________________
188
JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE
Haribhadra, Hemacandra and Mallişeņa, have taken a strong line of criticism against this view of the Vaišeșika (kaņabhunmata). A statement of the Vaišeșika school concerning the subordination of identity to difference has already been made earlier' by pointing out the predominant importance given to the concept of viseșa or particularity by the
Vaisesika, like the Jaina, acknowledges the reality of both dravya and paryāya (guna), he treats each of them as being absolute and, therefore, as being mutually independent (annonnaniravekkha). He, therefore, resorts to ubhayavāda (dohi vi naehi niam). The two views, or nayas, which are mixed, or contained, in the ubhayavāda of the Vaišeşika, are the dravyārthikanaya (davvātthiyanaya) and paryāyārthikanaya (pajjāvätthiyanaya) each of which is severally illustrated by him in the following ga., with reference to the Kāpila (the Sānkhya) darśana and the sauddhodana (the Buddhist) darśana respectively:
jam kāvilam darisaņam eyam davvätthiyassa vattavvam / suddhoana tanaassa u parisuddho pajjavaviappo // 48 //.
STP, p. 656. Owing to their extreme (suddha or pariśuddha) or exclusive character the two nayas or doctrines, whether singly, as in the Kāpila darśana or sauddhodana darśana, or jointly, as in the Vaišeşika darśana, are called the parasamayas' or heresies. In his extensive com. on gā. 49, Abhayadeva expounds, and refutes, the most controversial problems of the Vaišeşika philosophy. The problem of ubhayavāda is, however, touched upon at the opening and the concluding parts of the com.
Hemacandra devotes to the Vaišeșika metaphysics as many as six kās. (4-9) in his AVD and a few brief but lucid passages specifically to ubhayavada in his own com. on the sūtras 30-33 in his Pramāņamimāṁsā (pp. 25, 27 and 29, PMHS). Mallişeņa, in his elaborate com. on the six kās. of AVD, especially under the kā. 5, vividly brings out, in occasional polemical passages, the critical implications of this view (SM, pp. 10 ff. (text), especially pp. 13-20). Lastly, Haribhadra makes occasional critical observations on this question in his critique on the nature of reality in his AJP, Vol. I (particularly
pp. 65-66 and 71-76). 1. See supra, pp. 107-112.