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JUNE, 1929 ]
ALEXANDER'S CAMPAIGN ON THE N.-W. FRONTIER
"he could do nothing more on account of the difficult nature of the ground." A look at the map explains how easy it was for the chemy collected on Pir-sar to obstruct Alexander's march in that valley once Ptolemy's preceding move had been discovered and had indicated the direction which Alexander's attack was likely to take. The valley west of the DandaNûrdai spur is within easy reach from the south-western outlier of Pir-sar across the heights above the pass known as Pêzalkandau, 4,620 feet above sea-level. By crowning these heights the enemy could seriously interfere with the Macedonians' move up the valley without risking a battle in the open. It was equally easy for them, when Alexander's advance up the Valley had been brought to a standstill, to turn round and moving higher up to attack Pto. lemy's detachment holding the fortified camp which, we have seen, may be placed at or near Little ûna.
This attack was beaten off, and when Alexander on the next day resumed his advance up the valley, the Indians who contested it were attacked in the rear by Ptolemy, to whom Alexander during the night had managed to send orders to this effect, as recorded by Arrian. The importance of this help, as well as the difficulties encountered by Alexander, can be well understood by looking at the map. Not until the pass marked there with the height of 6,471 feet had been taken could the junction with Ptolemy's force be effected, and considering its elevation and the steepness of the Danda-Nûrdai spur, Arrian's description of the severe struggle it cost to gain this pass (tápodos) cannot have been exaggerated. Once the Macedonian forces were united in the course of the afternoon the further advance towards the "rock," which Arrian mentions as having been made during the remainder of the day, could present no difficulty. This advance would necessarily lie along the crest of the range as far as the Bûrimar plateau. That it came to a standstill, as Arrian records, without any attack on the rock being possible at the time is fully explained by the great natural obstacle met beyond, the fosse of the Burimar ravine.
I have already described above the general character of this ravine, its considerable depth and the precipitous nature of its slopes. But in order to realise better how fully its features explain Alexander's resort to having a mound constructed to cross it, attention must be called to some details. I have referred above to the protection afforded to Pir-sar by the extremely steep rocky slopes with which the Bar-sar hill forming its northern bastion falls off towards the ravine some 800 feet lower separating it from Bûrimar. These slopes, so easily defended from above, could not be attacked with any chance of success unless they could be brought within the range of missiles. Now the direct distance separating the top of Bar-sar from ground of approximately equal level on the Bûrimår plateau is some 1,300 yards, and that between the Mâshlun shoulder of Bar-sar and a corresponding elevation on the slope below Bûrimar certainly not less than 500 yards. It hence follows that since the ballistai and kata peltai forming the Greek artillery of that period could throw stones and darts only to a distance of some 300 yards, 64 and slingers and bowmen their missiles not much further, it was necessary to advance the position from which their "fire" was to be used. This could be done here with effect only in a horizontal direction, for a descent into the ravine would not have increased the chance of commanding the higher slopes.
The ingenious expedient of constructing a mound to secure this object is thus fully accounted for by the configuration of the ground observed at the Bûrimar ravine. In the same way the use made of timber for its construction, whether in the form of stakes or tree-trunks, fully agrees with the abundance of tree growth still observed on the slopes both above and below the Bûrimar plateau. Undoubtedly this plentiful timber available on the spot would supply the handiest material for the purpose. That the mound is said to have been advanced a stadion, or about 200 yards, on the first day is easily understood in view of the slope near the eastern edge of the Burimar plateau being comparatively easy. But it becomes steadily
5. Ct. M. Crindle, Invasion of India,' p. 21,