Jaina Gazette 1928

SR No.: 034890
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Ajitprasad, C S Mallinath
Publisher: Jaina Gazettee Office
Publication Year: 1928
Total Pages: 502
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 33 MB

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THE JAINA GAZETTE
unconscious objects e.g., a pitcher etc., the knowledge, “I am a knower" would have been equally impossible in the soul, if it were essentially unconscious. It is in this way that the Jaina philosophers show how knowledge of objects would be impossible for the soul, if it be held to be essentially unconscious. Another argument, advanced by the Naiyayikas is as follows : "I am a knower,"—such a perception shows that the "I" and the "knowledge or consciousness " are separate ; for, if the perception. “I am a knower " proved that the "I" and "knowledge" were identical, the perception, “I am wealthy" would have proved also the identity of the "I" and "wealth." The Jainas contend that the perception, “I am a knower" does prove the identity of the “I" and "knowledge": for, if the soul were not identified with consciousness, the perception, "I am a knower," would have been impossible for itself. If the Naiyayikas contend that the soul, although essentially unconscious, becomes a knower, the Nyaya position itself is weakened thereby. The 'soul' is the substantive (Viseshya) and “knowledge' is the Adjective (Viseshana); when both the substantive and the adjective are perceived, we have the perception. “I am a knower ;"—this is the Nyaya theory, But how is this knowledge of the "I" and "knowledge " to be explained by the Naiyayika? The soul cannot have such perception, for according to the Nyaya theory, the soul cannot directly know itself. If it be held that the "T"and the "knowledge" are perceived by another piece of knowledge, the fallacy of Infinite Regression (Anavastha) becomes irresistible ; for, this another piece of knowledge is possible only when its Adjective "knowledge-hood" is perceived along with it ;--this again supposes a third piece of knowledge,—and so on. It is in this way that the cognition, "I am a knower" becomes impossible if the soul be not identified with consciousness. For this reason, the Jainas reject the theory of the Nyaya philosophy that the soul is essentially unconscious.
The second Nyaya doctrine with regard to the soul is that it is eternally unchangeable i.e., absolutely immutable. The
Jainas criticise this doctrine also and hold that the soul is subject Shree Sudharmaswami Gyanbhandar-Umara, Surat