Tulsi Prajna 1995 04

SR No.: 524583
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Parmeshwar Solanki
Publisher: Jain Vishva Bharati
Publication Year: 1995
Total Pages: 158
Language: Hindi
Classification: Magazine, India_Tulsi Prajna, & India
File Size: 7 MB

Page 140

Vol. XXI, No. 1
21
"If the above doctrine is to be denied, all things would have to be recognized as one. If a certain thing spoil off, for instance, as a jar was not different from other things, such as cloth, then there would be no difference between the jar and sky-flower (ākāsa-kusuma). (i.e. sky-flower is a thing that does not exist at all-hence an absurdity) Likewise a thing that is always differeatiated from all other things. can have no other state save that of the sky-flower. Consequently. the general character in shape or universal entity, has to be admitted."
Kincidvivaksitam vastughatadi, sa yadi gharadirbhāvah patādinā bhāvāntareņatulyaḥ syāt-tato yadi vyāvșttaḥ syāt, tadā khapuşpanna tasya visesaḥ syāt, sarvathā vastvantarādvyāvșttatvät, na ca vastvantaradvyāvrttasyānyagatih sambhavati, khapuspatām muktvā. tasmā. ttasya vastunah khapuspatulyattvamabhyupagacchatā bhāvāntaratulyatvam vastutvam nāma sămânymabhyupa gantavyamiti siddham sāmānyātmakam ....... 30
Kamalaśila further explains the Jaina conception of the particular character of an entity. He says that if the same entity-jar was devoid of dissimilarity, then the jar could not be regarded as anything different from the cloth etc, in the form of "this is jar", "that is cloth", but in fact it does differ from other things. Therefore, the particular character is always present in reality. 31.
As the Buddhists do not admit the universal character of an entity, the Jainas endeavour to convince them that the universal character is merged in the particular character of an entity. They set forth the argument that if any entity is not similar to other things. it ceases to be entity. For, that wbich is excluded from an entity. could have no position, but non-existence, as in the case of a sky. flower.
Sarvathāpi hyatulyatve hybhipretasya vastunah. Vastvantareņa niyatam vastutvamavablyate, Vastuno hi nivsitasya kvānyā sambhāvini gatiḥ. ..
Lakşyate Dāstitam muktvå tārāpa'ha sarojavat.32 In support of the aforesaid view, another argument is presented, on behalf of the Jains; that is, if an cntity were not similar to or different from every other entity, how then is it possible that the common idea of being an entity" found to appear only in connection with the jar and such things, and not in connection with the crow's teeth. It is so because the said restriction is due to have a certain capacity in their natures. Though, according to Jainism, all things in the form of entities are not different from one another, their capacity may be regarded as the required “communality". This is also