Jaina Gazette 1928

SR No.: 034890
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Ajitprasad, C S Mallinath
Publisher: Jaina Gazettee Office
Publication Year: 1928
Total Pages: 502
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 33 MB

Page 233

76
THE JAINA GAZETTE
sations. The sensation of one moment perishes leaving a tendency or trace (Samskara) and is in this way, the cause of the sensation of the next moment. This sensation of the next moment which is thus an effect is again the cause of the sensation of the following moment. These sensations although different and separate from each other are linked together in a chain, as it were through the law of causality. For this reason, the momentary sensations following one another are conceived as a stream of consciousness and the Buddhist philosophers call this stream, the Series of Sensations (Vijnana-santana). According to them, there is no necessity for admitting the Atma or the Soul besides this stream of consciousness, this Series of Sensations. There are many philosophers e.g., Hume, Mill etc., in modern times, who like the Buddhists are the advocates of the sensationist theory and who deny the real existence of the Soul. Their conception of 'the flow or the continuum' of consciousness is very similar to the Buddhist conception of the Series of Sensations.
The objection against the sensationist theory is that if there be not any persisting reality underlying the momentary sensations, these become disconnected with each other and the Stream or Santana' becomes impossible. Without the Soul as the principle of connection, there cannot be any link between a sensation and a sensation; and without this linking. Recollection and conception are impossible and Self-consciousness or the consciousness of the 'I', referred to before, becomes inexplicable. For these reasons, the Vedanta philosophy in India has always critised the Vijnana-vada of the Buddhists. The Jaina philosophers also have rejected the sensationist position of the Buddhists by admitting the super-material reality of the Jiva and by attributing real existence to it,
In criticism of the nihilist doctrine of the Buddhist thinkers, the Jainas point out that Smriti or Recollection is impossible, if the Soul be denied. Sensations according to the Buddhists, are absolutely self-identical or particularistic (Svalakshna), so that if it were possible for one such sensation to revive another, it should also be possible for the perceptions of one man to be recollected by another man. The Buddhists no doubt urge