Tulsi Prajna 1995 04

SR No.: 524583
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Parmeshwar Solanki
Publisher: Jain Vishva Bharati
Publication Year: 1995
Total Pages: 158
Language: Hindi
Classification: Magazine, India_Tulsi Prajna, & India
File Size: 7 MB

Page 144

Vol. XXI, No. 1
25
toto. They say that the validity of the Laws of Thoughts should be considered by the testimony of Experience (samvedanā) and not by pre-conception ( Experience certifies that the dual character of entities exists in respect of its own individuality and does not exist a part from and ourside the nature (sarvamasti svarūpeṇa pararupena nāsti ca), In relativistic standpoint, both, being and non-being can exist together. Everything is real only in relation to and distinction from every other thing. The Law of Contradiction is denied absolutely in this respect. The point is only that the absolute distinction is not a correct view of things, according to Jainism.
As regards the triple character (origination, destruction, and permanence) of reality, the Jainas support it through "anyathānupapannatvahetu" as explained before. The permanent element possesses the character of idontity-in-difference (bhedābhebavåda). Identity is used in the sense that the substance and its modes cannot be sparated from a realistic stand point, and difference in the sense that they are different in name, number, etc. from a practical viewpoint « In other words, the modes are not absolutely different from substance, as in that case, the modes would not belong to the substance. With past reflections the substance is transformed into present modes and proves itself as a cause for future modes that are necessary for the understanding of the permanent character of an entity.
To preserve the unity of terms in relation to different characters, the Jainas assert an element which is called Jätyantara (sui-generis or unque).43 This is illustrated by the instance of Narasimha which is criticised by the Buddhist philosophers. Prabhāchandra says in response to the Buddhist criticism that it is neither nara nor simha, but because of their similarities they are called Narasimha. While having mutual seperation they exist non-differently in relation to substance and like waves in water they emerge and sink in cach other. Thus there is no self-contradiction in a dual character of an entity in relative sense, as the Jainas assert.
Na narasimharūpatvan na simho naraūpatah. Sabdavijpānakāryāņām bhedāt jātyantaram hi tat. Na naro para eveti na simhah simha eva hi. Samānadhikaranyena narasimhaḥ prakīrtitaḥ “
Dharmakirti urged with regard to the Universal-cum-particular character of reality that this theory compelled one to recognize the curd and camel as one entity. In connection with the fallacious mid dle term (hetvabbāsa), Akalanka points out that the Buddhist philosophers discover defects to censure the Jainas on the basis of