________________
COMMON SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE....
33
of our knowledge. Jainas are quite right when they maintain that memory is a recollection and as such not a knowledge of a datum perceived at present; this does not undermine its objective basis as it is definitely based on the object, though object, no doubt, is experienced in the past. Here Jaina realists seem to be more reasonable than Nyāya logicians who reject memory as a source of valid knowledge.
Jainas are in agreement with Nyāya philosophers when they maintain that negation is not different from perception and hence negation as an independent means of knowledge need not be recognized.
Jaina epistemology is, thus, rich in its content as far as the ways of knowing are concerned. It has, no doubt, some similarities with Nyāya epistemology, it has its own peculiarities as well.
Five Kinds of Knowledge in Jainism
In Tattvārtha sūtra of Jainism, we find five categories of knowledge. 1. Matijñāna : It can be called empirical perception resulting from five senses and the mind and is limited. It is either sensuous or non-sensuous depending upon senses or mind. It involves four stages of sensation, attention, determinate perception and retention. 2. Srutajñāna : It is the knowledge which is the result of some reliable authority which communicates the truth. It is knowledge derived from words of a trust-worthy person or scriptures. This knowledge from authority can be based on either human authority or superhuman authority. However, Jainas do not believe in authority of vedas, though they recognize authority of Tirthankaras, the omniscient beings.
Nyā.-3
