Jain Journal 1978 07

SR No.: 520051
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Jain Bhawan Publication
Publisher: Jain Bhawan Publication
Publication Year: 1978
Total Pages: 52
Language: English
Classification: Magazine, India_Jain Journal, & India
File Size: 3 MB

Page 24

JULY, 1978
between the followers of Parsva and Mahavira regarding this theory of knowledge, though they differed and later on compromised on certain other topics.
17
The Jaina philosophers define knowledge as the determinate cognition of itself and an object as it really is. The object however must be novel and not known before. Knowledge arises out of the relation between the knower (jñātā) and the known (jñeya). Absence of either of these two will make knowledge impossible.
1. Self and knowledge:
Knowledge is defined by the Jainas svaparabhāṣt. In other words knowledge reveals both itself and the object. There is no instance of knowing an object without a concurrent perception of the knowing itself. If knowledge was not by itself known, it cannot make its object known. The nature of knowledge, like a lamp, illuminates itself as well as an external object and does not stand in need of another knowledge for its own illumination.
The soul is the knower and knowledge pertains to the soul or self as a mode of it, and not in the sense of an external possession. No other substance or thing possesses the faculty of knowing. The soul without any knowledge is unreality. Similarly, knowledge without any reference to soul is a mere word signifying nothing. Knowledge is the soul's intrinsic inherence inseparable and in-alienable attribute without which no soul can exist.
The Jainas hold that relation between soul and knowledge is one of bhedabheda. That means in one aspect knowledge is non-different from the soul and in another aspect it is different from the soul. Knowledge is the essential quality of the soul. In this aspect knowledge and soul are identical. According to Naiyaikas, knowledge is the accidental quality of the soul and there is a complete difference between knowledge and the soul. The Jainas reject the Naiyayika view of complete difference between knowledge and soul. The Jainas point out that if the soul and knowledge were different then there would be some sort of relation between them. That relation can not be of conjunction of samyoga, because this relation is possible only between two substances, not between a substance and its quality. Therefore knowledge and soul are identical and non-different in the same way as fire and heat are not different.