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CONCLUSION
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The Problem of Error in Nyāya and Jainism
Error is a kind of non-valid cognition. The analysis of illusory perception has epistemological value. There is a hot controversy as regards the ontological basis of erroneous perception.
Nyāya and Jainism propound realistic theory of knowledge. Explanation of error becomes difficult on realistic position. If the object known is identical with object existent what possibly can be the place of error or illusory experience in a realistic world ? Nyāya view is that an illusion consists in misapprehension of an object as another. The Jaina view is the same more or less.
Jaina and Nyāya philosophers are one in refulting the theories of error propounded by philosophers of different systems on the basis that they are not founded on sound grounds. They agree in expounding the theory of Anyathākhyātī or Viparītakhyāti in spite of being realists. Strictly speaking, there cannot be error if we consistently hold extreme realistic position. But error as misapprehension of an object is not inconsistent with realistic principles of knowledge as object may not be apprehended as it is immediately.
D. M. Datta observes, “The minimum of realism is the presupposition that there is such a thing as knowledge; in other words that perception and thought refer to some object not the mere experience of perceiving and thinking. The maximum of realism would be the assurance that everything ever perceived or thought of existed apart from apprehension and exactly in the form in which it is believed to exist; in other words, that perception and conception are always direct and literal revelations and that there is no such thing
