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14
JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE
ultimate nature of reality; another accords this status to difference; the third type treats identity-in-difference as the ultimate reality but considers identity as more primary than difference, while the fourth one adopts the converse viewpoint; and, lastly, the fifth type, represented by the Jaina view, considers identity and difference as being necessarily co-ordinate, or equal, elements in reality. Together, these types, each of which represents a basically distinctive viewpoint, give rise to a scheme of five-fold classification which will be referred to towards the end of this chapter.
Starting with an important objection made against the Jaina view of identity-in-difference by the Vedāntic and Buddhist thinkers, we shall, in the course of the present chapter, be led to a preliminary review of the basic metaphysical viewpoints of the two schools, and, eventually, to a formulation of the five-fold classification just referred to. A somewhat elaborate examination of these two schools as well as of several others—all of which come within the range of the five-fold classification-will then be attempted in the course of the following five chapters. In the course of this procedure a number of issues, connected with the development of the main problem of reality, will inevitably arise. They will also be touched upon according to their degree of relevance and importance in the present study.
Granting, for the moment, the validity of the Jaina conception of identity-in-difference, and equating this conception to that of being-cum-non-being—these and similar other equivalent concepts and epithets will be fully explained in their appropriate places, we may begin with the statement of the Vedāntic objection.