Siddhachalam NJ 1990 04 Mahavir Jayanti

SR No.: 528591
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Siddhachalam NJ
Publisher: USA International Mahavir Jain Mission Siddhachalam
Publication Year: 1990
Total Pages: 68
Language: English
Classification: Magazine, USA_Souvenir Jain Center NJ Int Jain Sangh, & USA
File Size: 15 MB

Page 28

were originally atheistic and became theistic only after their fusion. The Samkhya system similarly denied the existence of God. In fact this was one of the characteristic features of Samkya system and the system itself is referred to as "god-less' (nirisvara). Many of the sutras maintain that God's existence cannot be proved. The Bhatta school of the Mimamsakas similarly denies the existence of a Supreme God.
Let us now consider the Jaina repudiation of God's existence. Jainism, unlike the theistic schools does not accept the existence of a supreme creator and sustainer of the world. The system maintains that the world is without a beginning and an end. In this we see the most consistent theory of realism, it being maintained that each and every one of the categories is eternally real and hence that logically they are in no need of postulating a god who is the supreme cause and ruler of the world. Acharya Jinasena ask: "If God created the universe, where was he before creating It? If he was not in space, where did he localize the universe? How could a formless or immaterial substance like God created the world of matter? If the material is to be taken as existing, why not take the world itself as unbegun began? If the creator was uncreated, why not suppose the world to be itself self-existing? Then he continues: "Is God self-sufficient? If he is, he need not have created the world. If he is not, like an ordinary potter, he would be incapable of the task, since, by hypothesis, only a perfect being could produce it...." The Jaina philosopher pertinently asks: "If every existent object must have a maker, that maker himself would be explained by another his maker, etc. To escape from this vicious circle we have to assume that there is one uncreated, selfexplaining cause, god. But then, if it is maintained that one being can be self-subsistent, why not say that there are many others also who are uncreated and eternal similarly.?" Hence "it is not necessary to assume the existence of any first cause of the universe" S. Radhakrishnan state the Jaina joint of view thus: "The Jaina view is that the whole universe of being, of mental and material factors has existed from all eternity, undergoing an infinite number of revolutions produced by the powers of nature without the intervention of any external deity. The diversities of the world are traced to the five co-operating conditions of time (kala), nature (svahhava), necessity (niyati), activity (karma) and desire to be
and act (udyama).
The Jainas' view of god is thus conditioned by their conviction that the world is uncreated and indestructible. Since the theists postulate the existence of god to account for the world of name, form and experiences, the Jainas are critical of every one of the arguments brought forth by the theists. Since the Jaina philosophers were most vigorous in rebutting the Nyaya philosopher's arguments, we shall refer to them alone here.
One of the arguments of the Nyaya philosopher is that the world as an effect implies a cause, an intelligent cause and that is god. The Jaina philosopher maintains that if on the analogy of ordinary effects having intelligent human causes it is argued that the ordinary effects having intelligent human causes it is argued that the world has god as its cause, it should also be held that like man, god is also imperfect. If on the other hand, it is said that the similarity between the two types of causation is not so striking, the Jaina philosopher maintains, the Nyaya philosopher is also not justified in drawing the inference he does. Because water-vapor is similar to smoke, there can be no justification in inferring fire from water vapor as from smoke. The third alternative,of maintaining that the world as effect is different from other effects (and so justifying a different type of cause) is again not accepted by the Jaina philosopher. He maintains that the most important thing about a cause regarding the world creation and an ordinary effect like a house getting gradually ruined is that the cause is invisible and so it should be accepted also that the ruins too were produced by intelligent agents.
Proceeding on the analogy of the ordinary creator- the causal agent for a given effect - the Jaina philosopher argues that god as the causal agent for the world must also be considered to have body. We have never seen any intelligent creator without a world, argues the Jaina philosopher.
The Jaina philosopher analyses the various other possibilities also even if a bodiless god is admitted to exist and is considered responsible for creation. Creation may be due to his personal whim or due to good and bad actions of men or due to god's mercy on men or due to god considering creation itself to be a play. The Jaina philosopher points out that none of the four alternatives give us a creditable account of god as a perfect being far removed from
humanity in the matter of his various endowments. Admitting god to have created the world out of his personal whim would do away with all natural laws governing the world. If good and bad actions are responsible for world-creation, god's independence would suffer, for he will then not be responsible for the good and bad experiences of men. Pointing out that out of mercy on humanity god created the world is still not a satisfactory argument since this can't account for the presence of suffering in the world. If, in this context, good and bad acts respectively are held responsible for enjoyment and suffering, god becomes a superfluous entity. The last alternative referred to signifies purposelessness on the part of god. The importance of all these arguments, the Jaina philosopher maintains is that accounting for the existence of god is an absolutely hopeless task and the better alternative is to dispense with the supposition altogether.
Jacobi explains how the atheistic aspects of Jaina thought can be understood in its proper perspective when he writes: "Though the Jainas are undoubtedly atheistical, as we understand the term, still they would probably object to being styled atheists. While admitting that the world is without beginning or end, and therefore not produced by a god, or ruled by one, they recognize a highest deity (paramadevata) as the object of veneration, viz., the Jina, the teacher of the Sacred Law, who being absolutely free from all passions and delusion, and being possessed of omniscience, has reached absolute perfection after having annihilated all his karma.
The Jinas, rather than the god's are thus worshipped and offered worship in temples, but since the Jinas have transcended the worldly plane, they cannot really answer the prayers. Gods, who are supposed to watch and control true discipline (sasanadhisthayika devatas) hear and answer the prayers. It is in this sense that the erection of temples is justified. Underlying all the ceremonial worship in temples and erection of statues for the Jinas is the strong conviction of the Jaina that the best mode of worshipping them is to practice the Jina's discipline.
We may conclude that Jaina 'atheism', without denying the existence of the soul and without presuming a creator makes each individual responsible for his own fate and maintains that everything in the universe is eternal and that ethical living alone can ensure lasting happiness.⚫
MAHAVIR JAYANTI SOUVENIR 26ers MAHAVIR JAYANTI SOUVENIR