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CHAPTER II
55
ing the cause is compromised and becomes dependent upon other things in order to be efficient. If, on the contrary, they do not make any difference to its nature, then it is futile to plead for inoperative and ineffective (akiñcitkara) elements in a thing. Applying this logic to the instance of the seed and the plant, the Buddhist argues that the plant is not the result of the productivity of an identical seed helped by the auxiliaries of rain, etc., but is an entirely different thing. In other words, the seed in itself is different from the seed in combination with its auxiliaries and, therefore, difference is ultimate. Failure to comply with this conclusion would lead the Buddhist to say that the seed as modified by auxiliaries is opposed to its initial unmodified condition. Such opposition does violence to the law that no two opposed things are one entity. The Buddhist, therefore, would conclude that causal efficiency is the essence of the simple and unique moments each of which is totally different from the others' (trailokya-vyāvarta).
Thus we see that in Buddhism permanence (or continuity or being) is treated as a mere subjective imposition (vikalpa)
1.
The exceptions, of course, are the Vātsīputrīyas (also called the Ābhidhārmikas or Vaibhāşikas), whose partial divergence from the extreme antagonism to the substantialist view has already been touched upon (see supra, p. 19, f.n. 1) and the Mādhyamikas who treat any positive view-whether it be the substantialist view or, for that matter, the erroneous doctrine of momentariness, under their negative and destructive method of prasanga (a form of reductio ad absurdum by means of which the inherent weaknesses of the opponent's doctrine is claimed to be exposed; here one is reminded of a similar method used by Zeno and Śrīharşa).