Comparative Study Of Jaina Theories Of Reality And Knowledge

SR No.: 022768
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Y J Padmarajaiah
Publisher: Jain Sahitya Vikas Mandal
Publication Year: 1963
Total Pages: 446
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 35 MB

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JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE
the table. In the infinitely variegated (citra) nature of things the one, or the other, or even both, might occur at a time and any kind of rigid legislation as to their occurrence could be motivated only by an artificial logic which does not take full cognizance of the plenitude and variety of the things in nature.
There are two very important considerations to be noticed in this connection. In the first place, however closely the
"We have come to the conclusion then, that no simple substance can exist, and that every substance that exists is divided into parts, which again have other parts, and so on, to infinity...... If we are compelled to add to this, the further conclusion that no substance can, without contradiction, be divided into parts of parts to infinity, we could not escape from contradiction any way. If, on the other hand, we should find that infinite series of parts of parts would involve a contradiction unless the substances had a certain nature, we should be certain that all substances had that nature, since under no conditions could they have the infinite series of sets of parts which they do have. NEMC, Vol. I, p. 192.
Incidentally, the charge of regressus ad infinitum (anavasthā) directed by the Buddhist against the Realist (see supra, p. 222 and also f.n. 1 thereon) as resulting from an attempt to relate two 'absolutely distinct' entities, is suggestively answered by Prabhācandra, and his answer is borne out by McTaggart (NEMC, Vol. I, p. 142 ff.). The Buddhist would, indeed, be right if the relata are 'absolutely different' (atyantabhede) from each other. But, owing to the fact that they are, according to Prabhācandra, of the nature of identity and difference-which is entirely different from either view when each of them is taken singly and totally (anekāntavastuno nātyantabhedābhedam jātyantaratvāt/ PKM, p. 515)—the relation obtaining between is a unique synthesis partaking of both the elements which enter it. This consideration, combined with the fact that the relatedness of the relata is not something ab extra but is grounded in the very nature of the relata, sets at nought the accusation of the vicious infinite against the Jaina view. Cf. PKM, p. 515, and NEMc, Vol. I, ch. xxiii.