Sramana 2007 04

SR No.: 525061
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Shreeprakash Pandey, Vijay Kumar
Publisher: Parshvanath Vidhyashram Varanasi
Publication Year: 2007
Total Pages: 242
Language: Hindi
Classification: Magazine, India_Sramana, & India
File Size: 9 MB

Page 163

158 :
Śramaņa, Vol 58, No. 2-3/April-September 2007
cognition (sarva-visayatā)and directness of perception (sākṣātkāratva) are the two characteristics of omniscience. However, the distinguishing feature of Kevala Jñānīs also said to be sarvavişayatā. Hence, the Jainas do not allow to any one to reduce omniscient knowledge to that of the epitome of the universe, however useful that might be. The Second Objection:
The second objection is about the knowledge of attributes and modes. Mīmārsakas argue, “even if the person, by his diversified nature, apprehends all things, he can not apprehend the specific individualities of all things. Under the circumstances there is no use of omniscient person who knows the things only in their general form, especially as in no other form is the thing apprehended. Jainas do not agree with this. To the Jainas, the substance does not exist separate from attributes and modes. Attributes cannot constitute reality because Jainas do not believe that esse est percipi. What they mean that on attribute in order to be objective and not merely psychical does require an objective basis and that is Dravya. In fact, objects cannot be conceived from attributes and vice-versa. Third Objection:
Even if we accept that the omniscient person knows every thing with all their attributes, omniscience cannot be true and complete unless it extends over all the places and all the times. In fact, according to Jainism, spatial and temporal limitations are transcended even in imperfect super normal perception called Avadhi, but only with regard to the objects having form. Even the highest type of Avadhi, though it can perceive all objects having form, it cannot perceive all the modes of all the things. This is not therefore complete omniscience. Again, they argue that if it is omniscience, is it successive or simultaneous, if it is successive, it cannot be omniscience, since in that case the endless number of objects with their innumerable attributes can never be exhausted and thus the knowledge so conditioned would never be complete.