana-sastra also. His Yuktyanusasana, Aptamimamsa and Svayambhustotra are the main works. Sumati, Patrasvami, Sridatta and Kumaranandin were such prominent philosophers of the 7th and 8th centuries A.D. whose works are mentioned by Buddhist and Jaina logicians, but the works have not yet been found. Sumati and Patrasvami were such renowned philosophers whose names are referred by the Buddhist logician Santaraksita (8th century) in his work Tattvasamgraha. Patrasvami's Trilaksanakadartham was a famous treatise in which the hetulaksana

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JAIN CONTRIBUTION OF THE JAINA LOGICIANS TO INDIAN EPISTEMOLOGY 5 of Buddhist philosophy was refuted vehemently. Vidyananda mentioned in Tattvartha-sloka-varttika about Jalpanirnaya the work of Sridatta and in Pramana-pariksa he mentioned about Vadanyaya the work of Kumaranandin. In the eighth century A.D. Haribhadra-suri (700-770 A.D.), an original thinker and profound philosopher, authoured several works. His famous philosophical works are Anekantajaya-pataka, Sastravartasamuccaya and Saddarsana-samuccaya. Commentary of Gunaratnasuri is famous on Saddarsana-samuccaya and commentary of Yasovijaya is also renowned on Sastravarta-samuccaya. Thus from Umasvati down to Haribhadrasuri, the predecessors of Bhatta Akalanka developed and enriched the Jaina epistemology. The advent of Bhatta Akalanka had a great significance from the point of view of systematization of Jain logic and epistemology. He flourished during the period from 720 to 780 A.D. as is upheld by Pandit Mahendra Kumar Nyayacarya in the introduction to his Akalankagranthatrayam Bhatta Akalanka has critically examined the views regarding metaphysics and epistemology of previous Indian philosophers like Dinnaga, Dharma Kirti, Prajnakaragupta, Karnakagomi and Kumarilabhatta. He authoured two commentaries entitled Tattvarthavartika and Astasati on Tattvarthasutra of Umasvati and Aptamimamsa of Samantabhadra respectively. In the Tattvarthavartika Bhatta Akalanka has discussed the definition of pramana and accepted that pramana (organ of valid cognition) is valid even after it cognises the object previously cognised. He gave an instance of a lamp which illuminates the object even after the moment it is lit. Although the main subject-matter of Tattvarthasutra is not intended to propound epistemology, in the context of description of knowledge commentator Akalanka discussed the definitions of pramana propounded by other Indian systems also. Astasati is a precise commentary having the size of eight hundred anustubh metres. Deep sense, few words and logical acumen are the specialities of Akalanka's style and they are more distinct in Astasati. Akalanka included some new topics in the commentary and threw a light on pramana-sastra explaining the Karika No. 101 of Aptamimamsa. He seems impressed by Buddhist definition of pramana also, because he used the term 'avisamvada' for defining pramana. He says that Pramana is a kind of cognition devoid of discrepancy and indetermination. Bhatta Akalanka wrote four independent works viz. Laghiyastraya along with the vrtti, Nyaya-viniscaya along with the vrtti, Pramanasamgraha and Siddhiviniscaya along with the vrtti. All these four works

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JAIN JOURNAL: Vol-XXXIII, No. 1 July 1998 mainly deal with the epistemology and logic. Laghiyastraya is a composite work having three manuals (prakarana) viz. (i) Pramanapravesa (ii) Naya-pravesa and (iii) Pravacana-pravesa. Pramana-pravesa contains four chapters on (i) nature of pramana (ii) classification (iii) object and (iv) resultant. Naya-pravesa is mainly devoted to the description of Nayas. Pravacana-pravesa, though begins with the definition of pramana, naya and niksepa, it mainly deals with srutajnana, a kind of paroksa pramana. 6 Nyayaviniscaya, another work of Akalanka, has three chapters on perception, inference and testimony. Pramana-samgrha, an important work of Akalanka, deals with every aspect of epistemology in nine chapters. Siddhiviniscaya is also an important work regarding epistemology and logic. He defines here pramana as siddhi. This treatise comprises twelve chapters which are indicative of their subject-matter. Akalanka says here that every knowledge is valid due to its corresponding nature and it is invalid due to its discrepancy - Siddhiviniscaya 1.19) If we summarise the contribution of Akalanka on the basis of his above mentioned four works, then we can point out his views as follows: 1) It was he who for the first time established recollection (smrti), recognition (pratyabhijnana) and inductive reasoning (tarka) as pramana. He has placed these under the category of paroksa pramana. He has said that if these cognitions are indiscrepant and devoid of doubt, illusion and indetermination (anadhyavasaya) then these are very much the means of valid cognition. 2) He upholds two types of pratyaksa-samvyavaharika (empirical) and mukhya (transcendental). The types of matijnana as avagraha (receiving), iha (speculation) avaya (perceptual judgement) and dharana (retention) were included by him in samvyavaharika pratyksa and he has accepted their sequential position as propounded in canonical literature. 3) He has accepted differences between matijnana and srutajnana according to the canonical tradition and has placed the srutajnana under the category of paroksa pramana, srutajnana is known in epistemplogy as agamapramana. (4) He has included upamana pramana (comparison) in the recognition (pratyabhijnana) of similarity which he conceptualised taking Samjna of Umasvati as its basis. 5) He has discussed all the epistemological terms, such as hetu, sadhya, drstanta, vyapti etc.

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JAIN CONTRIBUTION OF THE JAINA LOGICIANS TO INDIAN EPISTEMOLOGY 7 6) he has introduced some new hetus also such as karana (cause) purvacara, uttaracara and sahacara. 7) Akalarka has discussed naya and niksepa also which has formed an integral part of epistemology. The Jaina philosophers contributing to Indian epistemology after Bhatta Akalanka are: Vidyananda, Anantavirya, Manikyanandin, Vadiraja, Abhayadevasuri, Prabhacandra, Vadidevasuri, Hemacandra, Abhinava dharmabhusana, Gunaratnasuri, Mallisena, Vimaladasa and Yasovijaya. Since it is not possible to disscuss the contributions of all these logicians owing to the short time at my disposal, I think it to appraise you to the contributions of the prominent logicians. proper Vidyananda (775-840 AD), the first commentator of Akalanka, was a progound philosopher deeply acquainted with Jaina and other systems of Indian philosophy. He put forth a step to establish the Jaina pramana-sastra logically. He wrote three commentaries viz. Tattvartha-sloka-vartika on Tattvarthasutra of Umasvati, Astasahasri on Astasati of Bhatta Akalanka and Yuktyanusasanalankara on yuktyanusasana of Samantabhadra. In these commentaries he has cogently established the Jaina philosophy and has refuted other systems. Tattvartha-sloka-vartika, a commentary on the Tattvarthasutra, presents an exhaustive description of Jaina epistemology. He has discussed all the five types of knowledge. He also deals with perception, recollection, (smarana), recognition (pratyabhi jnana), reasoning (tarka), inference (anumana) and testimony (agama). Astasahasri expounds Aptamimamsa of Samantabhadra and Astasati of Akalannka on it, but Astasahasrihas become a kastasaharri, because its comprehension is an uphill task. Yuktyanusaranalannkara is an important work for understanding the Jaina philosophy in general. Apart from his commentaries Vidyananda wrote six independent works. viz. Vidyanandamahodaya, Aptapariksa, Pramanapariksa, Patrapariksa, Satya-sasana-pariksa and sripuraparsvanathastotra. All these works are important for the study of Jaina philosophy, particullarly his pramana-parikra is fully devoted to discussing the different aspects of epistemology. Herein Vidyananta defines pramana as right cognition. He repudiated the concept of nirvikalpaka pratyaksa mainly propounded by Buddhists. He says that perception is a kind of valid cognition and every valid cognition is regarded as determinant cognition. Vidyananda has also dicussed the definition of probans (hetu) and refuted the position of Buddhists and Naiyayikas who consider

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JAIN JOURNAL : Vol-XXXIII, No. 1 July 1998 hetu's trairupya and pancarupya repectively as its essential characteristics. pramana-pariksa is really the first composite and systematic work which expalins the complete Jaina epistemology and logic briefly. The second commmentator of Akalanka was Anantavirya. There are four Anantaviryas referred to in Jaina literature, but he was the third Anantvirya who flourished during 950 to 990 A.D. and wrote commentaries on Pramana-samgrahaand Siddhiviniscayaof Akalanka. Commentary on Pramanasangraha is known as pramanasamgrahabhasaya and commentary on Siddhiviniscaya is known as Siddhiviniscayatika. pramanasamgrahabhasyais not yet available, but its reference is found in the Siddhiviniscayatika. It is an important commentary for understanding the development of Jaina thinking regarding episteniology. Manikyanandin (993-1053 AD) was the first logician who wrote an aphoristic treatise entitled Pariksamukha which presents the Jaina system of epistemology in a nutshell. Prabhacandra a prominent philosopher wrote a voluminous commentary on it entitled prameyakamala-martanda Laghuanantavirya's prameyaratnamala, Carukirti's prameyasatalankara and santivami's Prameyakanthika are also famous commentaries on pariksamukha All these commentaries depict the importance of this first aphoristic treatise of Jaina logic. Vadiraja (1025 AD) was also a commentator of Akalanka. He wrote a commentary on Nyayaviniscaya of Akalanka known as Nyayaviniscayavivarana This is a big commentary comprising the size of twenty thousand Anustubh stanzas. It discusses the doctrines of several Indian philosophers like Kumarila, Prabhakara, Mandanamisra, Vyomasiva, Bhasarvajna etc. and refutes them cogently. Other work of Vadiraja on Jaina epistemology is pramana-nirnaya. It is an independent work on Jaina-nyaya. Vadiraja propounds only two types of paroksa pramana as inference and testimony and includes recollection, recognition and reasoning as the subdivisions of inference. Abhayadevasuri the commentator of Siddhasena's Sanmatitarka prakarang, was a disciple of Rajagacchiya Pradyumnasuri, Pandit Sukhalala Sanghavi & Pandit Becaradasa Dosi have placed him during the second half of the 10th centrury and first half of the 11th century A.D. Pandit Mahendra Kumar Nyayacarya considers him belonging to the last part of the 11th century of Vikrama Samvat, but he does not clearly say that who was earlier between Abhayadevasuri and Prabhacandra. It seems that Abhayadevasuri's commentary on

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JAIN : CONTRIBUTION OF THE JAINA LOGICIANS TO INDIAN EPISTEMOLOGY 9 Sanmatitarka was written eariler than the works of Prabhacadra becuase the issues raised in the Tattvabodhavidhayini (tika on Sanmatitarka) are found more systematic in the works of Prabhacandra. The commentary Sanmatitarkatika also known as Tattvabodhavidhayiniand Vadamaharnava explains naya, jnanaand jneya at lenght. Abhayadevasuri was a well-versed commentator on Jaina epistemology. He has a penetrating view when he refutes the other systems. The second kanda of his commentary mainly deals with epistemology. Prabhacandra, a renowned Jaina logician, has contributed a lot by writing two voluminous commentaries entitled Nyaya-kumudacandra and Prameya-kamala-martanda prameya-kamala-martandra is a commentary on Pariksamukha of Manikyanandin and Nyaya kumuda candra is a commentary on Laghiyastrayaof Akalanka. Pandit Kailasacandra Sastri places him during 950 to 1020 AD in the introduction to the first part of Nyaya-kumuda-candra and Pandit Mahendra Kumar Nyayacarya has fixed him with a minor modification during 980 to 1065 A.D. Prabhacandra has given many new cogent arguments to refute the other systemes and to establish the Jaina philosophy. He has discussed the other systems' prima facie views (purvapaksa) and refuted them on logical ground. Although he is credited to have written some other works like Tattvarthavstti, Sakatayananyasa, Sabdambhojabhaskara, Pravacana-sarasarojabhaskara, Gadyakathakosa, Mahapurana tippana, Ratnakarandatika, Samadhitantratika, Kriyakalapatika, and Atmanusasanatilaka, but scholars have divergent opinions about the authourship of some of these works. Although Prameya-kamala-martanda comes under the category of a commentary, but it seems to be an independent original work. Prabhacandra has also discussed all the other systems in detail and has subjected them to devastating criticism. In his other commentary Nyaya-kumuda-candra, Prabhacandra discussed some new topics and presented new arguments to establish the Jaina theory of epistemology. There is no doubt that he has explained all the aspects of pramana in a systematic and logical style in both the commentaries. Like Manikyanandin, a Digamber sect, Vadidevasuri was the first Svetambara Acarya who wrote an aphoristic treatise on Jaina logic entitled Pariksamukha, but somewhere or other Vadidevasuri differs from Manikyanandin as on the topics of kevali-kavala-hara,

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10 JAIN JOURNAL : Vol-XXXIII, No. 1 July 1998 emancipation of a woman etc. Vadidevasuri's pramana-naya-tattvaloka comprises eight chapters having two more chapters than pariksamukha, dealing with naya and vada also. Vadidevasuri was the first logician who systamatized the rules of vada according to Jaina views. Another new chapter which deals with naya is also important, because it summarises the Jaina perspective on naya. A profound philosopher of the 17th century, a celebrated Jaina philosopher Acarya Yasovijaya, has followed his Pramana-naya-tattualoka in his Jaina Tarka-Bhasa. Vadidevesuri himself wrote a valuable commentary as la-ratnakara. It is a voluminous commentrary having a size of eighty four thousand Anustubhmetres. The title suaduada-ratnakara is significant by its subject-matter. Vadidevasuri discussed those topics too which could not be taken up by Prabhacandra. The language of the work is very lucid and attractive. Syadvadaratnakara is of paramount importance since it goes one step further in developing Jaina epistemological doctrines. He was the first and the last commentator in the the Jaina sects who wrote such a big and authoritative commentary on Jaina epistemology. He dealt with all the philosophical aspects. He cogently proved the validity of karana, purvacara, uttaracara, sahacaraand vyapya hetus and coined the two new terms tiryak samanya and urdhvata samanya in the context of pratyabhijnanaand prameya. Hemacandrasuri, known as Kalikalasarvajna, was not only a logician, but also a poet, rhetorician, grammarian, lexicographer etc. His unique work Pramana-mimamsahas established him as an original thinker in the field of epistemology. He defines pramana as an authentic definitive cognition of an object. He does not feel any necessity of inserting 'sva' in the definition of pramana, because in the opinion of Hemacandra 'Svanirnaya' does not distinguish it from illusory cognition. Prior to Hemcandra pramana was defined as sva-para avasayi, svaparavabhasaka etc. which means pramana is a definitive cognition of an object and of the self. Thus Hemacandra has his own views whereas Manikyamandin inserted word apurva in the definition of pramana Hemacandra repudiates his insertion and says that a cognition taking note of an object previously cognised does not la of pramana exactly as the cognition which takes note of what is to be cognised in future. He proposes that with the point of view of modes cognition of previously cognised object is not possible, because a substance is changing every moment at the angle of its modes. Jinesvarasuri's Pramalaksana (10th-11th centuries A.D.) Candrasenasuri's Utpadadisiddhi, Abhinavadharmabhusana's

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JAIN : CONTRIBUTION OF THE JAINA LOGICIANS TO INDIAN EPISTEMOLOGY 11 Nyayadipika, Narendrasena's Pramana-prameya-kalika are also important works which have enriched the Jaina epistemological literature. In the seventeenth century Acarya Yasovijaya (emerged as a prominent philosopher) wrote more than a hundred works. His works mainly related to Jaina epistemology are-Jainatarkabhasa, Jnanabindu, Astarahasritatparya-vivarana and sastravartasamuccayatika.. Among these works former two are independent treatires and the latter two are the commentaries. Astasahasritatparyavivarana is a commentary on Astasahasri of Vidyananda and Sastravartasa-muccayatika is a commentary on Sastravartasamuccaya of Haribhadrasuri. To conclude, we can say that the Jaina epistemology has completed a long journey of development ranging from the 2nd century A.D. to the 17th century A.D. It has been enriched by a huge literature comprising aphoristic treatises, commentaries, varttikas, bhasyas and independent works. It goes without saying that both from the point of view of volume of literature and quality of philosophical discussion it is not less advanced, (if not more), than the Vedic logic and Buddhist logic. Some points are noted below : A. The Jaina philosophers of both the sects Digambara and Svetambara joined their hands to develope the Jaina epistemology and logic. Jain philosophers were well-versed with all the systems of philosophy, whatever they thought appropriate for Jaina system was accepted. Their refutation of opponent's view is based on cogent reasons. B. If the works of Sumati, Kumaranandin and Patrakesari are found available, then the history of the development of Jaina epistemology may be rewritten. c. Umasvati was the first philosopher who recognised right knowledge as pramana and classified the pramana into two types i.e. pratyaksa (perception) and paroksa. After establishment of right knowledge as pramana all the descriptions of knowledge found in canonical literature came under the category of pramana. D. The division of knowledge as indriya-pratyaksa and no-indriya pratyaksa as found in the Nandi-sutra seems a latter development. E Although Nyayavatara is the first systematic work on Jaina epistemology and logic, Bhatta Akalanka systematized it. He

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12 JAIN JOURNAL : Vol-XXXIII, No. 1 July 1998 included recollection, recognition and reasoning as pramana under the category of paroksa pramana He introduced karana, purvacara, uttaracara and sahacara hetus as valid probans. F. The knowledge occurring through sense organs was first included as empirical perception (samvyavaharika pratyaksa) by Jinabhadraganin. Earlier it was mentioned as indriyapratyaksa in the Nandisutra. In the Nandi-sutra the concept of anindriya pratyaksa (quasisense) is not mentioned. The Nandisutra mentions about no-indriya pratyaksa, but this term was used to denote transcendental perception. G. The mukhya pratyaksa was given a new name as paramarthika pratyaksa by Vadidevasuri. He further divided it into two types as sakala and vikala pratyaksaon the basis of a division found in the Sthananga-sutTa as kevala and no-kevala H. The Svetambara logicians are unanimous in accepting the validity of cognition which cognises the object previously cognised. Whereas Digambara logicians like Akalannk Manikyanandin and Prabhacandra were of opinion that it is a condition for valid cognition to be regarded as a pramana that it must cognise the object which is previously not cognised. I. Hemacandra for the first time mentions that mind is capable to know all the objects. Umasvati says that mind is only an instrument of Srutajnana. We cannot forget the scholars of the 20th century like Pandita Sukhlal Sanghavi, Dalsukha Bhai Malavaniya, Mahendra Kumara Nyayacarya, Satakari Mookerjee, Becardasa Dosi, Darbarilala Koti and Nathamal Tatia who have contributed to bring out the literature with their perfection of editing and illustrative notes. Some of Jaina Saints and scholars are also engaged in translating the epistemological works in Hindi, Gujarati and English. Pandit Kailasa Candra Sastri, Nagin J. Saha, and Muni Nathamala (Acarya Mahaprajna) and are such modern scholars who also contributed to present the Jaina views in a critical manner. The Jaina epistemological literature is undoubtedly of paramount impartance for understanding the development of Indian and Jaina thinking on epistemology.

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JAIN CONTRIBUTION OF THE JAINA LOGICIANS TO INDIAN EPISTEMOLOGY 13 PART II AN APPRAISAL OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO EPISTEMOLOGICAL DOCTRINES As pointed out before the term 'epistemology' encompasses two dimensions of philosophy i.e. Jnana-mimamsa and Pramana-mimamsa. Today I want to make it clear that Nayamimamsa is also a dimension of epistemology which has been discussed exclusively by Jaina philosophers. Epistemology is a science of knowledge which includes all that deals with every aspect of knowing. Pramanamimamsa and Nayamimamsa are not absolutely different from Jnanamimansa. The Tattvarthasutra of Umasvati propounds clearly that knowledge of an object is attained by pramana and naya. (Tattvarthasutra 1.6). Herein it is also clear that Adhigama (knowledge) is a resultant and pramana and naya are the means. pramana and jnana are the terms which are commonly found in all the systems of Indian philosophy. But the characteristic concept of 'naya' is a peculiar contribution of Jaina system of Indian epistemology. The Jaina logicians contributed their mite to establish the doctrine of naya. Although 'naya' is a part of srutajnana, it has been developed by the Jaina logicians as a separate branch of knowledge which denotes the different attitudes and standpoints. Another contribution of the Jaina logicians the is development of the theory of Anekantavada (non-absolutism) and Syadvada. Saptabhangi naya (sevenfold predication) is also a development of non-absolutism. Thus the Jania contribution to Indian epistemology is significant for knowing a truth with different perspectives. The fivefold knowledge i.e. matijnana (sensuous knowledge), srutajnana (scriptural or verbal knowledge, succeeding (matijnana), avadhijnana (visual intuition), manahparyaya jnana (intution of mental modes) and kevala-jnana (pure and perfect knowledge) is an original contribution of Jaina tradition which was manitained by the Jaina logicians by including it in the twofold pramana. Now I want to highlight the points on which Jania logicians contributed to the Indian epistemology regarding pramana. The main contributions of the Jaina logicians regarding pramana are as follows: Definition of pramana and its nature illuminating the self and the object. (i) (ii) Establishment of recollection (smrti) as an independent pramana (iii) Establishment of recognition (pratyabhijnana) as an independent pramana

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14 JAIN JOURNAL : Vol-XXXIII, No. 1 July 1998 (iv) Establishment of inductive reasoning (tarka) as an independent pramana (v) Definition of probans (hetu) as incompatibility with the contradictory (anyathanupapatti). (vi) Establishment of new probans such as karana, purvacara, uttaracara and sahacara (vii) Particular view about the members of pararthanumana required (for inference for others). (viii) Nature of prameya (object) is Dravyaparyayatmaka or Samanayavisesatmaka. Now we shall discuss the above arguments and clarify the thoughts of the Jaina logicians about these points. i. Definition of Pramana Regarding the definition of Pramana Jaina philosophers are unanimous in propounding it as definitive cognition. The other characteristic of pramana accepted by them is the nature of pramana illuminating the self and the object. The Jaina logicians uphold that the contact of the sense organ and object never can be a pramana They say that like object, the sense-object contact also cannot be a pre-eminent cause in generating valid knowledge, because both of them are non-revelatory, because Jaina thinkers propound that pramana is useful for accepting the desired object and abandoning the undesirable one. Hence it must be cognition. They also accept that a valid cognition through a pramanadoes not require to prove its validity, because the knowledge is always of the nature of illuminating the self and the object. They give an example of the Sun or a lamp which illuminates itself and the object. It is true in our experience also that we know what we know. The Naiyayikas accept that a cognition can illuminate only its object and vijnanavadins say that a knowledge always illuminates the self. The Jaina logicians clearly accept that knowledge is possessed of both the qualities in its nature. About its nature of determinate the Jaina logicians are firmly determined. Hence, they have refuted the Buddhist definition of pratyaksawhcih is devoid of determination, because they accept the pratyaksa as nirvikalpaka (non-propositional). ii. Establishment of recollection (smrti) as Pramapa : Recollection is a knowledge which arises after the stimulation of memory-impression and is expressed by the pronoun 'that' (tad.) Manifestation of recollection is necessarily conditioned by stimulation of memory impression. Hemcandra defines recollection as such.

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JAIN CONTRIBUTION OF THE JAINA LOGICIANS TO INDIAN EPISTEMOLOGY 15 vasanod-bodha-hetuka tad ityakara smrti. (Pramana-mimamsa.1.2.3) Almost all the philosophers from Bhatta Akalanka down to Vadidevasuri define recollection almost in the same manner. Bhatta Akalanka says that recollection is a resultant of retention, but it is also a pramana, because of its resultant recognition (pratyabhijnana). Although Prasastapada has mentioned recollection as a kind of vidya (right knowledge), but he did not accept it as an independent pramana. Nyayasutra mentions it as an attribute of soul. But none other system than Jaina has accepted it as an idependent. The Pramana -mimamsa philosophy does not consider it as pramana, because it cognises the object previously cognised, and pramana in their opinion always cognises the object previously not cognised. Buddhist philosophers also give the same argument, but they present some more arguments, such as (i) it is not generated by an object, so it does not correspond to the object, (ii) if recollection is considered as pramana then intention, repugnance (dvesa) etc. will also be considered as pramana and it will create an infinite regress, (iii) recollection deals with past object. But in view of the Jaina logicians, Buddhist view is not accurate. The Jaina logicians Akalarka, Vidyananda, Prabhacandra and Vadidevasuri put forth many cogent arguments to establish it as an independent pramana. Some of them are presented here. 1. 2. If recollection is not regarded as a separate organ of valid condition, because it cognises the object previously cognised, then it is not a valid reason, because the recollection also cognises partly unknown from the point of view of time etc. 3. Recollection is an organ of valid cognition, because it is an indiscrepant cognition. Whenever the recollection is found discrepant then it comes under the psuedo-organ of valid condition. The recollection which is corresponding to activity is an indiscrepant knowledge. 4. Inference cannot be an organ of valid cognition without having recourse to recollection of invariable concomitance. Every philosopher who accepts inference as a means of valid cognition has to invariably resort to recollection of invariable concomitance. For example, when we perceive smoke on a mountain the impression of our previous cognition of smoke pervaded by fire in kitchen is awakened and we recollect it immediately. Vidyananda says that without accepting the validity of recollection, the validity of recognition does not exist. If recollection is not valid then inductive reasoning cannot take

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16 6. JAIN JOURNAL : Vol-XXXIII, No. 1 July 1998 place. Without the help of valid inductive reasoning the inference cannot occur. If inference does not take place then validity of perception can not be proved. In this way, in absence of all the pramanas object cannot be proved. Thus if we do not accept the validity of recollection all the organs of knowledge and the knowable things will not exist in the world of reality. 5. Recollection is a valid organ of cognition because it is a means of knowledge like a perception. The intelligent people cannot behave without the validity of recollection. If we do not accept its validity then we cannot even reach our homes. All the transaction of money will be stopped. The students will not be able to write any thing in their answer sheets at the time of examination. Thus the validity of recollection is duly established in all our activites. If recollection is understood as invalid cognition on account of its occurrence after perception then it is also not legitimate because inference also occurs after perception. As inference is a valid organ of cognition because it is devoid of abt, illusion and indetermination, so is the recollection. because it also has the same quality. Without the memory of probans (hetu)and probandum (sadhya) the invariable relation between them cannot be established. Jayanta Bhatta in his Nyayamanjari says that recollection is not invalid because it cognises the object previously cognised, but it is invalid because it is not generated by the object, because the object does not exist at the time of correspondence due to its momentariness. na smoter apramanatvam glhita-grahita-kstam api-tuanartha-janyatuam tad apramanya-karanam 11 The reason of the invalidity of recognition pointed out in this Karika is also corresponding to the Buddhist view, but it is not proper according to Vidyananda. He replies as under. narthaj janmopapadyeta pratyaksasya smsteriva 1 tadvat sa eva tadbhavad anyatha na ksana-ksayah 11 Tattvartha-sloka-varttika (1.13.27) The reply is given to the Buddhist philosophers that in the Buddhist view even the perception also, is not generated from the object because the object does not exist at the time of correspondence due to its momentariness. Prabhacandra replies in a different way that we the Jainas do not accept the perception generated from the object. It is true that in Jaina philosophy the knowledge is a result of subsidence

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JAIN CONTRIBUTION OF THE JAINA LOGICIANS TO INDIAN EPISTEMOLOGY 17 cum-destruction of the karma obscuring knowledge. Acarya Hemcandra gives a different argument that recollection is a valid organ of cognition without its emergence from an object, such as yogijnana is a valid organ of cognition without its emergence from an object. iii. Establishment of recognition (pratyabhijna) as pramana Another contribtution of the Jaina logicians to Indian epistemology is the establishment of recognition pratyabhhijnana as an independent organ of cognition. According to the Jaina logicians recognition is the synthetic judgement born of observation and recollection. Akalarka has used the term Samjna, Samjnana and pratyabhijnana for recognition. The Jaina philosophers have included the comparison (upamana) under recognition as one of its kinds. They did not accept comparision as a separate organ of valid cognition. The Jaina logician Vidyananda propounded two types of recognition i.e. knowledge of oneness (ekatvajnana) and knowledge of similarity (sadrsya jnana). When the object already perceived and recollected is the same at the time of recognition, the recognition is in the form of knowledge of oneness and when the object is similar to the object being perceived and recollected, the recognition is in the form of knowledge of similarity. tadevam ityekatva-nibandhanam tadrsam evedam iti. sadrsyanibandha (Pramana-pariksnamp.42). He is the same Devadatta so'yam devadattah is the example of knowledge of oneness and as an ox so the gavaya go-sadrso gavayah is the example of knowledge of similarity. Manikyanandin, a profound scholar of Jaina epistemology, goes a step futher and recognises recognition on its various aspects. He says the recognition can be manifold. Some examples are: it is identical with that, it is similar to that, it is different from that, it is relatum to that. tad evedam tat sadrsam, tadvilaksanam, tat-pratiyogityadi (Pariksamukha 3.5) former two types of recognition have already been mentioned above. A buffalo is different from the cow is the example of tad-vilaksanatva and 'this is away from that' 'this is near to that', are the examples of (tat pratiyogitva). Acarya Hemcandra corroborates the kinds proposed by Manikyanandin. Vadidevasuri, the author of Pramana-naya-tattvaloka and Syadvadaratnakara used the new terms of tiryak samanya and urdhvata-samanya relating to the definition of recognition. Tiryak samarya and he is the same Devadutta denotes urdhvata-samarya. In Indian philosophy Nyaya, Vaisesika, Mimamsa, Vedanta and Kasmira Saivism also discuss the recognition, but they include it in perception and do not recognise it as a separate organ of valid cognition.

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18 JAIN JOURNAL : Vol-XXXIII, No. 1 July 1998 Jayantabhatta, a foremost Naiyayika, accepts the validity of recognition under perception, because it is generated by sense object contact with the help of latent trace (samskara). But the Buddhist logicians are of the opinion that recognition cannot be pramana, because regress, illusory knowledge having no object and uncorresponding nature of it. For establishment of recognition as independent valid organ of cognition the Jaina logicians have given many arguments the main arguments are being presented here. 1. Recognition is neither merely a recollection nor merely a perception, but it is different from both and is possessed of being a new pramana, because it has to cognise a different object which is not cognised by mere perception and mere recollection. So recognition is an independent organ of cognition. 2. It is a pramana, because it is found indiscrepant in behaviour. Acarya Hemacandra says that without accepting the recognition as independent pramana (valid organ of cognition) the logical justification of bondage and emancipation would become absolutely impossible. If it is the self same person who suffers bondage and achieves liberation, it is possible that the person can try to achieve the joy of freedom. Bhatta Akalanka maintains the sequence of recollection, recognition and inductive reasoning is the resultant of recognition. He tells that the meaning of a word can be known only if the validity of recollection is accepted. Perception is not capable to differentiate between distant and near, short and long etc., only recognition can do so. Vidyananda says that without the acceptance of recognition we cannot know that I am the same who was child, teenager, young, and adult before and now have become an old man. (Tattvarthailokavartika, 1.13.46). He says that without accepting its validity of recognition Buddhists would not be able to consider the oneness between two momentary objects or svalaksana. It is necessary to accept the validity of recognition for the knowledge of similarity also. Recognition is different from inference because it recognises the hetu (probans) only and inference is a later process. 7. The object of recognition is not cognised by recollection and perception separately, hence it cognises the object which is not cognised by any other pramana. 8. There is no contradictory cognition which affects its validity. Thus the Jaina logicians have established the recognition as an 3. 6.

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JAIN: CONTRIBUTION OF THE JAINA LOGICIANS TO INDIAN EPISTEMOLOGY 19 independent pramana.It is to be noted that they include upamana (comparison) in the category of the knowledge of similarity under recognition. iv. Establishment of inductive reasoning (tarka) as pramana It is also a significant contribution of the Jaina logicians that they established the tarka as an independent pramana.. They propound that invariable relation between probans (hetu) and probandum (sadhya) can be known only by Tarka pramana. Tarka of inductive reasoning expresses the universal necessary concomitance between probans and probandum. Hemacandra says Inductive reasoning is the knowledge of universal concomitance conditioned by observation and non-observation (Pramana-mimamsa, 1.2.4). In the Nyayasutra of Gotama tarka (reasoning) has been used for indicating inference orArthapatti (presumptive cognition). It is only the Jaina logicians who considered tarka as a knowledge of universal concomitance. Akalanka, Vidyananda, Prabhacandra, Vadidevasuri and Hemacandra are the logicians who advanced cogent arguments for the establishment of tarka as an independent pramana. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. The main arguments are: The object which is cognised by tarka is not cognised by any other pramana. Tark is a knowledge of universal concomitance. No other pramana can do so, neither perception nor inference. The validity of inference depends on tarka, because it is a knowledge of necessary concomitance and without the knowledge of necessary concomitance inference cannot arise. It has a corresponding nature. It is not conceivable that perception is competent to discharge the entire series of operations that are involved in the knowledge that whatever is a case of smoke is invariable the product exclusively of fire in all places and times, and not of anything else. The reason that it is not discursive and owes its genesis to the inference exerted by a datum that is present, If Inference is competent to know the necessary-concomitance then it will result in infinite regress, because an inference will require another inference. Thus the Jaina logicians have established tarka as independent pramana by presenting cogent arguments. This shows their intensive thinking about the system of epistemology and logic.

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20 v. Definition of probans (hetu) One important contribution of the Jaina logicians to Indian epistemology is the definition of reason or probans (hetu). Probans is a necessary means for the occurrence of inference. Inference is the knowledge of probandum on the strength of probans. All the Indian philosophers who accept inference as an organ of valid cognition, unanimously agree that probandum (sadhya) can be known by probans (sadhana, hetu) as in the case of probandum fire on mountain can be known by probans smoke. But on the definition of probans the Indian philosophers have divergent views. The Buddhist philosophers propound three characteristics of a valid probans, viz-its subsistence in the subject (paksa-dharmatva), its subsistence in the homologue (sapaksa-sattva) and the absence of the same in a heterologue (vipaksasattva). These three characteristics of probans are also mentioned in the Prasastapadabhasya of Vaisesika philosophy. But the Nyaya philosophy admitted two new characteristics apart from the above three which are the absence of contradiction of the probandum (abadhitavisayatva) and the absence of a countervailing probans (asat-pratipaksatva). The Jaina logicians have given a new idea about the characteristics of prabans that it bears only one characteristic and that is the certainty of logical impossibility (anyathanupapatti or avinabhava) of the one in the absence of the other. Prabans cannot exist in the absence of probandum. This is the only characteristic of probans; for example, smoke a proban cannot exist in the absence of a probandum fire. JAIN JOURNAL: Vol-XXXIII, No. 1 July 1998 The Jaina philosophers have refuted the notion of trairupya (triple characteristics) and panca-rupya (five characteristics) of probans maintained by Buddhists and Naiyayikas respectively. The Jaina philosophers right from Siddhasena down to Yasovijaya have indifferently propounded that a probans has only one characteristic and that is the certainty of logical impossibility of that (probans) in the absence of probandum. It is having the sole and solitary characteristic of standing in necessary concomitance with the probandum. Patrasvami was profound logician who wrote a separate book Trilaksanakadarthana to refute the Buddhist view. Its reference is found in Tattvasamgrha, a work of Santaraksita, the Buddhist logician. Santaraksita has criticised the view of Patrasvami, but the Jaina logicians have firmly defended their views. The main arguments of the Jaina philosophers are as follows: 1. The sole and solitary characteristic of standing in necessary concomitance with the probandum is sufficient for defining probans. Three or five characteristics are not required for a valid

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JAIN CONTRIBUTION OF THE JAINA LOGICIANS TO INDIAN EPISTEMOLOGY 21 probans. There are some hetus possessed of three characteristics, but deviod of validity, e.g. sa syamas tasya patratvad drsta syama yathetare/ iti tri-laksano hetur na niscityai pravartate // Tattva-samgraha 1369 sa syamah tat-putratvad tarayah anyaputravat (Pramana-pariksa p.45). He must be swarthy in complexion since he is the son of Maitreyi (a woman of swarthy complexion). It is an instance of a defective probans, because it is not necessary that every son of Maitreyi will be swarthy in complexion. So in the absence of necessary factor of universal concomitance the three characteristics are useless. 2. There are many hetus which are not possessed of triple characteristics but they are competent, because of having a unitary characteristic of necessary concomitance with the probandum; for example, tomorrow will be Thursday because today is Wednesday, Sakata constellation will arise after a muhurta, because the krttika constellation has just arisen, are such hetus which do not have triple characteristics (Trirupata), but competent enough for the inferential cognition of a probandum. The only one characteristic of Anyathanupapattiis needed to define a probans Patrakesari says anyatha-nupapannattam yatra tatra trayena kim | nanyatha-nupapannattam yatra tatra trayena kim | Tattva-samgraha 1368. Vidyananda gives two arguments to prove the illegitimacy of triple characteristics of probans as under (i) It is found in fallacious probans also. (ii) It is not a differentia to distinguish a probans from a pseudoprobans. Acarya Hemacandra says that refutation of trairupya will also serve as a refutation of the pancarupya, since this is nothing but an elaboration of universal concomitance. Thus it is a new perspective of Jaina logic which speaks of the deep and penetrative thinking of Jaina logicians. VI. Establishment of new probans (such as karana etc) The Jaina logicians propounded four new probans also, namely karana (cause), purvacara, (predecessor), uttaracara (successor), sahacara (simultaneous). These kinds of probans have not been

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22 JAIN JOURNAL : Vol-XXXIII, No. 1 July 1998 accepted by other Indian systems. The Jaina logicians propose so many examples of these hetus as means of inference. There would be rain, since a particular type of clouds are seen' is an example of karana hetu.. 'Sakata constellation would rise because otherwise the rise of krttika would not have been there is an example of purvacara hetu. Here, after the rise of krttika the rise of the sakata takes place immediately after it without exception, and therefore, the krttika indicates the rise of the sakata as its predecessor reason. 'Bharani rose before, because krttikais risingis an example of uttaracara hetu. Here the rise of krttika, which succeeds the rise of Bharani indicates it. These two purvacara and uttaracara are different from the cause and effect as they are mediated by the obstacle of time. The fruit of mango should be possessed of a colour because the fact of being possessed of taste cannot be justified otherwise. Here taste which is always simultaneous with the colour being not justified in its absence, indicates it. All these hetus are valid because of their invariable concomitance with thier probandum. Acarya Manikyanandin clarifies that there are two types of avinabhava-saha-avinabhavaand krama-avinabhava. Karana, karya, purvacara and uttaracara hetus are found valid because of their kramavinabhavaand sahacara hetu is found valid because of its sahaavinabhava. In this way the concept of vyapatihas also been developed by the Jaina logicians. It shows their logical acumen. Right from Akalanka down to Vasovijaya almost all the Jaina logicians have accepted the validity of aforesaid four new hetus. Philosophers of other systems do not consider a cause as hetu, because cause is possible even without its effect, therefore it is not an indicator of the effect. The Jaina logicians reply this question that where it is possible to ascertain that all other causes are also cooperating and there is no hindrance in its capability, then alone the cause can be the indicator of effect. We can give examples to support their thinking as-milk is sweet, because sugar has been added to it, balloon will fly up because hydrogen gas has been filled up. If cause is capable to make an effect and it is devoid of hindrance then it may be a valid hetu, but in the respect of definition of hetu as propounded by the Jaina logicians that hetu never remains in the absence of effect, but karana (cause) hetu remains even in the absence of effect, so here it contradicts the definition of hetu propounded by the Jaina logicians. In purvacara hetu also the same situation has happened. When a sequence of some incidences is definitive then purvacara & uttar hetus are useful for a common man. Sahacara hetu is also common

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JAIN : CONTRIBUTION OF THE JAINA LOGICIANS TO INDIAN EPISTEMOLOGY 23 in our daily life. For example : back part of a wall is inferred by perceiving front part of it. It seems that the Jaina logicians have accepted these hetus, because of their corresponding nature in behaviour. Regarding the member of pararthanumana, the Jaina logicians have propounded that paksa-vacana (the statement of the thesis) and hetu (probans) these two members are sufficient for an inference for others (pararthanumana), but for the dull minded persons they have accepted five members also. To conclude we can say that the Jaina logicians have contributed their mite to Indian epistemology in many ways. They discussed about every aspect of Indian epistemology and logic. It seems that they have a deep study of other systems also. It is noteworthy that they developed the epistemology regarding pramana upholding the canonical views, but they have given due significance to the empirical view also. Hence the Jaina epistemological literature is of paramount importance for the understanding of the epistemological thinking of other systems also, because the Jaina philosophers have presented their opponents' views honestly and systematically. The Jaina logicians have contributed their mite to epistemological doctrines which can be summed up as follows : A. They established the nature of pramana illuminating itself and the object. B. They cogently established recollection, recognition, and inductive reasoning as independent pramanas. c. They are very precise in defining the hetu, but they have elaborately conceived kinds and sub-kinds of hetus. Their view of non-absolutism helped them in developing the epistemological doctrines and they formed many new technical terms such as: sanuyavaharika pratyaksa, tiryak samanya, urdhvatasamanya, saha-avinabhava, krama-avinabhava etc. They enrich the literature on Naya and Niksepa also which are mentioned in canons for understanding a proper meaning of a word.

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LORD MAHAVIRA ON PRAMADA Colonel D.S. BAYA SHREYAS (Retd) When asked by his principal disciple, Ganadhara Gautama, as to how an individual ought to walk, stand, sit, lie-down, eat-drink, and speak, so as not to incur sin,' Lord Mahavira replied that an individual who walks, stands, sits, lies-down, eats-drinks and speaks carefully does not incur sin.2 What is Pramada ? The English equivalents of the word 'pramada' are: A. Carelessness, B. Idleness, C. Indiscretion, D. Negligence, E. Non-vigilence, and F. Remissness. Accordingly, Pramada can be defined in two parts-firstly, neglecting to do what one is required to do (or one's duty) due to Idleness or sloth; and secondly, doing what one does carelessly, indiscreetly, negligently, without exercising due vigilence, or with undue remiss. Lord Mahavira's answer to Ganadhara Gautama's question lays down a premise for the conduct of spiritual practitioners or sadhakas. The premise is jayanai.e. care vigilence or non-negligence. Thus jayana is the opposite of pramada, and when the Lord lays down the observance of jayana in each and every action of the sadhaka. He also, by the law of reverses, lays down the avoidance of pramada. Another facet of pramada is idleness, inaction or neglecting to do what is essential in the pursuit of one's ultimate goal, which is nothing but spiritual salvation or nirvana. Again, by the law of reverses, it means doing what ought not to be done. 1. kaham care, kaham citthe, kahamase, kaham saye I kaham bhunjanto, bhasanto, pavam kammam na bandhai? II Dasavaikalikasutra, 4/7. 2. jayam care, jayam citthe, jayamase, jayam saye I jayam bhunjanto, bhasanto, pavam kammam na bandhai II Ibid, 4/8.

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SHREYAS: LORD MAHAVIRA ON PRAMADA The Lord had all along, in His preachings, laid the most stress on this one aspect of the sadhaka's conduct. In the tenth chapter of the Uttaradhyayana-sutra are contained as many as thirtysix reasons, each addressed to Ganadhara Gautama, as to why pramada, or the neglect of desirable action, ought to be avoided even for a samaya or the millionth part of a second. As believers of the faith, it will be worthwhile to ponder over a few of these reasons 1. The human life is like a ripe, withered, yellowed tree-leaf, that may fall at any time-meaning that the death may come at any time. Hence, O Gautama! avoid pramada even for a samaya.3 2. The human life is like a dew-drop at the tip of a blade of grass, that may dry up at the break of dawn or may fall to the ground at any time. Hence, O Gautama! do not succumb to pramada even for a millionth part of a second.* 3. Short as the life-span is, it is, again, threatened by many a threat. As you have to shed the bondages of your actions (karmic bondages) of the past in such a short life, O Gautama! do not entertain pramada even for a samaya.5 25 4. (In the eternal cycle of life and death) for all the living beings, the Human life is very difficult to come by in a long time, and the fruits of karmas are very difficult to bear. Hence, O Gautama! do not let pramada overcome you even for a samaya.6 5. (With the passage of time) your body is weakening, your hair are greying, and your entire vitality is diminishing. Hence, O Gautama! do not indulge in pramada even for a samaya.? 7 6. Ailments such as fouling of body airs, wounds and eruptions, cholera and various other deadly diseases destroy your body 3. dumpattae panduyae jaha, nivadai raiganana accae I evam manuyana jiviyam, samayam Goyama ! ma pamayae II Uttaradhyayana-sutra, 10/1. 4. kusagge jaha osabindue, thovam citthai lambamanae I evam manuyana jiviyam, samayam Goyama ! ma pamayae II Ibid., 10/2. 5. ii ittariyammi aue, jiviyae bahupaccavayae I vihunahi rayam pure kadam, samayam Goyama! ma pamayae II Ibid., 10/3. 6. dullahe khalu manuse bhave, cirakalena vi savva-paninam I gadha ya vivaga kammuno, samayam Goyama! ma pamayae II Ibid., 10/4. 7. parijurai te sarirayam, kesa panduraya havanti te I se savvabale ya hayanti, samayam Goyama! ma pamayae II Ibid., 10/26.

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26 JAIN JOURNAL: Vol-XXXIII, No. 1 July 1998 when they (suddenly) erupt. Hence, O Gautama! do not practise pramada even for a samaya.8 In the thirty-second chapter of the Uttaradhyayana-sutra, the Lord has indicated 95 areas of activity, which when practised, will steer the sadhaka along the path of spiritual attainment and ultimately to salvation (nirvana). These have been termed as the abodes of discretion or the Apramadasthana..By dispelling the ignorance (ajnana), attachment (raga), and revulsion (dvesa), the sadhaka is able to attain the supreme bliss (enlightenment) and the spiritual salvation (nirvana). The raga and dvesa are the seeds of karma (the karmic bondage) and they produce the delusion (moha) of the spirit (atman). Hence the path to spiritual salvation lies in avoiding the seats of indiscretion (Pramadasthana) and adhering to the seats of discretion (Apramadsthana). The seats of indiscretion (Pramadasthana) are the pursuits of bodily pleasures-the pleasures of the five sense-organs (indriyas) of touch, smell, hearing, sight and taste. These sense-organs have been termed as thieves that steal the opportunities for spiritual attainment, and under the influence of these thieves, the creatures indulge in unlimited distorted activities that hinder the soul from attaining the nirvana or moksa. 10 Exhorting the spiritual practitioners (sadhakas), the Lord has said that they should start on the spiritual highway while their bodies are still strong, till they are not harassed by the old age, till they have not been overpowered by disease and till their sensory organs (indriyas) have not been dulled and benumbed by the onslaught of disease and decay.11 The sum and substance of this deliberation is that pramada or indulgence in idle pursuits, pursuit of transient bodily pleasures, indiscretion, negligence and carelessness even in the performance of 8. arai, gandam, visuiya, ayanka viviha phusanti te I vivadai, viddhamsai te sarirayam, samayam Goyama! ma pamayae II Ibid., 10/27. 9. rago ya doso vi ya kammabiyam. Ibid., 32/7. 10. evam viyare amiyappayare, avajjai indiyacora-vasse II Ibid., 32/104. indiyakasayacora, subhavana sankhalahi vajjhanti; ta te ragadosadi na vikuvvanti I Bhagavatiaradhana, 1401. 11. jara java na pidei, vahi java na vaddhai I java indiya na hayanti, tava dhammam samayare II Dasavaikalika, 8/36.

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SHREYAS : LORD MAHAVIRA ON PRAMADA 27 essential bodily functions are hindrances in the path of spiritual advancement, and, therefore, pramada ought not to be indulged even for a samaya or the millionth part of a second. The words of the Lord, "Samayam Goyama! ma pamayae" have been echoing through the ages, and have been exhorting the sadhakas, through these more than two thousand five hundred years. to this day. The exhortation, though addressed to Ganadhara Gautama, is aimed at each and every individual, who has his sights set on spiritual salvation or Nirvana. So, Samayam Sadhakam ma pamayae it is, for anyone who will hear and heed.

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THE FOLLOWERS OF PARSVANATHA BINOD KUMAR TIWARY Parsvanatha, the powerful religious teacher of the 9th-8th centuries B.C. has been accepted as one of the great propagators of Jain principles and ideas. He was the 23rd Tirthankara of the Jain order and traditions. As a reformer, he fought against the prevailing corrupt practices which were prevalent in the then society and religion. He preached the welfare of humanity without taking into account the caste, creed or sect. After getting the perfect knowledge, Parsva became the head of an enormous community. He had eight ganas and eight ganadharas.1 The samgha of Parsvanatha consisted of sramanas, nuns, lay votaries, female lay votaries and different types of saints.2 The Svetambaras and Digambaras give different account and number of the followers of Parsva, but the Digambaras give their number very high, which seems to be an exaggeration. The division of Jain samgha into different branches prove his great organisational capacity. The followers of Parsva belonged to all factions of the society. By virtue of his descent, his influence in royal family was great. He himself was a member of the royal family of Kasi. The Jain writers inform us that Nagnati (king of Gandhara), Nimi (king of Videha), Dvimukha (king of Panchala), Svayambhu (king of Hastinapura), Ravikirti of Kusasthalapura and Karakanda (king of Kalinga) had adopted the faith of Parsva.3 The ancient literary sources reveal that Gautama Buddha had also been under Jain influence for some time before becoming enlightened.* The statement of Buddha itself confirms this truth. Most of the facts, detailed by Buddha, are remarkably close to the conduct of Jain religion. Relating to his ascetic life, he said, 'I lived nude, took my food in hands.... uprooted my hair... and never warmed my body.'5 Some scholars are of the view that as the way shown by Parsva seemed to be very difficult and tedious, the Buddha invented the middle path which is known as madhyamapratipada.6 1. Kalpasutra, 160 (SBE, Vol. xxii, p. 273). 2. Ibid., 161 to 166. 3. Uttaradhyayana, 18-40-50 (SBE, Vol. XLV, p. 81). 4. Darsanasara, 6-9. 5. Majjhima Nikaya, Mahasihanada Sutta, 12. 6. Veer Parinirvana, Oct. 1975, p. 15

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TIWARY: THE FOLLOWERS OF PARSVANATHA The teachings of Parsva were very much popular among the general people during those days. People from all walks of life were immensely influenced by it. Parsva had a large number of such followers in Bihar and eastern U.P. regions. Mahavira's parents were worshippers of Parsva' and they died practising the slow starvation following Jain faith. There existed a number of monks of Parsvanatha's order following caturyama dharma during the time of Mahavira who absorved them into his order by converting them to his doctrine of pancamahavratas. It appears that he drew his followings largely from the non-Aryan indigenous tribes like the Yaksas, Nagas and Asuras and from the socalled Vratya or non-Vedic ksatriyas. The Uttaradhyayana-sutra relates to the meeting of the head of Parsva's follower Kesikumara and Mahavira's ganadhara Indrabhuti. Their discussions concentrated mainly on the principles of the Jain religion. Kesi was greatly satisfied by Mahavira's explanation and he accepted the five great vows of Mahavira. Kesi and Gautam of this meeting represent the two Jain orders, the old and the new. The Bhagavati-sutra10 refers to a dispute between Kalasavesiyaputta, a follower of Parsva with a disciple of Mahavira. Gangeya, a follower of Parsva, who lived at Vanijyagrama, gave up the four vows of Parsva and adopted the five mahavratas of Mahavira." Before accepting the Mahavira's five precepts (panca-mahavratas), Gangeya had a discussion with Mahavira. 12 Clearing the doubts in the mind of Gargeya, Mahavira showed his respect for Parsvanatha, acknowledging him as a superman.13 The Nayadhammakahao11 mentions the name of Pundariya, who accepted the four vows of Parsva. The famous disciple of Mahavira named Gautama met Udaka, a follower of Parsva and succeeded in winning over him to his side. From the dialogue between Udaka and Gautam, it appears that the followers of Parsva and the disciples of Mahavira were known as the Nighantha Kumaraputta and Nigantha Nataputta respectively. It is quite interesting to know that at a place called Tungiya, 15 about five hundred pupils of Parsva embraced the five mahavratas of Mahavira. 16 29 7. Acarangasutra, II, 15, 16. 8. This goes to prove Parsvanatha to be the predecessor of Mahavira. 9. 23, vv. 1-89; SBE, XLV, pp. 115-129. 10. Bhagavati-sutra, 1. 975; cf. also Weber's Fragment der Bhagavati, p. 185. 11. Ibid., p. 32. 12. Vyakhyaprajnapatti, 9.32.371. 13. Parsvanatha is called Purisadaniya in Kalpasutra (Chapter 1, para 25). 14. Naya, 19, 20. 218. 15. This place is identified with modern Tugi, situated two km off Biharsarif according to Prachin Tirthamala, pt. 1, p. 16. 6. Bhagavatisutra, pp. 136 ff.

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30 JAIN JOURNAL : Vol-XXXIII, No. 1 July 1998 The Buddhist literature mentions some Niganthas who were the followers of Parsva. These include Vappa??, Upali18, Abhaya19, Aggivesayana Saccaka20, Digha Tapassi21, Asibandhakaputra gamini22, Deva Ninka23, Upalikka24, and Siha.25 Not only men but lay women also joined Parsva's order as he had allowed women to enter his order. The Nayadhammakahao26 says that Kali, an old maiden, joined Parsva's order and was entrusted to Pupphachala, the head of the nuns. Two sisters of Uppala joined the order of Parsva, but being unable to lead the rigid life of the order, they became Brahmin parivrajikas.27 Vijaya and Pagabbha, two female disciples of Parsva saved Mahavira and Gosala in Coorg Sannivesa.28 The Jataka literature also mentions several lay women as followers of Parsva and among them are Sacca, Loha, Avandika and Padacara etc.29 D . Parsva's influence not only remained within the areas of this land, but it reached even in the far areas of Central Asia 30 and Greece. 31 Scholars have proved that the ancient city of Kasita (Caspia) appears to have been named after Kasyapa, the gotra name of Parsva. The Greeks of the 4th century B.C. and the Chinese pilgrims of the 6th7th centuries A.D. noticed the existence of the Nirgrantha Sramanas in that region. Hence it has reasonably been inferred that Jainism s prevalent in places like Caspia, Aman, Samarkand and Balkha32 and the credit would certainly go to Parsva. Parsva attained nirvana at Sammedasikhara (Parsvanatha hill)33 and that's why it became a centre of Jain faith.34 Parsvanatha preached 17. Anguttara-nikaya, II, 196 ff. 18. Majjhima-nikaya, I, 371 ff. 19. Ibid. 392 ff. 20. Ibid. 237 ff; Majjhima Nikaya Atthakatha, I, 450. 21. Ibid., 237 ff. 22. Sangutta-nikaga, V, 312 ff. 23. Ninkha is a deva who visited Buddha and uttered a verse in praise of Nigantha Nataputta. 24. Mahavagga. 25. Samyutta-nikaga, 1. 65 ff. 26. Naya, II, I, pp. 22 ff. 27. Women wanderers. 28. Jataka, III, t. 29. Ibid. 30. cf. J.W. McCrindle's Ancient India. 31. Beal's Siyuti, I, p. 55. 32. Cf. Jain Gazette, August 1906, p. 13, 33. Kalpasutra, 186, (SBE, XXII, p. 275). 34. Parsvanatha Hill is in Hazaribagha of Bihar.

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TIWARY: THE FOLLOWERS OF PARSVANATHA his nirgrantha dharma among the aboriginals of modern South Bihar and Bengal. Even today, the followers of Parsvanatha or his teachings can be seen within the 'Saraka' community in Manbhum, Singhabhum, Lohardagga and other districts of south Bihar and Bengal. The name of this community 'Saraka' is nothing but a degenerated form of the word Sravaka 35 They belong to the same lineage of ancient Jain sravakas. During the recent past, they have embraced Hinduism, though a few of them still follow Jainism at some places. This tribe is mainly engaged in plantation, spinning, weaving and commerce. Like the orthodox Jains, the members of this community drink water after straining it and have their meals before the Sun set, with the idea to protect living beings.36 In the regions of Birbhum and Bankura districts of West Bengal, the serpent deity called 'Manasa' is worshipped during the months of Asadha, Sravana, Bhadrapada and Asvina37 (approximately during the period from July to October). This may be having some connection with the legend that Dharmendra had adorned Parsvanatha's head in the shape of Nagaraja. 38 This apparently shows that in course of time, they took to the worshipping of the very symbol which had adorned Parsvanatha. Originally they must have been the followers of Parsva. The Jain religion was essentially anterior to Mahavira and Parsvanatha had been an earlier historical personage. He not only gave a strong base to the Jain principles, but even paved the way for Mahavira to preach, organise and give a new shape to the Jain samgha. 35. A technical word in Jainism (meaning 'a layman'). 36. J.C. Jain. Mahavira, p. 10. 37. Jaina-Siddhanta-Bhaskara, Vol. II, Pt. II, p. 75. 38. J.C. Jain, op. cit. 31

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NEWS ON JAINISM AROUND THE WORLD Summer school in Prakrit Language and Literature The three Week Summer School was inaugurated at the Bhogilal Leherchand Institute of Indology on May 24, 1998. The Valedictory Function was held in the morning of June 14, 1998. The function started with the traditional Jaina namokara mahamantra and a Sarasvativandana in Prakrit. Forty very senior teachers and research scholars in Indian Universities and Colleges, from all over the country, participated in the School, as whole-time students. Professor S.R. Banerjee from Calcutta University, related in brief the history of activities of the Summer School for the last 10 yearly sessions. Dr (Mrs) Kapila Vatsyayan, Academic Director of the IGNCA was the chief guest, and Hon. Justice M.N. Venkatchaliah, Chairman, NHRC was the guest of honour. Shri Parasmal Bhansali, Chairman, Nakoda Parshvanath Jain Pedhi, presided. Shri Pratap Bhogilal, Chairman, BLII, Shri N.P. Jain, Vice-Chairman, BLII and Shri R.K. Jain, Hony. Secretary, Atma Vallabh Jain Smarak Shikshan Nidhi, all very actively participated in the conduct of the function and introduced different institutions connected with the BLII. Prizes to first three top students in the School were presented along with certificates to all the 40 participants. Acarya Hemacandrasuri Puraskar was presented on this occasion to the well-known scholar of Prakrit and Sanskrit Studies, Dr. V.M. Kulkarni by Dr (Mrs) Kapila Vatsyayan, the chief guest, on behalf of Nanakchand Jaswanta Dharmarth Trust founded by Shri Deven Yashwant, Chairman. Justice M.N. Venkatachaliah in his address quoted examples from various well-known personalities of the western world and India to convey the message that whatever we do including small jobs like sweeping, must be done whole-heartedly and excellently. He said, "Indology represents the great Indian civilization which not only speaks of the concepts of cosmology, mind and matter, the circular time and absolute truth but also integrates them all. In order to understand the cultural heritage of this great country, indology is the only way. In this age of diminishing values, objective moral values are very important

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Acharyya Hemchandra Suri Puraskar

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33 NEWS ON JAINISM AROUND THE WORLD which have been prescribed by our ancient authorities. The modern concepts of mind and cosmology etc., are the product of the recent times and these are dealt with in Indological tradition well over several thousand years back, in the history of human civilization." Dr (Mrs) Kapila Vatsyayan, the Chief Guest, exhorted the august gathering that all Indian languages from North to South and East to West are integrally related to each other whether it is Vedic or Sanskrit, Pali or Prakrit, Tamil or Telugu, Malayalam or Marathi or whatever else. Though lots of Dravidian elements are available in the Vedas also, Pali and Prakrit have played a very important role in the development of Indian culture, languages, literature and dialects as a whole. If we do not learn the history of the development of our national languages, then we cannot even study mathematics, physics and philosophy etc. Three crores of manuscripts are lying unused in the Jain Bhandaras. Whatever the western scholars have said about them, we have been in a way forced to accept and believe. If these mss., are micro-filmed, our Indian scholars can have access to them and these can be studied seriously and sincerely opening new vistas of knowledge of our ancient culture. Dr. V.M. Kulkarni, the awardee of Acarya Hemcandrasuri Puraskar, the first Director of the BLII, in his speech of acceptance of the award, briefly stated, how he has been working for well over 60 years in the field of Prakrit and Sanskrit Languages & Literature. The award has come to him only as a token of recognition of his services to ancient Indian languages and literature. The Function was conducted by Dr. V.P. Jain, Director, BLII. Vimal Prakash Jain

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IT INDIAN RELIGIONS JOIN HANDS Temple event shows U.S. adaptation Lord Mahavira-or rather, a 5-foot marble statue of him-takes up residence in the Hindu Temple of Greater Cincinnati this weekend amid lectures, feasts and an aerial shower of flowers The event brings together two religions that have flourished in India since ancient times : Hinduism, which covers a wide range of beliefs and practices, and Jainism, founded by Mahavira in the sixth century B.C. The interreligious event is made possible by the close ties that Indian immigrants have forged here and in other U.S. cities. "In India, you wouldn't find this," said Vir Jain, a member of the Jain Center of Cincinnati and Dayton. "This temple is a Hindu temple that represents Hindu culture, and Jain is a part of Hindu culture. What we represent here is Hindu culture rather than Hindu religion." Cincinnati-area Jains and Hindus had talked about building a combined temple, but as fund raising for the Hindu temple dragged on, the Jains built their own in the West Chester area a few year ago. An estimated 1.200 Hindu families and about 100 Jain families live in the area. Jains stress non violence, a multiplicity of viewpoints and freedom from possessiveness, and they believe in the peaceful co-existence of all living beings. Hindus believe the ultimate reality behind the universe is manifested as deities that vary from region to region. All Hindus share belief in the law of karma and rebirth, and the fourfold goal of human life (righteousness, worldly prosperity, enjoyment and liberation). From the beginning, the local Hindu temple stressed unity by including deitles from all regions of Inda. South Asian religion expert Raymond Williams said this ecumenism grows out of the surge in Indian immigration since 1965. "The community created here (in the United States) is different than any group of Indians that exists in India itself," said Mr. Williams, a Professor of religion at Wabash College in Crawfordsville, Ind, "These people are in the process of re-creating what it means to be an American Hindu and that negotiation, as it shapes identities and commitments,

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1 Detroit Jain Temple

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INDIAN RELIGIONS JOIN HANDS 35 is reflected in the way they build temples and shrines and mosques and Sikh gurdwara and Christian churches." Or , in the words of SamanShrutpragya, a Jain monk visiting from India: "Every religion has different philosophies and different ideas, but we try to make harmony. How can we make harmony? If you like to worship Mahavira, you can worship Mahavira. If you want to worship (Hindu deity) Krishna, you can worship Krishna." From The Cincinnati Enquirer, Metro/Butlei, May 15, 1998. Conference on 'Jainism and Ecology' at Harvard An international seminar titled "Jainism and Ecology" was held at Harvard University's Center for the Study of World Religions on July 10-12,1998. Dr. Sulekh Jain, president of the Jain Academic Foundation of North America (JAFNA) told India Abroad recently that the conference was being sponsored by the foundation jointly with the Jain Academy of the United Kingdom. "The topic of Jainism and ecology presents many interesting challenges to scholars and leaders of the Jaina tradition," says the conference convener, Dr. Christopher Key Chapple, Professor of Theological Studies at the Harvard University's Center for the Study of World Religions. Participants were to include Cromwell Crawford of the University of Hawaii in Honolulu, Kim R: Skoog of the University of Guam, John Koller of Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, John Cort of Denison University, Padmanabh Jaini and Kristi L. Weley, both of the University of California at Berkeley, and Paul Dundas of the University of Edinburgh in Scotland. A large number of Jain scholars from India have also been invited to participate in the conference, Sulekh Jain said. The topics put down for discussion include "Jain Cosmology and Ethics for the Eco-Crisis," "Jain Biocosmology and environmental Thought," "Ahimsa as a Categorical Imperative for Environmental Care." "Jain Principle of Ahimsa and Ecology. "Ecology and Spirituality in Jain Tradition, "The Nature of Nature Jain Perspectives on the Natural World." and "Digging Ahimsa. The Limits of a Jain Environmental Ethic." The proceedings of the conference will be published in a book form by Harvard University. (From India Abroad, July 10,1998.Sulekh Jain.)

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Monsoon 1998 Registered with the Registrar of Newspapers for India Under No. R. N. 12121/66. . If pure music had the power to beckon - Clouds and bring rain, Pure beauty may, one day, bring back Light in the blinded eye. We believe so. And therefore we tryWith our sculptures. POT POURRIE CREATIONS THE INCODA 1/A, Jatin Bagchi Road Calcutta - 700 029. Phone/Fax : 464-3074/1843 I Calcutta show room : I p-591, Purna Das Road Calcutta - 700 029. Phone No. 463-2366 Delhi show room : | 14 Kaushalaya Park Hous Khas New Delhi - 110 016 Phone No. 6528407 Jain Education By the courtesy-ANTARCTICA GRAPHIC LIMITED 1A. Vidyanagar Street, Calcutta-700 009