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Shinkan Murakami, Sankuya Tetsugaku Kenkyu - Indo Tetsugaku ni okeru Jiga-kan - (A Study of the Samkhya Philosophy - Concepts of the Self and Liberation in Indian Philosophy -). Tokyo, Shunjüsha, 1978. xxii, 794, 23, 144 pp.
Recent studies of classical Samkhya have been greatly facilitated by the publication of the Yuktidipikā (Abbrev. YD), an anonymous commentary on the Samkhyakarika (Abbrev. SK), which has amply provided us with new materials for investigation. It often refers to views maintained by some Samkhya teachers before Isvarakṛṣṇa, and sarcely known from any other commentary. In many places it records at length a controversy between the Samkhyas and their opponents, through which many problems not discussed in other commentaries are clarified. A study of YD by P. Chakravarti, who first edited this newly discovered text, was published in 1951 under the title: Origin and Development of the Samkhya System of Thought (Calcutta Sanskrit Ser., XXX. Reprint: New Delhi 1975). E. Frauwallner derived much benefit from YD when he treated the development of Samkhya thought in his Geschichte der indischen Philosophie, Bd. I (Salzburg 1953). G. Oberhammer identified the śastra, from which some passages are quoted in YD, as the Saṣṭitantra of Varṣaganya.2 The isvara-doctrines referred to in YD were examined by G. Chemparathy.3 A. Wezler directed his attention to the stylistic peculiarities of YD, and set forth the view that YD was a commentary on a Varttika of SK.4 The author of the book under review, viz., S. Murakami, has fully utilized YD along with other sources for the scrutiny of the philosophical thought crystalized in SK.
Murakami's book is a comprehensive study of Samkhya philosophy in the classical period. Instead of giving an all-round treatment of various subjects that are found in this system of philosophy, Murakami takes up the concept of the soul or self (purusa, atman) as the central
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theme of his investigation, and relates all problems to this central theme. This bulky book of nearly 1,000 pages may be divided into three parts: (1) Examination of the concept of the soul in pre-Samkhya literature (Chapter I). (2) Elucidation of the Samkhya system as presented in SK on the basis of a close examination of all available commentaries (Chapters II-IV). (3) Discussion of some specific problems (Chapters V-VIII).
In Chapter I (pp. 21-144), the author tries to trace the evolution of the concept of purusa from the early Upanisads to classical Samkhya. On the basis of his examination of the concept of purusa in the early, middle and younger Upanisads, the author draws the following conclusions: (1) The purusa in the early Upanisads is almost identical with the atman; it is not a Homeric psyche (ghost-soul) as supposed by E. H. Johnston, but an animating corporeal principle. (2) The trend to distinguish the purusa as pure soul from the atman which has various aspects is noticeable in the middle and younger Upanisads. The early-Samkhya materials found in the philosophical chapters of the Great Epic and elsewhere have not been utilized by the author for this book. Chapter II (pp. 145-256) is a thorough-going study of the commentaries on SK, 17, 19 and 18, which respectively treat the arguments for the existence of the soul, the characteristic features of the soul, and the proofs for the plurality of the soul. Chapter III (pp. 257-308) is devoted to the study of the functions of the organs of perception (buddhindriya), the mind (manas), the I-principie (ahamkara), and the intellect (buddhi); of the eight forms (rūpa, bhāva) and the fifty divisions (bheda) of the intellect. In Chapter IV (pp. 309-440), the relation between the primordial matter (prakṛti, pradhāna) and the soul is discussed. This relation is often explained in Samkhya works by means of the simile of the reflection (pratibimba), e.g., of the moon in the water, or the like. The author has gathered from various sources passages which deal with the reflection-theory, and has thoroughly examined them. In the remaining chapters (V-VIII) the author takes up for investigation some specific problems in the Samkhya system, making extensive use of related materials. In Chapter V (pp. 441-534), the author discusses the problem whether the soul is one or many. In the commentaries on SK 11, the soul is characterized as pervasive (vyāpin) and omnipresent (sarvagata). This seems to mean that the one-ness of the soul was admitted by the Samkhyas. In fact some commentators (G, M) clearly state that the soul is one. However, it is established in SK 18 that there are many souls. The author solves this apparent inconsistency by accepting the view set forth in J that the soul is pervasive and therefore one in the state of liberation (mokṣa), but that it appears as many before the attainment of liberation. This solution is appropriate and acceptable. Chapter VI (pp. 535-640) examines the concept of the soul in the Vedanta and the Vaiseṣika systems. R. Garbe was of the opinion that the pervasiveness of the soul was admitted by the Samkhyas under the influence of Vedanta philosophy. The author, however, disagrees with him, pointing to the fact that the individual self (jiva) was not acknowledged as pervasive in the Vedanta school before Sankara, when SK was composed. Like the Samkhyas, the Vaiseṣikas too admit the plurality of souls and yet maintain that the soul is pervasive. Regarding the doctrine of the pervasiveness of the soul, E. Frauwallner set forth the view that the old Vaiseṣika idea of the individual, body-sized soul was modified at a certain stage in the development of their philosophical thought with the prototype of the VedantaSamkhya soul-doctrine as its model. The author declines to accept this view. According to him, the doctrine of the pervasiveness or the omnipresence of the soul held by the Samkhyas and the Vaiseṣikas is based on the tradition of the early Upanisads, as in the case of the Vedanta. In Chapter VII (pp. 641-686), the author discusses the problem of liberation and of the knowledge (jñana) leading to it. According to SK 62, only prakṛti is concerned with bondage and liberation, the soul being never bound nor liberated. On the other hand, all the commentators attribute the liberating knowledge in SK 64 to the soul. In connection with this problem, the author makes reference to passages in Bhavaviveka's Prajñāpradipa, Chapter 18 and Tarkajvälä, Chapter 6 (both are available in Tibetan translation), where two different Samkhya views are taken up for criticism: the view that the prakṛti is liberated and the view that the soul is liberated. The author comes to the conclusion that the latter view represents the
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ultimate standpoint of the Samkhyas. In Chapter VIII (pp. 687-784), the meaning of the negation of the self in SK 64 is investigated. From the explanations given by the commentators it is to be understood that the negation is intended for the removal of the false notion that takes what is not the true self, i.e., the evolutes of the prakti, for the self. By removing that false notion the true self is realized. The author finds a similar idea in the Maitri Upanisad and in the Yogasūtra and its commentaries. He further compares the concept of selflessness (nirätman) in the Maitri Upanisad and in the Samkhya system with the concept of anätman as found in early Buddhist literature, and discusses the similarity and the difference between them. Lastly, the arguments against the Samkhya idea of selflessness in Asvaghosa's Buddhacarita and Bhavaviveka's Prajñāpradipa (Chapter 18) are examined.
The author has pursued with persistence in the last four chapters the problem of liberation in the Samkhya system. By putting together the conclusions of these chapters, we may summarize the author's interpretation of the central philosophy of classical Samkhya as follows. The Samkhya philosophy is aimed at the liberation of the self. The self is essentially one, all-pervading and always liberated, but men is ignorant of it and accustomed to consider that there are many selves, each undergoing birth and death individually. This is due to the faise notion that takes internal organs, body, etc., for the self. By eradicating this false notion, man attains liberation, that is the realization of the true self as isolated from the material clements.
Samkhya philosophy thus interpreted has undeniably a close affinity to early Buddhism. The author cites (p. 684) an interesting passage from YD, in which the liberation of the Samkhyas is identified with the nirvana of the Buddhists. However, on the often-discussed problem of the relation between Samkhya and Buddhism, the author refrains from drawing any definite conclusion.
In the course of his pursuit of the main subject of each chapter, the author discusses also some important problems, such as the meaning of guna in the Samkhya system (pp. 161-172), the authenticity of Vācaspati's ascription of some fragments to Pancasikha (pp. 539-544), the authorship of J (pp. 580-600), etc. Though the author has attempt to trace the historical development of the concept of purusa from the early Upanişads to classical Samkhya, he generally limits the scope of his investigation to classical Sāmkhya and does not show interest in the problems concerning the origin and evolution of some concepts of philosophical importance in the Samkhya system. In his interpretation of those concepts, he simply follows the explanations of the commentators.
In his Conclusion (pp. 787-793), the author stresses that in Samkhya philosophy the soul theory is as important as the evolution theory (parināmavāda) and the theory of causation (satkāryavāda). . Throughout the book the author presents in great abundance translations of the passages on which his discussions are based. This is good in principle, but sometimes he unnecessarily translates lengthy passages, so that a reader is led far away from the subject under discussion. It is often the case that several commentators give much the same explanation of a kärikā. The author untiringly translates all commentaries one by one with such remarks as that B is virtually identical with A, or that C does not differ much from A. It is tiresome to read all those commentaries in translation. The author should have avoided this useless repetition, noting only significant differences between commentaries. I will cite a few instances.
(1) In Chapter II, the author deals with the five arguments for the existence of the soul as set forth in SK 17. After examining the explanations in the commentaries on the fourth argument 'bhoktrbhāvät', the author introduces a lengthy discussion between the Vijñānavādins and the Samkhyas on the structure of bhoga (enjoyment, experience), which is found in YD. This discussion is highly technical and not easy to follow. It continues for ten pages (pp. 186196), and after this interruption, the author proceeds to explain the fifth argument. This discussion should have been treated separately or simply omitted. (2) In Chapter VIII, the author points out that an idea akin to the Samkhya concept of selflessness as expressed in SK 64 is found in the Yogasutra 2.5, where four kinds of viparyaya are mentioned. Relevant here
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is only the fourth type of viparyaya which takes anātman for atman. However, the author translates even those passages in Vyāsa's commentary which explain the other three viparyayas, and adds detailed notes (pp. 718-720). (3) In Chapter VII, the explanation given by different commentators of the expression 'nāsmi, na me, naham' in SK 64 are examined (pp. 657-663). The author gives first a Japanese reading of P on SK 64, and then a complete translation of G on the same karika (8 lines in translation). He then translates M on the same karika from beginning to end (11 lines), without omitting such expressions as 'apariśesam means niravaśesam', 'viparyaya means samsaya, and that which is contrary to it is aviparyaya', and so forth. Then follow a series of translations, based on the same principle, of V2 (7 lines), YD (15 lines), J (8 lines), TK (39 lines) and lastly C (23 lines). In each of these commentaries, the number of lines which explain the phrase in question is less than half of the figures given above: M3, V23, YD 6, J 4, TK 16. If the author had taken more pains to properly arrange the materials for a clearer elucidation of the subjects under discussion instead of putting everything he studied into this book, its size could have been reduced to half or at the most two-third.
It is good that the author presents abundantly his translations of passages of YD, which unlike other commentaries on SK is not always very clear. However, the present reviewer has been rather disappointed to find deficiencies in the translation. A few examples are given below.
YD explains at length the reasons for which the soul is recognized as akarty (non-agent) on p. 84.2-7 and p. 86.6--26 (under SK 19). These passages are translated by the author on p. 234 and pp. 234-236. YD, p. 84. 2-3: ... visayesu bahyantahkaranasamnidhye... . Murakami's translation. In my English rendering of his Japanese translation, I will try to be faithful to his wording as far as possible): ... when external organs approach the objects, ...' Antahkarana is omitted. YD, p. 84.3-5: na ca sattvādinām ... angabhāvam pratipadyate, näpy angibhāvam. M: "[The soul] is not understood as being a part (angabhāva) of the sattva, etc., nor is it understood) as being the whole (arigibhava) (of the sattva, etc.).' In this context,
part' (bubun) and 'whole' (zentai) for ariga and angin do not make sense. Moreover, arga bhāvam pratipadyate cannot be taken to mean 'is understood as arigabhāva.' A literal translation is as follows: "[The soul) does not attain the state of being subordinate (angabhava) to sattva, etc., nor (does it attain) the state of being the principal (arigibhāva) of sattva, etc." In other words, the soul does not give assistance to sattva, etc., nor does it receive assistance from them: the soul and sattva, etc. do not cooperate with each other. YD, p. 84.5: evam saha gunaih kāryam na kurute strikumäravat. M: 'Thus (the soul) does not produce an effect in cooperation with the elements, as (for example) a woman and a boy.' In note 31, the author states: "The ineaning of strikumāravat is not clear. It perhaps has the same meaning as dhätrikumāravat in p. 86. 17. As a matter of fact a woman (strī) cooperates with a man (pums, purusa), but not with a boy (kumāra) in order to produce an effect in the form of a baby. As will be seen below, (lhätrikumäravat has a different meaning. YD, p. 86. 16-17: ... utpăditasyanyena sthitim kurute dhätrikumāravat, sthitasya vā prayogam rathasakatayantraprerakavat. M: 'For that which has been made to originate, (man) puts a stop by means of another, as in the case of a inother and a child (!!). Or there is a motion (prayoga) for that which is standing still (!), as in the case of one who sets chariot, cart or machine in motion. This passage is an objection raised by an opponent against the Samkhya contention that the soul is akarty because of its nonproduction of an effect. He argues that there are actions which are not intended to produce an effect. Murakami failed to understand the meaning of the objection. Anyena should be read with utpädita. The verb kurute is to be supplied after prayogam (Acc., not Nom. !). A mother and a child' does not illustrate anything. My translation is as follows: "One provides the sustenance (sthitim kurute) of that which has been produced by another, as in the case of a foster mother and a child. Or, one effects the setting in motion (prayogam (kurutel) of that which is standing still, as in the case of ..." Wrong translations are found also in M, p. 235, 11. 6-8 and the last four lines.
One of the important subjects treated in this book is the reflection-theory. The author
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spends as many as one hundred and one pages (pp. 340-440) to elucidate this theory, translating and analysing materials collected from the following sources: Commentaries on SK: YD, TK, C. Yoga literature: Yogasutra (YS), YS-bhasya, YS-bhasya-vivarana, Tattvavaiśāradi, Yogavārttika, Rājamārtanda. Sankara's Brahmasūtrabhāsya. Bauddha literature: Tarkajvala, Prajñāpradīpa with Avalokitavrata's commentary, Tattvasamgraha with Panjikā. Vaisesika literature: Vyomavati, Nyāyakandalī, Kiranävali. Jaina literature: Yoga bindu, Anyayogavyavacchedadvātrimśika and Syādvādamañjari, Tarkarahasyadīpika and Laghuvrtti on Saddarśanasamuccaya. Samkhyasūtra and its commentaries by Vijñānabhikṣu and Aniruddha.
Though the reflection-theory is not found in SK, it is known to be old, since it is found in an often-quoted verse ascribed to Vindhyavāsin. This theory was originally intended to explain that the buddhi (citta in Yoga literature; manas in Vindhyavāsin's verse), which is unintelligent as an evolute (vikara) of the prakrti, becomes intelligent by reflecting the intelligence of the purusa. The buddhi is thus compared to a crystal which reflects the colour of a cushion, etc. The purusa, being deprived of any activity, does not undergo modifications; he simply stands near the buddhi. The reflection of the purusa on the buddhi is explained also by the simile of the moon in the water. In later times, a new interpretation was applied to the simile of crystal, according to which the simile is meant to cxplain that the functions of the buddhi are erroneously superimposed upon the purusa which in itself is devoid of any function, just as the colour of a cushion, etc. is superimposed on a crystal which in itself is transparent. Finally, the theory of the mutual reflection (paraspara-pratibimba), i.e. the reflection of the purusa upon the buddhi and that of the functions of the buddhi upon the purusa , was developed as we find it in the Yogavārttika and the Samkhyapravacanabhāsya. By carefully studying materials collected from various sources, the author has clarified this development of the reflectiontheory. He has further examined the similies of mirror, magnet, etc., which are also intended to explain the relation between the buddhi and the purusa.
It is regrettable that the translations given by the author are not without defects. Sometimes the author is obviously wrong in his rendering. Moreover, there are many cases where the wording of his translation is difficult to follow. I will note only some of the defects that have come to my notice while going through the section dealing with the reflection-theory.
p. 342.8-9: arthākāra ivābhāti yathā buddhis tathā pumān / ābhāsamano buddhyato buddhā manivad ucyate // (YD, p. 80.1-2). M: 'Just as the buddhi appears like the form of the object, even so the soul, assuming the same appearance, cognizes from it (?) by means of the buddhi, like a gem: - so it is said.' The meaning of M is not clear. H (= reviewer's translation): "Just as the buddhi (appears in the form of the object), even so the soul appears as if it had the form of the object. Therefore, it is said that the knower, [i.e. the soul), which appears by means of the buddhi, is similar to a gem." . p. 343. 6: buddhir upăttavisa yendriyavrttyupanipätāt tādrupyam pratipadyate (YD, p. 87. 22). M: 'Since the buddhi conforms to the received object and the function of the sense-organ, it assumes their form. The same cognitive process is explained in TK ad SK 5 with the words 'upāttavisayā nām indriyānām vrttau satyām...' and this passage is translated by the author on the same page as follows:'... when there are the functions of the sense-organs which have received the objects ... The author should have analysed the compound 'upă ttavisayendriyavrtti-' in the light of this passage.
p. 351.4-3*5: etac cittam eva ... cetanācetanasvaru pāpannam ... (Yogabhāşya 4.23). M: 'This very mind ... has become the essence (= own form) of the intelligent and the unintelligent...'H (literal transl.): "... has taken as its nature both the intelligent and the unintelligent ...". A similar mistranslation is found on p. 351. 14 for grahit-grahanagrāhya-svarūpa-citta-bheda-.
p. 355.8*: ... drścchāyāpannayā buddhyā samsrstāh śabdāda yah ... (Tattvavaišaradi 2.20). M:... sound, etc. that are created by the buddhi on which the (soul's] faculty of seeing is projected ...'H: "... sound, etc. that are touched by the buddhi ..."
p. 370.4*: ... arthabhānasya kādācitkatvadyupapattaye ... (Yogavärttika 1.4). M: 'to
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prove it to be reasonable that the perception (= appearance) of the object is accidental (güzenteki)... Kādacitka may better be translated as 'occasional' (ichijiteki) or 'sporadic' (tokiori-no).
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p. 371. 7:...sarasīva taṭadrumāḥ (ibid.). M: ... just as the trees [are reflected] in the pond.' Tata (bank) is omitted.
p. 371. 11:...samskäraseṣā buddhiḥ puruse pratibimbitā (ibid.). M: ... the buddhi possessing the residue of the impression is reflected on the soul. 'H: "... the buddhi of which [only] the impression is the residue [i.e. the buddhi which has ceased to function] is..." p. 382. 6*: M: (buddhyavasita). The text has adhyavasita (Tattvasamgrahapañjikā 'on k. 297).
p. 382.4-3*: tad evasya bhoktṛtvam, na tu vikārāpattiḥ (Pañjikā on Tattvasamgraha kk. 296-297). M: That indeed is its (= the soul's) nature of being an enjoyer (?), but [it (?)] does not become a vikara.' 'That' stands for the transition of the form of an object from the buddhi to the soul. Murakami's rendering is hard to follow. I succeeded in understanding the meaning only with the help of the Sanskrit text (not only here, but also in many other passages). The latter half is obviously wrong. H: "..., but not [the soul's] changing into a vikāra."
p. 383. 8-10. The author should have explained here the inconclusiveness (anaikantikatā) of the reason mentioned in the foregoing passage quoted from Kamalasīla's Pañjikā on the Tattvasamgraha.
p. 383. 12:... pratibimbasya tādātmyena samudbhave (Tattvasamgraha k. 298). M: 'If the reflection arises as the identity (doitsusei toshite) [with the soul] ...' (!)
p. 385. 11-12: pradhanasyadyo vikaro buddhir bijasyocchūnateva (Vyomavati p. 521. 15). M: The first evolute (vikara) of the primordial matter is the buddhi, just like the growth (seicho) of a seed.' The growth is not the first stage of the change of a seed. H: “ . . . the swollen state of a seed."
p. 385. 2 (also p. 386. 8*, 1*): -viṣayakaraparinatendriya-. M: 'the sense-organ which is transformed by dint of the form of the object.' H: "... transformed into the form of the object."
p. 386.8-11: The Sanskrit text is awkwardly quoted here by the author. The original sentence is: puruso 'vikṛtātmaiva... upadhiḥ sphaṭikam atadrupam svanirbhasam svākāram karoti... The author puts a break at atad (!), and translates that portion of the sentence as follows: ... A limiting adjunct [for instance, the colour of a flower] makes a crystal [as it were] something other than itself.' The reason for this awkward quotation is explained on p. 390: the author found that this passage is almost identical in wording with a verse ascribed elsewhere to Vindhyaväsin, and tried to make it a verse. However, the reading of the fourth pada as constituted by the author (upadhiḥ sphaṭikam atad. The final -d should be changed to -t!) is not metrically correct. H: "The purusa, whose nature is unchanged, makes the unintelligent mind (manas) resemble himself through his proximity [to the latter] (Read svanirbhasam acetanam manaḥ karoti instead of svanirbhasena cetanam...). A limiting adjunct makes a crystal, which has not the colour of that [adjunct], resemble itself and possess its own form. [In the same manner, the purusa...]".
p. 398. 7-6*: kathamcitsakriyakatāvyatirekena... anyathātvänupapatteḥ (Syādvädamañjarī XV, 11.92-93). M: 'Because, it would be absolutely impossible [for the purusa] to undergo change, were he not accompanied with action.' The author seems to have wrongly construed kathamcid with anupapatteḥ. This is a general statement, and it is not necessary to consider the purusa to be the implied subject. H: "Because, without being somehow accompanied with action, change would be unreasonable."
p. 411. 2-4: antahkaranam hi taptalohavac cetanojjvalitam bhavati, atas tasya cetanayamanatayadhisthätṛtvam ghaṭādivyavṛttam upapadyate (Samkhyapravacanabhāṣya 1.99, p. 48. 19-21). M: The internal organ is illuminated by the intelligent (cetana), like the heated iron. Therefore, it is reasonable that the fact that it (= internal organ), as one which functions intelligently, as a controller is excluded from a jar, etc.' (!!) The term ujjvalita is
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________________ 308 REVIEWS rendered by the author consistently as 'terashidasareru' (to be illuminated, lit up, p. 410.5, 4*, p. 411.1, 2,5,8), but it means 'to be caused to flare up, shine' (moetatasareru, kagayakasareru). The author's translation of the latter sentence makes no sense at all. H: "Therefore, it is reasonable that the controller-hood, which is excluded from a jar, etc., belongs to it (= internal organ), for it is regarded as intelligent." p. 411.5: nany evam castanyenantahkaranasyojjvalane citeh sangitvam agnivad eva syat (ibid., p.48. 21-22). M: '(Objection) If the internal organ is illuminated (terashidasareru) thus by the intelligent, it would follow that the intelligent has attachment, like fire.' 'Shuchaku' (attachment, adherence) for sanga is not appropriate in this context (also in p. 421. 7: 'mushuchaku' for asanga). H: "..., it would follow that the intelligent has the nature of coming into contact (with the internal organ), like fire (which comes into contact with iron]." pp. 421.5-423. 6: (Samkhyapravacanabhasya 1.87. pp. 43. 27-44. 31). M is hardly readable, since it contains mistranslations (e.g. p. 421.4*, p. 422.3), mechanical word for word replacement with no care for the meaning (e.g., p. 421.8-9, 13), inaccurate translations of indeclinables (e.g. p. 421.6,12), improper punctuations (e.g., p. 421.5), ambiguous expressions (e.g., p. 422. 1-2), etc. As a matter of course it is not easy to give a lucid translation of a text of this style. However, since the author did intend to publish a translation, he should have spent more efforts to make it more accurate. A good German translation of this text was published by R. Garbe long ago, and the author could have improved his translation in many respects if he had consulted it. Despite the fact that there are a number of weak points as mentioned above, the book is useful as it discusses some essential problems with a thoroughness hitherto not seen in books on classical Samkhya and at the same time furnishes us amply with materials for the understanding of the Samkhya philosophy. It is earnestly to be hoped that the author will in his future works arrange the materials in a better way, make efforts to prepare more accurate translations and improve the presentation of his materials. The table of contents and a summary of each chapter are given in English (pp. 1-23). The indices (pp. 1-144) of (1) Japanese and Chinese terms, (2) Sanskrit and Pali terms, (3) Tibetan terms, (4) Modern European terms, and (5) Citations are undoubtedly of much help for the readers of this voluminous book. Kyoto University MASAAKI HATTORI NOTES 1 Two editions are now available: (1) Pulinbehari Chakravarti (ed.), Yuktidipika, Critically edited for the first time from original manuscripts. Calcutta 1938 (Calcutta Sanskrit Series, XXIII). (2) R. C. Pandeya (ed.), Yuktidipika, An ancient commentary on the Samkhya-karika. Delhi-Varanasi-Patna: Motilal Banarsidass, 1967. For the other commentaries on the Samkhyakarika, the following abbreviations are used: C: Samkhya-candrika by Narayanatirtha, G: Gaudapadabhasya, J: Jayamangala, M: Matharavitti, P: Paramartha's Chinese translation of *Suvarna (or Kanaka)-saptati, TK: Samkhya-tattvakaumudi, V1, V2: Samkhyasaptativstti (V1), Samkhyavrtti (V2), ed. by E. A. Solomon. 2 G. Oberhammer, "The Authorship of the Sastitantram," WZKSO IV (1960), pp. 71ff. 3 G. Chemparathy, "The Testimony of the Yuktidipika concerning the Isvara Doctrine of the Pasupatas and the Vaisesikas," WZKSO IX (1965), pp. 119-146. 4 A. Wezler, "Some Observations on the Yuktidipika," ZDMG, Supplement II (XVIII Deutscher Orientalisten tag, 1972), pp. 434-455. It is to be hoped that the new edition of YD, modelled on Kielhorn's critical edition of the Mahabhasya, announced by Wezler will be published in the near future. 5 The asterisk indicates that the lines are counted from the left.