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NYAYA AND JAINA EPISTEMOLOGY
a means of valid knowledge will lead to agnosticism.
ii. Conception : It is also called recognition. According to Nyāya, it is a kind of perception. While Jainas maintain that it is a unique experience produced by perception and recollection both, though it is neither of them alone. According to Nyāya, in recognition object is presented as existing at present qualified by past. Jaina view differs from that of Nyāya. According to Jainas, in recognition, we apprehend identity of an object with past and present. So its object cannot be apprehended by perception alone nor recollection alone. Jainas rightly point out that it is not a kind of perception, since it is not direct or immediate cognition. It is not recollection since it apprehends present object. It is the basis of judgements of identity, similarity, dissimilarity, etc. It is not restricted to the form of comparison of Nyāya school but is wider than that.
iii. Recollection : Nyāya definition of pramāna excludes memory as a means of valid knowledge. Jainism considers it as a valid source of knowledge, though it is a representative knowledge. It is knowledge concerning the past and Jainas are quite right when they maintain that this does not undermine its objective basis.
Extrasensory Perception
With the exception of Cārvāka and Mimāṁsā schools, all the systems of Indian philosophy admit the phenomena of extrasensory perception. Extrasensory perception has been an interesting problem in the field of para-psychology to-day.
Nyāya classifies perception into ordinary and extraordinary. In Nyāya, there are three types of extraordinary perception. Of these, three sāmānyalaksana
