Jaina Gazette 1928

SR No.: 034890
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Ajitprasad, C S Mallinath
Publisher: Jaina Gazettee Office
Publication Year: 1928
Total Pages: 502
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 33 MB

Page 342

THE JAINA DOCTRINE OF SOUL
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could be produced. The Jainas point out that in order that the Atoms may be drawn towards it and joined, the soul need not be all-pervasive. Magnet draws Iron; but Magnet is not an all-pervasive substance. It may be contended that if all the Atoms of infinite directions be supposed to be attracted towards the soul, the form and the magnitude of the Body becomes indefinite. The Jainas point out that the same difficulty may arise if you suppose the soul to pervade and thereby draw all the atoms. If it be said that owing to 'Adrishta' only those atoms are drawn towards the soul which are competent to form the Body, the Jainas answer that the very same thing may be urged by those who deny that the soul is all-pervasive.
According to the Jaina philosophers, the soul is of the same extent as the Body. The Naiyayikas say that if the soul be supposed to be confined within the Body, the soul like the Body must be said to have parts; if the soul be supposed to have parts, it is to be looked upon as an effect; if it be an effect, what is its cause? The soul cannot have anything which is not of the same nature with it (Vijatiya) as its cause; because it is impossible for the soul to be generated from the non-soul. Nor can we think that the soul generates from substances which are of the same nature with it (Sajatiya); for, these causes must have 'soul-hood' (must themselves be souls) in order that they may be of the same nature with the soul; it then comes to this that the soul generates from the souls, which according to the Nyaya thinkers is an unreasonable theory. For, how can more than one soul operate in one and the same body? Even admitting it to be possible, how can the effect of one cause-soul be combined with the effect of another cause-soul? A pitcher has parts; when the parts separate, the pitcher is destroyed. In the same way, if the soul be supposed to be constituted of parts, the soul must be said to be subject to distruction.
In reply to the above Nyaya criticism, the Jainas put forth their theory that in some respects the soul may be supposed to have parts and be an effect, although it has neither parts nor is an effect in other respects. A pitcher is made up of limbs, all of the same nature; but the soul is not an effect like that. It is
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