Jain Journal 1993 04

SR No.: 520110
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Jain Bhawan Publication
Publisher: Jain Bhawan Publication
Publication Year: 1993
Total Pages: 67
Language: English
Classification: Magazine, India_Jain Journal, & India
File Size: 4 MB

Page 62

APRIL, 1993
person born blind, examine the other systems. Looking at things from different angles of vision each has been disputing with the others, asserting his own system to be correct and the others wrong. Such disputations among the various systems of philosophy are reconciled by the all embracing all encompassing anekanta - the universal system, the all comprehensive science of thoughts and the so called "intellectual ahimsā."
Those qualities in an object which do not clash are accepted by all without raising any controversy but the simultancons existence of two opposite qualities is not easily accepted by the one who is not follower of syddvāda. The syādvada explains the multifaceted nature of a substance with respect to different view points as it makes use of 'also' (bhi), not the emphatic 'so' (hi). Nevertheless to emphasize one particular aspect the use of 'so' (ht) is also made by the speaker but the other qualities and aspects are not denied by him.
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When we use the preposition 'also', it signifies that there is something more but the preposition 'so' tells that so far as it goes this much is correct and no further. Hence the two prepositions do not contradict each other, rather they supplement. Thus 'syädvāda' is not a doctrine of probability it is very much a certainty.
In a 'pramāņa' sentence which engulfs all parts or qualities the term 'syad' is used to denote many facettedness while relative to 'naya' which covers only one part or aspect the term 'so' (hi) is used to denote one facet. In other words when a statement is wholly correct about a part, the use of 'so' (hi) is imperative and when a sentence is partly correct in the context of the whole the use of 'also' (bhi) is imperative.1
Anekānta does not mean that all reverse qualities can exist simultaneously, but it accepts only those consistent qualities which establish the objectivity. For example we may fall in the error of sometimes saying that the soul is animate and sometimes saying that the soul is inanimate. The soul is never inanimate. While applying anekanta, cases like this have to be qualified as 'is' or 'is not'. For instance the soul is animate (embodiment of knowledge) and never inanimate. Though
1 Bharilla, Dr. H. C., Tirthankar Mahavira and His Sarvodaya Tirtha, p. 113.