Abhidha

Author(s): Tapasvi Nandi, Jitendra B Shah
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/001534/1

Page #1
ABHIDHA L. D. Series : 131 General Editor Jitendra B. Shah Prof. Tapasvi Nandi L. D. INSTITUTE OF INDOLOGY AHMEDABAD - 380 009 Follate 8 Fersonal use only www.jalnelibrary.org

Page #2
ABHIDHA L. D. Series: 131 General Editor Jitendra B. Shah - I L. D. INSTITUTE OF INDOLOGY AHMEDABAD 380 009 Prof. Tapasvi Nandi

Page #3
L. D. Series : 131 Abhidha Dr. Tapasvi Nandi Published by Dr. Jitendra B. Shah Director L. D. Institute of Indology . Ahmedabad First Edition : February, 2002 ISBN 81-85857-13-X Price : Rs. 120 Typesetting Swaminarayan Mudrana Mandir 3, Vijay House, Nava Vadaj, Ahmedabad-13. Tel. 7432464, 7415750 Printer Navprabhat Printing Press, Gheekanta Road, Ahmedabad Tel. 5508631, 5509083

Page #4
abhidhA pro. tapasvI nAndI lAlabhAI dalapatabhAI bhAratIya saMskRti vidyAmandira amadAvAda (gujarAta rAjya)-380009.

Page #5
lA. da. graMthazreNI : 131 abhidhA * DoM. tapasI nAndI prakAzaka DaoN. jitendra bI. zAha niyAmaka lAlabhAI dalapatabhAI bhAratIya saMskRti vidyAmaMdira ahamadAbAda prathama AvRtti : pharavarI 2002 * ISBN 81-85857-13-X : * mUlya : ru.120 * TAIpa seTiMga : zrI svAminArAyaNa mudraNa maMdira 3, vijaya hAusa, navAvADaja, ahamadAbAda - 13. phona : 7432464, 7415750 : mudraka : navaprabhAta prinTIMga presa ghIkAMTA roDa, ahamadAbAda - 1. phona: 5508631. 5509083

Page #6
PREFACE Agam Prabhakar Muni Shri Punyavijayji was a profound scholar of the Jaina agamas and agamic literature. He had lent significant contribution to the manuscriptology and to the methodology of editing the ancient works. He, moreover, had edited several rare works in an ideal way. Sheth Shri Kasturbhai Lalbhai founded L. D. Institute of Indology in the fifties; thanks to his inspiration. The L. D. Institute, since its inception, is an important centre for the studies concerning Indological subjects. As one of its academic activities, the Institute organizes lecture-series, one being in the memory of Muni Shri Punyavijayji. For this series, learned scholars are invited to deliver lectures on the subjects of their specialization. In this series, Dr. Tapasvi Nandi, professor Emeritus (U.G.C.) and a scholar of Sanskrit Language and literature was invited to deliver lectures in February 2002. We are indeed deeply grateful to him for accepting our invitation and discussing the topic of 'Abhidha' from the rhetorical angle. Therein, he has also discussed different viewpoints of the ancient alamkarikas, including Acarya Hemacandra on this subject. We hope that these lectures, now appearing in print, will prove useful to the students of alamkarasastra. L. D. Institute of Indology Ahmedabad-380009 February 2002. Jitendra B. Shah Director

Page #7

Page #8
37f9 ... I am thankful to the L. D. Institute of Indology and its Director Dr. Jitendra B. Shah for having arranged my three lectures on 'Abhidha' under the "Muni Punya-Vijayajeesmoti-vyakhana" series, this year. What follows in this small monograph is only a portion from a chapter on Abhidha in my project on hand viz. "Sahrdayaloka or Thought-currents in Indian Literary Criticism" - some eight chapters covering 1100+ pages of which have been already drafted. Kindly give me lots of your good wishes so that this project is completed and it also sees the light of the day. Abhidha of course, as considered by literary aesthetes is the power of word yielding the expressed or conventional sense, i.e. the dictionary meaning. This is a normally accepted view and is projected by the Kashmere School of litarary aesthetics headed by Anandavardhna and ably supported by Abhinavaguptapada and Vagdevatavatara Mammata. They were followed by a host of brilliant writers on poetics, beginning with Acarya Hemacandra, Vidyadhara and Visvanatha and ending with the great Appayya Dixit and the greatest Punditaraja Jagannatha. But the course of Abhidha, as also that of other thought-currents did not run smooth and Anandavardhana had to face some opposition and also challange from other great names, such as Mukula, Kuntaka, Mahima and Bhoja. These acaryas had their own idea about abhidha which was either broader or narrower and Mahima, a strong protegonist of Kavyanumiti was not prepared to go beyond abhidha and tried to subsume whatever went under the name of gauni, laksana and even vyanjana under poetic inference. But these voices were once again silenced by Mammata and his followers who chose to accept Anandavardhana's lead and follow the

Page #9
[8] dictates of the Kashmere School of literary aesthetics. But Acarya Hemacandra though a loyalist, had absorbed something from Bhoja, the lone voice who projected what we may call the Malava School of literary aesthetics. He tried to project 'gauni' as a separate and independent sabda-vitti in keeping with the original tradition of the purva-Mimamsa and also one supported by Bhoja, of course slightly differently, as we will go to see in course of these lectures. So, we have tried to consider in course of these lectures the views of those who do not fall in line with the Kashmere School of thought and also the views of Acaraya Hemacandra who strikes a different note, of course not a discordant note, in projecting 'gauni, as a separate vstti. If the learned find what follows as interesting, then my task is done. At the same time may I remind the learned not to expect absolutely original ideas from me, as the great Naiyayika Jayanta has ably stated : "kutosti nutanam vastu", and prior to him the great Abhinavagupta had stated : "urdhvordhvam aruhya yad-arthatattvam dhih pasyati srantim avedayanti, phalam tad adyaih parikalpitanam viveka-sopana-paramparanam." So, this is an effort to go up the ladder, the viveka-sopanaparampara, as laid down not only by the ancient masters, but also by the great modern alamkarikas, such as Dr. De, Dr. Kane, Dr. Raghavan, Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy, Dr. Rama Ranjana-Mukherjee, my gurus Prof. R. B. Athavale, Prof. R. C. Parikh and Prof. Dr. Kulkarni and my most respected and beloved friends and best among learned, Dr. Revaprasad Dwivedi, Prof. Dr. R. C. Dwivedi, and Dr. N. P. Unni. Thanking all concerned, Tapasvi Nandi Aum Ma Aum.

Page #10
Mukula and Kuntaka Mukula We may compare Bhoja's approach, to that of Mukula-Bhatta, Kuntaka and also Mahima Bhatta, because these three writes also do not fall in line with the so called Kashmira school of thought. Though of course Mukula and Kuntaka were definitely Bhoja's predecessors, Mahima was perhaps almost a senior contemporary. The consideration of these writers also is taken up due to the reason that they also do not fall in line with the Kashmir tradition. As it is, they are all pre-Mammata but of course unique in their approach and Bhoja was under their influence. We examine Mukula Bhatta first. Mukula Bhatta to the best of our knowledge, has contributed a single work called the "Abhidha-vrtta-matrka." Mukula virtually accepts two sabda-vrttis such as abhidh, and laksana, but the latter is also an extension of, and therefore part of abhidha for him, and is broad enough to include even vyanjana. In the very first karika he observes : "sabdavyaparato yasya pratitis tasya mukhyata arthavaseyasya punar laksyamanatvam ucyate." - AVM. I. pp. 2 (Edn. Dr. R. P. Dwivedi, Chowkhamba Vidyabhavan, '73) He further observes : (pp. 2, ibid) : "sabda-vyaparad yasyavagatis tasya mukhyarvam. sa hiyatha sarvebhyo hastadibhyo'vayavebhyah purvam mukham avalokyate, tadvad eva sarvebhyah pratiyamanebhyah arthantarebhyah purvam avagamyate tasman mukham iva mukhya iti sakhadiyantena mukhya-sabdena abhidhiyate. tasya udaharanam, 'gaur anubandhya' iti. atra hi go-sabda-vyaparat yaga-sadhana-bhuta go-tva-laksana jatir avagamyate. atas tasyah mukhyata tad evam sabda-vyapara-gamyo mukhyorthah." i. e. - The apprehension of which is derived through the function of employment of a word is termed mukhya i. e. principal. It is said to be 'mukhya' because as is 'mukha' i. e. face seen first as compared to hands and other limbs, in the

Page #11
[2] same way that meaning also is apprehended first in comparison with all other meanings apprehended. So, 'that which is like 'mukha' or 'face' is termed 'mukhya' i.e. principal, which is formed with the help of Panini sutra 5/3/103, viz. "sakhadibhyo yah", which recommends 'ya' suffix which is in the sense of comparison and seen in words such as 'sakha' etc. The illustration is, "gaur anubandhyah" i. e. 'the cow / ox may be fixed for a sacrifice.' Here, 'go' is a word, and due to its employment gotva-jati is apprehended as instrument for performing a sacrifice. So, the mukhyata or principality will be fixed with reference to 'go-jati'. From this illustration, it is understood that the meaning viz. 'gotva-adi-rupa' which is derived by the function of the word 'gauh' is mukhya i.e. principal meaning. But, observes Mukula, that is called 'laksanika' or secondary whose apprehension follows the examination of a meaning derived through sabdavyapara "yasya tu sabda-vyapara-avagamyartha-paryalocanaya avagatis tasya laksanikatvam yatha purvasmin eva udaharane vyakteh." -- Mukula thus holds that the meaning of go-vyati or individual cow follows the first apprehension of go-jati, and therefore the go-vyati-jnana is laksanika for him. Mukula holds that -- (pp. 2, 3, ibid) : "sa hi na sabda-vyaparad avasiyate, 'visesyam nabhidha gacched ksina-saktir visesane' iti nyayat sabdasya jatimatra-paryavasitatvat. jatis tu vyaktim antarena yaga-sadhana-bhavam na pratipadyate iti sabda-pratyayita-jati-samarthyad atra jater asraya-bhuta vyaktir aksipyate. tena asau laksaniki. evam ayam mukhya-laksanikat visayopa-varnana-dvarena sabdasya abhidha-vyaparo dvividhah pratipadito, nirantaratha-nistah, santarartha-nisthas ca." Mukula holds that go-vyakti is not understood through the function of a word, because there is an all accepted dictum that, "abhidha can express only one of the two, viz. visesana or visesya. If it conveys visesana then it cannot express visesya, for the whole of its capacity is exhausted in apprehending visesana alone. Following this principle, in the said illustration, the word 'go' has a capacity to convey only 'gotva-jati'. When the apprehender thinks that jati' by itself, cannot be instrumental in the act of sacrifice, without its reference to the 'go-vyati, so then this 'go-vyakti' is covered by aksepa i. e.

Page #12
[3] implication (= i. e. either by anumana or inference, or arthapatti). Thus the meaning of go-vyakti is said to be "laksanika", according to Mukula. He further observes that thus by the description of two aspects such as 'mukhya' and 'laksanika', twofold abhidhavyapara of a word is established. The first (mukhya) flows directly from the word without anything coming in between, and is therefore said to be 'nirantarartha-nistha' i. e. directly apprehended from a word. The other is termed "santararthanistha" as it passes through a veil. It starts from word goes through mukhyartha i. e. jati -- and rests in vyakti at the next step. It is 'santarartha-nistha' because it has antara=vyavadhana, in form of first meaning which is jati-rupa. Mukula accepts a four-fold division of abhidha : (pp. 4, ibid) - samprati mukhya'bhidha-vyaparasya caturvidhyam abhidhiyate "tatra mukhyas' caturbhedo jneyo jatyadi-bhedatah" Mukula says that the Mahabhasyakara has suggested a four-fold classification of words in form of jati-sabda, guna-sabda, kriya-sabda and yadeccha-sabda. When words operate to convey their meaning (svarthabhidhanaya pravartta-mananam), they are coloured by the upadhis i. e. attributes -- upadhyuparanita-visaya-vivekatvad upadhi-nibandhana pravrttih. This upadhi i. e. attribute is twofold, viz. vaktr-sannivesita, i. e. which is grafted by the speaker, i. e. which is not natural to it, and vastu-dharma' i. e. one that naturally resides in an object. The first is illustrated by such words as 'dittha' and the like. The form of such words is collected by the last letter -- "antyabuddhi-nirglahyam samhitakramam svarupam" (pp. 5, ibid). This capacity to yield meaning is injected into a particular word by a speaker, who wants to flash the abhidha-power of that particular word according to his own choice. -- "tat khalu tam tam abhidhasaktim abhivyanjayata vaktra, yadrcchaya tasmin tasmin samjnini upadhitaya samnivesyate." (pp. 5) It may be noted that as Mukula was posterior to Anandavardhana, he knew. vyanjana very well and yet he willingly disowns it. He uses such words as "abhi-vyanjayata' but he does not encourage 'vyanjana-sakti' of a word. He only means, "making it manifest, or making it flash something."

Page #13
[4] Mukula considers another view point also. Says he -- some people hold that no such 'samhita-krama-svarupa' is injected into the 'samjni' because there cannot be such form independent of 'da'kara, etc. Thus it being 'abhavatmaka', it virtually does not exist. For these people, the yadrcchasabdatva of such words as dittha' and the like is also formed because for them also words such as dittha' and the like, having imagined (kalpita) samudayabhava, come into exercise for "abhidhana' of whatever samjna is desired, through the power manifested through the speaker's desire. The idea is, in the object which is called by the name of dittha, even if some imagined dittha-tva' is not there, in the sense of the meaning conveyed by this particular word, the word dittha itself will be taken as its meaning. (pp. 5): "yesam api ca 'da'karadi-varna-vyatirikta-samhita-krama-svarupabhavat na ditthadi-sabda-svarupam samhsta-kramam samjnisu adhyavasyate, iti darsanam, tesam api vaktr-yadrccha'-bhivyajyamana-saktibhedanusarena kalpanika-samudaya-rupasya ditthadeh sabdasya tat tat samjna'bhidhanaya pravartamanatvat yadeccha sabdatvam ditthadinam upapadyata eva." Mukula of course, sides with the earlier view of the vaiyakaranas. Vastu-dharma-rupa upadhi is also two-fold, esadhya' and 'siddha'. The former are the words expressing action - i. e. they are kriyasabdas, e.g. 'pacati' and the like. The latter i.e. 'siddha upadhi' is also twofold such as 'jati' and 'guna'. Jati' is said to be prana-prada-vastudharma. No object can own its form without its relation with "jati'. So, jati' is said to be 'pranaprada-siddha-vastudharma'. Mukula quotes Vakyapadiya : "gaur iti; na hi gauh svarupena gauh, napya-gauh gotvabhisambandhat tu gauh." . Some attribute (upadhi) becomes the cause of visesadhana for an object which has obtained its own form : (pp. 5, ibid) : 'kascit punar upadhir labdha-svarupasya-vastunah visesadhanahetuh, yatha sukladir ganah." - i. e. like 'guna' in form of whiteness etc. These qualities such as whiteness etc. are not responsible for the object to attain its own form. For that only 'jati' is capable. But after the attainment of its own form, it becomes instrumental in its 'visesadhana' - i.e. in laying down further its speciality. The 'guna's such as 'paramanutva' - 'atom-ness' or the quality of being an

Page #14
[5] atom, which are permanent (i. e. nitya), are also varieties of 'guna' - "tesam api sarvesam guna-jatiyatvat, they are also of the same type as these, i. e. suklatva and the like. As they are 'nitya' they may be like 'jati', but because they are 'visesadhanahetu', they are termed gunas, and not jati. Thus Mukula concludes : (pp. 6, ibid) - "tad evam prana-pradopadhinibandhanatyam yasya sabdasya sa jati-sabdo yatha gavadih. yasmat labdha-svarupasya vastuno visesadhana-hetuh arthah pratiyate, sa gunasabdo yatha sukladih." We may observe that these words are taken up fully by Mammata. So, Mukula not only serves as a shaping influence for Bhoja but also for Mammata to some extent because he, i.e. Mukula follows the lead of the grammarians such as Patanjali and Bhartphari. Now, Mukula considers purva-paksa. It goes like this -- Is it not possible that words connoting 'guna', 'kriya' or 'yadiccha' -- all can be taken as jatisabdas ? For example take the word sukla. Now the whiteness in milk, conch, balaka (= name of a bird), etc. is really different but a common word sukla' is used for a variety of white colour. Thus jati-nibandhanatva' - of 'guna-vaci' words is seen. This can be said of kriya sabdas also. The kriya of cooking is different in case of molasses, sesamum, rice etc. and yet it is conveyed by the same word viz. pacati.' The yadrccha words such as dittha' etc. as spoken by humans, parrots etc. are really different and yet because of jati i.e. 'dittha-sabdatva' they are taken to be one. So, as a result the 'catustayi pravrtti' of words does not hold good : "atasca guna-kriya yadrccha-sabdanam api jati-sabdatvat catustayi sabdanam pravrttir na upapadyate." (pp. 9, ibid). The siddhantin's answer follows : It is not jati' or 'class' which results in cognition of identity, in case of guna-sabdas or kriyasabdas. But it is 'samjni' i.e. the individual who makes for this sense of identity. The difference seen among individuals is the result of their difference in attributes, i. e. the asraya or substratum. For example, take a face, which when reflected in oil, sword, water or mirror, which are responsible only for the knowledge of the reflections, make for difference seen in the figures seen in them. In the same way, the

Page #15
[6] individual quality such as whiteness etc., owing to difference with reference to time, place, and context, and thus due to difference in medium, 'karanabheda' appear differt when vested in a conch, and the like. The colour looks, as though different. But thereby 'suklatva' - jati' is not proved to have existence. For 'jati' is that one 'dharma' which resides in many. But the substratum of the imagined suklatva jati, viz. sukla-vyakti is basically one and identical. Same is the case with such words as 'pacati', 'dittha', etc. Thus the 'vyakti' in form of paka-kriya is one and the same, and so also the individual: - samjni named 'dittha'. The illusory manifoldness - nanatva seen in different stages of pakakriya, or in an individual at different years such as of a child, young boy, young man, etc. etc.- - makes, for this wrong perception of jati in such cases. This is not real. Says Mukula (pp. 10, ibid) - "atra api ekasya eva pakadikriya-vyakteh, ditthadi-sabda-vyakteh, ditthadesca samjnino yatha-kramam abhivyanjakanam pakadinam tatha dhvaninam vayo'vastha-visesanam kaumaradinam ca yo bhedas tad vasena nanavidhena rupena avabhasamanatvat sthitam etat sabda-pravrtti-nimittanam sabdarthas caturvidhah iti." After this Mukula turns to the second variety of abhidha, i.e. laksanika abhidha. This also is two-fold. The AVM 2B reads: "Suddhopacara-misratvat laksana dvividha mata." Because of its being either suddha or upacaramisra, laksana is two-fold. The illustrations are 'gangayam ghosah' and 'gaur vahikah' respectively. The suddha-laksana is also divided two-fold, such as upadana-laksana and laksana-laksana (AVM 3A). Mukula suggests that when something else is imposed to support one thing. "sva-siddhyarthataya" ksepo yatra vastvantarasya tat (AVM 3B). - This is called upadanam; or 'inclusive' variety the other is the opposite of this (AVM IV A) laksanam tu tad-viparyasato matam." This is exclusive type. We know that all this has been accepted by Mammata without challanging. But the illustration that Mukula cites for upadanalaksana viz. "gaur-anuvandhyah" is rejected by Mammata. It is taken as 'arthapatti' or presumption or inference from circumstances, i.e. implication, for in the illustration cited by Mukula we cannot show either rudhi or prayojana which is the basis of laksana. Mammata also feels that sabda

Page #16
[7] pramana is resorted to only when other pramanas do not operate. Here, govyakti in the present illustration of 'gaur-anuvandhyah' is known through implication. So it is no use utilizing a sabda-vrtti here. Laksana-laksana occurs when one's meaning is sacrificed to obtain the other sense, as in "gangayam ghosah". Mukula proceeds to give a four-fold division of upacara-misra laksana (AVM. 4B-5A). He says : aropa'dhyavasanabhyam suddha-gaunopacarayoh (4B) AVM. pratyekam bhidyamanatvat upacaras' caturvidhah." (5A) AVM. Thus superimposition (aropa) and introsusception (adhvasana) make for these varieties. Thus in all four-fold upacara-metaphorical imposition is available. Thus Mukula first begins with upacara or identification as suddha and gauna. Suddha is that which has no upamana-upameya-bhava or similarity at its basis. The guna in form of similarity is absent here. This is illustrated by such examples as 'ayurghitam' where karya-karanabhava -- is at its base. Gauna upacara, or identification based on guna such as similarity between upamana and upameya which results in superimposition of the sabda and artha describing upamana on that concerning upameya, is illustrated as in "gaur vahikah". Now this two-fold upacara or identification is also two-fold on the basis of adhyaropa or superimposition and adhyavasana or absorption, i. e. partial and complete identification. Adhyaropa or partial imposition occurs when the difference between the object superimposed and the basic object on which superimposition is done, is not concealed, i. e. the difference between the two is not eroded. Here a lesser object whose identity is not covered up is seen clearly and on this object, another object of superior quality is superimposed. This is called 'adhyaropa'. This is illustrated in both the illustrations i. e. 'ayur ghrtam' and 'gaur-vahikah cited above. Prior to this

Page #17
[8] Mukula had made one remark that : kecit tu upacare sabdopacaram eva manyante, na arthopacaram. tad ayuktam. sabdopacarasya arthopacaraavinabhavitvat." (pp. 16) i.e. only sabdopacara is not possible as believed by some, because it necessarily involves 'arthopacara'. It may also be observed that when Mukula says (pp. 16), dvividhah upacarah, suddho gaunasca. tatra suddho yatra mula-bhutasya..." This suggests that Mukula is in favour of taking only upacara based on similarity as real upacara. In Mammata's mind this impression was lying at the root. It is therefore that by the end of his discussion on upadana-laksana and laksana-laksana, he writes : "ubhayarupa ca iyam suddha, upacarena a-misritatvat". So, for Mammata also 'upacara' is basically rooted in similarity. Precisely for this, Mammata does not use the term 'upacara' while treating saropa and sadhyavasanika. Mammata also did not favour the upacara which was sabda-gata. Mukula explains faropa' and 'adhyavasana' as : (pp. 18, ibid): "yatra adhyaropya-aropa visayayor bhedam anapahnutyaiva vastvantare vastvantaram upacaryate tatra an-apahnuta-svarupa eva vastvantare vastvantarasya adhikasya aropyamanatvad adhyaropah." - We have explained it as above. Adhyavasana is said to be there - When, "yatra tu upacaryamana-visayasya upacaryamane antar-linataya vivaksitatvat svarupapahnavah kriyate, tatra adhyavasanam." The suddha-upacaragata-adhyavasana is seen in, "pancalah". The word 'pancala' through laksita-laksana, it being the place for stay of a child of pancala, is itself used in the sense of a village : "atra-hi pancalapatyanivasadhikaranatvaj janapade laksita-laksanaya pancala-sabdah prayujyate." (pp. 18, ibid). Gauna upacaragata-adhyavasana is illustrated as in, 'raja". Here 'gaunatva' does not come to mind immediately, but only after some thought is given to it. So, it looks as it were it is ordinary - bhrastam iva', for the importance of rudhi is more powerful here. Thus we have 'adhyavasana-yukta-gauna-upacara' here. When to these four upacara-based varieties two as stated above are added, we have in all six varieties of laksana - "etena caturvidhena upacarena saha purvoktau dvau laksanabhedau samkalayya sat prakara laksana vaktavya" -- observes Mukula (pp. 18, ibid).

Page #18
[9] Now this laksana is said to be 'tri-skandha' (i. e. having three basic varieties) on account of its suddhatva, adhyaropa and adhyavasana: "esa ca laksana triskandha, suddhatvat, adhyaropad, adhyavasanat ca." (pp. 202, ibid) Thus when these three each are divided into two we have a scheme of six-fold laksana. Mammata also has the same observation : "laksana tena sad-vidha" (K.P.II). Mukula explains the sub-divisions such as - "tatasthe laksana suddha - syad aropastvadurage || (AVM-VB) nigirne'dhyavasanam tu rudhyasannataratvatah | (AVM VIA) i. e. suddha laksana will be with reference to tatastha (i. e. independently present), 'aropa' i. e. superimposition is with reference to 'a-duraga', and 'adhyavasana' or complete identification is in 'nigarana' i. e. swallowing up. This is two-fold; either through rudhi or asannatarata i. e. nearness." The idea is laksana is said to be two-fold such as 'upadana' and 'laksana'. Now wherever this occurs, the laksya object is not covered up (anuparaktatvat tatasthataya pratiyamane) by the 'laksaka' object, and so it remains 'tatastha' i. e. independent of the other object. This means that the 'laksya' object is not apprehended as covered up by the 'laksaka' object, e.g. "gangayam ghosah". Here 'tata' or the bank of the river Ganges is in mind and so,"gangayam" is used, not 'vitastayam'. So, 'tata' is not realized as completely covered up by a special flow of water, because that special flow is restristed to the limit of only indicating the bank from a distance. So, the apprehension of the bank takes place independently, and not as identified with the Ganges. We have to accept the same situation in case of upadana laksana also, e.g. in "The fat Devadatta does not eat by day.". "tatha hi- 'gangayam ghosa' iti atra ghosadhikarana-bhuta-tatopalaksanabhisamdhanena 'gangayam ghoso na vitastayam' iti ganga-sabde prayujyamane tatasya sroto-visesena-upalaksakatva-matropayuktatvena uparago na pratiyate, tatasthatvena eva tasya tatasya pratyayat. evam upadane'pi vacyam - yatha, 'pino devadatto diva na bhunkta' iti." (AVM pp. 20, ibid)

Page #19
[10] Mukula further observes that when it is required for the tata to express itself as covered up by the special flow and yet its own form is also to be revealed, then in the illustration viz. 'gangayam ghosah', first there is superimposition i.e. aropa, for in such an aropa there is apprehension of tata as coloured by the flow. So, the apprehension takes this form : "ghosa or dwelling is on such a bank which as it is in proximity of a special flow of water, is itself of the form of the flow itself.' As against that when the idea is to convey extreme proximity -- 'atyanta asannata', and when the particular statement is used to convey this extreme proximity, then the bank is presented as completely covered up by the special flow. So, it is shown that the dwelling is, directly on the Ganges, not anywhere else.' There it is the case of complete identification or swallowing up -- 'adhyavasana' : "yada tu ganga-sabdabhidheyasya sroto-visesasya a-vidura-vartitaya tatam anapahnutasvarupam sroto-visesoparaktaya vivaksitam bhavati tada purvasmin udacharane adhyaropo bhavati. srotovisesoparaktasya tatasya pratiteh sroto-visesa-avidura-vartitvat srotovisesa-rupe tate ghosa iti. yada tu atyantam asannatam ghosam prati srotovisesasya pratipadayitum etad vakyam sroto-visesanigirnataya tatam apahnutya prayujyate 'gangayam eva saksad ghosah na tu anyatra iti', tada adhyavasanam. (pp. 20, 21, ibid) Thus, "gaur vahikah" and "gaur eva ayam", are illustrations of gaunaupacara-mulaka, saropa and sadhyavasanika, respectively. Just as adhyavasanalaksana is possible with reference to proximity, similarly it is possible with reference to rudhi also : "yatha ca asannataratvena adhyavasanam purvam pravibhaktam tatha rudhatvena api pravibhaktavyam" (pp. 22 ibid). The illustrations are pancalah' and 'raja'. Precisely for this the karika said, "rudhyasannataratvatah" rudhatvat asannataratvat ca nigirne arthe adhyavasanam syad ityarthah." (pp. 22, ibid). Thus rudhi is also based on a forgotten relation, while prayojanavati has its sambandha fresh in mind. Mukula has not counted 'prayojana' as the hetu of laksana. Mukula here discusses a prima facie view. The objector's contention is -- "The 'mukhyartha' i. e. primary meaning is necessarily, conveyed by word itself. As against this, the laksanika' i.e. secondary meaning is not collected through the word. To put it more clearly, it can be said that, the

Page #20
[11] karya-karana-relation of a particular meaning with a particular word is ascertained through 'anvaya-vyatireka'. Again this apprehension is with reference only to the four-fold primary meaning such as jati, guna, kriya and yadrccha. But this is not so in case of the six-fold laksanika i.e. secondary meaning. This again is in the fitness of things, for if the word is connected directly even with the secondary sense, then even this 'laksanika' also will be branded as 'mukhya'. Again, as the laksanika artha is connected with the mukhya i.e. primary sense, and in that case if it is held that this secondary sense is also derived through the agency of the word itself, then the question which arises is that when a word also conveys the secondary sense along with conveying of its primary sense also, is it so that this secondary sense is conveyed in a sapeksa way or with some expectancy or nir-apeksa i.e. in an independent way without expectancy ? -- If it is conveyed independently i.e. (nirapeksah), then its apprehension should take place for all time. If on the other hand its apprehension occurs in a correlated way (sapeksah), then the question is what is expected here ? "atha sabdasya mukhyo yo'savarthas tena saha sambandho laksyamanasya arthasya drsta iti tad-dvarena tasya avagatir iti abhidhiyate, evam sati yadi nirapeksah svartha-pratipadana-dvarena laksyamanam artham avagamayati tada sarvada tam artham avagamayet, atha sapeksah, kim tasya apeksaniyam iti asankya aha" - (pp. 24, ibid) With reference to the above objection, Mukula observes that -- "vaktur vakyasya vacyasya rupabhedavadharanat laksana sat-prakaraisa vivektavya manisibhih." (7A) (pp. 24, ibid) "The learned divide this laksana, in a six-fold fashion, keeping in mind the formal varieties of vakta i.e. speaker, vakya i.e. the sentence and vacya i.e. the sense conveyed." The idea is that each of vakta, vakya and vacya are either staying independently or with one of the other two : (i) 'Vakta' is that person, who utters a sentence to convey some sense to someone else. (ii) Vakya' is the use of words having expectancy and which jointly convey a single sense. (iii) Vacya' is the meaning which is the object of a word either through its primary or secondary function. All these three have two sub

Page #21
[12] divisions each- i. e. samasta or vyasta i. e. each one stays either with either of the other two, or stays independently. The idea is that with reference to the different situations caused by space and time, these factors are united either in a 'samasta' or 'vyasta' form. As a result there occurs a difference in their nature. Due to this difference in nature, the experts have thought of the six-fold division of laksana: "etesam trayanam vakradinam vyasta-samastabheda-bhinnanam desa-kalavastha-vailaksanya-gata-samasta-vyasta-bhedasamyojitanam yah svabhava-bheda-prapancah, tata esa sat-prakara laksana paramarsa-kusalair vivecaniya." (pp. 24, 25, ibid). Through this six-fold meaning only, a word causes the apprehension of the secondary sense. Thus, through the agency i. e. karana-samagri such as vakta or speaker and the rest, the word is connected with the secondary sense and then becomes capable to give the secondary sense. The idea is that the word has expectancy with reference to these six-fold vakta, vacya etc., when it gives its primary sense. Then, through usage - - vrddha-vyavahara through this primary sense, it fixes its relation with the secondary sense. Through the said six-fold meaning the word conveys the secondary sense. So, a word does not give a secondary sense, till its relation with secondary sense is not comprehended. This relation is not brought about naturally, but only through the agency or karana-samagri such as vakta or speaker etc., and also only after the primary sense is collected. As is said by Sabarasvamin - "Then, how is it that a different word (= say, Ganga) is used for a different sense (i.e. say, tata) ? The answer is - In our opinion, through the medium of conveying of one's own meaning." (Mi. Su. I.4.12) Here, the secondary sense is intended through the primary sense. Sabara has further stated, (Mi. Su. I. IV. I) that laksana is from day to day usage, i. e. laukiki. Through this it is suggested by him that, when a word proceeds towards the secondary sense, it has an expectancy of a sort of relation. By 'loka' is meant the means of knowledge that come into function in day to day affairs. So, 'laukiki' means 'that which is known in ordinary parlance', i. e. that which is known through popular usage, i. e. that which is established by a word which carries some relation "etad uktam bhavati. na sabdanam anavadharita-laksanikarthasambandhanam laksanikam artham prati gamakatvam, na'pi ca tatra saksat

Page #22
[13] sambandha-grahanam, kim tarhi ? vaktradi-samagry-apeksaya svarthavyavadhanena iti. yad uktam-acarya-sabarasvamina" -- katham punah parasabdah paratra vartate ? svarthabhidhanena iti brumah." --- iti. atra hi svartha-dvarena laksyamanartha'bhinivesita sabdanam ukta. punasca asau eva aha -- "laksana'pi laukiki eva", iti. atra hi sambandhavadharanasapeksanam sabdanam laksyamane arthe pravittir ukta. vyavaharoparudhani hi pratya-ksadini pramanani loka-sabdena abhidhiyante. loka eva vidita laukiki, vyavaharagamya, parigrhita-sambandha-sabda-nistha iti arthah." Mukula here also quotes from Kumarila - "nirudha laksanah kascit samarthyad abhidhanavat, kriyante sampratam kascit kascin naiva tv asaktitah." - iti. i.e. Some laksanas are based on usage. They carry the strength of conveying a meaning like the primary function (= abhidhanavat). While some (other) laksanas are formed on the spot. Still others are not formed at all (i.e. they are not acceptable at all), because they are bereft of the power to convey sense." (Tantravartika-3/1/6 arunadhikarana). The first one is illustrated by 'raja' and the like. The second variety which is floated on the spot, i. e. the 'tatkaliki, is the result of the context of vrddha-vyavahara, vakta (i. e. the speaker) etc. such as seen in the verse, "snigdha-syamala." etc. In this verse the word 'lipta' has its primary sense contradicted because lustre or kanti has no inherent capacity to smear anything as is done by saffron powder. This is so with reference to words such as 'suhrd', 'rama', etc. also. The third variety is such which is not marked even in the vIddhavyavahara or practice of the seniors and the like. Nor, do we find such situation as in case of words such as 'lipta' and the like. So, this third type is unacceptable. They cannot be put into practice. What Mukula drives at is that laksana is possible only in cases of such words as are put into practice by seniors, or which are similar to such practice. Laksana is not possible anywhere and everywhere. For in that case any word will be able to deliver any sense, and this we do not find

Page #23
[14] in reality "tad evam, vaktradisamagri-anupravesena sabdanam svartham arpayatam arthantaram prati svarupa-dvarena sajatiya-sabda-dvarena va gamakataya avadharitanam laksakatvam iti sthitam." (pp. 30, ibid). The principle established is that, in the context of the instrumentality (samagri) of the speaker etc., a word becomes indicator (laksaka) only when through the same instrument (such as vakta etc.), they are accepted as conveying meaning through their very form either in the practice of the seniors or through such other device." After dealing with the four-fold 'mukhya artha' and the six-fold laksana Mukula discusses a fresh problem. He discusses the four views concerning (i) abhihitanvaya, (ii) anvitabhidhana, (iii) the samuccaya of these two and (iv) the 'abhava' of these two. He discusses the position of laksana with reference to these four alternatives. Says he "anvaye' bhihitanam sa - vacyatvad urdhvam isyate (7B) anvitanam tu vacyatve, vacyatvasya purah sthitah, dvaye dvayam, akhande tu - vakyartha paramarthatah - 8 nastyasau kalpite'rthe tu purvavat pravibhajyate." - 9A i.e. In abhihitanvayavada laksana is believed to take place after vacyatva is over. In anvitabhidhanavada it is believed to occur prior to the primary i.e. vacyatva. In the two (together), at both the places (i.e. earlier and later), and where 'akhandata' is accepted with reference to sentence sense laksana does not take place at all. It is believed and divided as done earlier in an imagined sense such as word-sense (because in reality only the sentence-sense exists)." Mukula observes (pp. 48, ibid).: akhande tu 'vakyarthe'sau laksana paramarthena nasti. bhinnanam padarthanam paramarthato'bhidheya-bhavasya anupapadyamanatvat, tad asritatvacca laksanayah kalpita-padarthasrayena tu sa laksana yatha-ruci purvavad abhihitanvaya-anvitabhidhana-tat-samuccaya

Page #24
kalpanaya vibhaktavyabhage nivesya, parasparasya desa-kalavacchedena'sesa [15] vyavahartr-nisthataya rudhatvat. Mukula observes that in all the four abhihitanvayavada and the rest, wherever it is primary sense, the functioning of laksana is according to Mukula functions when (i) the primary sense, being contradicted by any other means of knowledge becomes impossible, (ii) the laksartha being closer to mukhyartha, (iii) and also when this acceptance of the secondary sense - 'santararthagrahana' - rests on some 'prayojana' or reason : -- "ya ca iyam sat-prakara laksana purvam ukta, sa - (i) mukhyarthasya pramanantara-badhitatvena-a-sambhavat, (ii) laksyamanasya ca arthasya mukhyartham prati asannatvat, (iii) santarartha-grahanasya ca sa-prayojanatvat iti evamvidha-karanatritayatmaka-samagri-samasrayena vrddha-vyavahare paridrsyate. Now, says Mukula, the 'asannatva' or nearness of laksyartha with mukhyartha is five-fold, according to Bhartrmitra-such as, "abhidheyena sambandhat sadrsyat samavayatah vaiparityat kriya-yogat alternatives such as the not proper to accept the suggested. This laksana, laksana pancadha mata" iti. (pp. 50, ibid) i.e. through (i) relation with the primary meaning, (ii) through similarity (iii) 'samavaya' i. e. intimate relation, (iv) opposition (iv) relation with verbkriyayoga; laksana is said to be five-fold. Thus, says Mukula, the 'prayojana' is also two-fold. One 'prayojana' is such which depends on vrddhavyavahara which is beginningless in accepting the meaning that is conveyed and therefore depending on the established custom. This is as good as 'rudhi' or convention, e. g. in case of words such as 'dvi-refa' etc. This word is having two 'ra'-karas, as the word 'bhramara', meaning a bee, consists two 'ra'karas.

Page #25
[16] So, 'dvi-refa' -- i. e. one having two-'ra'karas, also conveys the same sense without dragging in the word 'bhramara'. Thus, this is as good as 'rudhi' or convention. Now Mukula has suggested that 'following a rudhi' is a 'prayojana' here. The second prayojana is different from the above rudhi-tulya-prayojana. Mukula observes (pp. 50, ibid): "aparam tu rudhyanusaranatmakam yat prayojanam uktam, tad-vyatirikta-vastvantara-gatasya samvijnana-padasya rupa-visesa-pratipadanam nama, yatha purvam udahstam, "ramo'smiti". This second prayojana is in form of establishment of a special form of an object, which is concealed in that object, but the conveying of which is intended. The illustration is, "ramo'smi..." etc. Both these purposes or aims (i. e. prayojanas) are to be determined through the secondary meaning arrived at, with the help of the above mentioned five-fold relation, when the primary meaning is set aside, it being in-appropriate. Now it may be observed here, that in nirudha laksana Mukula tries to find a 'prayojana' in form of 'following convention" as established by usage made current by seniors. But accepting or imagining a 'prayojana' in rudhimula, does not look possible to us. Dr. Rewaprasad observes that even if we accept what Mukula holds here, greater charm is caused by such usages as dvi-refa' in place of the direct mention of 'bhramara'. Thus, causing a greater charm could be a prayojana here. But we feel that it is better to hold only rudhi as the cause of laksana here and such rudhi in itself carries its own charm, for ultimately laksana or say, poetic deviation of any kind causes charm. So, rudhi laksana has an inherent charm which does not stand in need of any prayojana. Mukula provides illustrations for this five-fold laksana. At the end of it he observes that in this five-fold laksana the expressed meaning is at times (i) atyanta-tiraskrta i. e. completely lost, or (ii) The expressed is either intended or unintended (vivaksita / a-vivaksita) : (pp. 58, ibid) "idanim pancavidhasambandha-nibandhanayam asattau purvopavarnitayam kvacid vacyasya atitiraskarah, kvacid vivaksitatvam, kvacicca a-vivaksitatvam iti evam vidham

Page #26
[17] trayam yat sahrdayair upadarsitam, tasya visaya-vibhagam upadarsayitum aha - sadrsye vaiparitye ca vacyasya ati-tiraskriya-(10 B) vivaksa ca avivaksa ca, sambandha-samavayayoh, upadane vivaksa, tra laksane tvavivaksanam tiraskriya kriyayoge, kvacit tad-viparitata (12 A) i.e. The expressed is totally abandoned in case of the relations such as sadrsya and vaiparitya. There is intended and un-intended expressed sense in varieties based on 'sambandha' and 'samavaya'. In 'upadana' we have only the vivaksa of the expressed, i.e. it is always expected, and in 'laksana' there is only a-vivaksa, while in 'kriya-yoga' the expressed is either abandoned (tiraskriya) or not. Mukula explains this with reference to the illustrations cited by him, but we feel there is overlappings in these cases and his treatment is not as scientific as either of his predecessor Anandavardhana or of his successor Mammata. Mukula also observes (pp. 66, ibid): "laksanamargavagahitvam tu dhvaneh sahrdayair nutanatayopavarnitasya vidyata iti disam unmilayitum idam atra uktam. etacca vidvadbhih kusagriyaya buddhya nirupaniyam, na tu jhagityeva asuyitavyam iti alam atiprasangena." i. e. "This is just to suggest that the newly advocated dhvani by the connoisseurs falls into the region of 'laksana' only. The learned with very sharp intelligence have to brood over our observation and that it need not be immediately discarded. So now, enough of further elaboration." Mukula thus tries to incorporate 'dhvani' under laksyartha and thus for him vyanjana is part of laksana which again is abhidha itself because it i.e. laksana is only an extension of abhidha. Mukula concludes to his satisfaction that the word-element which is in itself undivided in form of pure sabda-tattva, i. e. prior to its being classified into the four-fold scheme of jativacaka, etc. the word-element which is 'a-bhinna' in its original form, attains to the 'vivarta' i. e. illusive change in form of 'sabda', 'artha' and 'sambandha'. i. e. word, its meaning and their relation later, then only the abhidha-sakti is said to be ten-fold. In its original non-dualistic form of word, there is no scope for this ten-fold division: (pp. 69, ibid)

Page #27
[18] "idanim sakala-sabda-a-vibhagatmakasya sabda-tattvasya yada sabdarthasambandha-tritaya-rupataya rajju-sarpataya vivarta-manatvam tada etad abhidhavsttam dasa-vidha-vyavaharo-parohitayopapadyate, na tu samhitarthavak-tattva-visayataya iti darsayitum aha - vivartamanam vak-tattvam dasadhaiva vilokyate. - 12 samhrta-kramabhede tu tasmin tesam kuto gati)." - 13A ityetad abhidhavrttam dasadhatra vivecitam. 13B mukhyasya abhidhavittasya prakarascatvarah laksanikasya tu sad iti evam dasaprakarakam abhidha-vrttam atra vivecitam. This treatment of Mukula's views suggests how he has influenced Bhoja in taking abhidh, as three-fold such as mukhya, gauni and laksana. We know that this approach is different from the one seen in the Kashmir school the highest expression of which we notice in Jagannatha. But prior to that we have also to take note of Kuntaka and Mahima also, who influenced the Malava school like Mukula. The flowering of the thought as seen in the Kashmir school is to be traced in Anandavardhana, who discusses abhidh, only from the angle of its difference from vyanjana, and then in the treatment of Mammata and his followers. Jagannatha of course comes last but in him we see the highest flight of abstract thinking and the final word on sabda-vittis. Mukula and Kuntaka are viewed as shaping influences for the Malava tradition as seen in Bhoja and also for the Kashmir tradition as seen in Mammata, for the K. P. is influenced by both the Dhy, and also the Abhidhavrtta-matrka of Mukula. Hemacandra we will go to observe follows Mammata, but absorbs the teaching of Mukula and Bhoja also, while Vidyadhara, Vidyanatha, Visvanatha and Kesava follow the lead of Mammata. So, now we will consider Kuntaka who like Mukula had his share in shaping the views of Bhoja, because for Kuntaka also, abhidha' has a connotation wider than permitted by the Kashmir school of thought.

Page #28
[19] Kuntaka After explaining the general definition of poetry and before explaining the special definition of it, Kuntaka first of all explains the form of word and meaning. He observes : evam kavyasya samanyalaksane vihite visesalaksanam upakramate. tatra sabdarthayos tavat svarupam nirupayati - 'vacyo'rtho vacakah sabdah prasiddham iti yadyapi, tatha'pi kavya-marge'smin paramartho'yam etayo)" - V J. I. 8 (pp. 13, Edn. K. Krishnamoorthy) i.e. 'After the general explanation of poetry, the question of its detailed definition is taken up. First of all, the nature of word and meaning is examined : That 'meaning' is what is signified, and word is that which signifies, is so well known that it needs no elaboration. Yet, in the province of poetry, their true nature is as follows :" (V.J.1.8) (Trans. K. Kri.) (pp. 300, ibid) Kuntaka goes on observing that the general meaning of the terms, 'word' and 'meaning' is of course, well known. The 'word' is the signifier and the 'meaning' is the signified : "yo vacakah pratyayakah sa sabdah, yo vacyas ca abhidheyah so'rtha iti' (pp. 14, ibid). Thus the word for Kuntaka is that which causes apprehension of meaning, and the meaning is that which is expressed i. e. apprehended. Now, let us first make it clear that Kuntaka also does not attempt any scientific definition of abhidha, vacaka sabda and vacyartha here. He does not have a fool-proof scheme as is seen in the K.P. of Mammata. Or, it may be that he knowingly defies the ruling of Anandavardhana who clearly distinguished between abhidha, laksana and vyanjana, and vacya, laksya and vyangya senses which are rendered in English generally as the expressed, indicated and suggested senses. No; he has his own approach and is closer to Mukula in the sense that he names only 'abhidha' as the 'sabdavrtti or say, visista abhidha, which is wide enough to include laksana and vyanjana in its fold, provided this deviation is poetic.

Page #29
[20] It is this trend which is perhaps inherited by Bhoja also. We will see that it is Bhoja who tries to furnish illustrations, not from worldly usage only, but from pure poetry to illustrate the main three divisions of what he calls abhidha, with its any number of sub-divisions. This trend is perhaps inherited by Bhoja both from Mukula to some extent and Kuntaka to a greater extent. For Kuntaka, as far as poetry, the result of the effort of a poet, is concerned, there is only one function of the poetic word and it is 'abhidha' which is not to be confused with the abhidha or power of expression of a word giving the conventional meaning only, as is seen in the Kashmir school of thought, but it is the power of poetic expression', which includes poetic usages such as laksana or indication and vyanjana i.e. suggestion, provided they carry the stamp of being pure and beautiful poetic expression, i.e. artistic expression only. Kuntaka, as Dr. Krishnamoorthy wants us to believe uses such terms as dyotaka', 'dyotya' and vyanjaka', 'vyanjya' in the sense of indicatorindicated (i.e. laksaka-laksya) and suggestor-suggested. But we are not convinced. It is only in a very loose sense that the terms dyotaka-dyotya are used by Kuntaka, and we fail to ascertain the exact import of these terms. Normally in the Kashmir school, these terms are taken as synonyms, but Kuntaka does not do it. Whether he takes it to mean laksaka-laksya is also not clear. But it is clear that he is out to include dyotaka-dyotya and vyanjaka-vyangya under his wider vacaka-vacya. He raises an objection and then silences it to his satisfaction thus. (Under V. J. I. 8 pp. 14, ibid) : "nanu ca dyotaka-vyanjakau api sabdau sambhavatah, tad asamgrahat na avyaptih, yasmat artha-pratiti-karitva-samanyad, upacarat, tau api vacakau eva. evam dyotya-vyangyayor api arthayoh pratyeyatva-samanyat upacarad vacyatvam eva. tasmat vacakatvam vacyatvam ca sabdarthayor loke suprasiddham yadyapi laksanam tatha'pi asmin alaukike kavyamarge, kavikarma-vartmani ayam etayor vaksyamanah paramarthah kim api apurvam tattvam ityarthah." Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy translates : (pp. 300, ibid) : "The general meaning of the terms 'word' and 'meaning' is quite well known indeed. The 'word' is

Page #30
[21] the signifier and the meaning' is the signified. One might object that the indicative and suggestive words too which have their own signification may yet be termed word' and the above statement would illustrate the fallacy of "too narrow". Our reply is that they are expressive words by implication, the metaphorical application being based on their similarity with denotative words. Similarly, the meanings alluded to are as good as denoted meaning because of the similarity in point of being understood. Thus, although 'signifying' and 'being signified' are enough qualifications to mark off the nature of word and meaning everywhere in the practical world, they do not serve the purpose of poetry whose province is supra-mundane. Therefore, their essence in the world of poetry deserves to be pointed out clearly as is done in the next verse." One thing is clear. Kuntaka knows the difference between pure abhidha, gauni, laksana and vyanjana. But he refuses to accept any scheme of sabdavrttis as is done by the Kashmir school. Bhamaha had rejected certain alamkaras as 'varta', and promoted the cause of "vakrabhidheya-sabdoktih". Anandavardhana had also advised the poet to be in search of 'special word and sense that make for poetry : "yatnatah pratyabhijneyau, tau sabdarthau mahakaveh" Dhv. I. 8. Kuntaka therefore chooses to concentrate only on the poetic use of word and sense and as he has to give some name to this special poetic power of a word, he gives the name 'abhidha' to it, which is not the technical abhidha of the Kashmir school. Kuntaka, it seems, has no concern for the fool-proof scheme of word / meaning / word-power, as seen in the Kashmir school of thought. He is concerned only with the poetic. On the otherhand we saw Mukula carrying on from grammar and Mimamsa, but ending in poetry. Bhoja has a much broadbased scheme as we will go to observe and he is trying to absorb both nonpoetic and poetic literature. His scheme with twelvefold relationship of word and meaning of course aims at the poetic in the end. He takes care to illustrate the varieties and sub-varieties of first eight varieties of sahitya from poetic literature and many of his illustrations are read as this or that variety of dhvani in the Dhv. So, clearly we have two trends of thought. One represented by

Page #31
[22] Anandavardhana and his followers who present a perfect scheme and the other by such writers as Mukula, Kuntaka, Bhoja, Mahima, Dhananjaya and Dhanika and some others who do not fall in line with the Kashmir school of thought. We will continue with Kuntaka who also forms part of the shaping influence that moulds Bhoja's thinking, Mukula being the earlier one. As seen above Kuntaka, though not accepting the thinking of the Kashmir school in a sense that he does not welcome the fool-proof scheme of the functions of a word, on the otherhand follows the author of the Dhv. when he talks of 'the unique expression' as 'word'. He observes: (VJ I. 9 pp. 14, ibid) "sabdo vivaktitarthaikavacako' nyesu satsu api, arthah sahrdayahladakari sva-spanda sundarah." "That unique expression which alone can fully convey the poets' intended meaning out of a hundred alternatives before him is to be regarded as 'word'. Similarly that alone which possesses such refreshing natural beauty as to draw the appreciation of delighted readers is to be marked as 'meaning'. (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 300-301, ibid) That Kuntaka's scheme is broad enough to embrace vyanjana and vyangyartha is borne out by the famous illustration from Kumarasambhava, viz. "dvayam gatam..." in which he pin-points the use of the special word "kapalinah", that is the source of beauty. He observes (pp. 15, ibid) "atra, paramesvara-vacaka-sabda-sahasra-sambhave'pi kapalina' iti bibhatsarasa-alambana-vibhava-vacakah sabdah jugupsa"spadatvena prayujyamanah kam api vacaka-vakratam vidadhati." "Though a thousand and one synonyms are possible to refer to the Almighty Lord Siva, the poet has chosen here the word, "One whom only skulls adorn", in order that, it may suggest disgust through a word which serves here as a pointer to the primary sentiment of the 'horrid'. And he succeeds in endowing the verse with artistic beauty of expression." (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 302, ibid)

Page #32
[23] Kuntaka (V.J.I., vrtti) further remarks "kavi-vivaksita-visesabhidhanaksamatvam eva vacakatva-laksanam yasmat pratibhayam tat-kalollikhitena kenacit parispandena parisphurantah padarthah prakrta-prastava-samucitena kenacit utkarsena va samacchadita-svabhavah santo vivaksa-vidheyatvena abhidheyatapadavim avatarantah tathavidha-visesa-pratipadana-samarthenaabhidhanena-abhidhiyamanas cetas camatkaritam apadyante." "Therefore, the proper definition of 'signification' is that capacity to convey the particular shade of thought intended by the poet. In fact, in the world of the poet's creative imagination, things come to life with a touch of original invention; or their real nature gets veiled by a rich afflatus calculated to present the subject in a most attractive light; as such, the process of communication is a slave to the poetic intention. Only when the right verbal correlative for the particular has been found, the delight of the reader is assured. - From this it becomes absolutely clear that Kuntaka accepts only one power of word and that is abhidha, or say, 'vicitra abhidha' meaning 'beautiful or artful expression.' It is not the abhidha which signifies only the conventional meaning. But it is that abhidha - which conveys any meaning intended by the poet, be it laksya, dyotya or vyangya. So, his is the 'vicitra abhidha' which covers up the laksana and vyanjana also. So, we may say, Kuntaka, has a definite approach, but no definite scheme. He wants to convey the poetic only. After mentioning the unique features of words and meanings in poetry as distinct from their commonplace aspect, Kuntaka proceeds to show that there should also be the presence of positive artistic beauty. He observes (V.J.I. 10 pp. 20, ibid) - "ubhau etau alamkaryau tayoh punar alamkrtih, vakroktih eva, vaidagdhya bhangi-bhanitih ucyate." - (V.J.J. 10) "Both these are "the adorned". Their adornment consists in the poetic

Page #33
[24] process known as 'artistic turn of speech." (trans. K. Kris. pp. 308, ibid). Thus 'word and sense' are 'alamkarya' and 'vakrokti' is the alamkara' for Kuntaka. This is what he calls "vicitra abhidha" : "ubhau etau sabdarthau alamkaryau, kenapi sobhatisayakarina alamkaranena yojaniyau. kim tat tayor alamkaranam iti abhidhiyatetayoh punah alamkrtih - tayoh dvitva-samkhya-visistayoh api alamkrtih prasiddha-bhidhana-vyatirekini vicitra eva abhidha." (vrtti on V J. I. 10 pp. 20, ibid) "Both these refer to words and meanings which deserve to be looked upon as the subjects of ornamentation for the enhancement of their appeal. "What then is their ornament ?" One might ask. The answer is that though they are two in number, they have only one common ornament. What exactly is this common ornament. "Artistic turn of speech" is the reply. It stands for a charming and novel utterance peculiar to poetry and distinct from familiar usage. In other words, artistic utterance itself is the ornament in question." (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 307, ibid) That Kuntaka is thus a 'kevala-abhidhavadin", or better say, "kevalavicitra-abhidhavadin" is now clear. This follows even from the treatment he presents concerning paryaya-vakrata and upacara-vakrata as well. In the former he incorporates what we call sabdi vyanjana. For upacara-vakrata Kuntaka observes (V.J.II. 13, 14) (pp. 93, ibid) "yatra durantare'nyasmat samanyam upacaryate lesena'pi bhavat kancid vaktum udrikta-vittitam." (V.J. II. 13) and, "yan mula sarasollekha rupakadir alamkatih, upacara-pradhana'sau vakrata kacid ucyate." (V.J. II. 14)

Page #34
[25] i. e. "wherein even when the two are far apart from each other, a common attribute, however slight, is metaphorically superimposed in order to indicate that the resemblance is very close.. (13) and which forms the basis for various pleasing and inventive figures of speech headed by metaphor - such a type of poetic beauty is designated - by the name, 'beauty of metaphorical expression" - (II. 14) (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 381, ibid) Kuntaka's upacara-vakrata is 'prayojanavati gauni laksana itself. So, he seems to accept laksana-mula-vyanjana under 'upacara-vakrata'. In this context, the author of Ekavali, Vidyadhara, observes that, "etena yatra Kuntakena bhaktau antarbhavito dhvanis tad api..." - But we may say that Kuntaka has only partly subsumed dhvani under bhakti'. Moreover, when Kuntaka on one hand holds that 'word and sense' are 'alamkaryau', and on the other hand when he rejects the case of 'rasavad alamkara' on the ground that 'rasa' is always 'alamkarya' and never an 'alamkara', he seems to contradict himself. On the otherhand, Anandavardhana has, a perfect scheme, which holds the whole of 'alamkara' field as "vacya-vacaka-rupa". In short Kuntaka has no perfect scheme and his vicitra-abhidha is a loose concept thus rendering his approach unscientific. 'Bhoja' as will be observed by us is influenced by Mukula and Kuntaka and carries his own concept of fabhidha'. But Mahima Bhatta is also an important name who defies the scheme of sabda-vittis as presented by Anandavardhana and the whole of the Kashmir school of thought.

Page #35
Mahima Mahima accepts sadhya-sadhana-bhava in any verbal function. He not only does not accept Anandavardhana's scheme of the three functions of a word such as abhidha, laksana and vyanjana, but positively denounces it and installs only one function of the word, i.e. only abhidha and leaves all other meaning to be collected by what he calls 'anumiti' or 'kavyanumiti' i.e. 'poetic inference to be precise. We will have to examine his approach in greater details as below. While refering to the powers belonging to word and sense, Mahima, observes Prof. Dr. C. Rajendran (pp. 67, "A study of Mahimabhatta's Vyaktiviveka" pub. Calicut, '91), discusses the various aspects of language like word and sentence. According to him, all verbal expressions should be considered as inference since they consist of establishing something (sadhya) by means of something else (sadhana). The fact that language is used to persuade the hearer to do or not to do something, implies that the hearer has to be convinced of the logic of the speaker's arguments. The hearer has to grasp the connection between sabda and artha, the sadhya and sadhana, through inference and then only he is convinced of the soundness of the speaker's idea : (vy.viveka, pp. 26, 27, Edn. Dr. Rewaprasada Dwivedi, Chowkhamba Sktseries, office, Varanasi, '64) - "sarva eva hi sabdo vyavaharah sadhyasadhana-garbhataya prayena anumanarupo'bhyupagantavyah, tasya parapravrtti-nivrtti-nibandhanatvat, tayonca sampratyaya-asampratyayatmanor anyathakartum asakyatvatah, na hi yuktim anavagacchan kascid vipascid vacana-matrat sampratyayabhag bhavati." Mahima divides sabda into two such as 'pada' or word and 'vakya' or sentence. Word is further subdivided into (i) naman i.e. noun, (ii) akhyata or verb, (iii) upasarga i.e. semantic prefix, (iv) nipata or preposition and (v) karmapravacaniya i.e. adverb. - "dvividho hi sabdah, pada-vakya-bhedat; tatra padam aneka-prakaram namakhyatopa-sarga-nipata-karmapravacaniya-bhedat (pp. 27, ibid). 'nama' denotes an existing object, which is qualified by either jati i.e. class, guna, i.e. quality, kriya i. e. action or dravya i. e. substance. -

Page #36
[27] Mahima observes : (pp. 28, ibid) : 'tatra sattva-pradhanani namani tani api bahuprakarani sambhavanti. jati-guna-kriya-dravyanam tat-pravstti-nimittanam bahutvat." Thus jati, guna etc. are the pravstti-nimittas. 'Artha', for Mahima, is two-fold, viz. 'vacya' and 'anumeya'. The 'vacya' or expressed is the object of verbal functioning and it is this which is termed 'mukhya' or principal. He observes : (pp. 47 ibid): "arthopi dvividho, vacyo'numeyasca. tatra sabda-vyapara-visayo vacyah. sa eva mukhya ucyate." yad ahuh - "srutimatrena yatrasya tadarthyam avasiyate, tam mukhyam artham manyante gaunam yatnopapaditam." - iti. tata eva, tad anumitad va, lingabhutad yad arthantaram anumiyate so'numeyah. sa ca trividhah vastumatram alamkara rasadayasca, iti. tatra adyau vacyau api sambhavatah anyah tu anumeya eva iti. tatra padasyartho vacya eva, na anumeyah, tasya - niramsatvat, sadhya-sadhana-bhava abhavatasca. (V. V. pp. 47 ibid) - Mahima classifies meaning into two viz. (i) expressed (= vacya) and (ii) inferred (i.e. anumeya). The former is called 'mukhya' i.e. principal and is collected by word-power (i.e. abhidha). It is said, "It is believed to be 'mukhya' i. e. principal sense, the essence of which is collected immediately on hearing (the same, i.e. the word). That which is collected by (a special) effort, is the secondary one. The latter, i. e. anumeya or inferred sense is that which is either directly collected from the principal sense (i.e. mukhyartha), or from the meaning inferred from it. This anumeya artha is again threefold viz. (i) vastu i.e. idea or a matter of fact, (ii) alamkara i. e. a figure of speech and (iii) rasadi, i. e. aesthetic rapture or sentiment etc. The first two could be met with at expressed level also (= vacyau api), while the third type is necessarily only inferred. Mahima holds that the direct meaning of a word is always vacya or expressed, because there is no sadhya-sadhana-bhava between a 'pada' and

Page #37
[28] its meaning. It means there is no inferential relation between a pada and its artha. The 'pada' is without parts so sadhya-sadhana-bhava cannot exist. We have to examine this position minutely. We feel that a sort of selfcontradiction can be read in Mahima's position. At the outset Mahima had declared that : "sarva eva hi sabdo vyavaharah sadhya-sadhana-garbhataya prayena anumanarupo'bhyupagavtavyah, tasya para-pravitti-nivitti - nibandhanatvat, tayosca sampratyaya - a-sampratyayatmanor anyathakartum asakyatvat" (pp. 26, 27 ibid). Here Mahima suggests that the vacyartha which is collected from a pada having no parts, is directly expressed as the sadhya sadhana-bhava is not possible in this case. So, there is apparent contradiction. But this contradiction is easily removed when we remember even Anandavardhana's remarks while advocating the cause of vyanjan, even for the Naiyayikas under Dhv. III 33. Mahima has also derived inspiration from Dhv. here. The point is that when somebody speaks he wants to convey something. So, a man resorts to sabda-vyavahara to convey something and to make somebody else do or undo something. So, this verbal practice is resorted to for accomplishing some object. This becomes clear through inference. The inference is simple. It proceeds like this --- "When A speaks, he intends to convey something." That there must be something behind A.'s activity of speaking, is a matter of inference. This becomes clearer when we hear someone shouting in a language not known to us. We infer that he wants to convey to us something for our good or bad. This much is inferred. But what he actually conveys through the words utterred follows directly, through the power of expression, from the word itself. This is what Mahima wants to suggest. So, there is no contradiction in his statements. Thus, here, with the acceptance of the 'mukhya' artha, Mahima accepts, the power of direct expression, i.e. abhidha'. Mahima accepts only one word-power i.e. abhidha. All else is 'anumiti' for him. In his 'vyakti-vivekavyakhyana', Ruyyaka puts it thus : (pp. 48, ibid) : "arthopi iti. sabdasya vyaparantara-nirakarahartham, artha-dvaividhya-ghatanam. tatha hivrddhavyavaharat, samketat va, sabdesu artha-nirnayah tesam ca yatrarthe vidyamanatvam tasya vacyatvam eva. anyasya tu tesam abhavad arthasamarthyad avagatih na ca asambaddho'rthas tam artham pratyayayati.

Page #38
[29] sambaddhacca arthantara-pratipattau anumanam eva. tena laksanayah anumanantarbhavah pratipadito bhavati. tasya ca vyapakatvat...... na ca laksanayam anumanasya antarbhavah iti vacyam, tasya tat pariharena vitter vyapakatvat. vyanjakatvam anumanam eva iti vaksyate vitatya. ta vacyanumeyatva-bhedena arthasya dvaividhyam." Ruyyaka explains that in order to eliminate the possibility of the word having any other (i. e. even a second) power, 'meaning' is said to be twofold. Meaning is decided in case of a given word with the help of either the vrddha-vyavahara, i. e. practice of the seniors, or through 'samketa' i. e. convention. In whichever meaning these factors reside, that meaning is called the 'vacya' i. e. expressed. In case of any other meaning where either of these two does not stay at the basis, the other meaning is collected through implication. If the primary meaning is not connected (i. e. is asambaddha) with the other meaning, the latter is not conveyed at all. And when through connection, the first meaning yields the second meaning, this apprehension is nothing else but 'anumana' or 'inference only. So laksana is covered up by 'anumana', the latter having a wider scope... . ...It cannot be said that 'anumana' is covered up by laksana, because even in the absence of laksana, anumana can take place. (Thus, anumana has a wider field). That (the so called) suggestion is nothing but only inference i. e. 'anumana' will be discussed in greater details (by Mahima)." So, for Mahima there is only one sabda-vyapara and that is 'abhidha'. All else - i. e. laksana and vyanjana' fall in the province of anumana or inference. This means that though not accepting these two functions, Mahima accepts the meanings derived through these functions and subsumes these meanings - viz. the so-called 'laksyartha' and 'vyangyartha in the terminology of the kashmir school of thought, under anumeya artha' i. e. inferred meaning arrived at through 'anumiti' or precisely 'kavyanumiti', and certainly not by any function or vyapara of a word. For Mahima, the vacya' is the meaning of a 'pada' i. e. word, arrived at through 'abhidha' on the strength of either 'samketa' or 'veddha-vyavahara'. But the vakyartha, or sentence-sense can be either (i) a fact which is already

Page #39
[30] known and which is not required to be substantiated, and (ii) a fact, which is unknown, expecting to be substantiated. This unknown fact is always established with the help of a known fact with which it is invariably related. Their invariable concomitance is realized from means of valid knowledge i. e. pramanas which are three, such as, (i) 'loka' or worldly context, (ii) veda or revealed literature, and (iii) direct experience i. e. adyatma. Mahima observes : (pp. 49 ibid) : "vakyarthas tu vacyasya arthasya amsaparikalpanayam, amsanam vidhyanuvada-bhavena-avasthiter, vidheyamsasya siddha-asiddha-taya upapadana-anapeksa-sapeksatvena dvividho boddhavyah. Mahima had suggested that the meaning derived from a pada is without parts i. e. nir-amsa. But the sentence-sense is having 'amsa' or parts. Some part is 'vidheya' and some is 'anuvadya'. i. e. some part is 'newly enjoined i. e. it is predicated, and some is 'anuvadya' i. e. which is the 'subject' part and hence already known. The vidheya-amsa is also either 'siddha' or 'sadhya'. The former does not stand in need of being substantiated, the latter needs substantiation. Thus vakyartha is two-fold, when the vidheya-amsa is 'a- siddha', it takes the form of sadhya-sadhana-bhava, the 'anuvada' portion turning into a 'sadhana'. This sadhya-sadhana-bhava is decided through invariable concomitance i. e. avinabhava-sam-bandha. And this depends on means of knowledge which are three-fold : "asiddhau sadhya-sadhana-bhavarupah, anudyamanasya amsasya sadhana-dhura-adhirohat." (pp. 49, ibid) (pp. 52, ibid) sadhya-sadhana-bhavasca anayoh avinabhavavasaya-krto' vagantavyah. sa ca pramana-mulah. tat ca trividham - yad ahuh - 'loko vedastatha'dhyatmam. pramanam trividham smrtam" iti. Mahima holds that 'loka' pramana depends only on wellknown worldly matters - "tatra loka-prasiddhartha-visayo lokah. (pp. 52, ibid). "sastra-matraprasidhartha-visayo vedah. (pp. 53 ibid) i.e. veda-pramana is that the subject of which is known in sastra only i. e. in various disciplines. Mahima adds that by mentioning 'veda', other sources such as itihasa, purana, dharmasastra etc. are also to be understood, as they all rest on veda : vedagrahanam itihasa-purana-dharma sastradi-upalaksanam, tesam tan-mula

Page #40
[31] tvopagamat." (pp. 53, ibid). And, "adhyatmikartha-visayam adhyatmam" - (pp. 53 ibid) : "The adhyatma-pramana has spirituality as its subject." This means that it is self-apprehended. This sadhya-sadhana-bhava is two-fold (i) sabda i. e. that which is expressly stated, and (ii) 'artha' or that which is implicit. Again both the sadhya and sadhana may be expressed either by means of words or by sentence : sa hi dvividhah sabdas ca arthasca, iti. so'pi ca sadhya-sadhanayoh pratyekam padartha-vakyartha-rupatvat...... yathayogyam anyonya-sankaryat bahuvidha iti, tasya din-matram idam upadarsyate." (pp. 54, ibid) - i.e. words that convey the sadhya-sadhana-bhava could be jati-vacaka, gunavacaka, etc. The meaning of the word again can be an attribute - i.e. dharma, or a substratum, i. e. dharmin. Dharma again can be samanadhikarana, or vaiyadhikarana as when both sadhya and sadhana reside either in the same substratum or not. The sadhya-sadhana-bhava expressed by a sentence differs on the basis of karakas used. One thing that emerges very clearly from this is that Mahima accepts only abhidha, and that too in the normal accepted sense of the term as a word-power that yields the conventional meaning which is called primary or mukhya. All else is collected by inference, i. e. all other meaning is 'anumeya' for Mahima. So, he refutes other sabdavrttis such as gunavitti, laksana, tatparya and vyanjana. The trend of incorporating other sabda-vittis such as laksana and vyanjana in abhidha was traced by us in Mukula, a near successor of Anandavardhana. Kuntaka also without rejecting positively any other sabda-vitti advocated the case of his vicitra-abhidha which as observed by us is not the same as 'abhidha that gives the primary meaning, but it is only a 'poetic expression' in general. Bhoja also as we will go to see, does not name vyanjana and incorporates gauni and laksana under his threefold abhidha, the mukhya being the first variety equivalent to our normal 'abhidha'. Mahima does not subsume other sabda-vittis under abhidha but he totally rejects them as sabda-vittis as such and advocates the case of only abhidha that gives the primary sense, as sabda-vitti, one and only.

Page #41
[32] The rest for him is 'anumana' i. e. kavyanumiti. We will examine how he presents his case. Mahima proceeds as follows. In such an example as, "upodharagena vilola-tarkam" etc. we have double-meaning statements. Here, the apprehension of the second meaning takes place according to Mahima, in the following way : (pp. 113, 114 ibid): "Yat punah asya aneka-sakti-samasrayatvat vyaparantara-kalpanam, tad arthasya eva upapadyate, na sabdasya, tasya aneka-sakti-samasrayatva-asiddheh" - i. e. when a word (in such illustrations as quoted above) is said to have such functions that deliver several meanings, and when based on such a premise an additional word-power called vyanjana is postulated with reference to a word, virtually it is only the meaning which promotes other meanings and not the word, for a word can never be proved to be the substratum of many functions. Mahima further argues : "tatha hi, ekasrayah hi saktayah anyonyaanapeksa-pravsttayah apraksta-paurvaparya-niyama, yugapad eva svakaryakarinyo drstah yatha dahakatva-prakasakatvadayo'gneh" - i. e. Those more than one powers residing in a single substratum, have their functions independent of each other and there is no sequence of earlier and later seen with reference to them. The idea is that these powers operate independently of one another and also simultaneously, or at least without a fixed sequence. For example fire burns a substance and also gives light. But the imagined other functions of words are not such. - "na ca sabdasrayah saktayas tatha drsyante, abhyupagamyante va, niyogatah abhidhasakti-purvakatvena itarasakti-pravrtti-darsanat. tasmat bhinnasraya eva ta na sabdaika-samasraya iti avaseyam - i.e. In case of word-powers this not so, because other powers (such as laksana and vyanjana) function after abhidha's function is over. Thus there is no simultaneity but sequence. So, it is better that different objects should be imagined as their substratum and not just 'word. Now this bhinna-asraya or different substratum could be 'artha' i. e. meaning and not sabda or word. Mahima observes (pp. 114, ibid) : yas casau asrayo bhinnah sa 'artha' eva iti tad vyaparasya anumanantarbhavo'

Page #42
[33] bhyupagantavya eva." - This different substratum could be 'meaning', and the functions of this 'meaning' element, should be subsumed under 'anumana' or inference alone. Before we proceed with Mahima's contention, we have to evaluate his conviction. He gives the illustration of fire which has different powers operating simultaneously. But we can have instances of objects having different powers not operating simultaneously, but only in sequence and such powers may not be absolutely independent of each other. For example a cricketer can also be a singer and a performing artist and his different powers may not operate simultaneously. Sachin can be a good batsman and also a modest speaker. Sunil Gavaskar, we know was a great batsman, a captain of the team and now also a good critic and a very good commentator also. When he bats he does not comment. So, Mahima's illustration proves something which is partially true. Even fire, when it gives heat and light does not help in cooking when not so required. Now let us see how Mahima further argues : "tatha hi - (pp. 114, ibid) - gaur vahika ityadau tavad gavadayo'rthah badhita-vahikadyarthantaraikatmyah tadrupya-vidhana-anyatha-aupapattya kenacid amsena tatra tattvam anumapayanti, na sarvatmana." Now this other separate substratum is nothing else but 'sense'. So, its function has to be subsumed under inference. In such illustrations as, "The vahika is a bull", the meanings such as 'go' i.e. 'bull' etc., are not identified with other meaning such as that of vahika. For Mahima the process involved is 'anumana'. In order to establish abheda' - superimposition when no other means is available, the meaning such as 'go' makes us infer the superimposition through some portion of it, and not through the whole of it. No speaker, who is not out of his mind, goes for superimposition of one thing over the other, without realizing any element of similarity between the two. - So any intelligent listener, who has knowledge of the speaker's mind, accepts similarity as the basis of superimposition. He does not hold mere physical expression of identity as the basis. Mere physical expression of identity is refuted on the first count by itself, for we can see that 'vahika', the man cannot be a 'bull'.

Page #43
[34] So, the expression of identity by the speaker, is only to make the listener apprehend the similarity. The 'prayojana' behind this expression is to cause apprehension of such qualities as inertia (jadya) etc. which are associated with 'go', as also seen in the vahika. This sort of an expression - to use different word for conveying a different substance - is called an 'atidesa'. Here 'go' is used for "jadyadi (i.e. dullness and stupidity). For, it is said, "jatisabdo'antarenapi jatim yatra prayujyate, sambandhi-sadrsad dharmat tam gaunim apare viduh" - (v.v.45, pp. 115) i. e. when a word denoting "jati' or class, is used with reference to something else than itself (i.e. sva-vacya), it is done when in that other object there is a quality of similarity. Others call such a usage as, "gauni". The idea is that in such instances as "upodha-ragena" etc. the word, through abhidha power gives only the vacya i.e. expressed sense. The power that makes for the apprehension of another sense (arthantara), rests in the 'sense' i. e. 'artha' and not in the word i. e. sabda. Now this apprehension of another sense, through sense, is, according to Mahima, through 'anumiti' or inference only. So, the power seen in sense should be taken as inference. In the illustration viz. "gaur-vahikah" etc., as there is an apparent diff between 'go-tva' and 'vahika-tva', the identity through 'ekadhikarana' i. e. the use of same case-termination, does not click to sense. Then it makes us infer the identity of qualities such us jadyadi-inertness-etc. So the identity is based on the qualities of vahika, which are similar to gotulya-jadyadi i. e. inertia and the like that are associated with vahika are similar to those resting in the bull. It is clear that any speaker who is not out of sense, never asserts identity between two separate objects without sensing common qualities between the two. Again, the prayojana or the reason behind such awkward or artful expression as calling a human being a bull, is the existence of such qualities as inertia etc. that normally go with the objects such as bull etc. in the object called 'vahika' on which go-tva is superimposed.

Page #44
[35] It may be noted that Mahima has expressed such terms as 'sadrsya' and 'sadharmya', simultancously. He has observed : (pp. 114, ibid) "na hi anunmattah kascit, kvacit, kincit, kathamcit, sadharmyam an-utpasyan eva akasmat tattvam aropayati" - i. e. without perceiving 'sadharmya' i.e. the state of having similar or common qualities in any way whatsoever, nobody goes for superimposition of any object on any other object. So the cause of superimposition is apprehension of similarity alone. 'Sadnsya' i. e. - similarity, and 'sadharmya' or having common qualities, are two important terms used in literary criticism. Dr. Rewaprasad observes (pp. 115, ibid) that Mammata has accepted 'upama' i. e. simile as : 'sadharmya resting on difference", wh his followers (such as Visvanatha) have defined it as similarity (based on difference of objects). Vamanacarya Jhalkikar in his Bala-bodhini commentary on the K. P. has discussed at length with reference to both 'sadharmya' and 'sadrsya'. Between these two he accepts "prayojya-prayojaka' bhava-sambandha" i. e. the relation of promoter and promoted; here sadharmya being the promoter and 'sadisya' being promoted thereby. For Bhartrhari 'sadharmya' stands for 'samana-dharma-sambandha', i. e. - relation based on similar or common qualities. The etymology of the term 'sadharmya' goes as, "samano dharmo yayos tau sa-dharmanau, tayor bhavah". BhartThari explains the taddhita-pratyaya conveying 'bhava', and used after a compound, as 'sambandha' or relation. "krt- taddhitasamasebhyah sambandhabhidhanam bhava-pratyayena" - In the term 'sadharmya', the 'syan pratyaya is in the sense of bhava' only. In the notes attached to the 'kama-dhenu' commentary on Vamana, Kaiyata's words are quoted. There the explanation of 'bhava' as - "prakrti-janya-bodhe prakaribhuto bhavah" -- is also useful in the present context. The meaning of this expression is that, "by bhava' is meant that 'dharma' or quality, which is lying inside that portion, of a word, to which a pratyaya is attached. In the word 'sadharmya', the pratyaya 'syan' is attached to the word 'sa-dharma' or 'sa-dharman'. Its meaning is that which has similar (or common) qualities." Thus here 'samana-dharma' is the visesana and the vyakti or person adorned with this is 'visesya'. 'syan' suffix is used in the sense of 'bhava'. So, it means, "samana-dharma." But the apprehension of "samana-dharma" is caused by

Page #45
[36] 'samana-sabda' as well. By 'sadharmya' we have apprehension not only of the equality, but also of the vyakti or person in whom this similarity rests, and also of the relation with it. So, Bhartphari's view as quoted above is more authentic. To point out the relation between 'sadrsya' and 'sadharmya', Jhalkikar (pp. 541, balabodhini on K.P.) observes : "yah sadharana-dharma. pratiyogikah, upamanopameyo-bhayanuyogikah, sambandah, sa sadharmyam iti ucyate; yasca upamana-pratiyogikah, upame-yanuyogikah sambandhah, sa sadrsyam iti ucyate." - iti sadharmya-sadrsyayor bhedah." - This explanation in 'navya-nyaya'-style pertains to this much that - "the relation that simultaneously rests in both upamana and upameya, is called sadharmya." "Sadesya' is different from this. It does not stay simultaneously in two, but it rises from one and settles in the other. 'Sadrsya' or similarity is of one into the other, it is not resting in the two - vice versa. In fact, with reference to sadharmya, we cannot call the substratum as upamana and upameya, because in the apprehension caused by 'sadharmya' the qualities of the two objects are found to be equal. In sadisya there is 'nyuna-adhikarva' between the two i. e. there is difference in quantity of the qualities. In case of one we apprehend 'utkarsa' and in case of the other, 'apakarsa'. So, upamana-upameya-bhava rests on this 'utkarsa-apakarsa' or more and less quantity with reference to the dharma i. e. quality. That having higher degree of quality, dharmot-karsa' is termed upamana, and that having dharmapakarsa' is termed upameya. The 'sadrsya' resting in object having utkarsa travels into that having 'apakarsa'. The sadrsya of both does not go into eachother. Thus 'sadharmya' suggests equality with reference to qualities while sadrsya suggests equality in which the 'upamana' - element is having a greater quantity of equal quality. The dissimilarity between sadharmya and sadrsya rests on normal worldly usage. In ordinary parlance it is stated that, "there is 'sadharmya' between these two objects, while there is 'sadrsya' between those two." But actually this difference is not exactly borne out by such normal usages also. For the normal usage can take the form of such expression also

Page #46
[37] as, "there is sadharmya of this into that object, and between them is sadisya". In the usage quoted above, where the praksti of the term 'sadharmya' was taken as ending in daul (dvi-vacananta), and wherein that of sadnsya as ending in singular (i. e. eka-vacananta) the opposite can also follow in the present usage. In different disciplines there is difference with reference to the concepts of 'sadharmya' and 'sadrsya'. The discipline of grammar takes them as different, while the nyaya-darsana takes them as identical and this is acceptable to Mahima, he being closer to the nyaya discipline. So, in expressions like 'gaur-vahikah', taken as 'gauni-vstti' and, like 'gangayam ghosah', taken as laksana, Mahima accepts only 'anumana'. As noted above in the case for the former, Mahima holds that no sensible person will identify one object with a totally different object without seeing some similarity between the two. The expression 'gaur vahikah' cannot be taken literally as it is perceived directly as incongruous, we infer that vahika is a bull in some respects. This secondary sense which is not given by the word directly is only inferred. In the same way the fact of a hamlet being situated on the flow of the river Ganges being contradicted by direct perception, we infer the qualities of coolness and purity of the hamlet from the expressed meaning. Mahima does not accept dhvanivadin's observation that the meaning of the hamlet being situated on the bank of the Ganges is derived through laksana, and the qualities of coolness and purity of the hamlet are derived through the suggestive power i. e. vyanjana. For Mahima both the secondary and suggested senses are arrived at through anumiti kriya - or inference and so the distinction observed by the Dhvanikara between bhakti and dhvani is uncalled for. Mahima observes (pp. 118) "tasmad yo'yam vahikadau gavadi-sadharmyavagamah, sa tattvaropaanyatha-anupaptti-parikalpito'numanasya eva visayah na sabda-vyaparasya, iti sthitam." . He further observes (pp. 119, ibid) : "gangayam ghosa ityadau api gangadayorthah svatmani-anupapatti-badhita-ghosadyadhi-karana-bhavah, tad

Page #47
[38] upadana-samarthyat sambandha-matra-parikalpita-tattvaropam tad adhikaranabhavopagama-yogyam arthantaram eva tatadi-rupam anumapayanti. Mahima further observes that only similarity cannot be the cause of identification or superimposition. Other relations such as 'samyoga' or conjunction, etc. also can be the cause. So, through 'Ganga' etc. the objects such as the bank etc. are inferred, and not through any other vitti or function of a word, because the fact of being the substratum of the hamlet cannot be understood by any other way : (pp. 119, ibid) "na hi tat sadrsyam eva ekam tattvaropa-nibandhanam isyate, kim tarhi ? tat-sambandhadir api, iti tat-sambandha-matra-samaropita-tadbhavas tatadir eva ghosadyadhikaranabhavopadana-anyatha-anupapattya gangadinam arthanam anumeya eva bhavitum arhati. Mahima accepts only one power of the word and that is the power of direct expression viz. abhidha. He rejects anything else than that and whatever other meaning is comprehended, he holds, is through 'anumana' or inference. He firmly believes that the power of a word is exhausted after giving its expressed sense. So, it has no capacity even to know about the existence of the secondary sense, such as the 'tata' or bank, in this case. What to think of actually touching this secondary sense ? The metaphorical expression is resorted to only to convey the knowledge of the existence of coolness and purity of the Ganges resting in the hamlet, the object of superimposition, and not similarity, as in the first illustration. The cause viz. 'tattvaropa' i. e. superimposition is identical in both the cases. Mahima holds that similarity of the object which is superimposed or its samyogadi relations are manifold. He quotes a famous karika here, with a difference in reading from the same quoted by Abhinavagupta in his locana on Dhv. i. e. with reference to the expression, "bhaktam ahuh tam anye." Mahima observes : (pp. 119, ibid) : "sabdah punah svarthabhidhanamatra-vyapara-paryavasita-samarthyo na arthantarasya tatader vartam api veditum utsahate, kim punah samsparsam iti uktam. prayojanam punah asya evam-vidhasya ukti-vaicitrya-parigrahasya tatadau aropa-visaye vastuni aropyamana-gangadi-gata-punyatva-sitalatvadi

Page #48
[39] dharma-pratipattih na sadrsyam iti purvasmad asya visesah. ubhayatra api ca tattvaropa eva hetuh. sa hi tat-samya-tat-sambandhadi-nibandhanatvad bahuvidha drstah-yad ahuh "abhidheyena sambandhat sadrsyat samavayatah, vaiparityat kriyayogad laksana pancadha mata" - iti. In the locana, we have, "abhidheyena samyogat" and also, "samipyat" for 'sadrsyat' of Mahima. In locana, we have 'abhidheyena samyogat. The idea is that 'samyoga' or conjunction is a type of 'sambandha' i. e. relation in general. Abhinavagupta explains 'samyogat' as 'bhramara-sabdena yasya samyogah sambandhah'. Mahima does not like this usage of a specific term to denote a general term. So, he goes for the reading 'samyogat, retaining the term denoting a general relation. Similarly, in Locana we have 'samipyat', while Mahima reads 'sadrsyat'. Abhinavagupta has explained 'samavaya' as 'sambandha-matra' i. e. any relation whatsoever. The relations such as 'samipya' or proximity could be believed to be covered up by 'samavaya', so Mahima opts for sadrsya. Actually, we can say that not only 'samipya', but even 'sadrsya', 'vaiparitya' or any other relation could be contained in 'samavaya'. Because of this only, later naiyayikas such as Gadadhara and the rest have taken only "abhidheyena sambandha", as definition of laksana, which they choose to define as "sakya-sambandho laksana". The expression of special relations such as sadisya, vaiparitya etc. is covered by 'sambandha' only, but they are mentioned only to make things clearer. This way, argues Prof. Rewaprasad, the reading of Locana as 'samyogat, is more acceptable. The reading 'sadisya' is not preferred to 'samipya' by Locanakara, because by using the term 'gauna', the explanation of laksana based on similarity is already covered up by him. Virtually 'sambandha' being manifold, laksana may not be taken as five-fold only. Mahimabhatta also incorporates what is known as tatparya-sakti under abhidha only. Some people hold that to convey the correlated meaning of

Page #49
[40] different words in a sentence, there is a separate power called the tatparya sakti which rests in a sentence. Tatparya sakti is thus advocated by some to explain the apprehension of the intention of the speaker from a sentence or a statement. Mahima feels that the import of the speaker is inferred by the hearer from the expressed sense. When someone says, "eat poison, but do not eat at his house", the hearer infers that taking food at his house is more despisable than eating poison. The inference follows the commonsense that, without some special reason, a friend or a well-wisher will never stop anyone from taking food at some person's place. The hearer understands, thus through inference, that eating food will be more harmful than taking poison. Mahima observes : (pp. 133 ibid) . "visabhaksananujnanader vakyarthasya aprastutasya eva upanyaso hi purvoktena nayena prastutatiriktarthantara-pratipadana-paratvat, tatra hetutaya avagantavyah, iti na sabdasya tatra vyaparah parikalpaniyah. "visabhaksanad api param etad grhabhojanasya darunatam, vacyad ato'numimate prakarana-vaktr-svarupajnah." - 67 visabhaksanam anu manute na hi kascid akarida anu manute na hi kascid akanda eva suhtdi sudhih, tena atra arthantaragatir arthi tatparya-saktija na punah." 68 iti sangraharye. Mahima, who accepts only 'abhidha' as word-power further rejects the views of those who hold a 'dirgha-dirghatara-vyapara' of a word, like that of an arrow. The purva-paksin argues as follows : Starting with the expressed sense, till the implied sense is collected, the powers of the word extends further and further like an arrow. There is no separate power of a word for collecting the other implicit sense. Like an arrow shot by a brave bow-wielder cuts through the armour, rips through

Page #50
[41] the chest and takes the breath away of an enemy, and there is no difference seen in the function of this single arrow, similarly, a word used by a clever poet, in sequence, conveys its primary meaning through abhidhana (i. e. abhidha-vyapara), and makes the apprehension of the second implied sense by the same power of the word used. There is no difference in the power of function of one and the same word. Again, argues the objector, that ultimate meaning should be taken as the meaning of a given word, for conveying which it is used. Thus, this is the power of the word only and not that of the sense : kinca yatparah sabdah sa sabdartha iti sabdasya eva asau vyaparo nyayyo na arthasya." (pp. 137, ibid). The objector here seems to be the commentator Dhanika, the brother of Dhananjaya, the author of Dasarupaka. This is suggested by Dr. Rewaprasad Dwivedi (pp. 140, ibid) Mahima does not accept this. He argues as follows : "This is not correct : (pp. 140 ibid) tad ayuktam. saksat-sabdasya artha-pratitihetutva-asiddheh." The word cannot be taken as cause of the implied) sense. If it is held as cause through sequence (paramparyena), there will be difficulty in placing some objects as effect and others as cause, for there is no regulation to that effect - "paramparyena tu tasya hetutvopagame vastunam hetu-phala-bhavavyavahara-niyamo na vyavatisthate." (pp. 140, ibid) Mahima observes : This cannot be accepted. The reason is that in arriving at the sense, word is not the direct cause. It cannot be taken as a cause in sequence also for it will be difficult to name something specific as cause and also something as effect. In case sabda is held as a paramparahetu, then as in case of the spring season being held as the cause of flowering, we will also have to hold a potter who fashions a pot used in watering a plant, as the main cause of flowering. So, it is wiser to accept 'artha' or sense as the cause of further sense, and not 'word'. It is not proper to say that when some function is carried out by a son, his father also is considered the chief substratum of the function concerned. For, in such cases there will follow the contingency of 'sankarya-dosa', - 'na hi yatra putrasya vyaparah sa pituh eva iti mukhyataya sakyate vaktum, tayor anyonya-vyapara-sankarya-dosa-prasangat." (pp. 140, ibid). The fault will be of mixing up of activities of different agents.

Page #51
[42] Mahima further argues that this illustration of an arrow is also not congruent with the situation : "kinca ayam visamah sara-drstantopanyasah (pp. 140, ibid). The line of his argument proceeds as below : This 'saradrstanta' is a mis-fit, because as the arrow on its own does the activities of cutting, piercing, etc. through a single power, the word does not. The word executes its function with the help of 'sanketa' or convention. The word has its function only at places where convention is fixed. So, the function of the word is limited upto the expressed sense only, not upto any 'arthantara' i. e. sense beyond the expressed one, as no 'sanketa' or convention is fixed with reference to the other extra sense. In case we accept the capacity of a word to give 'arthantara' also, i. e. added sense also, then people will be able to apprehend any sense with the help of any word. So, for a meaning which stands in need of convention, to that only the function of a word is limited, and it does not extend further upto any added sense, in absence of any convention. For the added sense, the function not of word, but of the expressed sense only should be accepted : tatasca abhidheyartha-visaya eva asya vyaparo yuktah, na arthantara-visayah, tatra sanketabhavat. tad abhave'pi tatra tat parikalpane sarvah kutascid abhidheyarthavad arthantaram api pratiyat, tasmad yatra sanketapeksa, tatra eva asya vyapara iti avagantum yuktam, na arthantare; tatra vaksyamana-nayena arthasya eva tad-upapattisamarthanad iti." (pp. 140, 141, ibid) We may observe with Dr. Rewaprasad that Mahima here pushes two arguments in favour of his thinking. First, he holds that a word cannot convey another sense directly, as it does with reference to its conventional sense, and secondly, a word can convey only that sense with reference to which a convention is fixed. Mahima is of the opinion that the formation of a pot is the result of coming together of the two halves, and not the potter, as the joining of halves immediately preceeds the formation of a pot. Similarly in case of added sense, i. e. farthantara' the immediate predecessor is the expressed sense, and not the word itself. So, being an immediate cause the primary sense is the cause of any additional sense, and not the word.

Page #52
[43] Mahima also argues that the functions of the arrow and word are not identical. The function of the arrow, in cutting, ripping through and taking the breath away, is its own, i. e. it is an independent power of an arrow. But for the word it is not so. It conveys meaning remaining dependent on the convention. So, the function of the word is not independent but is dependent on something else. Thus a word has a limited capacity to convey only that meaning with reference to which convention is made. It cannot proceed to an added target, like an arrow. It cannot proceed to an added sense of its own. The added sense is collected only by the function of the primary sense, which should be taken here as the cause. So, the added sense has to be accepted as inferred only. But, we may say that Mahima's thinking is faulty. The arrow also, when placed in a sheath does not have any capacity even to pierce the softest thing on earth. Only when it is discharged by a mighty shooter, it does the said tricks. So, even the function of an arrow has its capacity, originally borrowed from the shooter's strength. Similarly, a word when used by an expert poet attains the added function to convey an added sense also. But, this is not to justify 'dirgha-dirghatara-vyapara'. Actually, as explained by Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, we have to accept difference in function to explain difference in meaning, otherwise we will get into a mess where any word will start giving any meaning ! Mahima, as stated above believes only in one power of word and that is abhidha. For him 'artha' or meaning is two-fold viz. vacya or expressed and 'anumeya' or inferred. He quotes a karika -- "That whose significance is cognised on hearing alone, is believed to be the primary meaning, and the gauna or secondary meaning is that which is collected as a result of (special) effort." He observes : (pp. 47, ibid) "artho'pi dvividho, vacyon'umeyasca. tatra sabda-vyapara-visayo vacyah. sa eva mukhya ucyate. yad ahuh : srutimatrena yatrasya tadarthyam avasiyate, tam mukhyam artham manyante gaunam yatnopapaditam." .

Page #53
[44] 'Anumeya' or inferred meaning is that, in whose apprehension, the y meaning or vacyartha serves as 'hetu' or 'linga' i. e. cause, or the 'hetu' can also be that meaning which is derived from the primary sense. -- "tata eva, tad anumitad va linga-bhutad arthantaram anumiyate, sah anumeyah." (pp. 47, ibid). We know that Bhartahari incorporates all meaning other than the primary in 'gauna' or secondary, but for Mahima all meaning else than primary is 'anumeya'. The primary meaning for Mahima is also the 'mukhya' or principal sense. Mahima accepts the relationship between word and meaning as conventional. Word gives meaning only when there is convention to that effect. He rejects the view that a word can ever convey such a meaning which is other than primary, i. e. one with reference to which a convention is not formed. He feels that any other meaning, beyond the primary one, can never be collected by the function of a word hat such added sense is arrived at by inference, the primary sense serving as 'hetu' or cause in it. We have seen that Mahima therefore rejects all other functions such as laksana, tatparya and vyanjana as functions of a word and subsumes them under anumana' or inference. Mahima of course accepts the added sense or what may be called the unexpressed sense. This, for Mahima is threefold viz. (i) vastumatra i. e. of the form of vastu' or a mattor of fact or idea, (ii) alamkara i.e. figures of speech or artful expression, and (iii) rasadayasca, i. e. the emotive stuff such as feelings, sentiments etc. The first two could be directly expressed, but for Mahima, the third variety is 'anumeya' or 'inferred only, The direct meaning of a word is always expressed, it being without parts and there being no relation of 'sadhya' or that which is to be established, and 'sadhana' or the instrument with which it is established, between the two i.e. vacya artha' and 'sabda'. He observes : (pp. 47 ibid) : "sa ca trividhah. vastumatram alamkara rasadayasca. iti. tatra adyau vacyau api sambhavatah. anyas tvanumeya eva iti. tatra padasya artho vacya eva, na anumeyah, tasya nir amsatvat, sadhyasadhana-bhava'bhavatah'. Mahima, like Anandavardhana, also believes that the vacya or expressed is not so charming as is the unexpressed or inferred : "vacyo hyartho na tatha camatkaram atanoti yatha sa eva vidhi-nisedhadih kakvabhidheyatam anumeyatam va avatirnah iti svabhava eva ayam

Page #54
[45] arthanam." The expressed is not as charming as the same when presented through artful intonation or conveyed through inference. This is in the nature of a meaning. The meaning conveyed through simple assertion is also less charming than the same conveyed through double negation. He substantiates his observation by quoting Anandavardhana who observes : "sararupo'hyarthah sva-sabda-anabhidheyatvena prakasitah sutaram sobham avahati. prasiddhisca iyam asti eva vidagdha-parisatsu yad abhimatataram vastu vyangyatvena prakasyate na vacyatvena" iti. The sequence i. e. krama, observes Mahima, in the first two varieties such as vastu or matter of fact and alamkara or artful expression, is self-evident and is clearly observed. So, if we resort to vyanjakarva to explain this sequence it is of no use at all. He rejects vyangya-vyanjaka relation between dhvani (i. e. word) and so called sphota also. Similarly on this analogy the promulgation of dhvani vis-a-vis kavya which is of the form of word and meaning placed together, is also not acceptable to Mahima. He accepts 'gamya-gamaka-bhava' instead. Mahima Bhatta does not accept Anandavardhana's idea of three types of meaning such as the expressed or vacya, the indicated or lakskya and the suggested or vyangya. For Mahima the indicated or laksanika i. e. metaphorical or secondary sense and the suggested or vyangya fall in the category of the inferred or 'anumeya' only and thus for Mahima there is a scheme of twofold meaning only; the vacya and the anumeya. Thus he seems to reject Anandavardhana's observation that the indicated -- laksyamana and the suggested i. e. the vyanjyamana are also different from each other. For Anandavardhana the secondary function or a-mukhya vyavahara is only an extention of the primary function and it is resorted to when the primary meaning is found to be non-congruent with the context. This secondary sense may not be charming also, and is arrived at only when the primary sense is rejected. This abandonment of the primary sense, in the opinion of Anandavardhana, could be either partial or total. This secondary function is seen only when we use language. The suggestive function, for Anandavardhana, is of wider scope and travels beyond language. When use of language is concerned, then also this suggestive function completely

Page #55
[46] differs from either the primary function of a word in language, i. e. abhidha, or the secondary function i. e. gunavstti or laksana or a-mukhya-vyapara, both from the point of view of nature and scope i. e. "svarupatah visayatah ca." Suggestivity, as noted above travels beyond the medium of language and is seen in any other art-form such as drama, music, painting and what not, taking the form of abhinaya or acting, or notes i. e. suddha svara, or colours etc. as the case may be. Thus for Anandavardhana the suggestivity has to be completely distinguished from laksana or secondary function of a word. Not so with Mahima. He rejects the very basis on which the concept of laksana rests. He rejects any other power or function beyond abhidha or the direct expressive power in case of a word. Mahima is of the opinion that the fact of 'krama' or sequence in the functioning of powers called abhidha, laksana and vyanjana goes against them belonging to the same substratum, i.e. word. As seen earlier, he feels that if more than one power belongs to the same thing, these powers should function simultaneously like heat and light emanating from fire. But we had observed earlier that his analogy is not applicable in case of a word, as there is no hard and fast rule that all powers belonging to the same thing should function simultaneously only. Even in day to day life we see agents using their various powers as and when the situation so demands. A bi soldier enjoys life also to the full and also fights against the enemy as and when required. A man may be gifted with a number of special capacity which he chooses to exhibit or utilize only when the situation so demands But Mahima is satisfied with his own argument and his own illustration of fire oozing light and heat simultaneously, and therefore concludes that word has only one power-abhidha--that gives the primary sense alone and whatever added sense follows, - call it laksyartha, tatparyartha or vyangyartha-call it by any name, it follows from the primary sense alone as an inferred sense, and the word has nothing to do with it. The other meaning follows from the primary sense due to the relation of linga-lingibhava only. Mahima observes. (pp. 121, ibid): "kinca upacaravrttau sabdasya ma bhud atiprasanga iti avasyam. kim api nimittam anusartavyam. anyatha anyatra prasiddha-sambandhah katham asammitam (= sanketa

Page #56
[47] virahita) eva arthantaram pratyayayet ? yat ca tannimittam tad eva asmabhir iha lingam iti akhyatam. yuktam caetat. sabdasya tatra vyaparabhavat. vyaparabhavasca sambandhabhavat. lingat ca linginah pratitir anumanam eva; na guna-vittau arthantara-pratitih sabdi iti tasyah vacakasrayatvam asiddham eva." Mahima (pp. 122) further observes in samgraha verses : "yah satattva-samaropah tat-sambandha-nibandhanah, mukhyartha-badhe so'pyartham sambandham anumapayet." (46) and, "tat-samya-tat-sambandhau hi tattvaropaika-karanam, gunavitter dvirupayah tat-pratitir ato'numa." (47) i. e. 'tat-samya' and 'tat-sambandha' -- these two are the causes of 'tattvaropa' i. e. superimposition of one object over the other. So, in two types of gunavitti (or laksana) the apprehension of the cause --- i. e. prayojana -- is through inference only. Thus, Mahima accepts two types of gunavrtti : (i) based on 'tat-samya', as in 'gaurvahikah' and (ii) based on 'tat-sambandha' as in 'mancah krosanti'. He further observes that abandoning of mukhya-vytti is not possible in case of a word. So, only a meaning superimposed on a (primary) meaning causes inference of similarity. "mukhya-vitti-parityagah na sabdasya upapadyate, vihito'rthantare hyarthah sva-samyam anumapayet." (48) Thus, when the function of a word is not established with reference to another sense, how can we hold sabda as 'skhalad-gati' with reference to a

Page #57
[48] result (phala, i. e. another sense) which follows through inference from a given linga or mark i. e. cause ? "ittham arthantare sabda vitter anupapattitah, phale lingaika-gamye syat kutah sabdah skhalad-gatih." (50) (pp. 122, ibid) Thus, observes Mahima, that whatever factors are considered in favour of gauni vitti, are taken by us as promoting anumana - "guna-vittau giram yavat samagri-ista nibandhanam, saiva lingataya'smabhir isyate arthantaram prati."-(55) (pp. 123, ibid) "na hi tat samayabhavat vacyam sabdasya kalpyate pratiyamanatayam ca vyaktasya anumeyata." (56) "tasmat svartha'tiriktena gatir na arthantare giram, vacakatvas'rayena'to gunavrtter asambhavah." (57) Mahima suggests that when we resort to metaphorical expression or guna-vitti, the secret underlying this activity is that it is the natural linguistic habit of people that they identify similar or mutually connected objects. When we see a person with long neck and ugly figure we call him "karabha' or a youngone of a camel. Again on seeing children crying in a cradle, we describe the cradle as crying : (pp. 121, ibid) : "loko hi tat-sadrsam tatsambaddham ca tattvena vyavaharan drsyate, tad yatha dirgha-grivam vikata-kayam ca kamcit pasyan 'karabha' iti vyapadisati, manca-sambaddhan ca kamscit krosato mancah krosanti iti." On hearing such sentences which

Page #58
[49] are non-congruent by nature, an intelligent person concludes that such an incongruous identification has some valid reason as its basis. This he decides through reasoning. Mahima does not accept arthapatti' as a separate means of knowledge -- i. e. pramana and subsumes it under 'anumana' or inference -- "arthapatter anumanantarbhava'bhyupagamat iti uktam." (pp. 118 ibid) Mahima classifies gunavrtti or metaphorical expression into two such as (i) based on similarity, and (ii) based on some other connection : "tat-samyatat-sambandhau hi tattva-ropa-eka-karanam" (pp. 122, 47a, ibid). For him the apprehension of metaphorical meaning is only logical deduction from literal sense. It is a case of inference where the sadhya-sadhana-bhava is collected from loka i.e. worldly parlour. We have noted that for Mahima, as both bhakti' i.e. metaphorical expression and dhvani are covered up by inference, there is no cause to distinguish between the two as is done by Anandavardhana. Secondary meaning and the so-called suggested sense are, for Mahima, arrived at by the same process of 'anumiti' i. e. inference, because both are collected from the primary meaning. For Mahima, even terms involving 'faded metaphors' i. e. rudhimala laksana, have consideration of second meaning and are therefore collected by inference. In that case they are, in the opinion of Mahima, not different from Dhvani : (pp. 124, ibid) rudha ye visaye'nyatra sabdah sva-visayad api, lavanyadyah prasaktas te na bhavanti padam dhvaneh (61) (pp. 124, ibid) Mahima as observed earlier, also rejects tatparya sakti, which for him falls under anumiti. It may be noted that for Abhinavagupta 'tatparya' is a sentence-function, as explained by the Abhihitanvayavadins, which makes for the correlated meaning of various 'pada's or words in a given sentence. Thus this can be equated with samsarga-maryada of the later navya-naiyayikas, and the laksana of the Bhattas (Ref. : Dr. K. Kunjunni Raja, p. 222, ibid). But Dhanika's tatparya travels farther than mere sentence-sense as a result of the total of word-meanings. It is wider enough to cover Anandavardhana's vyangyartha also. The famous words of Dhanika are, "tatparyam na

Page #59
[50] tuladhrtam", for "it extends upto any limit till the speaker's intention is collected 'yavat-karya-prasaritvat." Dr. Raja observes (pp. 216, ibid) It can, "cover the whole range of the speaker's intention and cover all implications coming up in the train of the expressed sense." But we have seen above how Mahima rejects the case of tatparya-vrtti and how he subsumes it under 'anumiti'. Thus Mahima's concepts of 'abhidha' and 'anumiti' are powerful enough to digest all other concepts such as gauni, laksana, tatparya, vyanjana and even the broad concept of 'vakrokti' involving 'Vicitra abhidha' of Kuntaka. This is how Mahima takes kuntaka to task. Kuntaka holds such 'sabda' and 'artha' to be Kavya, as are charged by charming function of a poet and delight those who know (poetry). So, for Kuntaka such artful expression is the life of poetry which is different from the practice of word and sense as seen in various disciplines. But all this is not correct according to Mahima. He argues as follows : Is this special arrangement of word and sense merely the proper usage (aucitya-matra) of word and sense, or is it only the suggestion of the implicit sense which is different from the expressed sense as experienced by all? Because, no third alternative is possible it has got to be either of the two. The first alternative is not acceptable as the mention of such propriety is useless, because it stands refuted by the very assertion of the form of poetry. The point is that it is the poet's business to arrange vibhavadi, i. e. determinants, etc. It is not different from this. The determinants make for 'rasa' only when presented in a special way, and not otherwise. Again, only that theme makes for poetry, which is charged with rasa. So, no question of impropriety ever arises. In other words Mahima accepts only that as poetry which is charged with rasa, and this rasa is caused only by proper arrangement of vibhavadis. Thus 'anaucitya' has no scope in genuine poetry, worth its name. He observes (pp. 142, ibid) "te ca yathasastram upanibadhyamana rasabhivyakter nibandhanabhavam bhajante. na anyatha. rasatmakam ca kavyam iti kutas tatra anaucitya

Page #60
[51] samsparsah sambhavyate yan nirasartham ittham kavya-laksanam acaksiran vicaksanammanyah ?" Mahima says that in case you opt for the second alternative, then you are quoting only the definition of dhvani in different words, for the content of thought is one and the same. Now as far as this dhvani-laksana goes, it has been already refuted by us. Mahima sticks to his gunas and concludes : (pp. 143, 144, ibid) "atro'cyate'bhidha-samjnah sabdasya artha-prakasane, vyapara eka eva istah yas tu anyo'rthasya so'khilah." - (71) tatasca, "vacyad arthantaram bhinnam yadi tallingam asya sah, tan nantariyakataya nibandho hyasya laksanam." - (72) (pp. 143, ibid) "abhede bahuta na syad ukter margantaragrahat, tena dhvanivad esa'pi vakroktir, anuma na kim ? - (73) (pp. 144, ibid) Mahima also rejects suggestivity - vyanjakarva-as word-power, for there is no other power of the word except 'abhidha': (pp. 146, ibid) - Mahima observes" - na'pi sabdasya abhidha-vyatirekena vyanjakatvam vyaparantaram upapadyate, yena arthantaram pratyayayed; vyakteh anupapatteh, sambandhantarasya ca asiddheh. Even in the absence of 'vyakti' or 'sambandhantara', if suggestivity is accepted with reference to a word, then no fixed scheme will hold good in that case -- "tad abhave'pi tad abhyupa-game tasya artha-niyamo na syad, nibandhana-abhavat. (pp. 146, ibid) - Word cannot have any direct relationship with suggested meaning. If word had any natural, relationship with suggested sense in form of 'rati'

Page #61
[52] and other emotions as in case of songs (i. e. music), then one and all could have been able to apprehend the same -- "na hi asya, geyasya iva ratyadibhir bhavaih svabhavika eva sambandhah sarvasya eva tat-pratitiprasangat." (pp. 146, ibid) No relation of a word with the suggested sense can be believed to be born of convention as suggestion is 'aupadhika' and 'upadhis' are innumerable and uncertain. One and the same word may suggest different meanings under different contexts. So, to fix a particular suggested sense in case of a fixed word, like convention in case of expressed sense, is impossible. Mahima also examines the possibility of prefixes (= upasargas) being suggestive. He is clear that if suggestivity is totally denied in case of a word, the prefixes can never be accepted as suggesting any meaning. Dr. C. Rajendran in a ft-note (no. 58, pp 72, ibid) observes : "Here the assumption of MB (i.e. Mahima Bhatta) is that Dyotakatva of the grammarians is the same as the vyanjakatva of the Dhvani theorists. There is however, no supporting evidence adduced." It may be noted that on an earlier occasion we have also noted that the 'manifestation of sphota cannot be taken as identical with the suggestion of the dhvanivadins. Mahima holds that the prefixes are said to be 'dyotaka' i. e. suggestive only in a metaphorical sense. Actually they are capable of expression only and not suggestion. Mahima argues that in fact when we use such words as 'ghata' or pot and the like, for directly conveying the meaning of the object called a pot, even there these words such as 'ghata' should be held not as directly, expressive of a meaning but only as 'dyotakas' or suggestive, for the meaning of 'ghatapadartha' is already existent in our mind and is only revealed by the expression of the word 'ghata'. Thus even the whole vacya vacaka-vyavahara' the business of expression and expressed will be negated. So, it is better to accept metaphorical suggestivity here. Says he - (pp. 153, ibid) : "evam ca antar-matra viparivartitaya siddha-sadbhavanam ghatadinam ghatadisabda api dyotaka eva syuh, na vacaka it, vacya-vacaka-vyavaharo'stam iyat tasmat bhaktam eva dyotakatvam upagantavyam na mukhyam.

Page #62
[53] bhakteh ca prayojanam vacyasya arthasya sphutatvapratipattih, nimittam ca, visesana-visesya-pratityor-as'ubhavitaya kramanupalaksanat sahabhavapratitih." Mahima holds that it is only to describe the clarity of the meaning derived from a root modified by a prefix, that the prefix is figuratively stated as suggestive. If it is argued that actually a prefix manifests a particularity i.e. visesa---already existent in a verb and so they are suggestive and not denotative of a 'visesa' in a verb, than Mahima's reply is that you cannot cognise the exact form of visesa i. e. particularity manifested by a prefix. The meaning invariably apprehended should be taken only as 'expressed' meaning--if we do not accept this dictum then an adjective applied to a noun will also have to be regarded as 'dyotaka'. If taken to its extreme end, this would take us to believe that words like 'ghata' are also dyotakas as they manifest objects that are in the mind. So also will be the case of words such as 'nila' etc. which are taken as visesanas as a rule. - "samanyani ca garbhiksta-visesani bhavanti iti tesam tatra sadbhava-siddhau satyam niladi-sabda api tat-tat-dyotanamatra-vyaparah pradi-vad dyotaka bhavitum arhanti, na abhidhayaka iti." (pp. 152, ibid) Thus, Mahima emphatically denies the existence of what is termed as vyanjakatva. He thus accepts only 'abhidha' as word-power and all sense, other than the expressed is collected, according to him by 'anumana'. He declares (pp. 157, ibid) : (samgrahaslokas) "svabhavikam dhvaner yuktam vyanjakatvam na dipavat, dhumavat kintu krtakam sambandhader apeksanat." - (74) "pradinam dyotakatvam yat kaiscid abhyupagamyate, tad bhaktam eva, tatra istam na mukhyam tad asambhavat." - (75)

Page #63
[54] yatha hi yasya sabdasya bhava'bhavanusarini, yad arthabuddhih tasya asau vacyo'rtha iti kathyate." - (76) "go-sabdasya iva gaur arthah sa'nyatha tvavyavasthita vacyatva-vyavaharasca na syad arthasya kasya-cit." - (77) "pradi-prayoga'nugama vyatirekanusarini, prakarsadau matis tena tasya tad-vacyata na kim" - (78) "visesavagamasyasu bhavad anupalaksanat kramasya sahabhavitvam bhramo bhakter nibandhanam." - (79) (pp. 158, ibid) We have seen how there was a stiff opposition to the Kashmir school of thought that advocates a fool-proof scheme of chiseled concepts of abhidha, laksana and vyanjana. The challengers were great names such as Mukula, Kuntaka, Mahima and Bhoja. But this challenge was taken up by the Kashmir-school again with a successful counter attack by Mammata, Hemacandra and their followers, culminating in the efforts of Appayya and Jagannatha, and the road to him is bedecked by efforts of such greats as Mammata and his followers. What necessitated this rethinking and re-establishment from Mammata and his followers is creating again a conceptual clarity which originated with Anandavardhana who established vyanjana as a distinct power of word and explained how abhidha and laksana were different from it on account of visaya-bheda and svarupa-bheda. But Anandavardhana's attempts were challenged by some anti-vyanjana thinkers and again they mixed up abhidha,

Page #64
[55] laksana and vyanjana also in an incurable way. Kuntaka, though not an antidhvani thinker, was also slightly different from Anandavardhana in the sense that he cared only for the poetic expression and so his concept of vicitra abhidha was more ambitious and less clear. Nobody except Mahima cared strictly for visayabheda and svarupabheda underlying the sabda-vrttis. But Mahima erred on the other side. He accepted abhidha as abhidha pure and simple as taught by the mimansakas, grammarians; naiyayikas and also Anandavaradhana. But for the extra meaning, the pratiyamana artha, he postulated kavyanumiti in place of any word-power. For him, anything beyond expressed sense directly following from the word, was due to inference, and the word never could give any other sense beyond vacyartha. Thus, even laksana--what Mammata calls "aropita-kriya' also was not acceptable to him. As was laksana /laksyartha so was vyanjana / vyangyartha - equally non-acceptable as following from word. So, for him there was no hesitation on accepting dhavni as 'bhakta'. But with all his vehemence he was not convincing for the fact remained that whatever was experienced by a man of taste from poetry, was directly from poetry and not from any other thing such as inference. It was poetry, poetry and poetry alone, with its magic web of word and sense, that delighted the aesthete. Even Mahima had to concede a point when he accepted that his kavyanumiti was not congruent, with tarkanumiti. So, once again the balance swung in favour of Anandavardhana, and Mammata and others rediculed Mahima for rejecting different powers of a word. A clear-cut scheme of three powers of a word was the requirement of the context to explain the experience that accrued from reading of poetry. A change in a word here and there upset the balance of aesthetic experience and therefore it was word and word and word alone that was held responsible for bringing about the pleasure through the richness of its meaning. Thus, once again Mammata an followers laid down the royal road of three word-powers that led to the destination of aesthetic experience from poetry.

Page #65
Bhoja and Hemacandra Bhoja We know that Bhoja represents, according to us, a tradition, which we call 'the Malava tradition', to distinguish it from the Kashmir tradition as represented by Anandavardhana, Abhinavagupta, Mammata, Hemachandra, Vidyadhara, Vidyanatha, Visvanatha, Appayya and Jagannatha, to mention a few. This is not to suggest that Bhoja is always at cross-roads with the Kashmir tradition and that he always exchanges swords with Anandavardhana and the rest, but one thing is certain that the tradition Bhoja represents, one which we call the Malava tradition of literary aesthetics, has certain special traits of its own. It has to be candidly admitted that the views of Bhoja as interpreted by the great modern alamkarika Dr. Raghavan, for whom we have tremendous respect and love, will be our sole friend, philosopher and guide so far as Bhoja is concerned. But with due respect to the great savant of Indian literary criticism, we have to make an humble confession that at times we fail to understand what Dr. Raghavan explains, or at times we feel we can supplement his efforts, or in very rare cases we may even atten correct his impression. In doing this, we will surely go with the text of Bhoja as read in both of his works, viz. the Sarasvati-kanthabharana and the Srngara-Prakasa. Our efforts should not be misunderstood by the world of scholars, for to us, Dr. Raghavan remains, and will remain for a thousand years to come as the greatest interpreter of Bhoja, but we try to approach only in the fashion of a student with his curiosity a little more awakened as compared to a general reader. So, with pranams to both Bhoja and Dr. Raghavan, who for us is an 'abhinava-bhoja', we will try to explain the concept of abhidha as explained by Bhoja. It has to be noted that Bhoja has not discussed independently the topic of sabda-vrttis in his Sarasvati-kanthabharana, comprising of five chapters.

Page #66
[57] However there could be traced stray references to the sabda-vrttis here and there which do not carry any theoretical value, e.g. on pp. 709 (N.S.Edn. 1934 A.D.) we read : "yato rsa"ksepat-parihasa-lesoktya'mangalam, pravisa pindim, dvaram, bhaksaya, iti nyayat prasiddha-adhyaharah, dari vadati, mancah krosanti' iti prayogadarsanat adharadheya-yor abhedopacarasca viruddha-laksanadibhih prayujyamano na dosaya iti." - Such director indirect references to sabda-vittis do not carry any value for us. We will have to turn to the other work, the Sengara-prakasa for a comparatively more systematic approach to the topic of sabdavittis, though it has to be admitted at the outset, that Bhoja, in keeping with the tradition which he seems to have directly inherited from alamkara writers prior to Anandavardhana, does not treat this topic as systematically as is done by Mammata and other followers of the Kashmir school. We will pick up the thread with the help of Dr. Raghavan. We propose to reach him with honest enquiry as an advanced student. Bhoja's treatment of sabda-saktis is part of his larger scheme of explaining what 'sahitya' is. Dr. Raghavan thus explains : (pp. 87, Bhoja's Sr. Pra, '63) "We have already said that poetry being speech supreme, Sahitya is, between the two parts of language - sabda and Artha -- relation supreme. Thus, sahitya first means all linguistic expression and the general and inevitable grammatical and logical relations between word and sense; and then it means poetry and the poetic relations between the two. Bhoja means by sahitya both kinds of relation and he not only deals with poetry but with language also. At the lower levels, lies language with its general Sahitya; higher up, the language has risen above itself and has bloomed in poetry, and here, the Sahitya is poetic relation between word and sense. Bhoja defines kavya as the Sahitya or unity of word and sense. "tat (kavyam) punah, sabdarthayoh; sahityamamananti." tad yatha - "sabdarthau sahitau kavyam" iti. It is to a treatment of this sahitya of sabda and Artha that the Sr. Pra, is devoted. Bhoja calls his work itself Sahitya Prakasa in Chapter XI. yasmin asesa-vidyasthanartha-vibhutayah prakasante,

Page #67
[58] samhrtya, sa sahityaprakasa etadrso bhavati.' Chap. XI. p. 430, Sr. Pra. Vol. II The scheme of the whole work is contained in the definition, 'sabdarthau sahitau kavyam', and under the edifice of the Sr. Pra. lies the foundation and system called Sahitya. This has been already pointed out above in Ch. IV (of Sr. Pra. Raghavan). Sahitya is thus defined by Bhoja. It is the relation between Sabda and Artha and is of twelve kinds. Eight of these twelve Sahityas can be called general and the last four, are special and can be classed as the poetic Sahityas. "kim sahityam ? yah sabdarthayoh sambandhah sa ca dvadasadha, abhidha, vivaksa, tatparyam, pravibhagah, vyapeksa, samarthyam, anvayah, ekarthi-bhavah, dosahanam, gunopadanam, alamkarayogah, rasa-aviyogasceti." Again, at the beginning of chapter VII which begins the treatment of Sahitya, Bhoja repeats these twelve-fold relations between sabda and Artha as constituting Sahitya. "tatra abhidha-vivaksa-tatparya-pravibhaga-vyapeksa-samarthya-anvayaekarthibhava-dosahana-gunopadana-alamkarayoga-rasa-aviyogarupah sabdarthayoh dvadasa sambandhah sahityam ucyate." Vol. I. P. 428, Sr. Pra. Even the earlier work of Bhoja, the S.K.A. contains indications of this conception of Sahitya of Bhoja. The first verse of the work- "dhvanir varnah padam vakyam etc. covers part of contents of chapters I-VI of the Sr. Pra and the second verse of the S.K.A. gives the last four-fold poetic Sahitya, "" dosahana, gunadana, alamkarayoga, and rasaviyoga or rasanvaya; and commenting on the above-said first verse of the S.K.A., Ratnesvara who is acquainted well with Sr. Pra. says: - tad ayamatra tatparya-samksepah. sahitya-nirupanaya kila esa grantharambhah. sahityam ca sabdarthayoh sambandhah tatra sabda eva ka ityapeksayam ayam vibhago dhvanir ityadi arthastu stambha-kumbha-adilaksanah loke sastre ca prasiddhah, sambandhah kascid anadih, sarvasvayamanas tu sambandhah nanyatreti asminnayatate. sa caturvidhahdosahanam, gunopadanam, alamkarayogah, rasabhi(vi) yogasceti." Ratnesvara on S.K.A.I.

Page #68
[59] This rather long quotation from Dr. Raghavan brings out how ambitious project Bhoja has set himself to. By taking Sahitya in its widest sense as "coming together of word and meaning", he wants to cover under this banner both poetry (i.e. kavya) and non-poetry (i. e. sastra and loka-bhasa). So, Bhoja first takes sahitya merely as relation between word and sense in general and includes under it two sets of relations, grammatical and poetical. Among the eight grammatical relations four are classed as kevala-sabda sambandha-saktis and the other four as sapeksa-sabda-sambandha-saktis. Dr. Raghavan (pp. 88 ibid) gives the following table to explain Bhoja's classification : Kavyam sabdah (12 types) arthah (12 kinds) tayoh sahityam (12 kinds) grammatical 8 kinds of sabda-sambandha-saktis 4 poetical kinds 9-dosahanam 10-gunadanam 11-alamkarayogah 12-rasa-aviyogah. 4-kevala-saktayah 1-abhidha 2-vivaksa 3-tatparyam 4-pra-vibhagah 4-sapeksa-saktayah 5-vyapeksa 6-samarthyam 7-anvayah 8-ekarthibhavah The first eight go under the name of sabda-sambandha-saktis. Dr. Raghavan notes that in Bhoja, (pp. 89, ibid) Abhidha comprises the three vsttis, mukhya, gauni, and laksana. Vivaksa is of three kinds - kakvadi-vyangya, prakaranadi-vyangya and abhinayadi-vyangya. In

Page #69
[60] tatparya is included the pratiyamana and Dhvani. These eight sabdasambandhas are treated of in Chapters VII and VIII. Poetic Sahitya begins in Chapter IX. With this explanation furnished by Dr. Raghavan, we will start our investigation as to what exactly Bhoja wants to cover under 'abhidha' and whether his treatment is more, or equally or less scientific as compared to Mammata's scheme. When it is observed by Dr. Raghavan that Bhoja's abhidha covers three vittis viz. mukhya, gauni, and laksana, we feel that Bhoja seems to be under the influence of such writers as Mukula and even Mahima, who take laksana only as part of abhidha. For Mukula, the ten-fold abhidha covered the field of a-mukhya vrtti also. On the face of it the treatment in the works of Mammata and his followers belonging to the Kashmir tradition seems to be more scientific. Bhoja (pp. 223, Edn. Josyer, Ch. VII) says : "tatra abhidha-vivaksa..... dvadasa samarthah sahityam iti ucyate." - Then he proceed "tesu sabdasya arthabhidhayini saktir abhidha. taya svarupa iva abhidheye pravartamanah sabdo vitti-trayena vartate, tasca-mukhya, gauni, laksana iti tisrah." - We have a quarrel with the very first statement which is loose. When Bhoja defines abhidha as, "sabdasya arthabhidhayini saktih". he fails to discriminate between the directly expressed sense, called samketitartha, the indicated sense or laksyartha and the suggested sense called vyangyartha classified clearly in the Kashmir school of thought. Even Kuntaka's 'vicitra abhidha' covered all these three under one banner. May be we are in a frame of mind, or we have inherited a mind-set that tends to appreciate more the system as presented by Ananda-Abhinava-MammataJagannatha-led school of thought. Bhoja then proceeds as follows : (pp. 223, ibdi)... "tatra saksad avyavahitartha-bhidhayika mukhya. gamyamana-sauryadi-guna-yoga-vyavahitartha gauni

Page #70
[61] svarthavinabhuta-arthantaropalaksana tu laksana iti. tathahi gaur iti ayam sabdo mukhyaya vrttya sasnadimantam artham pratipadayati, sa eva tisthanmutratadi-guna-sampadam apeksamano yada bahlike vartate tada gaunim vrttim anuvadati. So, it is clear that Bhoja's mukhya is the 'abhidha' proper of the Kashmir school. Gauni and laksana are treated by Mammta as part of a-mukhya vrtti, i.e. laksana which is for him six-fold, sad-vidha. But Bhoja takes these two as extention of his wider abhidha, as done by Mukula. Perhaps even the earlier Mimamsakas also took laksana (including gauni) as extension of abhidha. Bhoja keeps gauni reserved for relations-'tadyoga' as put by the Kashmir school based on similarity, and his laksana is characterised by such meaning which is another one following from the svartha - So, 'tadyoga' is accepted even by Bhoja here. He illustrates gauni by the same illustration such as "gaur vahikah" (= bahlikah). One who urinates while standing like a bull is called 'gauh', due to similarity. The Kashmir school seeks comparison in 'jadya and mandya' - dullness and stupidily as seen in both. Bhoja further observes : tad aha "rudhya yatra sad artho'pi loke sabdo nivesitah sa mukhyas tat samyat gauno'nyatra skhalad-gatih." yada tu sabdah svarthatah kriyasiddhau sadhana-bhavam gantum asamarthah, tada abhidheya-avinabhutam arthantaram laksayati. tada sa ca laksana vrttih. yatha gangayam ghosah prativasati. atra ganga-sabdo visistodaka-pravahe nirudha'bhidhana-saktih. sa ca ghosa-kartrkayah prati-vasanakriyaya adhikarana-bhavam gantum asamarthah, svartha'vinabhutam tatam laksayati." (pp. 223, ibid). This means Bhoja is absolutely clear about the concepts of abhidha, and also gauni and laksana and surely he had read what Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta had written. But he chooses a different tradition which recognises 'gauni' as an independent vrtti from laksana, as seen later also in

Page #71
[62] Hemacandra. But what Bhoja does is still different. Over and above taking gauni and laksana as separate functions, he clubs them together as extension of abhidha and thus his abhidh, is wide enough to contain these two in its fold. This is, as observed earlier, like Mukula. He then quotes from Kumarila viz. "abhidheya'vinabhuta-pratitir laksana" and calls it the life of artful expression : "sa esa vidagdha-vakrokti-jivitam." Now this expression makes it clear that he appreciates the concept of 'vicitraabhidha' of Kuntaka, and in the same way he absorbs the influence of Vamana also, who suggested : "sadrsyat laksana vakroktih". (KSV. IV iii-8) Bhoja then attempts the classification of the three-fold abhidha, out of which the first viz. mukhya, which is pure abhidha for the Kashmir school, is two-fold : "tatra mukhya dvidha, tatha-bhutartha, tad-bhavapattisca" (pp. 223, ibid). Then, he proceeds : "tathabhutartha sodha, jati-visaya, vyaktivisaya, aksti-visaya, guna-visaya, kriya-visaya sambandha-visayasca iti." Now, it may be said that the divisions and subdivisions suggested here and also elsewhere normally are six or twelve. This is Bhoja's special feature. Again, here also, the sub divisions of 'tathabhutartha mukhya' which are six go by the difference in the nature of the objects described. These are broad divisions seen in the world and there is hardly anything special to be noted. Though Bhoja has taken 'sahitya' in a very wide sense and his concept covers sastra-bhasa and loka-bhasa or vyavahara-bhasa i.e. language in general also, we may say to his credit that he has drawn illustrations from poetry only. 'sambandha-visaya' is illustrated from the Vikramorvasiyam where Pururavas is said to be the grandson of the Sun and the Moon. But our observation stands that the varieties enumerated by Bhoja, all follow the nature of the object under description. Thus if a guna is described it is guna-visaya, if a kriya is described, it is kriya-visaya and so on. We may say this is just Bhoja's love for hair-splitting. 'tadbhavapatti' variety of mukhya is explained as : "arthasya a-tathatve adhyasadibhih tathatvapadanam tad-bhavapatti)." (pp. 224, ibid) This again is six-fold such as - "sa'pi sodha, adhyasatmika, kalpanatmika, vivartatmika, viparinamatmika, viparyayatmika, pravadatmika ca iti."

Page #72
[63] The adhyasatmika is illustrated by "kamalam anambhasi, kamale ca kuvalaye"... etc. (pp. 225). We know that this is a famous illustration of the figure atisayokti. Thus, Bhoja has quoted famous illustrations every where which we would put under this or that alamkara. The Kashmir school, as we know, puts the whole of 'alamkara' - under vacya-vacaka-bhava, with some undercurrent of vyanjana or vyangyartha in many alamkaras such as samasokti, aksepa, paryayokta, aprastuta-prasamsa etc. So, they are a 'vacyavacaka-bhava-vivarta' for those who follow the Kashmir school of thought. Dr. Raghavan should have gone for such critical and comparative study of Bhoja's concept of Sabda-vrttis. Actually he could have devoted a separate chapter to explain Bhoja's concept of sabda-vrttis. 'Mithyajnana' seems to be, for example, not different from niscayanta sasamdeha, or bhrantiman alamkara (pp. 225, ibid). The 'pravada variety is illustrated by the famous verse from the Meghaduta, viz. "ratna-cchayavyatikara iva..." (pp. 226, ibid), which is for us a beautiful utpreksa in "barhena iva sphurita-rucina gopa-vesasya visnoh." Bhoja then proceeds with the second variety of abhidha, viz. 'gauni as (pp. 226, ibid) : "gauni dvividha. guna-nimitta, upacara-nimitta ca. tatra yasyam dvayor vacanayoh samanadhikaranyena vaiyadhikaranyena va prayogah, visesana-visesya-bhava'nyatha'nupapattyaikasya pratiyamanaabhidhiyamana-guna-dvarakah sambandho bhavati, sa guna-vyavahitartha guna-nimitta." ... gunah svartho visesanam pravrtti-nimittam iti ca eko'rthah. sa dharma-guna-kriya-aksti-jati-svarupadi bhedad anantah. tat sambandhena yadyapi tannimitta vittir ananta-prakara eva kalpyate, tatha'pi tasyah sad eva vikalpa bhavanti mukhya-visayah, amukhya-visayah, bheda-visayah, abhedavisayah, visesana-visayah, a-visesana-visayah, iti." Now this again confirms our observation that the divisions and subdivisions suggested by Bhoja go with the nature of the thing described. There is hardly any logical divide. Bhoja also knows that there can be innumerable varieties that go with difference in the nature of the thing described. But he insists on six only. So, virtually there is no rhyme or rhythm in Bhoja's

Page #73
[64] varieties except, of course, the outward system of dividing a point into six or twelve sub-varieties. The 'upacara' variety of gauni which is also six-fold is explained as (pp. 229, ibid), "mukhyaya gaunya va anya-visesanasya sato'nyatra aropanam upacarah tannimittaka-upacara-nimitta. sa tu gauna-vyavahitarthatvat gauni bhavati, tasya api dharma-guna-aksti-kriya-svarupa-jatyadayah pravrttinimitta-tadbhedat. sa'pi sad-prakara bhavati-dharma-nimitta, guna-nimitta, akrti-nimitta, kriya-nimitta, svarupa-nimitta, jatinimitta ca." We are reminded of the words of Visvanatha in his Sahityadarpana (S.D. II-9 vitti) viz. "upacaro nama atyantam visakalitayoh padarthayoh sadrsyatisaya-mahimna bheda-pratiti-sthagana-matram." Bhoja holds that laksana is basically two-fold : (pp. 233, ibid) - "aksana laksita-laksanaca. tayor yasyam upatta-sabdasya arthasya kriyasiddhau sadhanatva-ayogat svartho 'vinabhutam arthantaram vyavahitam eva laksayati sa laksana, tad-vyatirikta tu vaksyamana-anekarupa laksita-laksana iti. tatra laksana sodha samipya-laksana, sahacarya-laksana, saha-caritalaksana, hetulaksana, tadarthya-laksana, parimana-laksana ca. laksita-lakskana'pi saddhaiva rudha-laksana, pratika-laksana, vivaksitalaksana, viruddha-laksana, tad-anya-laksana, prakirna-laksana ca. It is surprising that Bhoja refuses to go beyond laksana, especially in varieties called 'vivaksita-laksana' and viruddha-laksana' which normally for a follower of the Kashmir school, takes us further to vyanjana and vyangyartha. Dr. Raghavan has also not discussed all this in details. On the contrary he has not at all chosen to treat the topic of sabdavittis in Bhoja as an independent topic. Bhoja's illustration of vivaksita-laksana follows his explanation of this variety such as : "yatra yatha-kathamcit sabdaprayoge vivaksitam eva laksyanusarato laksyate sa vivaksita-laksana" - (pp. 235 ibid) - The illustrations cited are - 'manasijajaitra-ratham', etc. and, 'cakita-harinihari-netra-tribhagah'. Bhoja observes (pp. 235 ibid) - atra na ardha-sabdasya tribhaga-sabdasya arthah, kimtu, tabhyam asamagra-lokanam laksyate. na hi bhavati netra-caturbhago netra-sadbhago va iti."

Page #74
[65] Bhoja does not go beyond laksana here. We know that Anandavardhana has quoted the verse viz. vridayogannata. etc. with its fourth line ending in, "hari-netra-tribhagah once under Dhv. III 3, 4 - with the words : "padavayavena dyotanam yatha." Thus the part 'tribhagah' of the whole compound is for him suggestive of 'rasa'. Elsewhere under Dhv. III. 33 also this illustration is quoted to explain how 'cestavis'esa' becomes suggestive of songara-rasa. Under I. 19, Kuntaka also picks us this illustration to demonstrate - visesana-vakratva, a variety of pada-purvardha-vakrata. But Bhoja seems to be satisfied only with the secondary sense here, which is for him only 'a-samagra-alokanam'. Similarly Bhoja's tad-anya-laksana, which is illustrated by the famous verse : "suvarna-puspam prthivim"... etc. also ends with laksyartha only. Says he -- "atra na suvarna-sabdartho, na api puspa-sabdarthah kimtu suvarna-sabdena sarva-purusartha-mulam hiranyam, puspa-sabdena ca prasavartho laksyate. tabhyam ca laksitabhyam vyavasayinam purusa-visesanam vasumati sarvan kaman prasuta iti. Bhoja does not go beyond this while we know that this verse is given by Anandavardhana under Dhv. I, 13, as an illustration of "a-vivaksita-vacyadhvani.' Abhinavagupta in his locana on this explains both laksana and vyanjana such as - (pp. 78, Edn. Dr. Nandi, Ahd. '97-'98) - "suvarnani puspyati iti suvarna-puspa. etacca vakyam eva a-sambhavad-svar-tham iti krtva avivaksita-vacyam. tata eva padartham abhidhaya anvayam ca tatparya-sakty, avaga-mayya eva, badhakavasena tam upahatya sadrsyat sulabha-samtddhi-sambhara-janatam laksayati. tal laksana-prayojanam sura-krtavidya-sevakanam prasastyam a-sabda-vacyatvena gopyamanam san nayika-kuca-kalasa-yugalam iva maharghatam upanayan dhvanyate iti." We do not know why Bhoja stops at laksana only. But one thing is clear that though Bhoja does not mention 'vyangyartha' by name, he very much knows the same. In a number of illustrations of laksita-laksana this is bourne out. He observes (pp. 236 ibid) - "anye punah laksitalaksanam anyatha vyacaksate laksanaya upacaritavrttya gaunyabhihitarthena yatra arthantaram laksyate sa laksita-laksana iti." - He illustrates such a

Page #75
[66] variety by "rathanga-nama', 'pankti-rathah' etc. Then he gives poetic illustrations which for us are charged with vyanjana also, a name which he does not mention. For example in, "parimlanam pina-stana.".... etc. We have 'vadati bisini-patra-sayanam'. Bhoja has a note (pp. 237, ibid) : "atra vadati iti anena upacara-vittya jnapayati iti, parimlanam ityadibhih taddharmaih tanu-sannivesa-carutvotkarso laksyate." Mammata has quoted this verse as an illustration of prasada-guna (K. P. VIII), while Anandavardhana, under Dhv. I. 14, takes it as an illustration of 'upacaritasabda-vitti'. Says he, "yatra hi vyanjakatva-kstam mahat-sansthavam nasti tatra'pi upacarita-sabda-vsttya prasiddhyanurodha-pravartita-vyavaharah kavayo disyante. Read Abhinavagupta (Locana, pp. 82, Edn. Dr. Nandi) on this - "vayam tu brumah - prasiddhyam prayojanasya a-nighudhata ityarthah urtanena api rupena, tat-prayojanam cakasan nighudhata nidhanavad apeksate iti bhavah." Bhoja also cites the verse : 'nisvasandha ivadarsah candrama na prakasate and adds (pp. 237, ibid) "atra yatha andhe rupa-visesabhivyaktir na sambhavyate, evam tamasi api... yo rupagrahanasamarthah sondha ucyate. tatra upacarita-vittau yo'andhavat na pasyati sa evandha iti ucyate. iha yatra kimcit na drsyate tatra'pi andha-sabdopalaksita-laksanaya pravartate. We know that Anandavardhana cites this verse (Dhv. II. i) as an illustration of atyanta-tiraskrta-vacyadhvani. With this we come to the end of Bhoja's concept of abhidha, which includes mukhya (i. e. abhidha proper), gauni and laksana. Bhoja as observed earlier does not treat it as a special topic as is done by alamkarikas of the Kashmir school of thought, but it falls under the twelve types of 'sahitya' or relation of word and meaning in general, and of course as his illustrations suggest, with a special reference to the poetic use of word and meaning also. With this Bhoja's treatment of abhidha is screened.

Page #76
[67] Hemacandra Hemacandra gives a four-fold classification of words such as-mukhya, gauna, laksaka and vyanjaka. Ka.s'a (1.15) "mukhya-gauna-laksya-vyangyartha-bhedat mukhya-gaunalaksaka-vyanjakah sabdah" (pp. 18, Edn. Dr. T. S. Nandi, Ahmedabad, June 2000, Pub. L. D. Institute of Indology). He explains 'mukhya' artha as "saksat samketa-visayo mukhyah" (K.S.I. 16, pp. 18, ibid) He adds in this vrtti - "avyavadhanena yatra sanketah kriyate, sa mukham iva, hastadyavayavebhyah prathamam pratiyate iti mukhyah. sa ca jati-guna-kriya-dravya-rupah, tad-visayah sabdo mukhyo vacakah iti ca ucyate. yatha gauh, suklah, calati, devadatta iti. yad aha - mahabhasyakarah - 'catustayi sabdanam pravrttih' iti. Hemacandra is clearly under the impression of both Mukula and Mammata. But the chief merit of this acarya is that he puts things with absolute clarity and lucidity. He observes that the discussion of the nature of 'jati' and the like is irrelevant to the point and is therefore not discussed here: "jatyadi-svarupam ca prakrta-anupayogat na iha vipancyate." He refers in brief to the views on sanketagrahana such as: "jatih eva sanketa-visaya iti eke. tadvan iti apare, apoha iti anye." Though Hemacandra has not elaborated this topic in the body of his text which he calls the ka.sa and alamkara-cudamani, the name given by him to his svopajna vrtti, he discusses at length in his 'viveka' a commentary attached to the text, but also written by himself. Obviously, he has written 'viveka' for the more advanced students of this sastra, i. e. literary aesthetics. He says (pp. 1, Edn. ka. sa. with Viveka, by Prof. R. C. Parikh and Prof. Dr. V. M. Kulkarni, Bombay, '64) - "vivarikartum kvacid drbdham navam sandarbhitum kvacit, kavyanusasanasyayam vivekah pravitanyate."

Page #77
[68] 'to explain something presented, and to add something fresh - this viveka is presented at length.' So, in his 'viveka' on sutra I. 16 Ka. S'a he has covered everything that is read in Mammata and Mukula. Hemacandra observes : (pp. 43, ibid) "catustayi iti. jati-sabdah guna-sabdah, kriyasabdah yadeccha-sabdasca tatha hi-sarvesam sabdanam svarthabhidhanaya pravartamananam upadhiupadarsita-visaya-vivekatvat upadhi-nibandhana pravrttih. upadhisca dvividhah-- vaktr-sannivesitah, vastudharmasca. tatra yo vaktra yadecchaya tat-tat-samjni-visaya-sakti-abhi-vyakti-dvarena tasmin tasmin samjnini nivesyate sa vaktr-sannivesitah. yatha ditthadinam sabdanam antyabuddhi-nirgrahyam samhrta-svarupam. tat khalu tam tam abhidhasaktim abhivyanjayata vaktra yadrcchaya tasmin tasmin samjnini upadhitaya sannives'yate atah tannibandhana yadrccha-sabdah ditthadaya." Hemacandra now makes an interesting note : yesam api ca da-karadivarna-vyatirikta-samhita-krama-svarupabhavat na ditthadi-sabda-svarupam samhitakramam samjnisu adhyavasyata iti darsanam, tesam api vakt?yadrccha-abhivyajyamana-sakti-bhedanusarena kalpanika-samudaya-rupasya ditthadeh sabdasya tat tat samjna'bhidhanaya pravartamanatvad yadeccha sabdatvam upapadyata eva. - This is from Mukula- (pp-5 ibid). Hemacandra then gives the two varieties of vastudharma, such as siddha, and sadhya. He proceeds exactly in the fashion of Mammata and Mukula and also quotes from the Vakyapadiya of Bhartshari ---- He also discusses the views of kevala-jativadins, jati-visista-vyaktivadins and apohavadins ! The second opinion - viz. 'tadvan' is explained by Hemacandra as : (pp. 44, ibid) - "jater artha-kriyayam anupayogat viphalah samketah. yad-aha "na hi jatir daha-pakadau upayujyate iti vyaktesca artha-kriya-karitve api anantya-vyabhicarabhyam na sanketah kartum sakyate iti jatyupahita vyaktih sabdarthah."

Page #78
[69] Now this can be placed with Manikyacandra's remark in his sanketa on the K. P. (pp. 15, ibid) : "vyaktestu arthakriyakaritve api anantya-vyabhicarabhyam na sanketah kartum sakyate iti jatimati vyaktih sabdartha iti vaisesikadayah." We do not know who has influenced whom as both Hemacandra and Manikyacandra were almost contemporary. (See Dr. De, Dr. Kane). On 'apoha' also H.C.'s remarks are almost identical and then more explanatory with those passed by M. C. - M.C. reads : (pp. 15, ibid) 'apoha iti - jati-vyakti-tadyoga-jati mad buddhyakaranam sabdarthatvasya anupapadyamanatvat gavayadi sabdanam a-go-vyavsttyadi-rupah apohah sabdartha iti bauddhah" H. C. (pp. 44, ibid) reads : jati-vyakti-tadyoga-jatimad-buddhyakaranam sabdarthatvasya anupapadyamanatvat gavadi-sabdanam a-go-vyavittyadirupas tad-visistam va buddhi-pratibimbakam sarvatha bahyartha-sparsa-sunyam anyapoha-sabdavacyam sabdartha iti." Clearly H. C. seems to offer better comments. Again M. C. has 'gavayadi sabdanam', and H. C. has 'gavadi sabdanam' which makes better sense. Then the remark - 'tad-visistam va....' in H. C. also are further explanatory. Thus, our impression, is that perhaps H. C. had M.C.'s 'samketa' before him, though he may be himself a senior contemporary of M.C. Acarya Hemacandra, the author of Kavyanusasana revives a forgotten or better say forsaken tradition of taking 'gauni' and 'laksana' as independent word-powers, separate and distinct from each other. We had seen earlier how, Bhoja had clubbed 'gauni' and 'laksana as part of abhidha. We will have to refer once again to Bhoja in brief because Hemacandra seems to come closer to Bhoja in his concepts of 'gauni' and laksana, though of course Bhoja did not give these two any status independent of abhidha. Bhoja first of all enumerates 12 relations of word and sense./Bhoja (11.223, Josyer Edn.) observes : "tatra abhidha-vivaksa

Page #79
[70] tatparya-pravibhaga-vyapeksa-samar-thya-anvaya-ekarthibhava-dosahana - gunopadana - alamkarayoga - rasa-avi-yoga-rupah sabdarthayor dvadasa samarthah sahityam iti ucyate." tesu sabdasya arthabhidhayini saktir abhidha, taya svarupa iva abhisheye pravartamanah sabdah vitti-trayena vartate, tas ca mukhya, gauni, laksanas tisrah tatra saksad avyavahitarthabhidhayika mukhya gamyamanasauryadigunayoga-vyavahitartha gauni. Svartha-avinabhuta'rthantaropalaksana tu laksaneti." Bhoja (pp. 226, ibid) continues - "gauni dvidha, gunanimitta, upacaranimitta ca. We have discussed these observations of Bhoja on an earlier occasion but here we will once again go through Bhoja's writing for attempting a comparative study of Bhoja and Hemacandra. Bhoja's abhidha is that power of word which expresses meaning. Now here 'sabdasya arthabhidhayini saktir' can be one which directly expresses the meaning or indirectly also. When it directly expresses the meaning it is termed as 'mukhya' i.e. principal. Bhoja observes that a word operates in its meaning (this is strange, because we normally say that a meaning stays in a word) -- "svarupe iva abhidheye pravartamanah sabdah - in three-fold way. Thus there are three functions. -- 'vittitraya' of a word wherein his 'mukhya' which directly and without any interference gives a meaning is the first sub-variety of 'abhidha', which is our normal abhidha of the alamkarikas of the Kashmere school, Abhinavagupta, Mammata and Hemacandra including. Bhoja's 'gauni' is peculiar. He observes: "gamyamana-sauryadi gunayoga-vyavahitartha gauni." So, for Bhoja 'gauni is that variety of abhidha which has connection with a meaning which is 'gamyamana' -- implied, and not saksat - or directly connected. Again this meaning is of the nature of such qualities as 'saurya' i. e. bravery and the like. Thus this variety of abhidha is connected with implied quality.

Page #80
[71] Bhoja does not term it as subordinate but it is 'a-mukhya' in the sense that his mukhya variety of abhidha yields a direct meaning and his 'gauni yields gamyamana i. e. implied meaning. On the other hand we will go to see that for Hemacandra, and even for the earlier Mimamsa thinking which talked of 'gauna' function, 'gauni' was a secondary function i. e. 'amukhya' in the etymological sense, i. e. not-principal function. Again, Hemacandra's concepts of 'gauni' and 'laksana' are not absolutely identical with those of Bhoja and this will be clear from the following discussion. But for the present we continue with Bhoja who observes : (pp. 226, ibid) "gauni dvidha, guna-nimitta, upacara-nimitta." Thus 'guna' and 'upacara' are distinct entities with Bhoja. For the Kashmere tradition normally we have a division between sadharmya-mula identification and sadharmyetaramula i. e. upacara-mula identification. But Hemacandra, as we will go to analyse his concepts of gauni and laksana does not base his classification on similarity i. e. sadharmya or nonsimilarity. He has some other base of distinction. So, his 'gauni' thus viewed comes closer to that of Bhoja who has a 'guna-nimitta' and 'upacara-nimitta' gauni. Bhoja observes that in his gauni, words are placed either in 'samanadhikaranya' or 'vaiyadhikaranya' and on account of the visesana-visesyabhava which is not understood otherwise -- "anyathaanupapattya" there emerges a sort of relation between two words through implied and stated quality. This relationship is promoted or caused by guna and hence is termed guna-nimitta gauni. Bhoja explains 'upacara' (pp. 229, ibid) as that state of things where someone else's quality is superimposed on someone else. This 'upacara' for Bhoja takes place at both the levels i. e. at mukhya and gauna level : "mukhyaya gaunya va anya-visesanasya sato'nyatra aropanam upacarah." "sa tu gauna-vyavahitarthatvat gauni bhavati." Qualities of say a solid substance, if superimposed on an abstract thing it is upacara for Bhoja. Basically anya-dharmasya anyatra-aropana may be or may not be inspired

Page #81
[72] by similarity. As noted above in 'gunanimitta gauni" two words either in samanadhikaranya or vaiyadhikaranya are brought together and there has to be established a relationship of visenana-viaesyabhava, which as there is no other choice -- anyatha anupapattya -- has to be substantiated through the qualities these two words convey, in one case implicitly conveyed and in the other directly conveyed. So, a sort of similarity between these qualities is expected by Bhoja. In upacara there is no comparison but superimposition of say 'A's qualities on 'B'. It may be noted that 'B' has nothing of it, or say, 'B' is incapable of having these qualities. Thus, in "bhavati rusi kathora, kintu ramya mtgaksi" or, in "talaih sinjad-valayasubhagaih, nartitah kantaya me" - the qualities of "kathora" and "subhaga" go with a physical entity-murtimad-dravya and prani-visesa, but they are superimposed on anger (rosa), and twinkling bangles (sinjad-valaya). Now in this 'upacara' the meaning is secondarily imposed and hence it is 'upacara-nimitta-gauni for Bhoja. Laksana for Bhoja is also two-fold viz. laksana and laksita-laksana. When for the realisation of meaning of a given word, on account of there being no other instrumentality available, a meaning indicates another meaning which is having a relation of 'a-vinabhava' it is a case of laksana which is six-fold." tayor (i. e. between laksana and laksita-laksana) yasyam upattasabdasyarthasya kriya-siddhau sadhanatva'yogat svartho'vinabhutam arthantaram vyavahitam eva laksayati sa laksana, tadvyatirikta tu vaksyamana'neka-rupa laksita-laksana, iti. Bhoja says that the 'arthantara' which is having a close-connection (= avinabhava) such as closeness or samipya, comes up in laksana. The illustrations are 'gangayam ghosah 'mancah krosanti etc. Sahacarya laksana is seen in 'kuntan pravesaya', 'chatrino gacchanti', etc. Bhoja's concept of laksita-laksana is hazy. It is certainly not laksana mounted on laksana-which is rejected by Mammata. Whatever is not guided by samipya, sahacarya, sahacarita, hetu, tadarthya, and parinama -- is laksita-laksana, which includes rudha-laksana as in

Page #82
[73] dvirepha - which is only abhidha for Hemacandra, and pratika-laksana, viruddha-laksasa, tad-anya-laksana, prakirna-laksana etc. But for Hemacandra 'gauni', and 'laksana' are clearly distinct. Hemacandra at Ka.Sa. I. 17 explains, 'gauna' artha and at I, 18 explains 'laksya' artha and at Ka.Sa. I. 20 he enumerates the functions of a word. We will examine 'gauni and 'laksana' that tend to deliver 'gauna' and 'laksya' meanings respectively as follows. Ka.Sa 1-17 talks of 'gauna' meaning as : "mukhyarthabadhe, nimitte, prayojane ca bhedabhedabhyam aropito gaunah." This 'gauna' meaning for Hemacandra is caused when (i) primary meaning is contradicted, (ii) when there is 'nimitta' i. e. 'tadyoga' and (iii) when there is sprayojana' i. e. motive. This gauna' is superimposed either through non-identity or bheda', or through identity i.e. 'a-bheda'. Hemacandra explains in his vrtti - 'gaur vahikah', 'gaur eva'yam' ityadau mukhyasya arthasya sasnadimattvad pratyaksadina pramanena badhe, nimitte ca sadrsya-sambandhadau, prayojane ca sadrsya-tadrupya-pratipattirupe sati, aropya-aropa-visayayor bheda'bhedena ca samaropito'tathabhuto'pi tathatvena'dhyavasito, gunebhya ayatatvad gaunah, tadvisayah sabdo'pi gaunah, upacarita iti co'cyate." This meaning and the word conveying this meaning are both designated as 'gauna'. It is also called 'upacarita'. The illustrations are 'gaur vahikah' and 'gaureva'yam'. The first illustration clearly mentions both 'gauh' the object superimposed, and the person -- vahika -- the subject on whom the object is superimposed. Thus visaya' and 'visayin' are clearly mentioned -- bhedena'. In the other illustration only the visayin' figures and so this is 'a-bhedena aropa'. The direct meaning of 'gauh' -- an animal having dewlap, etc. -- is contradicted by direct perception or pratyaksa-pramana as we can see that 'vahika' is a human being and not a bull. This superimposition is caused due to 'nimitta' -- others call it tadyoga -- in form of similarity in qualities possessed by both the vahika and the bull. The qualities are those of dullness and stupidity. They are similar in both the visaya and the visayin. The

Page #83
[74] motive is to suggest the extreme similarity or one-ness between the subject and the object. This meaning is derived through 'guna' and is therefore termed 'gauna'. The relation was that of sadrsya. But when the relation is that of karya-karana etc., i. e. anything other than sadrsya, then also 'gauni takes place, says Hemacandra. Thus karyakaranabhava is at the base of the illustration viz. ayur ghrtam' (bhedena) and 'ayur eva idam' (abhedena); tadarthya is illustrated in 'indrah', for 'indrartha sthuna', sva-svamibhava is in, 'raja' for rajakiyah purusah', or 'gramah' for 'grama-svami, agramatre avayave 'agrah' etc. Here, it may be noted that we have all cases of abhedena -- aropah as 'visaya' is not separately mentioned. These illustrations are in a way dubious. This will be seen when we discuss Hemacandra's 'laksya' artha and 'laksana vrtti'. Ka.S'a I. 18 says - "mukhyartha-sambaddhas tattvena laksyamano laksyah." This means that the connected meaning which is indicated as identical with the primary meaning is called 'laksya'. While in 'gauni for Hemacandra there is superimposition of one object over another one either through complete identification i. e. a-bheda or through difference i. e. bheda, in 'laksana there is superimposition of 'one meaning' over 'another meaning' through a-bheda or complete identity only. The two meanings denote two objects but they are derived from one and the same word. Say for example 'gangayam ghosah', wherein there is identity between two objects viz. the current of the 'ganga' and the bank of the ganga. But these two objects are not separately or inseparately mentioned as is the case in 'gaur vahikah' or 'gaur eva ayam'. From the word 'ganga' these two are understood and there is superimposition, through absolute identity, of the meaning of the current of ganga on the meaning of the bank of 'ganga' both of which are expressed through one and the same word i.e. 'gangayam'. Hemacandra observes in his vitti - (pp. 45, Edn. Kulkarni & Parikh)

Page #84
[75] "Mukhyo'rtho gangadisabdanam srotah-prabhltih, tena sambaddhah tatadir arthah tattvena abhedena laksyamano laksyah. tattvena laksyamana iti vacanad bhedabhedabhyam aropita iti na vartate. sesam tu gaunalaksanam anuvartate eva. tadvisayo sabdo laksakah yatha gangayam ghosah, kuntah, pravisanti. atra gangayam ghosadhikaranatvasya, kuntanam pravesasya ca asambhavat mukhyartha-badhah samipyam sahacaryam ca nimittam. gangatata iti kuntavanta iti ca prayogat yesam na tatha pratitih tesam pavanatva-raudratvadinam dharmanam tatha-pratipadanam prayojanam." Thus, the difference between gauni and laksana for Hemacandra is that while in gauni there is superimposition of one object over another object, i.e. one thing over another thing. This is realised either through complete identification or through a state where both are separately mentioned. On the other hand in laksana there is also superimposition. But it takes place at meaning level. There is superimposition of the meaning of something over the meaning of another thing but both are mentioned through one and the same word. Again this superimposition is through absolute identity, 'gangatata' and 'ganga-pravaha' are not separately mentioned as in gaur-vahikah, but their meanings are identified through a common expression viz. 'ganga'. We observed that some illustrations of 'a-bhedena gaunartha' such as 'indrah', 'taksa', 'adhakah', 'raktah', 'gramah, seem to be 'in a way dubious'. This is so because here also the meanings of two separate objects, not directly and separately mentioned, are taken as one; the colour is 'raktah', the cloth is 'red cloth' or 'raktah patah', but only one word is used for two meanings. Even in laksana this happens. Two meanings of two different words are identified through a common expression. Thus the sacrificial post for Indra is said to be Indra. This is gauni. But here also meanings indicated by an identical word are identified through complete identity -- a bhedena'. It would have been better if like Mammata and many others Hemacandra also had mentioned 'gauni' as a subvariety of laksana based on similarity, the rest being suddha laksana.

Page #85
[76] May be Hemacandra was guided by one criterian. It can be this. In all illustrations of gauni of two varieties, the two objects were different from each other. In laksana the object is the same but two things connected with the same object are identified e.g. 'ghosa' and 'pravaha' - both belong to Ganga. But this is also not applicable in 'kuntah pravisanti'. So, it seems there is no logic in his approach. He finally observes (pp. 46) "yatra ca vastvantare vastvantaram upacaryate sa gaunah arthah, yatra tu na tatha sa laksya iti vivekah." Thus the classification of laksana into gauni and suddha as presented ata seems more natural. Hemacandra's effort to distinguish between two sabda-vittis such as gauni and laksana which for him are independent of each other, appears to be unnatural or acquired. Thus, the only point of difference is that in laksana the meaning indicated is 'tattvena laksyamanah', i. e. is indicated through identity, while in 'gauni it is either through identity or through difference also i. e. 'bhedabhedena'. But the thin line demarceting 'abhedena gauni' and 'tattvena laksana? remains undefined clearly. For Hemachandra himself says, "sesam tu gauna-laksanam anuvartata eva." At the same time one thing, for sure, is clear that Hemacandra's 'gauni', is not the same as 'gauni' variety of laksana as conceived by Mammata, or even that of Bhoja. Perhaps in recognising gauni as a separate vstti, Bhoja's influence was responsible.

Page #86