Jain Journal 1981 01

SR No.: 520061
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Jain Bhawan Publication
Publisher: Jain Bhawan Publication
Publication Year: 1981
Total Pages: 43
Language: English
Classification: Magazine, India_Jain Journal, & India
File Size: 3 MB

Page 13

90
as different colours can exist in a lustrous gem without conflicting with each other, so the universal and particular elements could abide in a reality.17
JAIN JOURNAL
We find two kinds of an entity, viz. existence of own nature (svarupa-astitva) and existence of the similar nature as others (sadṛśaastitva). The former tries to separate the similar (svajātīya) and dissimilar (vijātīya) substances and indicates their independence. This is called vertical universal (urdhatāsāmānya), which represents unity (anugatapratyaya) in plurality of different conditions (vyavṛtapratyaya) of the same individual. In other words, the permanent character of an entity is called urdhatāsāmānya.18 Sadṛśa-astitva, the so-called tiryaka sāmānya (horizontal), represents unity in the plurality of different individuals of the same class.19 The word 'cow' is used to denote a particular cow and it also refers to others of the class, because of similarity.20 Likewise, višesa is also of two kinds, paryāya and vyatireka. The former distinguishes the two modes of same entity, while the latter makes a distinction between the two separate entities. Thus each and every reality is universalized-cum-particularized (sāmānya-višeṣātmaka) along with substance with modes (dravyaparyāyātmaka). Here dravya represents the universal character and paryaya represents the particular character of a thing. In support of this dual character of an entity the traditional example of a ‘jar' has been given. Jar (ghața) made of gold can be changed into several modes while preserving gold as a permanent substance.21 Thus the substance is not totally undifferentiated, as it does become differentiated in the form of the successive factors.22
If the above doctrine is to be denied, all things would have to be recognized as one. If a certain thing spoken of, for instance, as a jar was not different from other things, such as cloth, then there would be no difference between the jar and sky-flower.23
If the same entity, jar, was devoid of dissimilarity, then the jar could not be regarded as anything different from the cloth etc. in the form of this is jar, that is cloth, but in fact it does differ from other things. Therefore the particular character is always present in reality. 24 All things
17 Tattvasangraha, 1709.
18 Hetubindutikaloka, p. 343; cf. Pramanamimansa, 4.5.
19 Hetubindutikaloka, p. 343; cf. Pramanamimansa, 4.4.
20 Pramanamimansa, 4.9.
21 Pramana Vartika Svavrtti Tika, p. 333; Hetubindutikaloka, p. 369.
22 Tattvasangraha, 313-315; also see HBT, pp. 98.
28 Tattvasangraha, 1712-3.
24 Tattvasangraha Panjika, p. 487.