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CHAPTER III
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entirely novel creation is of course an extreme view. But treating the cause as primary and the effect secondary amounts to disregarding the co-ordinate importance of change or difference. As a matter of fact a firm instance on the logic of satkāryavāda may even lead to a wholesale repudiation of difference. This is proved in the case of Advaitism'. As the philosophy of a realist the Sankhya tries to reconcile the doctrine of satkāryavāda with that of pariņāmavāda. Partiality for the former, however, so much dilutes the truth of the latter that difference' is subordinated to 'identity'. When the undivided supremacy of identity in the realm of puruşas is considered in conjunction with the primacy of identity over difference in the realm of praksti, the Sānkhya's adherence to permanence as a more primordial principle of reality becomes an undoubted proposition.
B. (i) The Bhedābheda Philosophy of Bhartsprapañca
Bhartạprapañca' is an early thinker who lived long anterior to Sankara and Sureśvara. He maintains a form of
1. As a result of treating difference as appearance, and not reality,
Advaitism has been more appropriately described as satkāranavāda. This doctrine differs from satkāryavāda in the greater degree of emphasis it lays on the cause. The distinction between the two doctrines is, therefore, one of degree rather than of kind. None of the works of the early thinker has come down to us. Reference to, and discussions of, the various aspects of his views are, however, found in some Vedāntic works which often quote expressions from his writings. A number of "Fragments of
