Tulsi Prajna 2001 07

SR No.: 524608
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Shanta Jain, Jagatram Bhattacharya
Publisher: Jain Vishva Bharati
Publication Year: 2001
Total Pages: 170
Language: Hindi
Classification: Magazine, India_Tulsi Prajna, & India
File Size: 8 MB

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third time in the fourth statements - syat avaktavya evaghatah. Here we get the third category-evaaktavya-'possibility' or probability in modern scientific terminology (not inexpressibility). With these three catgegories jain philosophers have constructed seven simultaneously true descriptive statements of an existent object of knowledge, sensory knowledge. Avaktavya I shall explain while stateing Husserl's view.
2. In Cartesian Meditations to explain his point Husserl gives an example of an object die. "...this die is given continuously as an objective unity in a multiform and changeable multiplicity of manners of appearing, which belong determinately to it. With that, another fundamental trait of intentionality is indicated. Every subjective process has a process of 'horizon', which changes with the alteration of the nexus of consciousness... there belongs to every external perception its reference from the 'genuinely perceived' sides of the object of perception to the sides 'also meant'-not yet perceived but only anticipated. Furthermore, the perception has horizons made up of other possibilities of perception, as perceptions that we could have, ... the horizons are 'predelineated' potentialities.... The object is, so to speak, a pole ofidentity, always meant expectantly as having a sense yet to be actualized." (Sections 17-19).
The Jain is not a Phenomenologist, nor is he in search of 'essence' by 'bracketing'. The contention of this passage is about what attributes have as yet been perceived of an object, and what can reasonably be thought and said to be of possible perception. Our knowledge of the anekanta at any given time are limited by the attributes known, perspectives grasped. But our quest do not rest with them. What truth claims we have made in positive and negative statements are our affirmations about the object. On the basis of these affirmations we seek more about the object. Thus reasonable possibility of attributes, perspectives, make part of our knowledge of an object, By reasonable is meant consistency and coherence with knowledge categorically stated by asti and nästi-evakarena. Thus saptabhangi is constituted of three categories- 'is'. 'is' not, 'possible' (asti, nästi, avyaktavya) emphasized by the words syadeva. If you want to include the still more modern ideas in the sciences, and call it probable I have no objection, for these probalistic are stated, expressed, in probalistic statements. When saying so I take into consideration paryaya which I have not discussed here, but
। तुलसी प्रज्ञा अंक 113-114
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