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316 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE emphasis. This view does not, however, bar the possibility of even a radical difference between the two interpretations in a certain number of situations considered under the present standpoint.
The non-distinction of the naigama standpoint is not, as just indicated, absolute. It does imply distinction but in a relative sense only. If the distinction is asserted absolutely, then arises the fallacy called naigamābhāsa, of which the Nyāya-Vaišeșika' system, which maintains an absolute distinction (atyantabhinnatva) between its categories, is an illustration.
Sangrahanaya (the class view) This standpoint concerns itself with the general' or the class character of a factual situation, unlike the naigama standpoint which includes the specific character as well. Just as naigamanaya is not hostile to the intermingled character of concrete existence, so also sangrahanaya is not repugnant to the complementary feature of viseșa which is not included in it. Sangrahanaya marks a step further from naigamanaya in that it differentiates, in its analytical process, the common character from the universal-cum-particular complex which every real is. For instance, when, pointing to a solitary tree at some distance from you, you observe to a stranger asking for direction, “turn left near the tree there", it is not relevant to
1. See PNTA, VII. 12 and the SRK thereon. See also Nayapradipa,
p. 101, and Nyāyāvatāra (P. L. Vaidya's edn.), p. 82. 2. sāmānyamātragrāhī parāmarśaḥ sangraha iti/ PNTA, VII. 13. See
also the SRK thereon, as well as TSV, p. 270, kā, 51. 3. See NKV, kā. 6.
