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E. A. Solomon
(locus) and Brahmin for its vişaya which it obscures; being the udhisthana of the superimposition of the phenomenal world, Brahman is the upådana of the world, which is its vivarta, Vacaspati regards Brahman with avidya as the sahakari-karani to be the upadana karana of the world in asinuchas being the object of the jira's avidya, Brahman appears as the insentient world.
Sankara commenting on Br. sū. 1.4.3 says that the term "avyakta' in Katha Up. 1.3.11 signifies the seminal power of the nature of Avidya which resides in the Supreme Lord and is constituted of Maya and is the Great Sleep in which the transmigratory souls sleep being devoid of the realisation of their own nature. 10 We can say on the basis of this and other passages from the works of Sankarācārya that he was inclined to regard the Supreme Lord as the afraya or locus of Avidya. At least we have the word 'asrayawhich became current in later discussions regarding the asraya (locus) and vişaya (object) of Avidya. Commenting on Sankara's Bhasya on Br. sū. 1.4.3, Vacaspati says that this Avidya-Sakti of Brahman, which is termed Maya and the like, cannot be defined as non-different or different from it; and what constitutes its avyaktatva is its indescribableness. This is the difference of 'Avyakrta-vada' from Pradhänavada.' The Avidyasakti is dependent on Isvara for it has Isvara as its asraya; It is arthavatt (purposeful, meaningful), for no substance can bring about anything by itself. It might be urged : If Brahman experiences samsara by virtue of avidya-sakti, then even the emancipated souls would have to be reborn for Avidya would remain in it. Or if Avidya were to be destroyed it would mean that the whole mundane world is destroyed for its very root would be destroyed. Answering this Sankara has said that the emancipated souls would not be reborn as the bijaSakti i... Avidya having the potentiality to emerge as the mundane world is destroyed by vidya (knowledge). Vacaspati explains this in conformity with his own view that the Jivas are the Asraya of their respective avidyas. He says, "We Vedantins do not say that there is one Avidya like one Pradhana in all jivas, so that we should be charged with this fault, avidya is different in each jtva, so only the avidyr of that jiva in whose case vidya lias arisen will be dispelled and not of other jlvas. and so there is not the contingency of there being the eradication of the entire sansdra." It might be urged that the distinctious of the jtvas are dependent on the distinctions of tlie avidya adjuncts and the distinctions of the avidya adjuncts are dependent on the distinctions of the souls; thus there is mutual dependence and neither is established. The answer to this is that it is not so. Since both are beginningless, they are established