Xuanzangs Proof Of Idealism

SR No.: 269514
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Eli Franco
Publisher: Eli Franco
Total Pages: 14
Language: English
Classification: Article
File Size: 2 MB

Page 11

Eli Franco: Xuanzang's proof of idealism (vijñaptimātratā)
pressed in the form of a single property. If two properties are needed, the second property is expressed in the form of a qualification of the first property. The qualification appears in the discussion and Harbsmeier's translation, but he fails to realize its function and implications:
"THOUGH BEING IN THE VISUAL SPHERE THEY ARE NOT PERCEIVED BY
THE VISUAL ORGAN." The qualification is clearly "though being in the visual sphere."
What Harbsmeier calls the visual sphere2 comprises dhātus nos. 1-3, that is, the sense of vision, the visible object and the visual consciousness. Consequently, we can reformulate the inference as follows: dhātu no. 2 (rūpa) is not separate from dhātu no. 3 (cakşurvijñāna), because it is not dhātu no. 1 (cakşurindriya) though it is included in dhātus nos. 1-3. If we now combine the two statements (not being dhātu no. 1 and being included in dhātus nos. 1–3), it is clear that the reason consists of a property which occurs in dhātus no. 2 and 3. Therefore, it is present in the sapaksa and it is absent in the vipaksa. For the distribution of the sapaksa and the vipaksa was as follows: sapaksa (being visual consciousness): dhātu no. 3 vipakșa (all the rest): dhātus nos. 1, 4–18 Thus, the reason is valid.
This implies, of course, that one could transpose any of the three dhātus and say, for instance: the visual sense is not separate from the visual consciousness because, while it belongs to the visual sphere, it is not the visual object.
In this case the subject, dhātu no. 1, is not separate from dhātu no. 3 because it is not dhātu no. 2, although it is included in dhātus nos. 1-3.
The property "not being dhātu no. 2” is present in dhātus nos. 1-3 and cannot be found in dhātu no. 2, which means that it is found in dhātus nos. 1 and 3 only. Thus the distribution into pakşa, etc., would be as follows: Subject: no. 1 sapakşa: no. 3 vipakşa: nos. 2, 4-18
29 I am not aware of an equivalent term in Sanskrit that would comprise the three visual
dhātus. The Chinese version of Xuanzang's inference does not use such a term. 30 Should one say that the property must be no. 3 because it cannot be no. 1, since no. 1 is
the pakşa? Probably not, because the requirement is that the paksa is excluded from the domain of the sapaksa, not from the domain of the hetu.
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