Jain Journal 1971 01

SR No.: 520021
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Jain Bhawan Publication
Publisher: Jain Bhawan Publication
Publication Year: 1971
Total Pages: 54
Language: English
Classification: Magazine, India_Jain Journal, & India
File Size: 3 MB

Page 19

JANUARY, 1971
realistically bondage and release are the attributes of the prakṛti and have no real significance for purusa.1
:
Comparing the Samkhya position as enunciated above with the position of Kunda-Kunda we now find a point of agreement between the two, that is dualism on absolute level; though they differ on the nature of constituent entities of dualism. Kapila, holds that the puruşa is an unchanged and intelligent entity. It is an extrinsic cause of the change. The intrinsic or material cause is the unevolved pradhana, for three attributes of worldly life, i.e. pleasure, pain and indifference can have their origin only in the ultimate cause of the world corresponding with its three guṇas, namely sattva, rajas and tamas. Puruşa merely indulges in what is presented by the prakṛti before it. Hence through this so-felt empirical identity it suffers the consequences for itself in the form of worldly change along with its various modifications, like pleasure, pain and indifference. KundaKunda though agrees here with the position of Samkhya so far as the nature of puruşa's indulgence into the worldly processes is concerned, yet he polemizes the possibility of such an indulgence on the basis of puruşa's character being inactive and flawless through and through. Kunda-Kunda urges, that if the spirit is devoid of change totally, there is no problem of worldliness to it; for various passions like anger, aversion, etc., causing the construction of worldly processes will not be found in the spirit. Or, granting, that the world as such exists, and it is matter which, after having transformed itself into the modes of passions, provides chances to the spirit to be likewise, then the question arises, whether matter compels the spirit to be passionate while it is or not intrinsically to be likewise? If it is not condusive to pssions intrinsically while it is getting passionate, then it is possible that one substance can drive the other in the way it is not liable to be essentially. If it is so, then the uniqueness of each substance will be a farce and dualism will be at a stake. If it itself tends to be likewise intrinsically, then the dynamism of spirit is self-proved. Thus the Sämkhya theory of changelessness of spirit is, untenable.
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Moreover, without changeability in puruşa how is its being enjoyer and knower proved? The term enjoyment implies feeling; that is, feeling something which was not being felt previously. This shows
1 Intro. to Samkhya Karika ed. by S. S. Suryanarayana Shastri, pp, ix, x. * Samkhya Karika, 19.
• Ibid, 21.
4 Ibid, 12.
$ Ibid, 20.