Jain Philosophy

SR No.: 250141
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Kamalchand Sogani
Publisher: Z_Vijyanandsuri_Swargarohan_Shatabdi_Granth_012023.pdf
Total Pages: 6
Language: English
Classification: Article & Philosophy
File Size: 572 KB

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of thing as existence. The critics fail to see that contradictory statements can be made about a thing, if the context is changed. The conviction of the Jaina is that if this proposition is denied, it shall be difficult for us to account for the difference of things. Hence, by asserting this proposition, we come across a new aspect of a thing which is not given in the first proposition.
(3) The third proposition is: Syat pen exists and does not exist. In this proposition, th two attributes of existence and non-existence in their relevant contexts are successively predicated of the pen. Thus this proposition which appears to be merely the summation of the first two proposition, not really so. It expresses a ne ect of pen under consideration. This rst or in the second proposition considered sep our guide, the third proposition is nothing but a sum of first two. But the Jaina experience which is our sole guide tells us that the combination of separate units gives rise to a distincti ibute. In the world 'go', though the two letters 'g' and 'o' are merely combined yet this combination gives rise to a distinctive meaning, not apprehended in any of its constituent elements.
ct is not present either in the If mathematics is
(4) The fourth proposition is 'Syat pen is inexpressible'. proposition, the two attributes of existence and non-existence instead of being asserted successively, as in the third proposition, are asserted simultaneously. The need for simultaneous assertion of these opposite attributes is man's desire to express in words the apprehension of pen as such. Since words are incapable of expressing this apprehension of pen, the pen is inexpressible. It may be noted here that inexpressibility is a novel and factual characteristic of pen. The distinction between the third and fourth proposition is that in the former the novel attribute is the result of consequitive togetherness of the elements of existence and non-existence, where-as in the latter it is the result of simultaneous presentation of the two elements in question. It goes without saying that this inexpressibility is not absolute. It is only so in the context of the two opposite attributes being together synchronally. "The commonsense principle implied in its recognition is that what is given cannot be rejected because it is inexpressible by a single positive concept".
The Jain Philosophy
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