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śramaņa, Vol 58, No. 2-3/April-September 2007
with full knowledge and acknowledgment of the relative, restricted and conditional nature of his conclusion. The Jaina philosophers give the respective names of durniti or bad judgment, naya or judgment (the relative and restricted knowledge of one of the infinite aspects of a thing and the judgment based on this is called naya and pramāņa (validity of knowledge) to these three kinds of judgments. They further point out that a 'naya' must be preceded by 'Syāt' in order to become a pramāņa.
All things exist from the point of view of their own substance, form, space and time and are non-existent with regard to another substance, form, space and time. Jainism prescribes the need to have an understanding of the seven steps of the Jaina doctrine of Syadvāda called as Saptabhangi (seven-fold predications) viz.:
1. Syādasti (relatively, a thing is real).
Example: From the point of view of substance the soul is real (permanent).
2. Syännāsti (relatively, a thing is not real)
Example: From the point of view of modes the soul is notreal (impermanent).
3. Syādasti-nāsti (relatively, a thing is real as also not real)
Example: From the point of view of substance the soul is real and from the point of view of modes it is not-real.
4. Syād-avaktavyam (relatively, a thing is indescribable)
Example: Assertion about a thing from the point of view of substance and modes both simultaneously, is indescribable.
5. Syādasti ca avaktavyam (relatively, a thing is real as also indescribable)
6. Syānnāsti ca avaktavyam ( relatively, a thing is unreal as also indescribable)
