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Vol. XX, No. 4
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(Tīb. : 'phags-pa 'jam-dpal-gshon-nur-gyur-ba (la-phyag: 'tshal-lo), so that he will be able to camplete the work without any obstacles. it is a general tradition among the Indian authors that at the beginning of their works they should worship their respective Gods or Goddess to complete the work smoothly. This trend was not only familiar among the Hindus, but also this was a practice among the Buddhists and the Jains. Therefore, Patanjali, the author of the great Mahabhasya, rightly opines that : māñgalika ācārya mahatah śāstraughasya mangalārtham sidhaśabdāmāditah prayurko/mangalădinihi śāstrani prathante virapuruşakāni ca bhavantyāyuşmat-puruşāņi ca, adhyetāraso siddhārtha yathā syuriti.17
Through the short gloss the author argues that the wordly objects are realised hy he means of the valid knowledge (pramāna) only. Then he gives three possible definations of the pramana (Tib. : 'jalbyed, viz., sphuţarthaprāpikā (Tib. i gan-bcad-don-thob-byed-pa), 18 ajñatajñāpakam (Tib. : ma-rtogs-don-gsai-'dod) and satyartho bodhakam (l'ib. : bden-pa 'i-don stogs-smra) and step by step he nicely refutes these. According to the author the aim of valid knowledge is to establish the existence of prameya (Tib. : gshal-bya) and this prameya is nothing. but identical with a dravya (Tib. : rdsas). Since the drayyas are ksanika in nature, it is not possible to realise the sphutārtan. Thus, Jayānanda refutes all the definations. Again, he rejects the two means of the valid knowledge i.e. the perception and the inference, which have been acceptad by the great Buddhist Logician Dharmakirtti and his followers. Thus, this short work of the Kashmirian Pandit is a direct attack to the pramaņavādina 'those who believe on the pramanās.
This work of Jayānanda now needs some comparison with the Vigrahavyāvartanikärikā of the great scholar and the founder of the Madhyamaka philosophy Nagarjuna. Nāgarjuna critises the validity of the pramānas through his seventy verses. Nagarjuna argues that if you establish objects through a pramāna, the pramāna itself must be established through another one and that itself by a fresh one. until you commit the fallacy of regressus ad infinitum. If on the other hand you attempt to establish objects without a pramana, your tenent falls to the ground.
A pramāna itself is not established. Had it been so, there would have been a complete cessation of gloom or ignorance. The view that a pramāna establishes itself as well as other objects, is untenable. 19 A fire which is cited as an illustration, can illumine other objects by removing darkness which besets them, but it can not illumine itself inasmuch as a fire never co-abides with darkness. Thus, Nāgārjuna criticises the validity of pramānas as discussed
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