Kamalasilas Interpretation Of Non Erroneous In Definition Of Direct Perception And Related Problems

SR No.: 269445
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Toru Funayama
Publisher: Toru Funayama
Total Pages: 27
Language: English
Classification: Article
File Size: 4 MB

Page 18

90
T. Funayama
1. Sataimira indicates the 'exception' (apavada) in Dignaga's system. It is a reference to a special kind of pseudo-perception, in addition to the explicitly enumerated three kinds of pseudo-perception (viz., [a] bhränti, [b] samvṛtisajjñāna and [c] anumana, ānumānika, smärta and abhiläṣika). However, there are two possible interpretations concerning its meaning.
2. According to one interpretation, taimira signifies that any cognition that is caused by the defect of a sense organ is implied in pseudo-perception. The whole stanza (PS I 7c-8b) means as follows: "Erroneous cognition (= erroneously conceptualized cognition), cognition of empirical reality, inference, its result, recollection and cognition related with wish are pseudo-perceptions, together with (sa-) cognition caused by the defects of a sense organ (taimira)." [This is the same with Dharmakirti's interpretation.]
3. According to the other interpretation, sataimira signifies that any deceptive cognition is pseudo-perception. It is the exception in Dignaga's system, since the notion 'deceptive/ non-deceptive' was not used by him. Hence the stanza means as follows: "Erroneous cognition, cognition of empirical reality,... and (ca) any deceptive cognition (sataimira) are pseudo-perceptions." [This is a modification on the basis of Dharmakirti's notion of non-deceptiveness.)
Jinendrabuddhi's idea would not reflect the original intention of Dignaga. It is only a product of the integration of Dignaga and Dharmakirti's theories.
The supposition that Jinendrabuddhi's own idea, as seen above, is the purvapakṣa in Kamalasīla's text would be important on several points. In the first place, there is no room to doubt Jinendrabuddhi's historical precedence to Kamalasila.84 Word-for-word correspondences in the five passages <a> <e> between their texts clearly show that Kamalasīla is indebted to the Pramanasamuccayaṭīkā and nothing else. It also reveals Kamalasīla's criticism of Jinendrabuddhi.
As far as I know, Vinītadeva's Nyāyabinduṭīkā does not mention a cognition of a yellow conch as a problem in the definition of direct perception. In this respect, the cognition of a yellow conch may have been taken up as an important topic about the middle of the eighth century. It was a special problem raised in the context of direct perception when people began to interpret Dignaga's wording sataimira by using Dharmakirti's notion of non-deceptiveness. Those people who maintained the validity of a cognition of a yellow conch, etc., are called by Durvekamiśra Amsasamvadavadin or 'propounders of the partial agreement/non-deceptiveness.85
It should be noted here that Jinendrabuddhi's discussion on this point was constructed on the basis of the somewhat astonishing thesis that a cognition of a yellow conch is non-deceptive. Therefore, his second interpretation of sataimira no longer holds when this thesis is denied. This is the reason why Kamalasīla introduced Jinendrabuddhi's commentary only as a pūrvapaksa. Śantarakṣita, Kamalaśīla and Dharmottara do not think such a cognition is direct perception as pramāṇa, 86 so that to them only Dharmakirti's interpretation of sataimira is correct.
84 Here I mean by Kamalasila the author of the Tattvasamgrahapañjikā. The text is considered to have been composed between ca. 760-780/790. Schmithausen [1965: 216 n. 150] and Krasser [1992: 157].
85 Tosaki [1984: 489f. n. 12] and Krasser [1991: vol. 2, 73-75].
86 TSP 483,14-19 (ad TS 1324f.): pramanyam hi bhavad dvabhyam [MK: dvābhyasam S] ākārābhyām bhavati/yathapratibhasam avisamvadad yathadhyavasayam va/tatreha na yathāpratibhasam avisamvadaḥ/pītasya pratibhasanāt tasya tathābhūtasyäpräpteḥ [tatha- MS: yatha- K]/napi yathadhyavasayam avisamvadaḥ/pītasyaiva