Comparative Study Of Jaina Theories Of Reality And Knowledge

SR No.: 022768
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Y J Padmarajaiah
Publisher: Jain Sahitya Vikas Mandal
Publication Year: 1963
Total Pages: 446
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 35 MB

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JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE
the terms themselves. Its application is unfortunately restricted to the cases of visayavişayābhāva (the subject-object relation) and višeşaņavićeşyabhāva (the substance-attribute relation, such as (a) the absent jar and 'the empty space' (bhāvābhāvayoḥ) and (b) (i) the spatial relations
ist objection that relatedness disappears, or becomes, under the circumstances, merely a'way of looking at things' (conceptualistic), is not endorsed by the Naiyāyika (in this respect the Jaina is with the Naiyāyika). The Naiyāyika never accepts the position of non-relatedness of even the 'natural property' (svabhāvadharma) of things : cf. “We have to accept it (svarūpa) as a relation because without some relation we cannot explain our sense of one thing being resident in another.” RML, p. 153.
It is a significant fact that svarūpasambandha is attributed, by the Naiyāyika, even to samavāya, although it is normally distinguished from the latter, and definitely from saryoga, as 'a third relation' (see NTN, p. 188) and is said to explain' such cases as do not come under either samāvaya or saryoga. Cf. IPC, 1927, p. 165, where Hiriyanna, while discussing the nature of samavāya, remarks that "it (samavāya) is directly connected with the relata", and then, adds, in a f.n., "This is technically described as svarūpasambandha, i. e., it is self-related not unrelated". Its self-relatedness is said to be due to the fact that it cannot, being an independent category (padārtha), abide in a dravya or a cause. The important fact to be noted, in this connection, is that eventually, even the Naiyāyika has to admit the 'nature' of things as the determining factor of at least one kind of relation. A wider scope of its applicability is not resorted to by him owing to his commitment to a radical pluralism. As for the Jaina, anything which does not have its own nature, which is the source of all relations, is to be described with Mallişeņa, as 'nissvabhāva' 'avastu', śaśavişāņa, or nothing (SM (text), p. 33). The compelling truth of nature' as the determining factor is somewhat indicated by the Naiyāyika's limited acceptance of svabhāvasambandha. Treating all relata as 'naturally' related will save the Naiyāyika from an unduly formal and hyperrealistic procedure.