World Of Jainism

SR No.: 023359
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Vishwanath Pandey
Publisher: Vishwanath Pandey
Total Pages: 132
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 32 MB

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THE ORIENT
tituent molecules which occupy space. The atoms are permanent, but they change their forms as a result of composition and decomposition. In Jainism creation means the change of form.
PSYCHOLOGY Indian psychology differs from its Western counterpart fundamentally; for, 'psyche' or 'soul' is considered in general in Western thought the same as mind or consciousness. In India, the position is different. Leaving aside the Buddhists and materialists all other schools of Indian philosophy consider mind not only different from soul or self but quite antagonistic to it.
Mind
Mind, in Indian psychology, figures as a material fact opposite to soul which is spiritual in nature. Mind, though subtle in nature, has physical base. It is closely associated with intelligence (buddhi) and egoism (ahamkara). The Jainas also hold a similar opinion, atthough the Jaina conception of mind differs from that of other systems. The Jainas like other systems make a clear distinction between the self and the mind. But in contrast to other systems they hold that the mind is not a sense organ (indriya). They hold mind to be an anindriya or noindriya. This has been stated earlier while discussing the epistemology of the Jainas. The reason why other systems considered mind as the sixth sense was that the knowledge of pain, pleasure and inferential knowledge required the supposition of some sense by which the above types of knowledge could be explained. It was held that the five senses were not capable of having the knowledge of above facts. Therefore, the supposition of mind was a logical necessity. But, since mind did not have external sense organ like, eye, ear, etc., it was supposed to be internal organ (antaikarana); and perception through internal organ was regarded as indirect perception. Thus, leaving aside the Jainas, other systems of Indian philosophy considered mind (manasa) as the internal sense.
One of the reasons to discard the existence of mind by the Jainas or accord to it the status of anindriya (not-sense organ) seems to be its epistemological position. Contrary to the belief found in other systems, the Jainas regard perceptual knowledge (mati-jnana) and authority (sruta-jnana) as indirect knowledge (paroksa-jnana). Here the definition of direct (pratyaksa) knowledge is that which is directly revealed to soul without the media of senses and the mind. Hence the experiencs such as pain and pleasure or extra-sensory perceptions are assumed to be directly experienced by the soul. This dispenses with the necessity of assuming the mind as a separate sense organ. This is the reason why the Jainas regard only five senses.
is the reason assuming the mind as a senshis dispenses with the