Once Again Vaisesika Sutra 3 1 13

SR No.: 269610
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Johannes Bronkhorst
Publisher: Johannes Bronkhorst
Total Pages: 17
Language: English
Classification: Article
File Size: 2 MB

Page 9

ONCE AGAIN VAIŠEŞIKA SŪTRA 3.1.13
673
- The inferential mark for the existence] of a mind is that there is (some
times] cognition and (sometimes] not, even though there is contact between soul, sense organ and object (3.2.1) The fact that (mind) is a substance and eternal is explained by the same
arguments as in the case of] wind17 (3.2.2) - There is (only) one mind (in each body] because (several] efforts do not
occur simultaneously, nor do (several] cognitions (3.2.3) - The inferential marks (for the existence] of a soul are: breathing in and breathing out, shutting and opening the eyes, life, movement of the mind, the modifications of the other senses, pleasure and pain, desire and aver
sion, and volition (3.2.4) - The fact that (soul] is a substance and eternal is explained by (the same
arguments as in the case of] wind18 (3.2.5)
This sequence makes sense, is coherent, and even clear enough to allow us to interpret the sūtras without the help of a commentary.
Recall that the reason why someone should comment upon 3.1.1 at its present position, i.e., at the beginning of Adhyāya 3, is quite clear: this allowed him to address the question of the existence of the soul at that place. We will see below why this could be a concern to this commentator.
First, however, we must consider the question what originally preceded sūtra 3.1.13. If we accept, with the ancient witnesses cited above, that this sūtra was a definition of perception, the question can be answered with a fair amount of confidence. The sutra must have been preceded by a related discussion. This is shown by the peculiar form of 3.1.13. Recall that this definition of perception does not mention the word 'perception'; instead it has anyat '[something different / the other one'. It clearly continues a discussion, which distinguished (at least) two kinds of knowledge or cognition (ñāna(?); or perhaps pramāņa? see below). The form of 3.1.13 indicates that it was preceded, in all probability, by one or more sūtras about inferential knowledge. This is what Jayantabhatta suggests in so many words (see above),19 and indeed, even in its present shape the Vaiśesika Sūtra has some sūtras somehow dealing with inference immediately preceding 3.1.13.
17 This refers to sütras 2.1.11 adravyavattvād dravyam and 2.1.13 adravyavattvena
nityatvam uktam, both of which occur in the discussion of wind. 18 See preceding note. 19 Similarly Jinendrabuddhi; see below.