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JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE
explanation. This stands out clearly in spite of the fact that Rāmānuja has not evolved a clear and well-grounded conception of difference in all respects. The ambiguous treatment of difference is evident when we see, for instance, that it (difference) is considered, on the one hand, as a component and therefore a genuinely real and distinct element in the complex whole (visiştaikyam) of reality, and, on the other, as something which does not touch' --for contact would mean introducing the taint of imperfection—brahman which is believed to be unchanging in nature.
It has just been noticed that, however ambiguous may be its nature, difference is definitely believed to occupy a subordinate or secondary place in relation to identity, in Rāmānuja's metaphysics. Nevertheless, we find two criticsRāju and Śrīnivāsācārya—who are inclined to take the view that for Rāmānuja difference is primary (mukhya) and identity secondary (gauņa)'. That this view (somewhat casually hinted at, and not accompanied by any serious supporting arguments), is not tenable is clear from the main drift of Rāmānuja's viewpoint. Whatever plausibility there is for an equal or co-ordinate-certainly not any superior (primary) - status of difference, derives eventually from the grammatical principle of co-ordination, or sāmānādhikaranya. There are
1. Cf. supra, p. 79, f.n. 4. 2. The New Ind. Ant., Vol. II, Nos. 1-6, 1939, p. 321, f.n. 4. See also
the same author's (Rāju's) Idealistic Thought in India, p. 154
f.n.2. sriniväsācārya's Darśanodaya, p. 194. 3. That sāmānādhikaranya signifies not merely unity but also
and co-ordinately with unity-difference is clearly pointed out
