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________________ Bahyarthasiddhikarika of Subhagupta Masaaki Hattori In his History of Indian Logic, S. C. Vidyabhusana gave the Sansket name for Dge-sruns, the author of the Sarvajna-siddhi-karika and four other treatises preserved in the Tibetan Tripitaka, as Kalyanagupta ; while he identfied Subhagupta, who is called a follower of Dharmakirti (varttikanusarin) by Haribhadrasuri, with subhakaragupta who flourished late in the 11th century. This theory, however, was criticised by B. Bhattacharya in the the foreword of G. O. S. edition of the Tattva-samgraha. He set forth the opinion that Haribhadrasuri must have referred to Bhadanta subhagupta, whose views were mentioned several times in the Bahir-artha-pariksa of the Tattvasamgraha, and doubted whether subhakaragupta, who was a Tantrika, ever wrote any work on logic wherein he closely followed Dharmakirti. Y. Miyasaka has recently disclosed, in his article on Subhagupta's theory of the word, the view that Dge-sruns must be the Tibetan name for subhagupta. His view is grounded on 1) that "dge' is considered as an equivalent for 'subha', 2) that subhagupta's theory of conventional designation' (sanketa) alluded to by Haribhadrasuri is similar to Dge-sruns' theory expounded in his Sruti-pariksa-karika and 3) that subhakaragupta cannot be referred to by Haribhadrasuri, who, according to the recognized theory set up by H. Jacobi, is assigned to ca. 750 A. D. The writer of the present paper agrees with Y. Miyasaka in regarding Dge-sruns and Subhagupta as being the same person, for this view can be verified by identifying quotations from Bhadanta subhagupta in the Bahir-artha-pariksa of the Tattva-sangraha (-panjika) with verses in the Bahyartha-siddhi-karika of Dge-sruns. The writer has prepared the following list of identification. (Skt.: Tattvasamgraha, Tib.: (1) (1) subhagupta no Kotoba-ron, Chizan Gakuho, No. 22, pp. 54-55. - 400 -
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________________ (1) (2) (3) . (4) (10) Bahyarthasiddhikarika of Subhagupta (M. Hattori) Bahyarthasiddhi-k., Pek. Ed., Mdo-hgrel, CXII): 1) dhi-matratvene samsadhaye...... (p. 582, 1-2) =k. 25 (201 a, 3): blo tsam nid du...... 2) tulyapara-ksanotpadad...... (p. 552, 6-7), cf. k. 31 (201 a, 8): hdra bahi skad cig...... 3) pratyeka-paramanunam..... (p. 551, 21-22) =k. 40 (201 b, 6): rdul phran rnams...... 4) Bhadanta-Subhaguptas tv aha......kevalam anava eva......na savayavatvam. (p. 556, 16 ft), cf. k. 42 (201 b, 7): de phyir phyogs chahi...... . 5) nanyo 'sti grahako...... (p. 569, 14--15) =k. 62 (202 b, 4-5): ses pa las gsan...... 6) punah sa ev'aha-atha saha-sabda eka-kala vivaksaya....... (p. 567, 25ft), cf. k. 64 (202 b, 6): dus gcig tu ni...... 7) saha-sabdas ca loke......(p. 567, 17-18) =k. 67 (202 b, 8): thjig rten hdi na...... 8) yada ca sarva-pranabhstam...... (p. 568, 1-2), cf. k. 69 (203 a, 1-2): gal te thams cad...... 9) kim canyopalambha...... (p. 568, 2-7), cf. k. 70 (203 a, 2-3) gsan kyis dmigs pa...... 10) purvikaiva tu...... (p. 569, 15--16) =k. 77 (203 a, 6-7): gan gis lhan cig....... 11) syad etat-na hi mukhyato yadisam...... (p. 570,18 f), cf. k. 80-81 (203 a, 8-b, 2): ses pa myon bar...... 12) sakara-jnana-pakse...... (p. 570, 23-24) =k. 83 (203 b, 3): ses pa rnam bcas...... 13) katham tad-grahakam...... (p. 561, 11-12) =k. 85 (203 b, 4--5): de hdzin byed de...... 14) sakaram tan nirakaram...... (p. 573, 7-8) =k. 91 (203 b, 8): rnam pa bcas sam...... 15) sa hy aha-yathaiya bhavatam vijnana-vadinam...... (p. 572, 10--12), cf. k. 97 (204 a, 4--5): ji ltar khyod kyi...... 16) atra Bhadanta-Subhaguptah pramanayati-yo jnana-akarah sa samvaditve sati ...... (p. 574, 20-22), cf. k. 7 (200 a, 5) ses pa mi bslu...... The Bahyartha-siddhi-karika consists of 183 couplets. Judging from the fact that prose fragments commencing with "Bhadanta Subhaguptas tv aha..." etc. are often quoted by Kamalasila, it appears that there was originally its prose commentary, which, however, was not translated into Tibetan. It is quite obvious that this treatise is intended for refuting the Vijnanavada theory and proving the objective reality of external object. It (1) Text reads tvena (2) For jnanac caksusair read jnanan naksa-dhir. (3) For loke 'nyon ('syan) naivanena (-anyena) vina read loke 'smin naivanyena vina. (4) Text reads sattvar prana-, perhaps incorrectly. (5) For Prajnanam read sajnanam. - 399
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________________ (6) Bahyarthasiddhikarika of Subhagupta (M. Hattori) (11) starts with stating the Vijnanavada doctrine that the object of eyes and other senses does not exist in the external world independently of the consciousness, just as the object seen in a dream or the second moon seen by those who are afflicted with eye-disease are not really existent, and this doctrine is criticized through various arguments. It is noteworthy that Subhagupta evidently directs his attack toward the views of Vasubandhu and Dignaga. In the Vimsatika-vijnaptimatrata-siddhi, realists assail the Vijnanavadins, arguing that if the object were not real, then our purposive action tending toward it would not be fulfiled, as for instance we cannot be satisfied with meals and drinks seen in a dream. In vindication of the Vijnanavada theory, Vasubandhu, citing an instance of nocturnal emission which is caused in spite of the absence of real woman, asserts that an action toward the object is possible even though the object is unreal. This thought of The latter Vasubandhu is retorted by Subhagupta. He is of the opinion that the reality of an external object is proved not through the fulfilment of an action tending toward it, but through the ascertainment of the object (arthaniscaya). Man can act upon an illusory cognition, but he can not get then the ascertainment of the object. It might be argued that a man would not discharge semen during a dream if he had not ascertained that he is with a woman. In anticipation of this argument, Subhagupta states that the seminal emisson is the result of the carnal desire which may be aroused whether there is a real object or not. If it should be maintained that an object is unreal, then the object seen in a dream would not be distinguished from the object seen through the actual sense, both being existent only in the consciousness. But the fact is that a man does not find the child whom he got.in a dream, while, if he really got a child, he can ascertain its objective reality. The above arguments are recognized as being levelled against Vasubandhu's theory. subhagupta holds the view that the external object is the union of atoms. (7) (6) Cf. Vimsatika, k. 4 & Comm. (7) Cf. Bahyartha-siddhi-k., kk. 124-133 (205 a, 6-b, 4). - 398 -
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________________ (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) Bahyarthasiddhikarika of Subhagupta (M. Hattori) As an atom does not exist independently by itself, a single atom can never be reflected in the image. We recognize the union of many homogeneous atoms as a single substance, just as we form the idea of continuance on really a series of similar moments. In the course of his discussion on atoms, subhagupta refers to the following view :- the presentation of a certain form is not produced from that (=external object), because (the external object which is supposed to have a visible form) is not a real substance. This is exactly the Dignaga's view set forth in his criticism of the Vasubandhu's definition of perception as being produced by that external object (tato'rthad vijnanam pratyaksam). A visible object must be the aggregation of many atoms, but, according to Dignaga, the aggregation is able to be apprehended by unifying through the conceptual construction a multiplicity of perception produced by each of its constituents. Hence, being a product of the conceptual construction, the aggregation is not a real substance and is incapable of producing the mental reflex of its own form. subhagupta contradicts the above-stated view of Dignaga, asserting that the aggregation of atoms is to be regarded as a simple substance existing objectively. His theory may well be identified with the realist doctrine ascribed to Vagbhata in the Alambana-pariksa-tika of Vinitadeva. As stated above, subhagupta is called by Haribhadrasuri a follower of Dharmakirti. However, the following is mentioned evidently in opposition to Dharmakirti's theory: - there is no apprehender other than the cognition, and the cognition through senses is not produced without an object; it is on this ground that the blue (object) and its cognition are considered as being apprehended together (saha-samvitti) and not on the ground of their (12) (13) (8) ibid., k. 40 (201 b, 6). (9) ibid., kk. 31-32 (201 a, 8-b, 1). (10) ibid., k. 34 (201 b, 2). (11) Pramanasamuccaya, I, k. 16 a: yad-abhasa na sa tasmat. cf. M. Hattori, Dignaga no Chishiki-ron, Tetsugaku Kenkgu, No. 463, Chap. IV, note 12. (12) Bahyartha-siddhi-k., kk. 35-36 (201 b, 2-4). (13) Cf. S. Yamaguchi, Seshin Yuishiki no Genten Kaimei p. 451. - 397
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________________ (14) (15) (16) (17) Bahyarthasiddhikarika of Subhagupta (M. Hattori) (13) non-difference. In the Pramana-viniscaya, Dharmakirti propounds the theory that (proposition :) the blue (object) and its cognition are not different, (reason :) because they are invariably found together (sahopalambha-niyama). Subhagupta examines the meaning of the term 'together' (saha). If it is taken as implying simultaneity (eka-kala), then the reason is inconclusive, for the Buddha's intellect is not without a difference from the mind of living beings, although the former is operative simultaneously with the latter, or the mind is considered as being different from other subordinate mental activities which operate simultaneously with it. If, on the other hand, the term 'together' is to mean the sameness, then the reason is contradictory, because it is generally admitted that the term 'together' presupposes difference' (anya). Moreover, we should recognize the fact that the object which is cognized by one person is cognized also by another. Accordingly, if the term 'together' is interpreted as 'one' (eka) in the sense of 'by one person', then the reason is inadmissible (asiddha). Even when 'one' is taken in the sense of 'as one', the reason contradicts the fact that the omniscience who has insight into the minds of all living beings does not regard them as one'. We have to omit, in this short paper, to enter further into details of the arguments developed in the Bahyartha-siddhi-karika. It, however, should not be overlooked that subhagupta's interpretation of sahopalambha-niyama' as the necessary relation of the cognition with the external object is undoubtedly realistic, while the above-mentioned theory of Dharmakirti is probative of his being a Vijnanavadin. We learn from this fact that Subhagupta was not a faithful successor of Dharmakirti's thought. It (18) seem's likely that subhagupta was a teacher of Dharmottara, for the latter (14) Bahyartha-siddhi-k., k. 62 (202 b, 4-5). (15) Pek. Ed. Mdo-hgrel XCV, 263 b, 4-5: Ihan cig dmigs pa nes pahi phyir H sno (=snon) dan de blo gsan ma yin/ cf. Sarvadarsanasangraha, Govt. Or. Ser., p. 32: saho palambha.niyamad abhedo nila tad-dhiyoh/ (16) Bahyartha-siddhi-k., k. 64 (202 b, 6). (17) ibid., kk. 67-69 (202 b, 8-203 a, 2). (18) Cf. Vidyabhusana, Hist. of Ind. Logic, p. 328. - 396 -
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________________ (14) Bahyarthasiddhikarika of Subhagupta (M. Hattori) and his successors are known to have interpreted Dharmakirti's theory from the Sautrantika viewpoint; but no conclusive evidence in support of the guru-sisya relation between the two has been obtained so far. All we can say quite safely is that Subhagupta flourished after Dharmakirti and before Santaraksita and Haribhadrasuri: that is to say, his date can be fixed at ca. 650-750 A. D. While, this paper was being printed, I was presented dy Dr. E. Frauwallner with an article published in WZKSOA, Bd. I, a footnote of which urged me to refer to his another article "Dignaga und anderes" published in the Festschrift Moriz Winternitz. He proved therein already the identy of Subhagupta with Dge-sruns, basing upon the same sources that I made reference to. I regret for my inattention to this article. However, the list of identification and brief accounts of Subhagupta's arguments, which were left unpublished by Dr. Frauwallner, may not be of no value. -395