Kamalasilas Interpretation Of Non Erroneous In Definition Of Direct Perception And Related Problems

SR No.: 269445
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Toru Funayama
Publisher: Toru Funayama
Total Pages: 27
Language: English
Classification: Article
File Size: 4 MB

Page 2

T. Funayama
eighth century. It is an attempt to shed new light on what is called by Stcherbatsky? 'The Philological School of Commentators'. I will make my intention clear by summarizing here the basic structure of the concerned section. Sāntarakṣita opens the section by pointing out that 'nonerroneous' is necessary in the definition in order to rule out from direct perception an erroneous cognition of 'hair-mesh' (/hair-net') and the like (kesondukādijñāna) (1311). Such a cognition is considered to be a perceptual error (bhrānti) caused by a sense organ indriya). This idea Sāntaraksita owes to Dharmakīrti. Much more interesting is his disciple Kamalaśīla's elucidation of 'non-erroneous': Kamalasīla takes it to be an equivalent of 'non-deceptive' (/non-belying consistent; avisamvādin/avisamvādaka) which is found in the general definition of a means of valid cognition (pramāna). As pointed out in previous studies, this equivalency is also indicated by Vinītadeva, and his idea was severely criticized by Dharmottara. This is one of the most important features of Kamalasīla's theory of perception. I believe that the same idea is presupposed by Sāntarakṣita, too. I will take up this topic below and discuss the origin and the significance of this peculiar interpretation (see Section IV).
After the above-mentioned introductory stanza, śāntarakṣita introduces and criticizes the contrary idea that a cognition of 'hair-mesh', etc., is generated by the mind, and not by a sense organ (1312-13). This idea is found in the Pramānavärttika and Pramānaviniscaya of Dharmakirti, so śāntarakṣita's opponents must have existed before Dharmakūti and not been his real contemporaries. Discussions are then expanded in the succeeding part through a further objection and reply [1314—1322], but I can't see any essential difference from Dharmakīrti's intention. Hence I suppose that stanzas 1312-22 are more or less a reproduction of Dharmakīrti's arguments.
Next, śāntarakṣita proceeds to a new point (1323–28]. The following objection is raised: A cognition of a yellow conch (pītaśarkādijñāna) for a white conch, etc., is direct perception. Such / a cognition is certainly erroneous in terms of its color. However, inasmuch as it is a cognition of 'conch' when its color is disregarded, it realizes the efficacy of a real conch, so that it is a means of valid cognition as direct perception (1323). This objection is more minutely explained in the Pañjikā, according to which the propounders were certain Buddhist insiders who followed only Dignāga's definition and insisted that 'non-erroneous' should not be added, because it contradicts the cognition of a yellow conch, etc. Kamalaśīla's opponents refer to a passage of Pramānasamuccaya, too, and interpret the disputable word sataimira of the Pramānasamuccaya I 8b. I consider that the interpretation is based on the statement of Jinendrabuddhi's Pramānasamuccayatīkā. I shall discuss this below in Section V.
Against this, sāntarakṣita's own idea is stated in 1324–28. He never admits the validity of the cognition of a "yellow' conch. To śāntarakṣita what there really is is only the color (varna) of the object; the shape (samsthāna) of the object does not exist as distinct from its color. That is why there is no validity in the cognition of a yellow conch' insofar as the shape is no more than the secondary construction through erroneous color-cognition (1326).
In this way, the discussions of Tattvasamgraha 1311-28 and the corresponding Pañjikā are
Sicherbatsky (1932: 39f.). 8 PV III 294-298 and PVin I 76,26–78,5.