Sramana 2012 04

SR No.: 525080
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Shreeprakash Pandey, Ashokkumar Singh
Publisher: Parshvanath Vidhyashram Varanasi
Publication Year: 2012
Total Pages: 72
Language: Hindi
Classification: Magazine, India_Sramana, & India
File Size: 7 MB

Page 42

Recollection (Smrti) in Jaina Logic.... : 35 of valid cognition. Because of this difference of opinion, Jain logicians were engaged in very rigorous arguments with those of other schools like Nyāya, Buddhism, and Pūrvamīmāmsā; epistemologically very illuminating. The other philosophical schools, not in favor of the epistemological status of recollection (Prabhākara Mīmāmsā, etc.) rejected recollection as a valid instrument of true cognition (pramāņa). They propound that memory is not an instrument of valid cognition because it depends for its genesis on perception which is another means of knowledge (valid cognition). The Jains refute this objection by saying that if the validity of the recollection is denied , the inference also will have to be excluded from pramāṇas because inference also depends on the knowledge of necessary concomitance, perception of hetu etc., and therefore on this ground even inference will cease to be pramāna. Ācārya Hemacandra said in this regard, “Moreover, if recollection be convicted of invalidity, one must offer oblation of water to inference (that is to say, one must be prepared to repudiate the validity of inference), since there is no possibility of inference being realized unless recollection has already taken note of the necessary concomitance. It is universally accepted by all logicians that inference is conditioned by apprehension of the probans and recollection of its necessary concomitance (with the probandum). It is established, therefore, that recollection is to be accepted as an organ of knowledge, otherwise the validity of inference would become unaccountable."15 In the commentary of 4th sūtra of 3rd Päda of Pramāņa-Naya-Tattvālokālamkāra, the commentator established that recollection is as much a source of valid cognition as inference. Further he said, “The Jain philosophers go on showing how the validity of inference would be impossible without the validity of recollection. They point out that inference is dependent on a recollection of the 'invariable relationship between the mark and the proven.' If the recollection which thus revives the idea of 'invariable relationship’ be invalid (Apramā) then the 'invariable relationship’ itself becomes incompetent for the purpose of the