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JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE
Vedānta and Buddhism, against the anekānta theory of reality.
The full significance, the necessity and the value of the Jaina defence, accompanied by a critical consideration of its opponents' fundamental assumptions governing their philosophical structure, can be fully appreciated only when the Jaina approach is viewed against the full background of Indian philosophy. Already a partial statement of the two principal opponent schools, viz., the Vedānta (Advaitism) and Buddhism, has been made mainly from the point of view of their criticism of the Jaina theory of reality. The identityview of Advaita is, in this context, a comparatively straightforward and unequivocal position, despite an immense range of internal developments within the framework of its adherence to this fundamental viewpoint. Hence, except for a further brief review, no elaborate treatment of this school is called for. A somewhat fuller glimpse into the basic ideas of Buddhism is necessary in view of the great impact, ranging over several centuries,' of this system, on the development of anekāntavāda. In between these two extremes of Vedānta and Buddhism, either of which leads to a lop-sided view, there are several schools which endeavour, with varying degrees of success, a compromise or a synthesis between the identity or substance view and the difference or modal view. These
1. Cf. "The principal actors on the Scene of The Indian Mediaeval
School of Indian Logic' (460 A. D.-1200 A.D.) were, as is well
known, the Jainas and the Buddhists." Vide, HIL, pp. 157-158. 2. These are characterised, in the Jaina terminology, as
dravyārthikanaya and paryāyārthikanaya, respectively.
