Vaishali Institute Research Bulletin 2

SR No.: 522602
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: G C Chaudhary
Publisher: Research Institute of Prakrit Jainology & Ahimsa Mujjaffarpur
Publication Year: 1974
Total Pages: 342
Language: English, Hindi
Classification: Magazine, India_Vaishali Institute Research Bulletin, & India
File Size: 7 MB

Page 81

THEORY OF DOUBT IN JAINISM AND
RATIONALISM
Dr. BASHISTHA NARAYAN SINHA
Jainism is one of the non-vedic school of Indian philosophy while Rationalism which is here proposed to be dealt with is one of the systems of modern Western philosophy. But both of them have tried to prove the existence of soul by establishing the 'theory of doubt' which one may know in the following way.
Jainism has a vast literature which is known as Agama. Agama consists of 11 Angas, 12 Upangas, 10 Prakirnakas, 6 Chedasūtras, Cūlikasūtras and 4 Mulasūtras. These scriptures discuss various social, cultural, religious, philosophical and other problems. But Vibeşāvaśyaka Bhaşya by Jinabhadragani (6th century), a well-known commentary on Avaśyakasutra (one of the four Mülasītras), if it is not remarked as exaggeration, may be declared as a compendium of Jainism. In this valuable work the concept of soul and its existence has been also presented through the medium of a talk between Mahavira and Indrabhūti Gautama, a Brāhmaṇa leader of a group of some vedic scholars.
Once Mahavīra after achieving omniscience happened to stay in a forest called as Mahasena where several persons with respect and regard went to meet him. That scene created a curiousity in Indrabhūti Gautama and his followers to see that great personality and they made up their mind to go to Mahavira. They went there in the leadership of Gautama, who raised the problem of soul. "How can one know the existence of soul" ? There are different 'Pramanas' for achieving the correct knowledge of a thing, such as Pratyakşa, Anumana etc. One can perceive a thing which has got some shape, size, colour, etc. for example, pen, pencil, book and so on. A thing like soul possesses neither bodily shape nor any colour. Thus, perception fails here to give the knowledge of soul. So far as Anūmāna is concerned it is also of no use here. When a person sees smoke coming out at a certain place, he infers that there must be fire, because it is already proved that where there is smoke there is fire. Though, at present the co-existence of fire and smoke is not seen, at sometime or other that might have been perceived, otherwise it is difficult to establish the relation between fire and smoke. It means the Anumāna depends on Pratyakşa. Anumana is impossible without Pratyaksa. Therefore the failure of Pratyakşa is