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CHAPTER IV
be an entity. If it were not so considered it would not be possible to speak of an 'infinity' of viseṣas which are further asserted to be downright perceivable facts.
115
By treating viseșa as a 'power' or 'potency' the Dvaitin seems to think that he has avoided the charge of infinite regress' to which Prasastapāda's view of viseṣa as a distinctive entity is believed to be liable. It is affirmed that "visesa (peculiar power and potency etc.) is sui generis, self-sufficient and self-explanatory".?
1. Cf. RRS, p. 512.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. HIP, Vol. IV, p. 179.
The main defensive argument advanced on behalf of the 'self-explanatory' character of viseșa is that it, like any 'ultimate category', cannot be explained, and that it, on the contrary, explains itself and 'others'. This sounds more like a dogmatic assertion than a logical argument. Further the Dvaitin seems to make capital out of the position assumed by the Advaitin, his principal opponent, on the question of avidya'. The latter is stated to consider 'avidya' as being somehow there projecting the cosmic illusion. If this could be regarded by the Advaitin to be sufficiently self-explanatory, then why not, the Dvaitin argues, treat viseṣa as such, that is, as an 'ultimate category' which is 'self-explanatory". All this seems to be rather defence of a notion which is invested with a fundamental significance in Dvaitism. Even Dasgupta, a favourable critic of Dvaitism,
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